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This study forms a unique study of South African diamond laws as developed in 
the context of the South African constitutional dispensation. This study is 
therefore a contribution to legal research and academia which forms an in depth 
consideration of international trade practices that influence the diamond industry 
which is used in this study specifically as a sample market. The diamond industry 
in South Africa provides a relatively comparatively small1
 
 but resilient source of 
economic activity through trade in diamond products as luxury items and items 
used for industrial purposes.  
It is therefore crucial that laws related to the regulation of this industry are 
comprehensively and analytically studied for the purposes of understanding 
South African national and international diamond trade regulatory framework. 
This is done with the aim of illustrating that there has been a significant shift of 
prevailing wisdom in the South African diamond trade industry. It is now evident 
that more constitutionally justifiable and internationally sound diamond trade 
practices have been adopted and applied. 
 
This study not only serves to benefit South Africa as a diamond producing 
country but it will also add required knowledge related to the international trade 
context particularly having regard to the fact that South Africa plays a significant 
role in the global economy and its diamond trading activities do not occur in a 
vacuum. Therefore the international trade aspect of this study lends it a dual 
purpose analysis of diamond regulation laws.   
 
                                                 
1 Report of Task Team Appointed by the Minister of Minerals & Energy to Analyze the Memoranda and 
Evidence Laid Before The Commission of Inquiry into the South African Diamond Industry, 20 December 
(1999). Chapter 5. This was stated in the submissions by Mr. L.A. Lincon, a director of De Beers. He stated 
that South Africa had 10% by volume of the world total of around 105 million carats. South African mines 
are no longer major producers of all desired qualities. As a result it was agreed in 1992 that rough 
diamonds destined for South African factories could be provided from the CSO’s (Central Selling 




Since this study is essentially a legal qualitative critique, it is aimed at providing 
academic insight into the policy of the law and an understanding of whether or 
not the regulations as they exist are effective. This is important in the 
understanding and possibly, further development of the legal regulatory 
framework surrounding trade in diamonds particularly. This study is also being 
carried out at a time when the global economy is in a recession and due regard 
of this global phenomenon will be taken in the body of this work. 
 
Further, this study seeks to demonstrate some of the internationally approved 
measures at diamond trade regulation which have emanated from South Africa. 
In so doing, the writer seeks to illustrate the role and part played by South Africa 
in combating the international plague of conflict diamonds through such 
mechanisms as the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme which has formed a 
powerful international legal regulatory tool in diamond trade. 
 
Focus has therefore been given to the adoption of legal methods of dealing with 
conflict diamonds and how other diamond producing countries in Africa have 
responded to the international call for combating illicit diamond trading.  Some of 
the diamond regulations of African countries considered in this work includes 
countries such as Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone. 
These countries have dealt with conflict diamonds within their countries and have 
therefore become a primary example of gross human rights violations and illicit 
diamond trading. 
 
With regard to other matters pertaining to diamond regulations of other African 
countries not necessarily based on considerations of conflict diamond, this study 
also includes the diamond laws of States such as Botswana, Tanzania and 
Nigeria. Some of these African States’ diamond laws have been considered 
briefly to give African perspective on some diamond related legal issues. The 
purpose of including those laws in this study is to provide a comparator for South 




Further, it is intended in this broader part of the study that the national and 
international diamond trade laws be considered widely from the perspectives of 
both developed and in particular developing countries in order to ensure that 
diamond laws generally are used to uplift human dignity and achieve general 
socio-economic empowerment. It is submitted that a study of equity based 
diamond laws will inspire a desire to achieve development as established by 
international benchmarks. The benchmarks referred to above include, for 
example, the use of knowledge on diamond trade laws to inspire ideas of 
development such as job creation and eradication of poverty initiatives while 
undertaking to have sustainability and conservation of the environment. These 
ideals are at the core of this study. 
 
Unfortunately conflict diamonds and illicit diamonds still continue to be a threat in 
international diamond trade through the existence of illicit markets and corrupt 
governments. These compromises clearly are a nemesis to the legal regulatory 
frameworks in place. There is hope however despite the negative cloud of 
conflict diamonds. This study will demonstrate such optimism in combating 
loopholes and weaknesses that allow the scenario of conflict diamonds to be 
generated to the detriment of existing legal and policing systems.  
 
Apart from the threat posed by conflict diamonds in the legal regulation of 
diamond trade, there is no doubt that the diamond industry and the laws 
applicable to it have drastically been altered by the new constitutional 
dispensation in South Africa. Historically South Africa was marked by a 
protection of unfair capitalism, market dominance and the legal protection of 
monopolies. Even the social sciences and political commentary on the subject in 
history makes little mention of equal access and benefit to the country’s 
resources in diamond trade, however, in this study it becomes evident that the 
law illustrates a radical change of trends in trade. One of the most evident 




trade, within the bounds of constitutional fairness and protection of free 
competition in the market. 
 
While considering the changes in the law pertaining to diamond regulation, this 
study specifically identifies the international trade nature of the diamond industry 
and consequently analyzes the regulatory systems and the law applicable to 
transactions relating to diamonds as subjects of international trade. This gives 
insight to the trade practices that influence the relationships between South 
Africa and other nations that are actively involved in trade while investigating the 
common trade principles that promote uniformity and harmony in the international 
regulation of diamond trade.  
 
There are several international instruments which have reformed international 
trade law although not all of these have been adopted or applied in much detail 
by the South African legislature and the courts in general. This study will attempt 
to discuss the effect of ratification and future accession of some of these by 
South Africa. A discussion of the regulatory systems of other jurisdictions and the 
extent to which these have adopted and dealt with the international instruments 
will be done. This is done in order to provide useful academic insight on the 
practical effects of accepting uniform rules of international trade in the South 
African legal system and more specifically the diamond industry. This aspect of 
the study is aimed at investigating, commenting and making recommendations 
on the contributions made by these international trade reformatory instruments to 
the constitutional ideals sought to be achieved during the constitutional 
dispensation of diamond trade in South Africa. 
 
This study also covers the role of relevant trade and other unions in the diamond 
industry. The role of Unions within the context of South African diamond trade is 
extremely crucial as these pressure groups are an important socio economic tool 
in the country. An investigation into their endeavors will be done, including their 




purpose will be to present them as a dynamic force in the industry that has 
contributed to the sustainability of the diamond industry in South Africa by 
reflecting the voice of the mine workers.  
 
This illustration is based on the argument illustrated in the metaphor that a palm 
is limited and of little use without its healthy fingers. Therefore the diamond 
industry needs the contributions not only of the State and commercial entities, 
but also needs the contribution of the diamond work force as duly represented by 
trade unions that are relevant to diamond trade. 
 
In conclusion this study is intended to provide insight and knowledge on some of 
the purely practical commercial legal aspects involved in diamond trade 
regulation. The crucial commercial activities involved will be investigated both in 
the domestic and international context. The investigation will also extend to other 
connected issues incidentally important and involved in domestic and 
international diamond trade regulation such as transportation and insurance 
aspects, international contracts and agency predominant in diamond trading.  
 
It is intended in this study that a thorough investigation and analysis of these and 
other aspects of the diamond industry from a legal perspective will add to current 
knowledge and academic appreciation of diamond trade legal regulation as 
applied in the South African context. The whole study will be considered 
specifically in light of the constitutional values and objectives which have 
significantly altered the practical, figurative and commercial change in the 
landscape of diamond practices and law. Further, this work is intended to 
contribute to the elimination of the academic knowledge gap concerning one of 






The methodology employed in this study for the purposes of achieving the goals 
as set out in the abstract and hypothesis of this study can be expiscated as 
follows. The study has based its primary structure by looking at the applicable 
history and development of national diamond trade laws an eventual influence of 
international trade law on South Africa’s diamond industry. There is an extensive 
review of legal literature in the form of statutes, case law, international model 
laws and uniform customs, relevant legal academic submissions and other 
international instruments that have been used to inform what has occurred in the 
national and international diamond trade context covering historical periods, to 
formulate a yardstick to measure diamond law development in order to focus 
primarily on modern times as intended in the study in the most descriptive 
manner. 
 
The conterminous part of the deliberation of this study contains a review of South 
African diamond legislation coupled with international trade laws as found in the 
various international instruments which are then comparatively analyzed against 
South African diamond trade practices.  What this study has done is to relate 
such developments directly to the diamond industry in a qualitative manner while 
using the diamond industry as a sample market or guinea pig market for testing 
the international trade law developments that have occurred in South Africa. 
Further, there is a crucial reflection of the prodigious changes in South African 
diamond laws as a result of the constitutional dispensation.  
 
This reflection was further enhanced with a review of legal regulatory frameworks 
of other major diamond producing or dealing countries in order to complete the 
global diamond trade picture while referring to some important constitutional 
values related to the diamond trade context. Some of the countries’ diamond 
laws or international trade in diamond law that are considered in this study reflect 




market competition themes which are important to inform global economic 
concerns for all industries and markets and in the case of this study, diamond 
markets. 
 
For practical commercial legal aspects of this study, there has also been an 
important or core analysis of the intertwisted relationships between the South 
African State and other commercial entities within South African international 
diamond trade. The methodology illustrated above includes an informal or 
unstructured interviewing process with members of the legal departments of one 
of the flagship South African diamond producers, the De Beers Group (De 
Beers). During the unstructured interview process, documents from the legal 
team of De Beers Marine (Pty) Ltd who are based in the offshore diamond mining 
area in the Western Cape, Cape Town volunteered much helpful diamond mining 
literature, all of which is available in the public domain.2
 
 
It can be stated that in this study legal literature and other academic reviews, 
various interviews and observations have been used to provide practical insight 
into the diamond trade industry in South Africa. These methods have been 
adopted to map out in this study the role of the more competitive or successful 
and world-famous South African and internationally acclaimed diamond trading 
company, the De Beers Group.  
 
De Beers has had significant role in participating with South African law as well 
as international law. It is therefore prudent that De Beers and its notable 
participation in South African diamond trade and law is captured in this study 
particularly in view of the fact that most academic literature on De Beers and 
diamond trade in general is outdated and does not reflect the latest 
constitutionally based approach to South African diamond trade. This practical 
approach is also further highlighted in the investigation of core commercial 
                                                 





contracts of diamond trade and the role of various stakeholders who ensure the 
successful legal compliance of the South African diamond industry. 
 
For a contextual analysis, resources from the United Nations Commission for 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), International Institute for the Unification of 
Private Law (UNIDROIT) as well as ratification documents have been extensively 
reviewed from the International Trade Law Journals and UNCITRAL updates. 
These instruments have also been used as part of an international diamond 
market international trade support structure test as developed during the course 
of this study because it became apparent during the course of this study that a 
global recession was taking place and affecting international trade relations in the 
most challenging way particularly trade in diamonds as industrial or luxury items.  
 
The information given in this study is largely descriptive in nature containing 
extensive and relevant literature reviews. The unstructured interviews mentioned 
in this methodology with the employees of De Beers have also been used to 
inform this study in order to have a clear view of the legal perceptions from within 
the company which is also important to the understanding of how the legal 
reforms have affected the manner in which De Beers see themselves as a 
powerful diamond trading group within the South African commercial structures 
and economy.  
 
At this stage it is also important to acknowledge in a special way the team of De 
Beers’ legal personnel who were involved in the preparation of papers pertaining 
to their contribution and participation in general South Africa law. Further, the 
voluntary and helpful participation of De Beers in this study is acknowledged and 
various documents, licences, commercial and environmental reports created by 
De Beers in line with legislation have been incorporated to formulate views and 





The deeply descriptive and international or foreign law comparative nature of the 
study is aimed at extending the broad knowledge base of South African diamond 
regulation laws in light of the national and international trade context while 
enhancing the importance of the diamond industry and the efforts of the State to 
create a balanced view of positive participation of the citizens in the country’s 
resources. The submissions given herein are intended to mark the dawn of 
constitutionalism and its contribution to the enhancement of the economy of 






This study without being ignorant or insensitive about the atrocities that have 
previously been associated with diamond trade is written from a reconciliatory 
perspective. This is done in an attempt to establish an awareness of the positive 
aspects of South African diamond trade legal developments as part of an 
acknowledgment that trade in diamonds must be done in a just and fair manner 
having respect for human dignity.  
 
The hypothesis underlying the inception and conception of this study is premised 
on the idea that South Africa is a diamond producing country whose diamond 
laws have been significantly altered by the dawning of the democratic 
constitutional dispensation. While the history of the diamond industry is captured 
greatly in academic literature, there are no legal works that have captured these 
significant changes in light of the diamond laws which form a significant portion of 
South Africa’s economy. Therefore it became necessary that an analytical study 
be prepared and presented to uniquely contribute to the knowledge of law in 
these aspects. This is the critical focus of this study. 
 
This study chronologically considers South African diamond laws which in the 
past were based on the protection of the dominating minority. Recent times 
however have seen the influence of the new constitutional democracy on the 
recently developed diamond laws. These progressive and current diamond laws 
have actively sought to promote the ideals of equal opportunities, the right to 
participate freely in economic activities and equitable access of all to natural 
resources and socio-economic justice to previously undermined groups in the 
diamond industry.   
 
The development outlined above has directly led to the elimination of unjust 
economic relations and an inequitable economic system designed to enrich one 




has been put in place and diamond trade regulation and this example of 
equitable economic activity must be well analyzed for the purposes of further 
development. On the other hand domestic regulation of diamond trade has been 
buttressed by the international regulatory systems based on international 
instruments. The two systems, national law and international law have been 
combined in diamond trade to combat illicit diamond trading that negatively 
impact on diamond trading both to national and the global economy at large. This 
is an ongoing challenge that this study is going to consider specifically. 
 
As recently as 8 February 2009, a report in the Sierra Leonean Sunday 3 Star Ed 
contained a documentary on illicit diamond trading. The report refers to an 
orphan scourging the jungle for precious stones in order to survive. The concern 
in the report was that the orphaned child earned from the meager proceeds of 
precious stones scouring, barely enough to survive even though he is supplying 
a multi-billion dollar industry. 
 
The report above was about illicit diamonds trade, the fact that remains is that 
the right to life of people such as the orphan above is endangered by unregulated 
or poorly regulated diamond trade in an effort to survive. This is a scenario that 
the international campaign for clean diamond trade needs to constantly deal with. 
This study acknowledges that international diamond trade when properly 
regulated internally through domestic legislation and externally through 
international law is able to encourage global development. This development 
includes the development of poor communities of developing States and this can 
lead to the achievement of international development objectives such as the 
United Nations 2015 Millennium Development Goals (MDG) under the initiatives 




                                                 




The diamond industry has been earmarked for its relevance to the achievement 
of the MDG stated above. It has been identified by the international community 
through the 8 MDG, that diamond trade can be used as a vehicle of 
empowerment rather than total destruction which has been the sad state of 
certain diamond producing developing States. The MDG, are specifically listed as 
the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger, achievement of universal primary 
education, promotion of gender equality and empowerment of women, reduction 
of child mortality, improvement of maternal health, combating HIV/AIDS, malaria 
and other diseases, ensuring environmental sustainability and the development 
of global partnership for development.4
 
 It is submitted that this study will create 
awareness of the positive role both nationally and internationally that equitable 
diamond trade can provide to the general upliftment of the human quality of life.  
This study also seeks to highlight the South African and international legal 
endeavors to eradicate any other form of unjust or illicit diamond trade. It is 
submitted that this study will encourage more development of cogent national 
and international rules for the promotion of legitimate diamond trade as this is 
part of respecting the South African constitution5
 
 which is the highest law of the 
land. Further, this study is intended to contribute to the knowledge and 
development of South African law for the purposes of achieving the practicality of 
benefiting all citizens of the South African Republic as desired in the national law 
and policies. 
This study is strictly a legal analysis and to that extent, it will not delve into other 
related albeit painful issues of diamond trade for instance, the narration of 
historical injustices caused by multinational companies. These have been 
captured in other works for instance in the writings of authors such as Luvhengo 
in his Multinational Corporations and Human Rights Violations in Africa Conflict 
                                                 
4 Ibid. 




Zones: The Case Study of Angola 1992 – 20056 and United States v Diamond 
Centre, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 1952)7 and a rather racially biased case of Queen v 
Keast8
 
 in South Africa, for example. These historical cases are important to 
South African development as they ensure that past mistakes of humanity are 
acknowledged and recorded in history so that such mistakes are not repeated.  
This study will also not delve further deliberate on the pain of the ‘resource curse’ 
but it is intended to be a study that makes a contribution to diamond laws from a 
reconciliatory perspective in other words a perspective illustrating the more 
humanitarian developments of national and international diamond laws since the 
civilized global community have already by action acknowledged the wrongful 
methods of handling diamond resources and now as civilized nations the 
international community is working together to engage in diamond trade that 
respects human rights. 
 
It is submitted with respect that often legal regulations are usually a response to 
an anomaly or anomalies in the relations among people or the State and its 
people. While it is submitted that diamond trade has in the past been associated 
with grievous human rights violations and probably continues to do so in the 
black markets, what this study intends to do is highlight the significant legal 
changes in diamond laws aimed at diminishing these anomalies without re-
opening the wounds of the past. This is the study of the legal development 
contribution sought to be achieved in this instance albeit in the context of 
diamond trade. 
 
Further, diamond trade regulation is an area of international concern and 
therefore leading nations are expected to take an explicit role in publicly 
condemning human rights violations that have tainted diamond trade in some 
                                                 
6Luvhengo Victor Multinational Corporations and Human Rights Violations in Africa Conflict Zones: The 
Case Study of Angola 1992 – 2005. A research report to the Department of International Relations, Master 
of Arts, University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. 
7 This was a case dealing with the dehumanization of Jewish Diamond Merchants during the holocaust. 




African countries. Most of these nations have acknowledged the human rights 
violations related to illicit diamond trading. This in itself is a positive contribution 
in international efforts to combat the illicit trade of diamonds and ensure the trade 
is done within legitimate limits and to the benefit of poor or perhaps developing 
States and the global economy at large. 
 
In this study South African efforts are commended in that despite the country’s 
unfortunate history of racial segregation and discrimination, it has managed to 
allow legislative changes which have created a new equity based diamond trade 
environment. This new diamond trade environment has allowed South Africa to 
conduct its current diamond trade within the newly established limits of equitable 
access to diamond resources while promoting international eradication of conflict 
diamonds.  
 
Efforts to make equitable diamond trade possible in South Africa under the new 
diamond laws is shown in the fact that South Africa has participated in allowing 
affirmative action measures in the diamond sector and South Africa has also 
engaged with the international community in the formulation and setting up of the 
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) which is an endeavor designed 
to keep conflict diamonds out of legitimate trade. By virtue of the name of the 
process, as Kimberley is a famous diamond mining town in South Africa, it can 
be said that South Africa has taken ownership of the process. 
 
Further, this study is essential to the understanding of an economic sector that 
has many commercial facets to it. If knowledge of such activities is kept hidden 
the economy will not develop because the citizens of the country will not know 
how to actively participate in various bodies and sectors of the industry that keep 
it a resilient market. It is submitted that through the contribution of studies of this 
nature to the South African diamond industry, such knowledge of diamond 
trading law will lead to further development as various conclusions and 





In light of the view that knowledge is power as reiterated throughout this study, it 
is submitted that further clarity of the diamond laws and the entities tasked with 
enforcing such laws in elucidated. There are various national bodies related to 
the industry, some are even affiliated with powerful international trading interests. 
Some of these bodies deal with various crucial aspects of the diamond industry, 
for example, associations for valuators, associations for beneficiators, jewellery 
associations, certification associations, industrial diamond associations, unions 
and State departments that regulate and implement the established diamond 
laws. This study will contribute in the enhancement of legal knowledge of those 
diamond related bodies as well. 
 
It is proposed that without the knowledge of these institutions and their role in the 
diamond trading, there is virtually minimal contribution or benefit that ordinary 
persons will benefit from the industry. This would be an irony when considering 
that diamond industry related constitutional values require that the resources be 
regulated for the benefit of the people of the Republic. Therefore, in this 
contribution it is believed that through this study, those who manage to 
internalize the writings of this study whether as ordinary mine workers or top 
controllers of the industry, all will be able to take the developed principles of fair 
and humanitarian based diamond commerce and become participants (from an 
individual basis) in making the diamond industry in South Africa become even 
more successful even in economically turbulent times by adhering to the fair 
principles now contained in the rule of law. 
 
It is further proposed that this study will be important in exposing important 
diamond institutions and their interests in the diamond industry so that it can be 
determined whether successful and productive constitutional equitable access 
has been created for all including those belonging to targeted groups in South 
Africa. This knowledge and understanding of the interaction between the 




international trade aspects will provide insight into the socio-economic 
development of the country and the economic emancipation of its poor 
population groups using the country’s diamond resources. 
 
Finally and most importantly this study will also highlight some of the critical 
challenges that have been or may be potentially created by attempting to use 
limited diamond resources as a vehicle for broad based economic empowerment. 
In light of principles established by the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996, the principles of fair capitalism and international anti-competitive 
laws, the changes in diamond laws that have occurred in the constitutional era 
will be carefully analyzed in order to enhance knowledge and provide a unique 





ADB - Antwerp Diamond Bank 
AGS - American Gem Society  
ANC - African National Congress 
AU - African Union 
BAPCPA - Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 11 USC 
1501 
CEEC - Centre d’Evaluation, d’Expertise et de Certification des Substances 
Minérales Précieuses et Semi-précieuses 
CEO - Chief Executive Officer 
CISG - United Nations Convention on Sale of Goods, 1980 
COMESA - Common Market for East and Southern African States 
COMI - Center of Main Interest 
CPI - Consumer Price Index 
CPIX - Consumer Price Index excluding interest rates on mortgage bonds 
DBCM - De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd 
DBM - De Beers Marine (Pty) Ltd 
DDA - Doha Development Agenda 
DDC – (New York) Diamond Dealer’s Club 
DDII - Diamond Development Initiative International 
DEEC - South African Diamond Exchange and Export Centre 
DMA - Diamond Merchants Association of Southern Africa 
DME - Department of Minerals and Energy 
DRC – Democratic Republic of the Congo, capital city Kinshasa 
DTC - De Beers Diamond Trading Company London 
DTCB - De Beers Diamond Trading Company Botswana  
DTCSA - De Beers Diamond Trading Company South Africa  
DTI - The Department of Trade and Industry 
ECOWAS - Economic Community for West African States 
EEA Agreement - Agreement on the European Economic Area 




EIA - Environmental Impact Assessment 
EMS - Environmental Management System 
EU - European Union 
FOB - Free on Board ICC Incoterms 2000 
GAO - US Government Accountability Office 
GATT - General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
GDP - Gross Domestic Product 
GDV - Government Diamond Valuator  
GFC - global financial crisis 
GRI - Global Reporting Initiative G3 Sustainability Reporting Guidelines 
IAPs - interested and affected parties 
ICAO - International Civil Aviation Organization 
ICC – International Chamber of Commerce 
IDB – illegal (illicit) diamond buying 
IDEX - International Diamond Exchange 
IFAW - Fund for Animal Welfare 
INSOL - International Association of Insolvency Practitioners 
ITAC - International Trade Administration Commission 
JASA - Jewellers Association of South Africa 
JCSA – Jewellery Council of South Africa 
JMASA - Jewellery Manufacturers Association of South Africa 
KPCS - Kimberley Process Certification Scheme 
LCs - letters of credit 
LIEO - Liberal International Economic Order 
MARPOL - International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution From Ships 
(MARPOL) 1973/78 as amended 
MDG - Millennium Development Goals 
MLCBI - UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency 
MPRDA - Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 
NAFTA - North American Free Trade Area 




NDTC - De Beers Diamond Trading Company Namibia  
NEMA - National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 
NGO – non-governmental organization 
NIEO - New International Economic Order 
ODA - Official Development Assistance 
OFAC - Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (US)  
OHADA - Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa 
ONESKY – A Canadian based environmental and human rights driven NGO 
OPEC - Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
PC - Participation Committee 
RBC - Royal Bank of Canada 
SACU - Southern African Customs Union 
SADC - Southern African Development Community 
SADC - Southern African Development Community 
SADPMR - South African Diamond and Precious Metals Regulator 
SADPMR - South African Diamond and Precious Metals Regulator 
SAPS – South African Police Service 
SARS - South African Revenue Service 
SASA - South African Sea Areas 
SAWIMA - South African Women in Mining Association 
SCOPA - Standing Committee on Public Accounts 
SDT - State Diamond Trader 
SGS - Société Genérale de Surveillance 
STCs - standard trading conditions 
TAC - Total Allowable Catch 
TDCA - Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement  
TURP - Trade Union Research Project 
UAE - United Arab Emirates 
UCC - Uniform Commercial Code 
UN - United Nations 




UNCTAD - United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
UNGA - United Nations General Assembly  
UNIDROIT - United Nations Organization for the Unification of Private Law  
UNSC - United Nations Security Council 
UNSC - United Nations Security Council 
UCP - Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits 
URS - United Registrar of Systems Ltd 
US – United States 
WGAAP - Working Group of Alluvial and Artisanal Producers  
WGDE - Working Group of Diamond Experts 
WGM - Working Group on Monitoring  
WGS - Working Group on Statistics  





Beneficiation - Means the polishing of a diamond or the setting of a diamond in a 
tool, in an article or in jewellery.9




Recession - In economic terms, a period of declining output for more that two 
successive quarters of a year.
 
11
Sector - major economic activities e.g. mining, manufacturing.
 
12
                                                 
9 Section 1 of Diamonds Act 56 of 1986. 
 
10 Ibid.  
11 Union Research Project (TURP) A User’s Guide to the South African Economy (1994) 22. 
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Chapter 1: The Development of South African Diamond Laws 
 
1.1 Introduction 
In this study of South African diamond trade regulation1, the period of 1994 to 
date,2 is important as a first port of call to consider the inception3 of the 
development of these regulations. The development of law applicable to the 
diamond industry in South Africa owes its existence to a vast number of factors 
such as the developments of the legally regulated national and international 
markets,4 availability of transport5 and the advancement of financial systems.6
 
 
The list above is not exhaustive however it does provide clarity on the direction 
as to where to begin when tracing the roots and development of what the 
national community has accepted to be South African diamond trade regulations. 
This study aims to analytically emphasize and provide academic insight on the 
systems of law regulating diamond trade in South Africa from the early 
developments of diamond laws up to the present Constitutional dispensation. 
                                                 
1 Such regulation took form in the development of the Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 and other diamond related 
statutes such as Diamonds Amendment Act 10 of 1991, Diamonds Amendment Act 22 of 1989, Diamonds 
Amendment Act 28 of 1988, Diamonds Amendment Act 29 of 2005, Diamonds Second Amendment Act 
30 of 2005, Diamond Export Levy (Administration) Act 14 of 2007. These laws will form the foundation of 
this study. 
2 This is the period in which the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1993 (the Interim 
Constitution), now repealed was applicable to the Republic of South Africa. The Interim Constitution was 
developed and promulgated as the final Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. The date of the 
commencement of the final Constitution was 4 February 1997 and is a milestone in South African 
democracy. 
3 In other words, the study will briefly introduce and consider the economic impact of the discovery of 
diamonds which led to the development of laws that are applicable in the Constitutional dispensation. 
4 The purchase of diamonds is going to be considered in light of the trade regulations under the Diamonds 
Act 56 of 1986 and other laws that are applicable in such transactions. 
5 This includes for example the availability of air carriage, for example, which is often used in international 
diamond trade. Such air carriage is regulated under various aviation laws in the Republic of South Africa 
such as the Carriage by Air Act 17 of 1946, Civil Aviation Offences Act 10 of 1972, Civil Aviation 
Authority Act 40 of 1998, Civil Aviation Act 13 of 2009 (the commencement date of this Act has not been 
announced). 
6 Financial systems within the Republic of South Africa together with those observed by the international 
community have an influence of diamond trade as will emerge from this study. These systems are also 
regulated in national law as well as international law in order to support international and national diamond 
trade with respect being given to harmonization and comity among nations. These practices will be 
considered under laws such as, for example, the Bills of Exchange Act 34 of 1964, The Cross-Border 
Insolvency Act 42 of 2000 and other international instruments such as the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Cross-Border Insolvency. 
 2 
This study forms a crucial work in light of the fact that diamond trade forms a vital 
cog in the economy of mineral rich States such as South Africa.7
 
 It is submitted 
that while the focus of this study is primarily aimed at an in-depth consideration of 
diamond regulations in the Constitutional dispensation, it is important to have an 
understanding of the background of the influences that have resulted in the latest 
developments of South African diamond laws. 
In order to place this study within the relevant trade context, it is important to 
consider the contribution of South African diamond trade to the GDP of the 
Republic of South Africa. 2007 was the year in which South Africa was 
celebrating its 140th anniversary since the discovery of Eureka diamond in 1867.8 
To date South Africa is still a leading producer of diamonds.9 The contribution of 
the diamond industry to the South African GDP to date is one per cent which is 
relatively small. However South Africa remains a significant producer with 




By way of introduction, this chapter will consider the economic history of South 
Africa in light of diamond trade and the manner in which it has affected the 
development of laws regulating diamond trade. This chapter will make reference 
to certain Constitutional aspects of South African trade. Further, this chapter will 
                                                 
7 Diamond trade largely contributes to the South African GDP, although there has been a decline of this 
contribution in comparison with the early eighties. Linda Ensor Business Day (South Africa) October 13 
2005. 
8 www.dme.org.za 21 march 2010.  Report R61/2007 section 2 ‘South African Diamond Heritage.’ 
9http://www.sadpmr.co.za/UploadedFiles/f503137dc3f34871b416f540062629b0.pdf 25 March 2010, 
section 19 of report ‘South Africa exported a total of 10 023 302 carats of unpolished diamonds valued at 
about $1.42 billion in the twelve months of 2008. The bulk of South Africa’s exports were to the European 
Community (includes United Kingdom and Belgium). The average $/carat price of exports at about 
$140/carat was marginally higher relative to 2007. It should be noted that exports include higher quality 
goods re-exported by diamond cutters and dealers and thus the average $/carat value of exports are not a 
reflection of the average $/carat value of South Africa’s mine production.’ 
10 www.dme.org.za 21 march 2010.  Report R61/2007. 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0441/P04413rdQuarter2007.pdf 25 March 2010. 
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discuss the legal framework11
 
 that forms positive law that has been established 
by the South African Legislature to support and create a balance in accessing 
economic involvement in national diamonds for the benefit of all the citizens of 
the Republic of South Africa. 
It must be noted that the Constitutional references made in this work are not the 
only focus but the umbrella supreme law under which diamond trade laws have 
been developed in the 20th century South Africa. Therefore Constitutional 
debates have been restricted to aspects pertaining to trade and the development 
of diamond laws. Further, important attention to relevant aspects of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act,12
 
 hereinafter referred to as the 
Constitution, will be discussed in this chapter insofar as the Constitution relates 
to the legal framework that has influenced the regulation of the currently 
overhauled laws governing the diamond industry in South Africa. 
This chapter is not going to deliberate extensively on the political history of South 
Africa. Notwithstanding that political history in South Africa has affected 
international trade in diamonds previously, however, this study will be a tool that 
places emphasis on the commercial legal history and economic considerations of 
the diamond trade industry that have most influenced the development of the 
applicable law. Further, a consideration of the actual business of diamond trade, 
specifically looking at aspects of international commerce such as international 
sales and all ancillary aspects of such commercial activity within the diamond 
trade law will be included as part of the overall theme of the study and this 
chapter. The parameters of this study have been outlined at the outset in order to 
create clarity concerning the legal debates to be considered. 
 
                                                 
11 The Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 and the MPRDA 28 of 2002 are some of the main examples of positive 
law created to provide for the practical achievement of the Constitutional goals in supporting more access 
to economic activity in the diamond mining and trade sector. 
12 108 of 1996. 
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Presently South Africa’s economy comprises of the following economic sectors,∗ 
mining and quarrying, manufacturing and agriculture, finance, retail/wholesale, 
government, transport, electricity/gas/water, construction, social services and 
other sectors that do not fit into the categories defined above.13
 
 These sectors 
are responsible for the Gross Domestic Product of South Africa (GDP) an 
indicator of the size of an economy. It is the study of the laws regulating one of 
these sectors, i.e. diamond trade, that will show how South Africa has developed 
in order to participate more equitably in international markets. The 
Constitutionally based trading methods of South African law will be important in 
attracting international trading partners to South Africa, particularly in light of the 
2008 and 2009 recession which has affected the global community. 
Unfortunately the historical attributes of the South African economy show that it is 
an economy largely built on inequality as a result of the apartheid regime which 
left a large section of the population unable to participate positively in the 
economy. As a result, severe imbalances were and are still evident in the 
provision of social services and economic activity. However, this work will reveal 
the extent to which the South African economy and participation in international 
trade has been developed and ameliorated by current legislation based on 
equity, focusing particularly on the diamond industry. 
 
With an understanding of the overview and themes of the aims of this chapter, it 
is important to note that this chapter will highlight some of the economic, 
environmental and socio-political factors that have influenced the development of 
diamond regulation laws. As a result there will be a demonstration of the manner 
in which South African diamond legal regulation has proved to be a model 
legislative framework for other diamond trading States across the continent, while 
illustrating South Africa’s active role in the world-wide effort to curb illicit and 
                                                 
∗ See definitions at end of this work.  
13 Trade Union Research Project (TURP) A User’s Guide to the South African Economy (1994) 11, 25. 
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conflict diamond trading which have proved cancerous to the socio-political 
stability of many diamond producing African countries. 
 
1.2 The Economy of South Africa 
Presently South Africa has one of the most sophisticated economies in the 
continent of Africa. However, it is an economy with the highest levels of 
inequality.14
 
 This means that there is a wide gap between the rich and the poor. 
While it is true that some of the South African trade systems and legal codes are 
sophisticated, it is unfortunately an economy marred by extreme poverty for 
millions. It has been said that there are parts of South Africa which represent the 
first world while it only takes a short drive to see a vast spread of a world that is 
in abject poverty. 
In the last fifteen years, the democratically elected Government has attempted to 
correct the economic inequality in South Africa by investing large resources into 
improving the quality of life for all South Africans. The areas of focus in improving 
the quality of life include basic infrastructure, housing, electricity,15
 
 water and 
sanitation, health, telecommunications and the improvement of other social 
services. The success of these government efforts lies in the creation and 
application of effective law. The diamond industry forms an important part of this 
economy both from the perspective of attracting national revenue as well as 
forming a fairly sustainable industry to benefit the country. It is important 
therefore that laws pertaining to this industry had to be amended to address the 
inequalities even in the access of the diamond resources of South Africa. 
 
 
                                                 
14 Trade Union Research Project (TURP) A User’s Guide to the South African Economy (1994) 17. 
15 In 2007 and 2008 South Africa experienced an energy crisis with the available power stations unable to 
keep up with the demands for electricity in the country. At that time the President assured the South 
African public that experts would be appointed to manage and investigate the situation. In 2009 the energy 
crisis seems to have been managed in a more efficient manner with less electricity blackouts, however, 
energy concerns will always be a concern that links directly with the ability of the economy to thrive. 
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1.3 The Mineral Roots of the South African Economy: Gold and Diamond 
Trade 
1.3.1 Earlier Legal Developments in Diamond Regulations 
In order to trace the economic history of South Africa, it is important to consider 
the history of a sector that has the most influence on the South African 
international trade involvement. That is the mining sector, in particular, the mining 
of gold and diamonds. The mining industry sustains South African economy and 
is the most influential in international trade patterns, laws and development. 
  
In 1886, the Main Reef of the Witwatersrand was discovered triggering a great 
gold-rush that gave birth to mining.16
 
 Not only did South Africa have large 
deposits of gold, it also had large deposits of diamonds which transformed the 
economic history of South Africa. The transformation resulted in sophisticated 
economic activity but this development came with challenges such as power 
struggles and racism. This is not uncommon in any society where a hunger for 
power and dominance exists. 
The men who initially transformed the diamond mining industry in the 1870s were 
David Harris, Cecil John Rhodes, C.D. Rudd, F. Stow, J.B. Robinson, B.I. 
Barnato, Woolf Joel, Anton Dunkelsbuhler, J. Wernher, L. Breitmeyer, F. Baring-
Gould, Max Michaelis and Sigmund Neumann.17
 
 They achieved their goals by 
replacing the independent diggers which led to a significant transformation of the 
South African economy. This legacy was continued by Paul Kruger and the 
Oppenheimers. 
The decision to replace the independent diggers was marked by the rising of the 
minority ruling class. This class was essentially a capitalist group assisted by the 
apartheid government to succeed at excluding other race groups from 
participating more meaningfully in gold and diamond mining. This history is 
                                                 
16 Wheatcroft Geoffrey The Randlords: The Men Who Made South Africa (1985) 2. 
17 Wheatcroft Geoffrey The Randlords: The Men Who Made South Africa (1985) 41. 
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captured in the records of South Africa as follows ‘the process begins in the 
1870s. In 1872 the white 'diggers' democracy' on the diamond fields was able to 
force the colonial government to restrict prospecting and mining rights to whites 
only. These laws had the effect of declaring all indigenous blacks ineligible for 
any form of control or ownership over the nascent industrial economy. Any white 
fortune seeker, no matter what part of the world he came from, could aspire to 
own and share in the mineral wealth of South Africa; but not an indigenous black. 




With the reality of diamond trade patterns based on racism illustrated above, 
some of the consequences of its implementation resulted in the white miners 
obtaining vast training and development in prospecting and mining skills. This 
means that only the white miners had the required mining tools as well as the 
mining knowledge which they would have had years to develop. For the black 
miners, they could not grow into any position of influence as mining entities 
because of the exclusionary laws. The consequence of this unfairness in the past 
oppressive diamond laws is that it created a general legal perception that the 
indigenous black is an underclass miner and the only time he or she is in 




The endeavors of the mining giants although skewed by racism resulted in the 
rise of De Beers as a monopoly of diamonds.20
                                                 
18 
 At a later stage a marriage 
www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/ruling.html 27 October 2009. See also references given by other authors 
on the same subject Lenin, V.I. A Great Beginning, Collected Works, Volume 29 (Moscow) 421; Marx and 
Engels, The German Ideology, (Moscow), 82. These writings are also a useful tool in illustrating the 
manner in which capitalist ideals were welcomed into South Africa from Britain, however, these ideals 
were particularly inhumane in South African history because at the core of them was the racist element. 
Therefore it became apparent that the effects of the South African economy would be that one racial group 
would inevitably be enriched at the expense of another. 
19 Ibid. 
20 D. Innes Anglo American and The Rise of Modern South Africa (1984) 21. It must be noted, however, 
that in light of modern diamond law in South Africa and the international law on anti-competitive behavior, 
De Beers are not a monopoly in South Africa as previously perceived. This change in the perception of De 
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between gold and diamond mining was seen in South Africa when De Beers was 
absorbed by Anglo American.21 The Anglo American group of companies is best 
defined as ‘a major force in the economic, political and social life of South 
Africa’.22
 
 Since this contribution is mainly concerned with diamond laws, a further 
study of the De Beers group as a flagship of diamond trade in South Africa will be 
considered in light of further contributions to the developments in law in this 
study. The racist diamond laws of the past have also been eradicated from South 
African law and the dignity of the indigenous black diamond sector participant 
has also been restored in diamond laws and the Constitutional values, all these 
will be studied in greater detail in the subsequent chapters. 
The contribution made by pioneer mining giants in the South African economy 
came about with the support of protective diamond mining and trading laws. The 
diamond legislative framework protected the interests of the pioneers from 
internal and external threats whilst simultaneously ensuring that the diamond 
industry remains competitive and profitable in the global arena. The success of 
diamond mining and trading in South Africa could not have achieved the 
objectives it boasts today without political stability and relative calm in the 
country. The notorious compliment to the painful case of ‘blood diamonds’ is 
political instability evidenced by armed civil strife as observed in countries rich 
with so-called blood diamonds.23
 
 
It is important at this stage to provide insight on the nature of the South African 
diamond regulation framework while making comparisons with the diamond 
regulation systems of other diamond producing countries. This is in order to show 
that internal control mechanisms without international control systems are 
insufficient in the prevention of the proliferation of international ‘blood 
                                                                                                                                                 
Beers is part of the Constitutional values that have influenced modern South African diamond laws. 
21 D. Innes Anglo American and The Rise of Modern South Africa (1984) 97. 
22 D. Innes Anglo American and The Rise of Modern South Africa (1984) 13. 




 This chapter will consider the strategies created nationally and 
internationally in order to deal effectively with the “conflict diamond” plague by 
enhancing the development of the diamond legislative framework. However, 
before these legal strategies are considered it is important to first look at the 
broad legal framework surrounding diamond trade by having regard to the legal 
issues raised in the history of such trade. 
International trade in gold and diamonds in South Africa started with a common 
trend for most developing countries. This trend is marked by the exportation of 
products mostly as raw materials.25
 
 This meant that the revenue which could 
have been generated by selling a beneficiated final product is left to the country 
that has the skills to achieve such beneficiation and not the country with the raw 
material. In South Africa the exportation of raw materials resulted in the initial 
legal developments which would protect trade in these raw materials.  
The early laws were thus concerned with the protection of the legal interests of 
those involved within the gold and diamond trade industry as producers of the 
raw material. Historically this meant that local industrial and technological 
conditions were suitable mainly for production of the raw material. The earliest 
diamond trading laws were therefore intended to regulate diamond production 
and sale.  These came after the 1900s in the form of the Diamond Control Act26 
substantially amended by the Transvaal Precious and Base Metals Act, 
Amendment Act.27 Thereafter the Diamond Act28  was followed by the Diamond 
Export Duty Act,29 the Diamond Export Duty Amendment Act30
                                                 
24 Also commonly referred to as ‘conflict diamonds.’ In this study the term conflict diamonds will be used 
as formal reference to such diamonds. 
 and the Precious 
25 Trade Union Research Project (TURP) A User’s Guide to the South African Economy (1994) 34. This 
trend which may possibly lead to the producing country’s impoverishment and lack of skills has been dealt 
with in modern diamond regulations through State supported investment in local beneficiation of diamonds 
for example. 
26 35 of 1908. 
27 18 of 1913. 
28 39 of 1925. 
29 16 of 1957. 




 These laws are now obsolete in light of the latest developments in 
diamond laws but they did serve an important regulatory function in the early 
days and serve as a useful historic tool for the study of the nature of the South 
African diamond industry. 
The main attribute of these pieces of legislation was the over-reliance on the 
criminal sanction to enforce compliance and deter unlawful conduct in the gold 
and diamond trade.  This was a common trend in the laws of the nationalist 
government of the time. The criminal features of the legislation revolved around 
the licensing and permit mechanisms. The regulatory and administrative bodies 
and institutions in these statutes had formal authorizations and functions with a 
criminal tone attached to it which promoted discriminatory policies that continued 
to exclude certain groups from participating meaningfully in the industry. 
 
The diamond laws of the earlier diamond trade era related to the power of 
granting permissions with a complementary power to withdraw the right or attach 
certain conditions to the right. The draconian element evident in earlier diamond 
laws was the presumption of guilt when a person is found in possession of an 
unpolished diamond. Even the Diamonds Act32
 
 prior to the amendments was 
riddled with a criminal tone and presumption of guilt. 
The command and control approach significantly contributed to controlling 
smuggling and proliferation of a parallel diamond trading market in South Africa. 
The legislative regulatory framework was stringent and laden with criminal 
penalties. This approach was not without deterrent benefits to the industry 
because it made it difficult for criminals to compromise the system by exploiting 
loopholes and fuelling illicit diamond trading.  
 
                                                 
31 73 of 1964. 
32 56 of 1986. 
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It is clear when tracing earlier developments of South African diamond trade laws 
the Constitutional principles were not considered imperative ass in the case of 
the post-apartheid South African diamond laws. The unfortunate disadvantage of 
the diamond legal framework at that time is that the law was designed to protect 
only pioneer minority established interests and did not encourage or promote 
access into the diamond mining and trading industry by other participants. 
Despite the fact that issues of environmental sustainability had already taken 
centre stage, for example, by 1986 the world had made huge strides in 
endeavors to protect the global environment, the South Africa Legislature was 
lagging behind with a consistent obsession to keep the country divided by unfair 
discrimination. 
 
Various global conventions in the environmental sphere had been passed. These 
include the 1972 Stockholm Declaration and the 1982 World Charter on Nature 
and the Brutland Commission which sold the concept of sustainable 
development.  However in South Africa no attempt was made to incorporate 
relevant principles such as sustainable development, precautionary principle, 
intergenerational equity, social justice among others into the regulatory laws on 
environment and the mining industry. Notwithstanding, modern diamond trade 
legislation, as will be shown during the course of this study has dealt with all 
these issues to deal with the inequity of past laws. 
 
The earlier unjust or inequitable laws gave rise to the application of diamond 
trade laws that were teeming with criminal suspicion with very little consideration 
of social justice. The application of criminally based diamond laws was evident in 
case law. Some of the earlier examples of laws protecting illegal trade in gold 
and diamonds were captured in an array of cases such as the case of Rex v 
Lipshitz.33 This was a criminal case dealing with the now repealed Acts34
                                                 
33 1921 AD 282. 
 which 
34 Section 106 (1) Act 35 of 1908 as amended by a repealed Act 18 of 1913. 
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made it a criminal offence to be in possession of unlawfully and wrongfully 
obtained unwrought gold. 
 
The fact that a person had to prove a right of possession (thereby his or her 
innocence) when found in possession implies that an accused was presumed 
guilty till he proved his or her innocence. This scenario violates the presumption 
of innocence that is cherished by modern democratic and Constitutional legal 
systems.35 This should not be surprising considering that during the colonial and 




In Rex v Broodryk37 the Appellate Division dealt with the now repealed Diamond 
Trade Act.38 Section 2 of the Diamond Trade Act39
 
 proved to be one of the main 
statutory controls for illegal diamond trade in the developing South African mining 
industry.  It provided that: 
 ‘It shall be unlawful for any person except as in this Act 
excepted, to have in his possession any rough or uncut 
diamond; and any such person as aforesaid who shall be 
found in possession of any rough or uncut diamond and 
shall be unable to account satisfactorily for, or prove his 
right to, the possession of such rough or uncut diamond, or 
to produce his proper permit for the same in accordance 
with the provisions of this Act, shall on conviction be liable 
to certain penalties.’ 
                                                 
35 See Rex v Broodryk 1932 AD 131 where section 2 of the Diamond Trade Act 48 of 1882 was applied to 
convict a person. The accused was not asked to give an account of how he came to be in possession of the 
uncut diamonds. 
36 See De Waal J. et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (2000) 3 ed 369-378. The authors comment that 
apartheid legal order was based on the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty as opposed to Constitutional 
supremacy. The apartheid legislature could therefore make laws it wished and no persons or institutions, 
including the courts could challenge the laws for want of substantive Constitutionality. 
37 1932 AD 131. 
38 48 of 1882. 
39 48 of 1882. 
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The accused in this case was found in possession of certain carpenter’s tools 
with diamonds concealed in them. At the time of the arrest no demand for an 
account was made and in any case at a later stage the accused was not able to 
give account.40 It was common cause that the accused was employed as an 
assistant fitter in the machine shop on the State alluvial diggings at Alexander 
Bay. In terms of the contract of service, the accused was not permitted to leave 
camp without being searched and X-rayed.41
 
 
The accused was subsequently granted three months sick leave. Upon leaving 
the premises to commence his leave it was found that there were certain tools he 
had which had not been examined thoroughly. The accused was searched and 
escorted to the gate while the tools remained with the detectives for further 
investigation. The tools were eventually broken apart and inside them were found 
a total of 176 diamonds. The accused at that stage had left Alexander Bay but 
was arrested thereafter. The accused was charged and convicted of 
contravening section 2 of the Diamond Trade Act.42
 
 
On appeal Counsel for the accused argued that possession of the diamonds in 
terms of the Diamond Trade Act43 had not been proved by the crown. The court 
rejected that contention on the basis that it created an absurdity in law where it 
would mean that there is no offence for a person, who is not exempted under the 
section, to have in his possession a rough or uncut diamond, but that it only 
becomes an offence when he is found out.44
 
 The appeal was dismissed. 
The cases above demonstrate the expeditious development of laws and 
technological advances developed to protect gold and diamond trade in its early 
stages in South Africa. This is a natural reaction to the discovery of a valuable 
                                                 
40 132. 
41 133. 
42 48 of 1882. 134 – 135. 
43 48 of 1882. 
44 136. 
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economic resource. One may not dwell too much on the jurisprudential aspects 
of theories revolving around law being there to protect those in power, as is 
evident in any capitalist society. The fact of the matter is that without an effective 
legal system an economy cannot function optimally. 
 
These early stages of development in diamond trade laws of South Africa, 
though based on discrimination, gave the country its sophisticated legal nature 
where the advancements proved that as a country South Africa is able to interact 
with the rest of the civilized world particularly as South African diamonds and 
gold were in high demand by international trading partners and the colonial 
masters. In the case of Rex v Fourie and Another,45 the two accused in this case 
were charged and convicted of stealing a box containing a quantity of gold bullion 
belonging to the Standard Bank of South Africa. At the time of theft the gold 




The stolen gold bullion was not recovered and was therefore not available as 
evidence at the trial because the two accused had agreed to dispose of it in order 
to gain personal advantage. In light of these illegal actions by the two accused, 
they were charged with wrongfully, unlawfully and corruptly defeating the ends of 
justice.47 The matter revolved around section 105 of the Precious and Base 
Metals Act,48 now repealed, which provided that ‘no person shall buy, sell, deal 
in, receive or dispose of by way of barter, pledge or otherwise, either as principal 
or agent, any unwrought precious metal.’49
                                                 
45 1937 AD 31. 
 Once again the court of appeal found 
that the accused were correctly charged and convicted of the crimes of illegal 
dealings in precious metals. These cases and past statutes are a reflection of 
diamond and precious metals regulations as existing prior to 1994 and the history 
of these laws is crucial to the understanding of modern diamond laws. 
46 36. 
47 Ibid. 





1.4 Diamond Trade and the Impact of Constitutional Values 
1.4.1 Modern Legislative Controls of South African Diamond Trade 
Having recognized the economic injustice of South Africa’s discriminatory past, 
the democratically elected government of National Unity undertook to bring about 
a more equitable economic system based on Constitutional values.50 There is no 
doubt that these Constitutional values are based on human rights and equity 
considerations supported by the international community.51 South Africa’s past 
apartheid policies had to fail not only from a human rights perspective but from 
an economic perspective as well since the international community had called for 
economic sanctions against South Africa condemning its apartheid policies.52
 
 It is 
only natural to perceive that South African diamond trading activities, like any 
other economic sector, would be compromised by such sanctions and therefore 
the removal of apartheid policies had to take place so that it would allow for 
economic empowerment for the whole country. 
Cawood, in his paper acknowledging the paradigm shift in South Africa’s mineral 
policy makes the point that it was the inauguration of the 1994 political 
dispensation in South Africa that initiated a shift in ownership, management and 
development of the country’s affluent mineral heritage. It is further submitted in 
his paper that it was the spirit of reconciliation, negotiation, globalization and a 
holistic view of sustainable development in the mineral resources that 




                                                 
50 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996. 
51 See colloquiums on apartheid held by the United 
Nations:http://www.un.org/av/photo/subjects/apartheid.htm 14 January 2008. 
52 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apartheid#Sanctions 17 January 2006. 
53 Cawood F.T. The Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act of 2002: A Paradigm Shift in the 
Mineral Policy in South Africa The Journal of the South African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy 
Jan/Feb (2004) 53. 
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It is important to note that the writings of Cawood agree most closely with the 
theme of this study. Cawood acknowledges that South African mineral policies 
and precious resources management were altered by a paradigm shift. He states 
that in South Africa there was a clear shift from a governing system of inequity to 
equity. One wonders if there would have been an eventual evolvement of 
equitable or inclusive management of the country’s resources had there been no 
move toward Constitutional values? This question must be answered realistically 
particularly in light of the fact that it is very difficult to ask those who benefit from 
inequity to give up their share of the benefit or power. On the other hand one is 
tempted to have faith in the human ability to care for fellow human beings 
particularly when oppression is at the core of another’s wealth gain.  
 
It is clear that there would not have been a natural evolvement of resource 
management norms in the country without a nationwide awakening to the 
realization that all forms of government that seeks to benefit only a few of its 
citizens while excluding others on the basis of unfair discrimination is evil. 
Constitutional values expressly established that unfair discrimination no longer 
has a place in a civilized South African society particularly where such a society 
is mineral rich and seeks to benefit itself in entirety through the management of 
those resources. It is clearly with disdain that South Africa looks at the past 
discriminatory anomalies and seeks to move positively forward in the 
Constitutional dispensation. 
 
It has become evident from Cawood that apart from a national shift into a 
consciousness of Constitutional values, South African diamond laws would have 
remained in the state of perpetually benefiting a smaller controlling minority. 
Hence, without the Constitutional values there would have been lesser national 
effort being given to international efforts to make diamond trade more humane, 
as South African trade would have been excluded as a result of sanctions from 
other trading partners who were opposed to apartheid policies.  Therefore one is 
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able to see from the developments in law the extent of the gravity of the impact of 
Constitutional values on the diamond industry in South Africa. 
 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act,54
 
 as a whole is important to 
all areas of law relating to South Africa. However it is at this juncture important to 
highlight select Constitutional provisions that are of particular importance to the 
South African diamond industry. The study of the Constitutional impact on South 
African diamond laws must be limited to relevant Constitutional imperatives 
which have affected South African diamond trading and mineral policies in 
general as these will allow for clarity in the direction of providing an analysis of 
the proposed diamond industry. Further, the study of the Constitution itself is a 
vast area which cannot possibly be looked at as a whole and therefore it is 
prudent that the limits of its consideration in this study are mentioned at the 
outset. 
Chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 contains what 
one can term the central provisions that ensure equity in diamond laws. This 
chapter contains the Bill of Rights which is the corner stone of South African 
democracy aimed at protecting values of human dignity, equality and freedom.55
 
 
The protection of human dignity and freedom is essential to diamond trade in that 
there can no longer be a class of persons who are unfairly excluded from 
participating freely in the economy in various mineral sectors. 
With these values in mind, economic rights are protected expressly in the Bill of 
Rights in sections 22 and 23 respectively.56
                                                 
54 108 of 1996. 
 These provisions encompass the 
new anti-apartheid economic strategies and have created a platform which 
55 Chapter 2 section 7(1). 
56‘ 22     Freedom of trade, occupation and profession  
Every citizen has the right to choose their trade, occupation or profession freely. The practice of a trade, 
occupation or profession may be regulated by law.  
23     Labour relations  
(1) Everyone has the right to fair labour practices.’ 
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allows all the citizens of the Republic to have the freedoms necessary to 
participate freely in sectors such as the diamond industry. 
 
Section 8 and 9 of Chapter 2 of the Bill of Rights captures an important aspect of 
Constitutional economic fairness by expressly providing for the horizontal and 
vertical application of the rights as well as expressly providing that all persons 
are equal before the law and are entitled to equal protection from the law. It is 
submitted that section 9 allows for the economic activity ground to be level by 
expressly providing that equality before the law includes the ‘full and equal 
enjoyment of all rights and freedoms’. This provision forms positive law that 
allows for the advancement of persons systematically excluded by virtue of a 
discriminatory past through the employment of affirmative action procedures. 
Affirmative action is intended to allow such previously disadvantaged persons an 
opportunity to participate meaningfully in the country’s economy in all sectors 
including the diamond trade sector.57
 
 
With regard to the formulation of trade unions, which are bodies or associations 
that are often active in the diamond trading and mining in general, the 
Constitution provides expressly for the rights of forming such bodies.58 It is 
submitted that it is through the Constitutional protection of this right to form trade 
unions that economic activity in diamond trade is further regulated by allowing for 
fair collective bargaining and if necessary allowing workers to have platforms 
from which they can participate with employer’s activities and voice grievances in 
their work places in a fair and open manner59
 
 without resorting to violence or 
unlawful activity. 
                                                 
57 Section 9(2). 
58 Chapter 2, Bill of Rights Section 23(2), (3), (4), (5) and (6). 
59 Section 17, which provides for ‘Assembly, demonstration picket and petition.’ The section provides that 
‘Everyone has the right, peacefully and unarmed, to assemble, to demonstrate, to picket and to present 
petitions.’ It is submitted that this right protects the employer and the workers particularly when unions 
seek to exercise this right in order to actively participate in collective bargaining. 
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A further relevant diamond industry related provision in the Bill of Rights is 
captured in the form of section 2460
 
 of Chapter 2 of the Constitution. This is a 
provision related to the right to a safe environment. The Constitutional mandate 
to protect the environment while seeking to ‘secure ecologically sustainable 
development and the use of natural resources while promoting justifiable 
economic and social development.’ This provision clearly speaks volumes to the 
diamond mining and trade sectors as diamond mining or mining in general has 
the most impact on the environment. An example of environmental impact can be 
seen by all in the large hole in the diamond mining town of Kimberley in South 
Africa.  
A mining activity involves a great deal of waste production and therefore 
environmental rehabilitation and ultimately conservation must guide every mining 
project in terms of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act.61
 
 This 
provision is important in guarding against environmental degradation during 
mining operations while ensuring that the environmental rights of persons 
involved within such industries are protected.  
It is also an important provision in the regulation of economic participation in the 
country’s natural resources by establishing a guiding principle that all such 
economic activity must be done in a justifiable economically sustainable manner 
for purposes of social development. This means that all mining operations must 
adhere to these Constitutional principles to make sure that the persons involved 
in such a sector are able to benefit from the country’s natural resources. This 
sustainable use of the environment is in line with some of the international 
                                                 
60 ‘24 Environment 
Everyone has the right- 
(a) to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being; and 
(i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation; 
(ii) promote conservation; and 
(iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while promoting 
justifiable economic and social development.’ 
61 108 of 1996. 
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strategies for socio-economic empowerment such as the United Nations 2015 
Millennium Development Goals (MDG). 
 
If one considerers specifically goal seven of the UN 2015 MDG which provides 
for the protection of environmental sustainability, mining is acknowledged to be a 
serious environmental threat as a general rule. It has been reported by the 
United Nations that Artisanal diamond mining has stripped thousands of square 
miles of African topsoil without rehabilitation or replacement. Therefore it is part 
of the UN goals to focus their attention on the promotion of sustainable mining 
practices and the rehabilitation of exhausted diamond fields so that the flora and 
fauna may be restored to such areas.62
 
 
In terms of enabling mining law for the purposes of section 24 of the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa Act63 the Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act64
 
 (MPRDA) is particularly helpful and will be discussed in more 
detail as the study progresses. It is however important at this stage to mention 
that the practice in seeking to conserve and rehabilitate the environment after a 
mining activity is made possible by section 38(1)(d) specifically where it is 
provided that a holder of a reconnaissance permission, prospecting right, mining 
right, mining permit or retention permit must as far as practicable rehabilitate the 
environment affected by the mining activity. 
To further support the practical environmental rehabilitation requirement in 
mining law, section 41 of the MPRDA provides for a financial provision for the 
remediation of the environment. The section provides as follows: 
 
(1) An applicant for a prospecting right, mining right or 
mining permit must, before the Minister approves the 
environmental management plan or environmental 
                                                 
62 www.ddiglobal.org 20 October 2009. 
63 108 of 1996. 
64 28 of 2002. 
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management programme in terms of section 39 (4), make 
the prescribed financial provision for the rehabilitation or 
management of negative environmental impacts.  
 
    (2) If the holder of a prospecting right, mining right or 
mining permit fails to rehabilitate or manage, or is unable to 
undertake such rehabilitation or to manage any negative 
impact on the environment, the Minister may, upon written 
notice to such holder, use all or part of the financial 
provision contemplated in subsection (1) to rehabilitate or 
manage the negative environmental impact in question.  
 
    (3) The holder of a prospecting right, mining right or 
mining permit must annually assess his or her 
environmental liability and increase his or her financial 
provision to the satisfaction of the Minister.  
 
    (4) If the Minister is not satisfied with the assessment and 
financial provision contemplated in this section, the Minister 
may appoint an independent assessor to conduct the 
assessment and determine the financial provision.  
 
    (5) The requirement to maintain and retain the financial 
provision remains in force until the Minister issues a 
certificate in terms of section 43 to such holder, but the 
Minister may retain such portion of the financial provision as 
may be required to rehabilitate the closed mining or 




In practice the Department of Minerals and Energy (DME) Regional Office 
personnel65
 
 uses certain guidelines to calculate the quantum payable in terms of 
section 41 above. The calculation of quantum depends on many factors which 
are all influenced by the level of risk to the environment. What is interesting is 
that the amounts reflected in the guidelines have been actuarially determined 
and reflect a minimum of ZAR 10 000.00 and a maximum of ZAR 80 000.00. It 
has been reported that generally the department usually requires amounts in the 
region of ZAR 38 000.00. This financial guarantee illustrates the seriousness of 
the Legislature in ensuring that Constitutional provisions are carried out. 
The only problem with implementation in practice of this very ideal 
environmentally considerate and Constitutionally sound Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Development Act (MPRDA)66
 
 law is that while it does not cost great 
amounts of finance to rehabilitate the environment, companies or mining 
interests who do not have financial liquidity at the inception of the mining project 
do not have a chance to get a foot in the door to commence mining activities, that 
is a potential barrier to empowerment.  
It is therefore important that the Department of Minerals and Energy (DME) 
considers each application according to individual merits of the proposed mining 
activity particularly where the ventures are financially feasible in the long run for 
purposes of using mining as a vehicle for empowerment. On the other hand there 
may be a dissenting view which realistically accepts that perhaps those who do 
not have access to required funds to undertake sustainable mining should leave 
it in the hands of those who do but what does that mean when looking at the 
                                                 
65 The Minister of Justice has the authority  
http://www.bullion.org.za/Departments/Environment/Downloads/Guideline%20Document%20for%20the%
20Evaluation%20of%20the%20Quantum.pdf 20 February 2009. Guidelines Document for the Evaluation 
of the Quantum of Closure Related Financial Provision Provided By a Mine Report No: 5863-5900-2-P 
Rev 1.5 Department of Minerals and Energy, Department of Minerals and Energy, Private Bag X 59, 
Pretoria, 0001. 
 Section B of report provides for a manual to be used for calculating the quantum. 
 
66 28 of 2002. 
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Constitutional goal of broad based socio-economic empowerment? It is 
interesting how the South African government attempts to handle this impasse. 
The short answer to that question is that even the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa Act,67 acknowledges that all development must take place within 
available resources.68
 
 However it is submitted that funding initiatives from foreign 
investors may be beneficial in developmental mining projects. 
With regard to safety of the mining environment, admittedly mining by its nature 
is a serious risk to those working down in the mines however it is equally 
expected that such environments are kept as safe as possible through the 
observation of various legislative safety codes in order to protect both the 
workers and the environment. South Africa has generally had impeccable 
foresight in that it has historically used sensible mining practices with a few 
serious exceptions in asbestos mining, for example. Good mining practices have 
been further enhanced by the Constitutional mandate to promote conservation 
and environmental safety in modern day South Africa therefore it is rare that its 
diamond mines have been hazardous and media reports have often reported 
mining deaths occurring through illegal mining rather than lawful mining generally 
speaking. However, on the whole it is quite clear that environmental safety is 
priority in South African diamond mining. 
 
It is submitted further, that sections 32 and 33 of the Bill of Rights69
                                                 
67 108 of 1996. 
 respectively 
are crucial to the protection of an equitable diamond industry. It is evident in the 
country’s diamond laws that information pertaining to diamond trade and 
beneficiation is held and controlled by the State for the purposes of regulating the 
industry must be made freely available to allow persons to exercise their rights in 
an appropriate manner. There must be a transparency with regard to information 
68 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 section 25 (5). The state must take 
reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to foster conditions which enable 
citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis. 
69 These are sections that provide for the right to access to information as provided for in terms of  the 
Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 as well as the right to just administrative action.  
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on administrative actions aimed at regulating the diamond industry. This includes 
information for example pertaining to the granting of mineral prospecting rights 
and other licenses necessary for the effective controlling of the Republic’s 
mineral resources and precious resources.  
 
The Constitutional provisions flagged above in terms of section 32 and 3370
 
 
illustrate that actions of the State bodies in regulating the diamond industry must 
be fair and just otherwise such actions would be subject to a review process in 
law. This study will investigate some of the examples of such State activity in the 
regulation of South Africa’s diamond trade. This exercise will be done in order to 
measure the effectiveness and impact of Constitutionally protected fair 
administrative action on diamond economic activity in the modern era. 
One of the most important contributions on legal development of national law 
under Constitutional values relates to the encouragement of the consideration of 
foreign law and international law when interpreting the provisions of the Bill of 
Rights. This is provided for specifically in the form of the section 39 reflected 
below. This means that there is a Constitutional imperative on every court to 
have sensitivity to international efforts that uphold Constitutional values and 
ensure that such values are taken into account when applying national law. This 
provision is of particular relevance to diamond regulations as a general rule 
because of the Constitutional dispensation. This section is important to 
international trade aspects of diamond regulations as such regulations generally 
fall within the realm of international law. Throughout this study, the relationship 
between national law, international law and the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa Act71
 
 is most clearly established. 
39     Interpretation of Bill of Rights  
                                                 
70 This must be done in line with statutes such as the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 and 
Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000. 
71 108 of 1996. 
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(1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or 
forum-  
(a)     must promote the values that underlie an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom;  
        (b)     must consider international law; and  
       (c)     may consider foreign law.  
 
(2) When interpreting any legislation, and when developing 
the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or 
forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill 
of Rights.  
 
The Constitutional mandate to enforce fair administrative action in essence 
means that Chapter 8 and 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
Act72
 
 are relevant to upholding Constitutional values in a broad and general 
sense. Therefore the Constitution permits the desirable formulation of a 
protective and governing State umbrella in South Africa in all sectors of economic 
activity through courts which administer justice in every industry as well as the 
establishment of State institutions which are there to protect the South African 
people from any potential threats against their Constitutional democracy. 
A further important Constitutional provision which has impacted the revised 
shape of South African diamond laws is encapsulated in section 35 of the Bill of 
Rights chapter. In a more particular manner section 35(3)(h) provides that ‘every 
accused person has a right to be presumed innocent.’ As previously noted in the 
earlier parts of this study under the heading discussing the earlier developments 
in diamond regulations73
                                                 
72 108 of 1996. 
 in South Africa it became evident that past diamond 
regulation laws being zealous of enforcing the criminalization to the extreme of all 
73 Parts 1.3.1 of this study. 
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potential threats to the diamond trade industry, almost all past legislation had a 
much heavier criminal undertone to it.  
 
This is shown in the presumption of guilt for the possession of unpolished 
diamond. In the Constitutional dispensation diamond laws have been structured 
in such a way that crimes related to diamond possession are treated with much 
respect to the provisions contained in section 35 of the Constitution therefore 
accused persons are able to defend their cases in diamond related matters in a 
more equitable manner. The Diamonds Act,74 as amended, contains prohibited 
actions insofar as criminal activity is concerned so that all accused persons 




When one contrasts the cases decided in the previous dispensation prior to the 
effects of section 35 of Bill of Rights, cases such as that of Rex v Fourie and 
Another76 and Rex v Broodryk77
 
 as examples quoted earlier in this chapter. It 
becomes apparent that if the accused persons in these cases had been 
presumed innocent until proven guilty, the courts would have had to afford them 
the opportunity to prove that they were not to be branded as diamond criminals 
on possession alone. With the presumption of guilt being strongly based on 
possession alone, this also meant that the crown had a much simpler task in 
proving its case to secure convictions based on possession alone. This approach 
had a general inequity in the law in that proving one’s innocence in possession 
cases was almost impossible. This is problematic in cases where persons are 
factually innocent and illicit diamonds have been planted on them without their 
knowledge. 
                                                 
74 56 of 1986. 
75 56 of 1986. 
76 1937 AD 31. 
77 1932 AD 131. 
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It is the above Constitutional provisions that have prompted significant change in 
the regulation of the diamond industry in South Africa. This understanding of the 
present diamond trade laws shows the extent to which South Africa has been 
influenced in its diamond trade timeline. This periodical study of diamond 
regulations provides a mirror into which the South African society can look for the 
sake of understanding its own image on issues of fair diamond economic activity 
so that necessary changes can be made where it is apt. 
 
Apart from the earlier decisions and laws demonstrating the court’s response to 
illegal dealings in unwrought gold and other precious metals there are newly 
reported cases and new statutes which have been developed by Legislature to 
combat such crimes and the general regulation of laws pertaining to the 
Republic’s diamond resources.  
 
This study will at this point make a survey of these latest developments in 
diamond regulations in order to gain a full understanding of the current legal 
framework on diamond regulation laws. Although the legal framework has been 
updated or developed generally, modern precedent still illustrates that the same 
old threat of illicit diamond trade in diamond and precious metals continues to 
exist. This criminal element that threatens diamond trade will be considered in 
more detail in the latter parts of this study however at present it is important to 
look at the trends that have impacted on the development of the most current 
legal framework.  
 
By way of introduction, it is important at this stage to consider very briefly a few 
court cases selected because of the time periods they represent in order to have 
an understanding of the natural progression of the changes in more modern 
diamond regulations. The source of modern developments of diamond trade 
regulations can be traced to earlier decisions such as that of S v Seseane.78
                                                 
78 2000 (2) SACR 225 (O). 
 In 
this case the court considered whether or not there was a contravention of 
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section 143(3) of the Mining Rights Act,79 now repealed, which was one of the 
more modern pieces of legislation that regulate mineral rights in South Africa. 
This repealed Act made it an offence for certain persons to be in possession of 
unwrought gold.80
The Mining Rights Act
  
81 is a law that typically resembled some of the earlier 
diamond laws applicable to dealings in gold and diamond trade (or other precious 
metals) in South Africa. In this case the appellant had been charged and 
convicted of contravening section 143(3) of the Mining Rights Act82
 
  in the court a 
quo. 
On appeal however it was established by the court that there was no proof that 
the appellant had physical control over the gold, therefore the conviction had to 
be set aside. From this decision one can clearly determine that the theme held by 
                                                 
79 20 of 1967. 
80 The insert of the section of the law is added herein order to illustrate the earlier sources of modern 
legislation. There is in fact a fair amount of similarity in the earlier law when compared with the modern 
law. Section 143 of the Mining Rights Act 20 of 1967 in casu provided as follows ‘143   Prohibitions 
relating to dealing in or possession of unwrought precious metal. 
    (1) Save as is otherwise provided in this Act, no person shall buy, sell, deal in, receive or dispose of by 
way of barter, pledge or otherwise, either as principal or as agent, any unwrought precious metal, unless-  
       (a)     he is the holder of a recovery works licence and concludes the transaction in accordance with the 
terms of his licence; or  
        (b)     he is a banker within the Republic; or  
       (c)     such unwrought precious metal has been won by him or his servants acting on his behalf from land on 
which he is lawfully entitled to prospect or mine for precious metals; or  
        (d)     he has obtained a certificate from the mining commissioner authorizing him to be in possession or to 
dispose of such unwrought precious metal; or  
[Para. (d) amended by s. 47 of Act 86 of 1981 and substituted by s. 1 (a) of Act 73 of 1988.]  
        (e)     such unwrought precious metal is required for scientific purposes or in connection with any trade, 
industry or profession, and the person in possession thereof, not being a jeweller, has purchased such 
unwrought precious metal under the authority of and in accordance with a permit issued by the 
Commissioner of the South African Police or any person designated by him.  
    (2) No certificate contemplated in subsection (1) (d) shall be issued to any person except in consultation 
with the Commissioner of the South African Police or a person designated by him.  
    (3) No person shall have in his possession any unwrought precious metal unless-  
        (a)     he is a person exempted under subsection (1); or  
        (b)     he holds a jeweller's permit; or  
        (c)     he is in possession of such metal in fulfillment of a contract of service with any such exempted 
person or holder of a jeweller's permit; or  
        (d)     he has come into possession of such metal in a lawful manner.’  
81 20 of 1967. 
82 20 of 1967. 
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earlier decisions and this particular repealed Mining Rights Act83 had not 
dramatically changed. If a person was proved to have been in possession of 
unwrought gold, it would be a crime if it not justified in terms of the law. This is 
essentially a theme evident in the earlier legal developments controlling the 
mining industry. It is therefore safe to argue that by the 1960s, diamond laws 
although developed to an extent some of the Constitutional values were still not 
laboriously prioritized in such laws in direct contrast to modern and currently 
active diamond law.84 However, the Mining Rights Act85
 
 considered in light of the 
case very briefly above does provide a historical legislative study of the laws that 
originated to create the more Constitutionally sound modern diamond regulation 
laws. 
On the question of police informers and traps set to catch illegal dealers in 
precious metals, S v Desai86
 
 is a useful decision in determining the attitude of the 
courts in such situations as well as an opportunity to study the legislative 
movements. Further, this matter is one decided in the Constitutional 
dispensation, therefore, it is a case that forms a fine example of the move from 
the repealed diamond law to the application of new diamond law under the 
Constitutional regime. 
This case serves to mark the default reaction of the law to the common threat of 
theft87 and illicit trading88
                                                 
83 20 of 1967. 
 of precious metals in the mining industry generally. This 
84 This is evident in that for example section 143 of the repealed Mineral Rights Act 20 of 1967, had a 
heavy leaning on the presumption of guilt for possession of unwrought gold and other precious metals, a 
position which has been dealt with to a great extent by section 35 of the Constitution which upholds to a 
great extent presumption of innocence until guilt is proven. 
85 20 of 1967. 
86 1997 (1) SACR 38 (W). 
87 Queen v Klaas (1893-1895) 7 HCG 245, 246. S v Gauss v Mukete; S v Petrus; S v Teodor 1980 ( 3 ) SA 
770 (SWA) 771, 772  In this case the four appellants had, in separate cases, been convicted by a magistrate 
of theft of diamonds. National Union of Mineworkers v De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd (1997) 18 ILJ 
1442 (CCMA) 1455 F. It was stated in this case that diamond theft the mine threatens its profitability and 
ultimately its existence. 
88 National Director of Public Prosecutions v Naidoo and Others 2006 (2) SACR 403 (T) 415F, 416 G., S v 
Mkonto 2001 (1) SACR (C) 591 E, S v Hove S v Shumba 1979 (4) SA 648 (ZRA) 649 F where the court 
held that the law in question intended to deal with the mischief of illicit diamond trading. Incorporated Law 
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criminal threat is the common ground which unites industries and law makers as 
they seek to protect the integrity of the precious metal sought to be protected. In 
fact one may be so robust as to even suggest that all sources of modern 
diamond laws are based on the removal of this particular mischief. The case 
serves as an important chronological link illustrating a progression from the 
recently repealed more modern mining regulations and how these were applied 
in the earlier stages of the Constitutional dispensation. 
 
The facts of the case show that the appellant had purchased unwrought gold in 
contravention of the now repealed Mining Rights Act.89 In his defence the 
appellant admitted to purchasing unwrought gold but raised the defence of 
entrapment. The facts of the case show that an informer had given information to 
the police that the appellant wanted to buy unwrought gold.90
 
 
Police inspector Kemp acting as the ‘trap’ afforded the appellant an opportunity 
to purchase the gold. The appellant had met the inspector and enquired about 
the quantity and quality of gold to be supplied. The appellant having satisfied 
himself that he was buying unwrought gold paid the agreed amount and took 
possession of the gold.91 The appellant was subsequently arrested and charged 
and convicted for contravention of the Mining Rights Act.92
 
  
On appeal, counsel for the appellant argued that the appellant was not guilty 
because the defence of entrapment was available which resulted in the absence 
of ‘illegality’. The court rejected this contention on the basis that by his own 
admission the appellant had knowledge that he was doing something illegal and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Society v Harris 1932 OPD 20 p 23, Cape Law Society v Du Plessis 1932 CPD 119 p 120, S v Thomas and 
Another [1988] 4 All SA 220 (NC) see judgment where the court held that a fine for illicit diamond buying 
was appropriate in the circumstances. Nusca v Da Ponte and Others [1994] 4 All SA 417 (BG), par. A 
factual background. Income Tax Case NO 1683 62 SATC 406 p 408, 409 where the amount of money to be 
taxed was a reward for information leading to the arrest of one involved in illicit diamond trading. 
89 20 of 1967. 
90 40 D. 
91 40 E – G. 
92 20 of 1967. 
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had made the choice not to resist temptation. Therefore any conscious deviation 
from the law is illegal and should be punished. Further this law had to apply 
successfully in this case because laws that are not seen to operate or whose 
operation depends on relative opinions of prosecutors or the idiosyncrasies of 
judicial officers would fall into disrepute. The court stated that in South African 
law there was no recognition of entrapment being a defence.93
 
 
For a more precise precedent on the modern developments and the most current 
laws regulating diamond and other precious metals trade, the case of National 
Director of Public Prosecutions v Naidoo and Others94 is most significant and 
deserves to be highlighted on the regulation of precious minerals. This case 
demonstrates the manner in which the modern statutory regulations regarding 
trading in unwrought precious metals in South Africa as then stated by the courts 
included the Mining Rights Act95 which had some sections of it at that stage 
being repealed by the Minerals Act96 (an Act subsequently repealed by section 
110 of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act) or MPRDA.97
 
 
These changes and developments in law demonstrate that dynamic legislative 
controls that have been adopted by Legislature in an effort to seek the 
achievement of the most internationally sound methods of trade in gold and 
diamonds. The classic scenario in the development of laws pertaining to trade in 
precious metals seems to be marked with a presence of new law against old 
problems that have always faced the industry and therefore it is common to find 
more judgments that relate to criminal activities that have long haunted the 
industry. 
 
The main pieces of legislation constituting the diamond trading legal regulation 
framework highlighted above can be summed up and listed as being the 
                                                 
93 41 B – F. 
94 2006 (2) SACR 403. 
95 20 of 1967. Repealed. 
96 50 of 1991. 
97 28 of 2002. 
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Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act,98 the MPRDA,99 the Diamonds 
Act100 as amended and the Diamond Export Levy (Administration) Act.101 It is 
important to note that the Diamond Export Levy (Administration) Act102 contains a 
Schedule of amendment of laws table which summarily shows the significant 
amendments the main diamond laws.103
 
 These modern diamond related laws will 
be considered in greater depth throughout this study. 
The Diamond Export Levy (Administration) Act104
 
 contains the following 
amendments, section 1 definition of unpolished diamond, section 60 relating to 
the export and import of unpolished diamonds, section 61A registration of 
unpolished diamonds for import, section 44 temporary exemption from Diamond 
Exchange and Export Centre (DEEC), section65A examination and valuation of 
unpolished diamonds for import, section67 deals with a fine in case of difference 
in values,section69B deals with the release of unpolished diamonds for import.   
The Diamonds Amendment Act105 as amended by the Diamond Export Levy 
(Administration) Act106 by virtue of the repeal of section 66 and 68 of the 
Diamonds Act.107
 
 The Diamonds Second Amendment Act 30 of 2005 is amended 
by the insertion of section 74 in the form of section 74A dealing with relief for 
certificated purchases. These latest amendments must be borne in mind when 
interpreting the modern South African diamond laws as they are designed to 
ensure equal economic participation for all citizens. 
                                                 
98 108 of 1996. 
99 28 of 2002. 
100 56 of 1986. 
101 14 of 2007. 
102 14 of 2007. 
103 See amended sections of the Diamonds Act as contained in the Diamond Export Levy (Administration) 
Act 14 of 2007, Schedule. 
104 14 of 2007. 
105 29 of 2005. 
106 14 of 2007. It must be noted that the Taxation Laws Amendment Act 8 of 2007 is also significant to the 
existing diamond regulation framework. 
107 56 of 1986. 
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This chapter will however be more focused on the Diamonds Act108
 
 and the 
MPRDA as an obvious legislative starting point on the modern laws regulating 
South African diamond trade. Other statutes will be discussed only to the extent 
they support these two pieces of legislation. It is submitted that it is these two 
significant pieces of legislation that have altered the face of diamond regulations 
in South African law to significantly bring about a more humane diamond trade in 
South Africa’s modern Constitutional dispensation. 
1.4.2 The Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 
The MPRDA109 as amended by the Minerals and Petroleum Resources 
Development Amendment Act110
 
 assented to on 19 April 2009 but not yet 
promulgated as the date of commencement is yet to be proclaimed. The MPRDA 
can be seen as the framework legislation aimed at defining overarching and 
generic principles in terms of which sectoral-specific legislation should 
subsequently be made. 
The common thread that runs through most of South Africa’s framework 
legislation in its current active state is the delineation of principles and themes 
that should guide the enactment of other statutes passed in furtherance of its 
socio-economic empowerment objectives. Framework legislation such as the 
MPRDA reflects governmental policy in the area they regulate and in this case 
minerals and petroleum resources exploitation and utilization. It is therefore 
                                                 
108 56 of 1986. 
109 28 of 2002. 
11049 of 2008. Date of commencement of the Act to be proclaimed. The purpose of the Amendment is 
stated in the preamble as follows ‘To amend the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act, 2002, 
so as to make the Minister the responsible authority for implementing environmental matters in terms of the 
National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 and specific environmental legislation as it relates to 
prospecting, mining, exploration, production and related activities or activities incidental thereto on a 
prospecting, mining, exploration or production area; to align the Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act with the National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 in order to provide for 
one environmental management system; to remove ambiguities in certain definitions; to add functions to 
the Regional Mining Development and Environmental Committee; to amend the transitional arrangements 
so as to further afford statutory protection to certain existing old order rights; and to provide for matters 
connected therewith.’ 
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important to highlight the principles and themes promoted by the MPRDA and its 
supporting regulations. 
 
The wording of the preamble of the MPRDA illustrates that it is an instrument 
whose main purpose is to actively bring about legislative objective to ensure that 
the State as custodian of the country’s mineral resources is empowered to deal 
with those resources in a sustainable manner for the benefit all people of South 
Africa. This includes those communities that are affected by mining and rural 
communities. There is a special commitment to eradicate discrimination in all 
forms in the mineral and petroleum industries. Due to the prodigious size of the 
MPRDA, it is important at this stage to discuss in further details certain excerpts 
of the Act in light of its contribution to the developments in diamond laws. 
 
The MPRDA is deeply concerned with the transformation and equity theme which 
is captured expressly in section 100111 of the MPRDA.  It provides that the 
Charter must reflect government’s objectives of redressing historical social and 
economic inequalities as stated in the Constitution and should set the framework, 
targets and time table for entry of historically disadvantaged South Africans112 
into the mining sector.113
 
 
The Diamonds Act114 itself, in line with the transformation goals which are central 
to minerals legislation in the MPRDA115 directs the Regulator (the South Africa 
Diamond and Precious Metals Regulator or SADPMR)116
                                                 
111 Read together with section 12 of the MPRDA which places a duty on the Minister of Minerals and 
Energy to facilitate assistance to any historically disadvantaged persons to conduct prospecting or mining 
operations. 
 to ‘have regard to the 
112 The MPRDA goes so far as to define exactly what is meant by historically disadvantaged persons and 
explains that it is those persons who were disadvantaged by unfair discrimination before the Constitution 
took effect. This means that persons who were excluded from participating in the mineral sectors of the 
Republic by virtue of racial bias, as the most obvious unfair discrimination of South African past legislation 
as contained in apartheid law, such persons are now under the Constitution given the right to enter into such 
a sector with the State as overall overseer and guardian of the mineral resources, as custodian. 
113 Section 100 of the MPRDA 28 of 2002. 
114 56 of 1986. 
115 28 of 2002. sections 2(d) and (e). 
116 Established in terms of the Diamonds Act 56 of 1986, as amended. 
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promotion of equitable access to and local beneficiation117 of the Republic’s 
diamonds’ in application for licenses and permits in terms of the Diamonds 
Act.118 The SADPMR is obliged by the Diamonds Act119 to ‘have regard to the 




The Constitutional principles like those established in section 9 of the Bill of 
Rights (which supports the equal treatment of all persons before the law), clearly 
forms the values and spirit of the MPRDA. For this reason the Act can be 
criticized or applauded as a vehicle for empowerment121
 
 at the expense of the 
country’s limited resources. This portion of the study will consider some of the 
diamond or mining industry reactions to the Act’s application for further clarity. 
Chapter Two of the MPRDA is headed ‘Fundamental Principles’.  It lists 
important principles that should apply in the minerals exploitation sector such as 
the South African State sovereignty over its own mineral resources.  These 
include, the State’s role as custodian122
 
 of all minerals in South Africa as a 
country, the principle of equity in access to mineral resources, the need to correct 
historical imbalances and benefit previously undermined groups, sustainable 
development, socio-economic justice and the need to promote economic and 
growth. Therefore it can be safely stated that the MPRDA forms the backdrop of 
the mineral laws that have informed developmental changes in the current 
Constitutionally guided diamond regulations. 
                                                 
117 MPRDA 28 of 2002 section 26. 
118 56 of 1986. 
119 56 of 1986. 
120 Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 sections 5 and 15 as amended by the Diamonds Amendment Act 29 of 2005 
read together with section 2 and 26 of the MPRDA. 
121 Section 1, definitions section of the MPRDA makes reference to ‘broad based economic empowerment’ 
which forms a fundamental Constitutional principle adopted by the State in an effort to empower its people. 
This broad based economic empowerment is defined as a social or economic strategy, plan or principle 
which is aimed at eradicating unfairness in the use of the country’s mineral and petroleum resources. 
122 Section 50 of the MPRDA, for instance, allows the Minister on behalf of the State to investigate any 
occurrences of mineral resources, compensate the owner of the land upon which such resources occur as 
part of the duties to be undertaken by the State in the management of its environmental resources. 
 36 
The MPRDA approaches the utilization of South Africa’s mineral and petroleum 
resources on the basis of merit from the perspective of the participants and 
potential participants. This is drawn generally from the wording of the law 
contained in Chapter four of the MPRDA, a chapter that regulates the mineral 
and environmental regulation of mineral and petroleum resources. This 




 in particular read together with the precise applicable 
regulations under the Act, deals with the granting and duration of prospecting 
rights on a standard of merit. This merit standard is adhered to in the MPRDA by 
inserting within the provision that those granted mineral rights by the Minister 
must illustrate that they have access to financial resources and technical ability to 
carry out the proposed projects in an optimal manner in accordance with the 
prospecting work programme.  
From the provisions of the MPRDA above it is clear that environmental safety 
and conservation is priority to Constitutional principles. Therefore applicants 
wishing to acquire mineral and petroleum rights must show that their operations 
will not result in unacceptable pollution, ecological degradation or damage to the 
environment. This means that applicants must provide a feasibility study together 
with an environmental impact assessment.124
 
 Clearly this provision is interpreted 
in this study to suggest that only proposed activities with sufficient financial 
backing, skills efficiency, environmental consideration and appropriate tools will 
be permitted to undertake activities taking place in the minerals sector and that is 
the standard of merit required by the MPRDA. 
                                                 
123 Section 17(1)(a)(b)(c) read together with sections 37 – 46 of the MPRDA which provides for 
environmental management principles, including principles pertaining to environmental rehabilitation and 
management of residue stockpiles and residue deposits. 
124 Section 28 of the National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998. Section 22 of the Environment 
Conservation Act 73 of 1989. 
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The MPRDA125 balances the provisions of section 17(1) by expressly providing 
that the Minister must refuse to grant a prospecting right if the application does 
not meet the requirements of section 7(1) or if the granting of such a right will 
result in an exclusionary act, an act that prevents fair competition or result in the 
concentration of the mineral resources in question being under the exclusive 
control of the said applicant.126 It is important for the South African State at all 
times even in the process of granting mineral rights, to continue to exercise 
custodianship over such mineral resources.127
 
 This will ensure that the 
Constitutional goals of equitable access to the South African Republic’s minerals 
are monitored by the State. 
The above provisions illustrate that while transformation goals are at the core of 
the MPRDA, this does not mean that environmental safety and high standards of 
mining ought to be compromised by such transformation goals. To further 
achieve the South African State and societal goals in the most optimal manner 
the State in the MPRDA undertakes that it will through its agencies assist those 
from historically disadvantaged communities who may lack skill and resources to 
participate by virtue of merit within such sectors. Therefore, it is stated that State 
policies are applauded as they do not suggest any stultification of performance 
standards in utilization of the country’s mineral resources. Therefore, 
transformation is a Constitutional mandate that should not be feared but desired 
and supported. 
 
With regard to developing national skills in the minerals sector, particularly 
mineral beneficiation, the MPRDA provides in section 26 for State incentives 
from the South African government to mining interests in an effort to promote the 
beneficiation of minerals within the Republic. Such local beneficiation is placed 
                                                 
125 Section 17(2). 
126 Section 17(2). 
127 MPRDA 28 of 2002. In line with the provisions of section 2(a) of the same Act which provides for the 
State’s custodianship over its own mineral and petroleum resources. 
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as priority within the MPRDA128 such that any person who wishes to beneficiate 
South African minerals outside of the Republic, such a person may only do so 
after written notice in consultation with the Minister has been completed.129
 
 It is 
submitted that this is a very important development tool for South Africa to 
improve local skills and technology to enable the country to not always be at the 
economic mercy of nations that have these skills. Further, trade that only 
involves removal of raw materials from the country is curtailed for the long term 
development of South Africa. 
It has been proposed by a particular author that while local beneficiation is the 
South African State priority in current mineral’s legislation, more enabling 
legislation must be created to remove any structural impediments that may exist 
in the system that will cause local mineral beneficiation to be competitive in all 
markets. In other words even more resources must be channeled into ensuring 
the survival of local beneficiation.130
 
 
One of the most important contributions of the MPRDA is the establishment of a 
Minerals and Mining Development Board131
 
 whose responsibilities is to advise 
the Minister on a broad range of issues. The issues include advice to the Minister 
on sustainable development in the use of national mineral resources, 
transformation and downscaling of minerals and mining and to provide a report 
on the application of the Act. The Board clearly acts as a provider of measurable 
deliverables under the MPRDA and through its reports South Africa is able to 
determine the success of its minerals policy and implementation. 
With regard to fair administrative action, this is a Constitutional imperative in 
matters pertaining to the granting of rights and access to the Republic’s mineral 
resources. The MPRDA makes a provision for this in section 96, a section which 
                                                 
128 28 of 2002 section 2(e) and specifically section 26. 
129 MPRDA 28 of 2002 section 26(3). 
130 Baartjies N.L. Diamonds – Source to Use The Southern African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy 
(2007) 2. 
131 Section 58. 
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provides for an internal appeals process and later if necessary access to courts 
to those who feel aggrieved by the administrative actions taken by the State 
organs. The Act sets out an appeals process to the Director-General from an 
administrative decision by the Regional Manager132 or an officer or to the 
Minister if it is an administrative action by the Director-General or the designated 
agency. In terms of section 96(3) only when internal appeals processes have 
been exhausted will parties be permitted to approach the court133
 
 for a review of 
administrative action. 
The MPRDA contains Schedule II which provides for transitional arrangements to 
deal with matters pertaining to rights held prior to the commencement of the 
MPRDA. The aims of these transitional arrangements as provided for in 
Schedule II it to allow for equitable access to mineral resources while allowing 
holders of old order rights an opportunity to comply with the provisions and aims 
of the MPRDA. Obviously a transitional period by its very nature suggests a 
specific time period to ensure that compliance with this legislation is achieved in 
South Africa. These provisions will affect the licences, land tenure and mining 
rights of pioneer mining interests under the order licences. However this will not 
be onerous or unfair in light of the Constitutional values of securing land tenure. 
 
It is prudent at this stage to examine one particular decision of the court 
pertaining to some of the practical aspects of the application of this seemingly 
Constitutionally progressive piece of legislation. This practical consideration of 
the MRPD Act will be considered in light of the case of Mofschaap Diamonds 
(Pty) Ltd v The Minister for Minerals and Energy and Others134
 
 which provides a 
true test of some of the provisions and policies contained in the MPRDA in light 
of the diamond mining sector. 
                                                 
132 Section 1, definitions, an officer designated by the Director-General in terms of section 8 as a regional 
manager for a specified region. 
133 Such a court would be required in law to apply the requisite provisions of the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
134 (3117/2006) [2007] ZAFSHC 51 (14 June 2007). 
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This matter was heard before the Free State High Court in Bloemfontein. The 
court in this case was concerned with the nature of the correctness of an 
application for a mining or mineral right. This is an important judgment as it forms 
a neutral decision around the mining industry and concerns itself with the proper 
observance of correct procedures that ought to be observed by parties when 
applying for a mineral right in terms of the current law. 
 
The facts are that Mofschaap (Pty) Ltd as applicant had lodged an application to 
the court seeking a rule nisi. The rule was calling upon the Minister for Minerals 
and Energy and his officers (respondents) to show cause as to why they should 
not be interdicted from granting a prospecting, mining permit or mining right in 
term of the MPRDA to any third party in respect of the mineral rich property 
named as the Mofschaap and Adullam farms while a review process was 
underway in respect of the respondents’ decision to refuse the applicant’s 
application for a prospecting right in respect of the property in question. After an 
agreement pertaining to the rule was reached the parties were granted an 
opportunity to bring the matter before the court. 
 
One of the points note pertaining to procedure in this case as argued by the 
respondents was that the applicant had not fully exhausted internal remedies in 
terms of section 96 and 103 of the MPRDA and had therefore failed to make an 
appeal to the Minister before approaching the court for relief. On this point the 




The court based its finding on this point by stating that the administrative decision 
taken by the respondents in this case was done under a scheme of the 
deconcentration of public power136
                                                 
135 Para. 10. 
 in terms of section 103 of the MPRDA. This 
meant that with respect to the decision pertaining to the granting or refusal of a 
136 Para. 11. As opposed to the scheme of decentralization of public power which allows the State agencies 
to act independently in the exercise of public power. 
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prospecting right to the applicant, the first respondent (Minister) had acted 
through the third respondent and therefore the decision to refuse the right by the 
third respondent must be regarded as the decision of the Minister and therefore 
there could be no cogent basis for an appeal being available to the applicant in 
this case in terms of section 96 of the MPRDA.137
 
 
With regard to the arguments raised by the applicant pertaining to grounds for 
review of the Minister’s decision to refuse the applicant a prospecting right, the 
court found that such arguments138 were tenuous with the result that the 
application was dismissed with costs.139 The court found that the regulations 
pertaining to the application for prospecting rights under the MPRDA had not 
been complied with by the applicant. Therefore, it was held by the court that it 
was essentially the applicant who had made an error in law pertaining to the 




This case is an important case for determining the test of the application of the 
MPRDA particularly in the area of establishing a guideline for interpreting the 
meaning of just administrative action. The case clearly pronounces on the 
interpretation of section 103 of the MPRDA and illustrates that the 
deconcentration model for the exercise of power excludes the appeal process 
that is recorded in terms of section 96 of the MPRDA. This means that parties 
may in certain instances proceed directly to court to protect their rights to just 
administrative action. This interpretive method in the protection of rights to just 
administrative action allows the public to exercise its administrative rights in this 
area of mineral rights with more flexibility. Further the true meaning of section 
103 as shown in the case allows for State agencies to be more open to public 
                                                 
137 Para. 13; 15. 
138 Para. 18. The applicant argued three points for the review by stating that the delegation of power was 
not properly exercised, that there was an error in law and there was procedural unfairness. 
139 Para. 18; 19. 




 when administrative decisions are taken, thus allowing for the 
appropriate checks and balances to exist within the system. 
According to Cawood142 the MPRDA is a newer product of the responses given 
to the State after the movements in Constitutional developments in mineral law. 
These developments were brought about by the following historical facts and 
proposed law. Firstly it was the 1995 African National Congress (ANC) Freedom 
Charter, the 1994 Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), the 1994 
election of the ANC, the 1995 view of the Chamber of Mines of South Africa, the 
1995 Mineral Policy Process Steering Committee, the 1996 Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, the 1997 Green Paper on a Minerals and Mining Policy 
for South Africa, the White Paper on a Minerals and Mining Policy of South Africa 
and finally the 2002 Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 
2002 read together with the 2002 Broad-Based Socio-Economic Empowerment 
Charter and the regulations applicable to the MPRDA.143
 
 
Author Peter Leon, argues a cautionary point concerning the MPRDA. In his 
writings Leon states that the newly elected government of 1994 was quick to set 
its sights on the Republic’s mining industry. Leon, further points out in his writings 
that the South African State custodianship is largely supported by section 2(a) of 
the MPRDA and states that the development of the MPRDA stems from the 
internationally accepted right of the State to exercise sovereignty over all its 
mineral and petroleum resources. State sovereignty in turn reflects the 
sentiments of the new international economic order, however Leon argues that in 
                                                 
141 In other words there is a greater amount of transparency in the manner in which administrative action is 
taken particularly when a party wishes to approach the courts concerning the administrative decisions taken 
by State organs in the regulation of access to mineral rights in South Africa. 
142 Cawood F.T. The Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act of 2002: A Paradigm Shift in the 
Mineral Policy in South Africa The Journal of the South African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy 
Jan/Feb (2004) 56. 
143 Cawood F.T. The Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act of 2002: A Paradigm Shift in the 
Mineral Policy in South Africa The Journal of the South African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy 
Jan/Feb (2004) 58. 
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South Africa this has resulted in a law that is uncertain in application and thus 
has created an unattractive venue for foreign investment.144
 
 
It is submitted that the author’s arguments above serve as a caution to the 
plausible but wide reaching values of the MPRDA concerning even wider 
principles such as broad-based economic empowerment. The reality is that it is 
difficult to ensure that these values are upheld particularly when they show broad 
idealism without providing measurable deliverables concerning their application. 
Unfortunately there are times when South African State policy does not balance 
well with foreign investment. On the other hand it is argued that any State worth 
its salt must put the interests of its own country’s development ahead of only 
seeking unsustainable revenue from outside. 
 
Indeed a country ought to be able to manage its own resources without unfair 
interference from outside sources particularly in cases where such a State 
adheres to principles that reflect the protection of human rights and broad-based 
socio-economic empowerment for its people. However, it is proposed in light of 
the argument above that the MPRDA must not seek to isolate the Republic from 
foreign investment particularly if such investment is in the best interests of broad-
based socio-economic empowerment. This means that the MPRDA must 
continue to evolve until it is able to fully appreciate the uniqueness of South 
Africa’s needs without over emphasizing a particular developmental need above 
another. This may lead to serious imbalances later on and thus make a mockery 
of the goal of achieving sustainable development. 
 
Cawood145
                                                 
144 Leon Peter A Fork in the Investor-State Road: South Africa’s New Mineral Regulatory Regime Four 
Years On Journal of World Trade 42(4) Kluwer Law International (Netherlands) (2008) 671 – 690. 
 correctly articulates the historical and legal developments leading to 
the creation of the MPRDA. He makes some observations that further support 
the Constitutionally progressive branding of these new minerals laws in South 
145 Cawood F.T. The Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act of 2002: A Paradigm Shift in the 
Mineral Policy in South Africa The Journal of the South African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy 
Jan/Feb (2004) 56. 
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Africa’s development. He states that the MPRDA is concerned with the important 
role played by the South African State in using its resources to incorporate social 
aspects of an economy and makes it thoroughly inclusive by making an important 
and special mention of the role played by mining in local and rural development. 
This is a leap forward for the law when one compares the MPRDA with its 
predecessor in the form of the Minerals Act.146
 
 
Cawood points out clearly in his writings that previous legislation did not make 
provision for the reconnaissance permissions in terms of section 13 to 15 and 
retention permits as provided for in section 31 to 36 of the MPRDA. Section 1 of 
the MPRDA defines the meaning of these terms. The MPRDA does allow for 
such permits and permissions respectively subject to certain conditions such as 
following established procedure to obtain the granting of such rights. These rights 
are obtained by merit and therefore the process has the effect of rooting out 
unfair competition and the hoarding of rights.147
 
 Once again the developmental 
legal trends showing an intention to ensure that equitable access to South 
Africa’s mineral resources is made possible. 
Schedule II of the MPRDA, deals with transitional arrangements from the old 
order to the new order of holding rights. Cawood argues that the MPRDA does 
not provide much security of tenure for unused old-order rights. However, he 
suggests that conversion of such rights to new-order rights is cogent in these 
circumstances. In other words to secure old order mineral rights, all the holders 
of such rights need to do to protect themselves is to convert these rights. Further, 
active holders of old-order rights who wish to continue conducting business 
conversion is  a sensible option since failure to do so will result in an automatic 
cession of rights. When dealing with these rights the spirit of the Constitution of 
                                                 
146 50 of 1991. Ibid. 
147 Cawood F.T. The Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act of 2002: A Paradigm Shift in the 
Mineral Policy in South Africa The Journal of the South African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy 
Jan/Feb (2004) 60. 
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the Republic of South Africa Act148 is expected to be upheld by the State when 
dealing with the rights of holders.149
 
 
This effectively means that if the cession of rights to mineral property amounts to 
an expropriation in accordance withsection55 of the MPRDA, for instance, 
compensation will be payable according to established Constitutional principles. 
Further, no person is to be arbitrarily and unfairly deprived of property. These are 
important core Constitutional values as contained in the Bill of Rights provisions 
on property stated below. 
 
‘Property  
25. (1) No one may be deprived of property except in terms 
of law of general application and no law may permit 
arbitrary deprivation of property.  
(2) Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of 
general application   
a. for a public purpose or in the public interest; and  
b. Subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time 
and manner of payment of which have either been agreed 
to by those affected or decided or approved by a court.  
(3) The amount of the compensation and the time and 
manner of payment must be just and equitable, reflecting 
an equitable balance between the public interest and the 
interests of those affected, having regard to all relevant 
circumstances, including   
a. the current use of the property;  
b. the history of the acquisition and use of the property;  
c. the market value of the property;  
                                                 
148 108 of 1996. 
149 Cawood F.T. The Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act of 2002: A Paradigm Shift in the 
Mineral Policy in South Africa The Journal of the South African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy 
Jan/Feb (2004) 62. 
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d. the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the 
acquisition and beneficial capital improvement of the 
property; and  
e. the purpose of the expropriation.  
(4) For the purposes of this section   
a. the public interest includes the nation's commitment to land 
reform, and to reforms to bring about equitable access to all 
South Africa's natural resources; and  
b. property is not limited to land.’ 
 
Having considered legal sources and other academic legal contributions 
pertaining to the MPRDA, it is clear that Constitutional values are at the forefront 
of interpreting the MPRDA’s provisions. However, this understanding of the Act 
to date has not been without challenges on the ground or to the average person 
involved in the mining industry or diamond industry. This is because when one 
looks at current legislation it is clear that the South African State is requesting 
mining giants to open mineral resource markets to new entrants and thus 
creating undesired market competition in an effort by the State to enforce broad-
based socio-economic empowerment for its people. 
 
Examples of these challenges that have tested the provisions of the MPRDA 
have been recorded in media. For example, as recently as 25 January 2008 the 
media reported a legal battle between the mining giant De Beers and the 
Minerals and Energy Ministry over the control of diamond mine dumps said to 
contain deposits worth billions of rands. This media report made a statement that 
perhaps the MPRDA is not entirely clear on this issue as it does not seem to 
apply to the granting of licenses to prospect of tailing dumps which in fact have 
already been mined. The media report had correctly made a statement that the 
Bloemfontein High Court had found in favour of De Beers.150
                                                 





Of course the legal battle being referred to in this case represents the milestone 
judgment of De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v Ataqua Mining (Pty) Ltd and 
Others.151 This matter involved an application lodged by De Beers for an order 
prohibiting Ataqua Mining Pty (Ltd) (‘Ataqua’) mining from conducting any 
prospecting operations on or removing material from the tailings dumps situated 
on subdivision 16 of the Jagersfontein farm in the Fauresmith Magisterial district 
as De Beers sought stated that it was the owner of such tailings dumps. Further, 
the order sought to confirm that Ataqua’s prospecting rights granted under 
7/2006 did not entitle it to conduct any prospecting operations in the tailings 
dumps aforementioned. Finally the order sought a review and setting aside of 
Ataqua’s prospecting right in these circumstances.152
 
 
The arguments put forward by Ataqua in this case contained a series of moving 
statements pertaining to State control over mineral deposits of any kind. They 
argued that this view was supported by the empowerment policy established 
under the MPRDA with the object of using them to meet Constitutional goals of 
equitable access to the nation’s resources.153 However, the court accepted De 
Beer’s arguments which while it did not dispute remedial legislation also required 
that the application of the MPRDA be interpreted as a whole using the purposive 
approach to achieving Constitutional aims.154
 
 
With regard to the interpretation and application of the MPRDA De Beers argued 
many points however three of these points will be highlighted in this study. Firstly 
it was argued by De Beers that while the Minister has power to expropriate 
property undersection55 of the MPRDA, Schedule II containing provisions for 
transitional arrangements is very important because it provides a form of security 
                                                 
151 Case Number: 3215/06 in the High Court of South Africa (Orange Free State Provincial Division), 
judgment delivered on 13 December 2007. 
152 Para. 1. 
153 Paras. 26 – 35. 
154 Para. 42. 
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of tenure in terms of Schedule II item 2. It terms of the said item 2 compensation 
is payable for such expropriation.155
 
 
The second point argued by De Beers was that one could not just simply go and 
mine tailing dumps at will just because the National Environmental Management 
Act156 does not provide sufficient control over tailing dumps.157 De Beers argued 
that a distinction must be drawn between NEMA and the MPRDA. The distinction 
to be made is because in terms of the MPRDA, an Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) is required in terms of section 39(1) for whoever wants to 
engage in a mining activity or remove diamonds from dumps. Further section 
41(1) of the MPRDA imposes a duty on the applicant to make a financial 
provision in advance for the rehabilitation of the environment following the impact 
of the mining activity and therefore these provisions of the MPRDA are 
paramount to the circumstances raised in this case therefore it cannot be said 
that only NEMA could be relied on.158
 
 In other word De Beers was stating that 
this was a fresh mining activity that had to comply with all the statutory 
requirements of the MPRDA. 
Thirdly De Beers on the point of the meaning of ‘mineral’ under the MPRDA 
argued that while diamonds are still in the ore ownership does not vest in the 
miner. Transfer of ownership in such a case is hindered by the fact that such 
diamonds still form part of the land. Once the ore is severed from the land, a 
movable res is created which is the object of separate ownership. Therefore 
when you extract kimberlite (which is diamondiferous) ore you become the owner 
of the ore. A diamond by nature is a simpler mineral unlike gold which takes 
many forms.159
                                                 
155 Para. 46. An alternative remedy as argued was to launch an application with the Department of Minerals 
and Energy. 
 It is clear from this argument that by analogy De Beers extracted 
156 107 of 1998. 
157 Paras. 50 – 51. 
158 Ibid. 
159 Para. 53. 
 49 
the kimberlite ore and became owner thereof as a separate re capable of 
ownership and lying in the dumps. 
 
The gap in the MPRDA was identified in paragraph 57 of the judgment where it 
was argued that the MPRDA is silent on the actual meaning of ‘tailings or tailings 
dumps.’ It was further argued that mentioned in the Act was the word residue 
stockpiles such as including tailings stockpiled for potential use. However, it was 
argued further that the MPRDA use of residue stockpiles and residue deposits do 
not include tailings dumps. Even so the tailings dumps in question, as argued by 
De Beers, were not residue stockpiles as they were produced before the 
application of the MPRDA. It was stated by De Beers that a mineral is expressly 
defined as a substance occurring naturally and it must have been formed by or 
subjected to a geological process. Minerals in a stockpile have been severed 
from the land therefore in this case a tailings dump is not a residue stockpile. 
 
The court after determining the arguments before it found in favour of De Beers 
by stating that the MPRDA leaves no doubt that mining rights in respect of 
minerals which have not been mined are not within private hands and the State 
exercises custodianship over such minerals in terms of section 2 of the MPRDA. 
The court held that the tailings dumps in this case were not a subject matter of 
the MPRDA because they do not occur naturally and they are privately owned by 
De Beers who have owned them since 1973 (making it an old order right) having 
spent financial resources, labour and time maintaining these dumps.160
 
 
According to the MPRDA and the inferences that may be drawn from the case 
above it is clear that the Act provides fully for dealing with residue stockpiles and 
residue deposits in terms of section 42 of the Act.161
                                                 
160 Para. 68. 
 The definitions section of 
the Act includes tailing deposits and states that they ought to be managed 
161 Para. 44. In fact the argument by De Beers in this case did agree with the custodianship of the State over 
South African minerals in essence. This argument was also made by Ataqua in seeking to uphold their 
prospecting right on the tailing dumps in question. 
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according to an acceptable environmental management plan (a NEMA inspired 
concept which Ataqua attempted to rely on as part of their reasons for seeking to 
carry on mining activity on De Beers tailings dumps). It is noted that although the 
MPRDA does not specifically provide that such residue or dump necessarily 
belongs to the State in section 42 the application of the law in the case above 
certainly clarified this issue to an extent by stating that it was not a naturally 
occurring mineral under the South African State’s custodianship. Therefore no 
provision was applicable in the MPRDA for the tailings dump in this instance. 
 
It is submitted that to counteract such an impasse in law with regard to licenses 
for mining the tailing dumps, amending legislation will deal with this issue more 
specifically. This will be important since mining an already mined dump is 
effectively cheaper and may be very useful for empowerment mining interests. 
This empowerment however may not be done without proper respect being given 
to the property rights of the tailings dumps owners.  
 
It is submitted herein with respect therefore that licenses for mining tailing dumps 
should be State administered and State controlled in order to create social order 
while ensuring that legislative goals are achieved. However, with great respect to 
land tenure rights of tailings dumps owners. Having considered the provisions of 
the MPRDA it is clear that it is a statute that has played a seminal role in 
informing the latest structural developments of diamond specific laws. The 
decision of the court above certainly had the effect of forcing the South African 
State to take cognizance of the limits of its custodianship over mineral deposits in 
the country.162
 
 The decision illustrated a firm commitment to protecting property 
rights of old order mining interests in spite of the pursuit of broad based socio-
economic empowerment. 
In response to this case on 30 May 2008, the South African Chamber of Mines 
released a public document containing ‘comments to the portfolio committee on 
                                                 
162 MPRDA 28 of 2002. Section 2 (a). 
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minerals and energy on certain of the amendments proposed in the MPRD 
Amendment Bill.163 The MPRD Amendment Bill is instrumental to responding to 
the gap in law as raised in the case of De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v 
Ataqua Mining (Pty) Ltd and Others.164
 
 The Bill and the commentary on it is a 
direct response to the case. It is interesting to note that the State immediately 
used its prerogative of turning to the Legislature for dealing with this question 
rather than incurring costs in an appeals process requesting the courts to deal 
with the gap in the interpretation of the MPRDA. This means that the court in 
deciding this matter had applied the MPRDA as correctly although the outcome 
was not entirely intended by the Legislature. The State in casu acknowledged the 
soundness of the decision with the result that the gap identified in the application 
of the MPRDA had to be dealt with by the law makers. 
What is proposed in the amending bill dealing with this issue is that as the 
MPRDA stands it reflects the position that old order residues (tailings dumps not 
covered under the MPRDA) were not intended to be expropriated therefore what 
needs to be done with the new amendment is that the words ‘or old order right’ in 
the definition of ‘residue deposit’ be included. Further it is proposed in the bill that 
‘residue stockpile’ will be deleted and thus allow the State to expropriate such 
residues to continue with the State policy of using the expropriated land for the 
achievement of its broad-based socio economic empowerment goals.165
 
 In terms 
of the proposed amending legislation the South African State will still take 
ownership and custodianship over the tailings dumps not covered in the MPRDA 
however compensation will be payable to the holders of the old order rights. 
 
1.4.3 The Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 
                                                 
163 [B10D-2007] 
164 Case Number: 3215/06 in the High Court of South Africa (Orange Free State Provincial Division), 
judgment delivered on 13 December 2007. 
165 [B10D-2007]. See report to the portfolio committee. 
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The Diamonds Act166 was assented to on 11 June 1986 and entered into as force 
of law on 1 October 1986. The Act has been amended by the statutes listed 
herein. The list includes the Diamonds Amendment Act,167 the Diamonds 
Amendment Act,168 the Diamonds Amendment Act,169 the Abolition of 
Restrictions on the Jurisdiction of Courts Act,170 the Diamonds Amendment 
Act,171 the Diamonds Second Amendment Act172 and the Diamond Export Levy 
(Administration) Act173
 
 whose commencement date is 1 November 2007. 
The Diamond Export Levy (Administration) Act174 has signifinantly altered the 
face of the Diamonds Act and therefore it is important to take cognizance of 
these changes when interpreting the provisions of the Diamonds Act.175 The 
provisions of the Diamonds Act176 and other diamond legislation mentioned 
above will be considered throughout this study from various angles that illustrate 
the industry regulation of the diamond industry. At this point the Diamonds Act177 
is simply being looked at from the perspective of understanding the structure of 
the legislative framework of diamond law. This part of the study will focus 
particularly on the main pillars of Constitutionally sound diamond legislative 
provisions together with milestone provisions contained in South African law 
against trade in conflict diamonds. As the study progresses more provisions of 
the Diamonds Act178
 
 will be expiscated. 
                                                 
166 56 of 1986. 
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The Diamonds Act179 forms the leading statute with regard to regulating dealing 
and trade in diamonds in South Africa. The Diamonds Act180 has a fairly technical 
industry based set of regulations that came into force on 1 April 1987. There 
have been further regulations in 2007 made applicable to this Act.  The main 
purpose of the Diamonds Act181 is to provide for the South African Diamonds and 
Precious Metals Regulator (SADPMR) and for the establishment of the State 
Diamond Trader (SDT).182 These State organs are established in order to control 
the purchase and sale, the processing, the local beneficiation183 and the export 
of diamonds and incidental matters.184
 
  
Most importantly the provisions of the Diamonds Act185 are also applicable in 
terms of other minerals as determined by the Minister by notice in the 
Government Gazette as stated in terms of section 2 of the Diamonds Act186 read 
together with section 1 of the MPRDA which defines the word mineral. Off course 
it would be a Legislative nightmare to have a special Act for each mineral that is 
mined and subject to controls listed under the Diamonds Act.187
 
 
The current state of the Diamonds Act188
                                                 
179 56 of 1986. 
 and its regulations is one that 
evidences constant activity in terms of amendments, changes and developments 
in the body of the Act. This illustrates Legislature’s desire to eradicate any 
potential problems in the statute whether it relates to the interpretation of the Act 
or application. Legislature is expected to constantly update controls of the 
diamond industry as it is an industry that forms one of the core economic 
activities of the South African economy.  
180 56 of 1986. 
181 56 of 1986. 
182 Diamonds Act 56 of 1986. State Diamond Trader established in terms of section 14 and definition of 
State Diamond Trader inserted by section 1 of the Diamonds Amendment Act 29 of 2005. 
183 Means the polishing of a diamond or the setting of a diamond in a tool, in an article or in jewellery. 
Section 1. See MPRDA 28 of 2002 section 26. 
184 Preamble. 
185 56 of 1986. 
186 56 of 1986. 
187 56 of 1986. 
188 56 of 1986. 
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Legislature has therefore essentially ensured that the laws regulating diamond 
trade are sound, effective and keep abreast with the latest developments in 
terms of technology, international concerns, national concerns and other 
advances including the vice of criminal activity. The Diamonds Act189 expressly 
provides for authorized bodies that will exercise legitimate control over the 
diamond trade while expressly providing for the criminalization of unauthorized 
activities. The stakeholders have clear parameters in which to operate when 
carrying out activities involving trade in diamonds. Some of the provisions of the 
Diamonds Act190
 
 will be studied in some detail without attempting to 
unnecessarily re-write it. 
As far as diamond trade is concerned the definition section of the Diamonds 
Act191 is very useful in providing explanations of terms related to participants 
within the diamond industry. Further this section the Act clearly sets out the ambit 
of the application of the Act. First and foremost the diamond industry is defined 
as including ‘any person involved in the buying of, selling of, dealing in, 
importation of, export of or production of diamonds, or beneficiation involving 
diamonds.’192 By definition this Act193 is applicable to national as well as 
international trade transactions related to the diamond industry and therefore 
provides a link between South Africa and the international community at trade 
level. This understanding of the scope of the Act194
 
 forms the basis of the study 
as it contains industry specific enabling legislation for the purposes of bringing 
about Constitutionally sound trade practices and economic activity in the 
diamond sector. 
                                                 
189 56 of 1986. 
190 56 of 1986. 
191 56 of 1986. 
192 Chapter 1: Application of Act, Section 1.  
193 56 of 1986. 
194 56 of 1986. 
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A dealer in diamonds in terms of the Act is defined as ‘a holder of a diamond 
dealer's licence contemplated in section 26 (a)’.195 In terms of section 26(a) of 
the Diamonds Act,196
 
 a lawful dealer must be in possession of a diamond 
dealer’s licence which will be issued by the Regulator or SADPMR (the South 
African Diamond and Precious Metals Regulator established by section 3(1) of 
the Act) authorizing the holder to carry on business as a buyer, seller, importer or 
exporter of unpolished diamonds. 
The Diamonds Act197 applies in conjunction with the MPRDA198 as previously 
elucidated in order to define the meaning of a diamond producer.199 A producer 
of diamonds is a person entitled to win or recover diamonds in terms of section 
19 of the MPRDA.200
 
 In terms of this section, a producer is a holder of 
prospecting who has rights and obligations expressly defined within the section.  
In terms of section 25 of the MPRDA, a producer is also a holder of mining rights. 
Further according to section 27 of the MPRDA a producer is a holder of a duly 
issued mining permit. 
The main purpose of the Diamonds Act201 is to establish explicit State control. 
Through the establishment of the SDT, a juristic person established in terms of 
the Diamonds Act.202 The main objects of this juristic person are to ensure the 
promotion of equitable access to and local beneficiation of the Republic's 
diamonds.203 The SDT is to achieve its objects by complying with the 
internationally recognised procedures of handling unpolished diamonds.204
                                                 
195 Diamonds Act 56 of 1986. 
 
196 56 of 1986. 
197 56 of 1986. 
198 28 of 2002. 
199 28 of 2002. 
200 28 of 2002. 
201 56 of 1986. 
202 56 of 1986. State Diamond Trader established in terms of section 14. 
203 Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 section 5, 15 and MPRDA 28 of 2002 section 26. 
204 Diamonds Act 56 of 1986. Section 1, as amendment by the Diamond Export Levy (Administration) Act 
14 of 2007. 
‘'unpolished diamonds' means-  
        (a)     diamonds in their natural state, as they occur in deposits or extracts from the parent rock;  
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The Diamonds Act205 prior to the amendment by the Diamond Export Levy 
(Administration) Act206
 
 had a definition of an unpolished diamond which included 
synthetic diamonds as part of that definition. It is submitted that this is a strange 
definition that took away the integrity of true diamond to an extent as it had the 
effect of giving laboratory diamonds equal recognition in law. While due 
recognition is given to laboratory diamonds as a cheaper alternative to real 
diamonds, it is proposed that the high value integrity of the true mined diamond 
should always be given its separate value categorization as such. This is 
important for economic development purposes. 
It can therefore be seen from the above notes that the Diamond Export Levy 
(Administration) Act Levy Act207 a crucial Act in changing the face of the 
Diamonds Act208 and its amending legislation. Therefore when reading the 
Diamonds Act it is important to have regard to the amendments brought in by the 
Diamonds Export Levy (Administration) Act.209
 
 
One of the common themes in the last fifteen years of South African diamond 
related legislation regulating economic activities involving South African 
resources is the theme of equitable access to such resources. Equitable access 
here is recognized as the abandonment of unfair and racially discriminatory 
practices that have excluded certain persons from participating and accessing 
the country’s resources and exercising certain rights. 
                                                                                                                                                 
        (b)     diamonds simply sawn, cleaved, bruted, tumbled or which have only a small number of polished 
facets (windows which allow expert examination of the internal characteristics), and includes diamonds 
that are provisionally shaped but clearly require further working;  
       (c)     tumbled diamonds of which the surface has been rendered glossy or shiny by chemical treatment or 
chemical polishing;  
        (d)     broken or crushed diamonds;  
       (e)     diamond dust; or  
        (f)     diamond powder,  
and applies regardless of whether such diamonds are won or recovered within the Republic.’ 
205 56 of 1986. 
206 14 of 2007. 
207 14 of 2007. 
208 56 of 1986. 
209 14 of 2007. 
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It can therefore be safely stated that legislation such as the Diamonds Act,210 
National Water Act211 and the Marine Living Resources Act212 are examples of 
legislation that support the theme of equitable access to South African economic 
resources. In making equitable access to South African economic resources a 
reality the Constitutional court in (Phambili II) Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v 
Minister of Environmental affairs and Others213 stated that most of the South 
African economy is dominated by historically advantaged companies owned by 
white people therefore it should be accepted that legislation such as the Marine 
Living Resources Act214 (which in this case dealt with the hake industry) was 




Judge Ngcobo emphasized in the same judgment that South Africa is a country 
in transition from a system of inequality to a system of equality therefore it is 
impossible to root out systematic racial discrimination without taking positive 
action.216 Therefore equitable legislation was introduced in order to remove 
competitive access which had its roots in forms of discrimination.217 Clearly the 
MPRDA is one of those positive laws that are established to assist in creating 
equity and balance in accessing economic involvement in national diamonds. 
Further, the Diamonds Act,218
 
 as amended while it pre-dates the Constitution 
when interpreted in light of the ethos of the MPDRA it also serves as an 
important diamond law that works together with the MPRDA to achieve a 
diamond industry that upholds Constitutional principles. 
                                                 
210 56 of 1986. 
211 36 of 1998. 
212 18 of 1998. 
213 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC). 
214 18 of 1998. 
215 498 G-H. 
216 522 F-H. 
217 525 E - F.  
218 56 of 1986. 
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In the Diamonds Act219 itself provisions that form examples of positive law to 
eradicate unfair discrimination in mineral resources can be found in section 
4(a)(b)(c) of the Diamonds Act220 which provides for a regulating body which will 
‘ensure that diamond resources of the Republic are exploited and developed in 
the best interests of the people of South Africa, to promote equitable access to 
and local beneficiation of the Republic’s diamonds and to ensure compliance with 
the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS).’ Section 5(a) provides that 
the SADPMR must have regard to the promotion of equitable access to and local 
beneficiation of the Republic’s diamonds when considering applications for 
licenses and permits provided for in the Diamonds Act.221 It is evident that 
equitable access to the diamond industry is statutorily protected in the Diamonds 
Act222
 
 not only from a national perspective but from the international perspective 
as it is clear that dealing in conflict diamonds would be rampant but for the use of 
the KPCS. 
A further provision relating to fairness and equity in the diamond industry is 
section 5(2) of the Diamonds Act.223 This section provides specifically that when 
the Regulator is considering an application for a licence or permit, due regard 
must be had to considerations of the ‘broad-based socio-economic 
empowerment Charter contemplated in section 100 of the MPRDA.’ The 
provisions of the Diamonds Act224
 
 above clearly seek to reverse the effects of 
apartheid laws in the diamond industry. It is appropriate in this instance to 
consider a few examples of such broad-based economic empowerment efforts by 
the South African State in partnership with private business, most of these efforts 
will be considered in a more in depth manner as this study progresses. 
                                                 
219 56 of 1986. 
220 56 of 1986. 
221 56 of 1986. 
222 56 of 1986. 
223 56 of 1986. 
224 56 of 1986. 
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To further allow for equitable access to diamond resources, Chapter IX of the 
Diamonds Act225
 
 is crucial. Section 95(jA) provides that the Minister in 
consultation with the Regulator may make such regulations as he or she deems 
necessary to create ‘guidelines for and implementation of broad-based socio 
economic empowerment in terms of section 100 of the MPRDA. This means that 
after careful consideration of industry specific requirements, to further support 
equity in the industry, the Minister has power to issue whatever regulations are 
necessary to achieve that objective. 
Other equity supporting diamond legislation comes in the form of the Diamond 
Amendment Act226 and the Diamonds Second Amendment Act.227
 
 Both these 
pieces of legislation alter the actual manner in which diamond trade is to be 
conducted. This is achieved by allowing the South African State greater say in 
the diamond product produced by the South Africa’s diamond producers.  
The State’s control over diamond sales will be investigated more thoroughly as 
this study progresses, however it is clear that there is certainly more enabling law 
that seeks to protect equitable access to South Africa’s diamond resources. This 
is particularly evident in the wording of the preamble of the Diamond Amendment 
Act228
 
 as it provides that the Act is there to ‘empower the Minister to make 
regulations regarding guidelines for, and the implementation of, broad-based 
socio-economic empowerment.’ It is submitted that regulations are the practical 
steps that link the ideal objectives of diamond legislation with the practical 
achievement of those objectives. 
The balancing act of maintaining equity in the industry is evident in what is known 
as BEE (Black Economic Empowerment) partnerships and agreements which 
have been established in an effort to have positive action to root out systematic 
                                                 
225 56 of 1986. 
226 29 of 2005. 
227 30 of 2005. 
228 29 of 2005. 
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racial discrimination in all national sectors. These so called BEE deals are not 
unique to the diamond industry as they form part of the section 100 broad-based 
economic empowerment goals of the MPRDA as well the Diamonds Act,229 all of 
which are projects initiated by the South African State. On February 9, 2007 De 
Beers for instance gave a press conference announcing their plan to partner with 




In this announcement De Beers set out the details of an agreement where it 
would be working together with the Department of Minerals and Energy to 
amalgamate the West Coast operations of Alexkor and De Beers Consolidated 
Mines’ Namaqualand Mines into a new, stand alone diamond mining company. 
‘The new independent and empowered company would capitalize on synergies 
that exist across both operations and will realize the full economic potential of the 
West Coast diamond mining industry. As a first step in this process, De Beers will 
be issuing, through a special purpose vehicle, a 20 per cent stake in its 
Namaqualand Mines to the Department of Minerals and Energy.’231
 
 
De Beers announced that it would, as part of the agreement ‘make its 
management, technical expertise and assets available to the Department of 
Minerals and Energy for the next three years to facilitate the start up of the State 
Diamond Trader. This further cements De Beers’ commitment to play a 
constructive leadership role in the diamond industry by encouraging industry 
growth and facilitating broad BEE ownership and competition within the diamond 
sector in South Africa.’232 Clearly through corporate and government 
partnerships of this nature the equity objectives of the Diamonds Act233
                                                 
229 56 of 1986 section 5. 
 are made 
a reality. This is an example of effective law. It is submitted that although the 
230 http://www.csrwire.com/News/7479.html 20 September 2009. This is in line with the constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa Act, 1996. 
231 http://www.csrwire.com/News/7479.html 20 September 2009.  
232 Ibid. 
233 56 of 1986. 
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application of these laws will have challenges associated with them, South Africa 
has been able to apply these laws in a relatively smooth manner with the rule of 
law being given priority in every government strategy. 
 
The positive sounding press releases are important in the diamond industry in 
order to give public accountability of the empowerment initiatives that are taking 
place. They highlight important challenges or successes that are usually faced by 
new entrants in the industry. These challenges vary from entity to entity however 
the most prevalent one is that while the South African State is pleased to grant 
licenses to new entrants, proper mining tools are not available for proper 
execution of mining activities. Therefore unless the State in partnership with 
private business assists these initiatives with mining tools and skills, the granting 
of licenses to new entrants will simply not be enough. Ignoring the groundwork 
needs of new entrants will cause failure of these empowerment initiatives. This 
will lead to more anger and frustration on the part of the new entrants as they 
continue to feel even more helpless. This is an outcome that is not desirable in 
South African diamond mining. 
 
In the Diamonds Act,234 illegal acts are dealt with in chapter 3 of the Diamonds 
Act.235 Its is expressly stated in the act to regulate matters pertaining to 
possession, sale, purchase, assistance by a non-licensed person, dealing, 
processing, erection and operation of machinery, export of unpolished diamonds 
is prohibited unless such activities are conducted within the lawful manner 
established within the Act. Although the Diamonds Act236
                                                 
234 56 of 1986 sections 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25. 
  is clear concerning 
criminal offences contained in the statute, the overt presumption of guilt in the 
235 56 of 1986 sections 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25. Chapter three provides sections specifically 
dealing with the following topics: Section 18  Possession of unpolished diamonds prohibited, section 19 
Sale of unpolished diamonds prohibited, section 20 Purchase of unpolished diamonds prohibited, section  
20A Assistance by non-licensed persons prohibited, section  21  Dealing in unpolished diamonds restricted, 
section 22 Processing of diamonds prohibited , section 23 Erection and operation of machinery 
prohibited,  section 24 Export of unpolished diamonds prohibited and section 25 provides for Unpolished 
diamonds found or picked up by chance. 
236 56 of 1986 sections 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25. 
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wording of the statute has been significantly reduced by using in the wording of 
the Diamonds Act237
 
 various specific prohibitions. 
The Diamonds Act,238
 
 is crucial as it deals with the unique situation of what ought 
to happen should an unpolished diamond be picked up or found by chance. This 
section addresses an unusual but realistic scenario  
‘Any person who by chance finds or picks up any 
unpolished diamond at any place where he or she or his or 
her employer is not permitted to prospect, dig or mine for 
diamonds in terms of the MPRDA shall forthwith take that 
unpolished diamond to the nearest police station and 
deliver it to a member of the South African Police Service 
on duty who holds a rank of at least sergeant.’239
 
 
The point of taking the found unpolished diamond is to give the police a chance 
to establish true ownership of the diamond.240 If proof of ownership of the found 
or picked up unpolished diamond is not established that diamond can be sold 
and the proceeds thereof paid into the State Revenue Fund.241
 
 Where it is 
established that the person found or picked up diamond in terms of section 25(1), 
that person shall be entitled to an amount calculated at one-third of the amount 
realized at the sale of the diamond. This is a statutory incentive for ensuring that 
diamonds that are found and picked up without being accounted for shall benefit 
the finders within the legal perimeters. The State is willing to pay individuals for 
conducting themselves lawfully in such circumstances. 
                                                 
237 56 of 1986 sections 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25. 
238 56 of 1986 section 25. 
239 Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 section 25(1) Hopefully such a diamond does not end up in the black market 
through corrupt activities. 
240 Section 25(2)(a), (b). 
241 Section 3. 
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One of the main controls on the trade of diamonds is that it must be conducted 
on premises registered as a diamond trading house.242 An application in writing 
must be made to the Regulator for the registration of premises as a diamond 
trading house.243 Further, all unpolished diamonds intended for export purposes 
must be offered at a Diamond Exchange and Export Centre (DEEC).244
 
 This is a 
measure to curb clandestine dealings with foreign nationals in exporting 
unpolished diamonds which may remove legitimate revenue from South African 
legitimate diamond trade. 
Essential to trade is section 56A which requires that disclosure be made 
regarding synthetic or enhanced diamonds.  A register in terms of section 57 
must be kept in respect of unpolished diamonds. All these regulations must be 
implemented by the Regulator as it has the responsibility of controlling all matters 
related to the diamond trade industry.245
 
 
In express terms provided in the Diamonds Act246 that the functions of the 
Regulator are to implement, administer and control all matters relating to the 
purchase, sale, beneficiation, import and export of diamonds; and to establish 
diamond exchange and export centres, which shall facilitate the buying, selling, 
export and import of diamonds and matters connected therewith.247
 
  
The aims of the Diamonds Act248 are achieved through the cooperation between 
the State Diamond Trader and the Regulator. The State Diamond Trader is 
further empowered by the Diamonds Act249
                                                 
242 Section 44. It must be noted that the amendments relating to the export and import of unpolished 
diamonds are captured in the Schedule of the Diamond Export Levy (Administration) Act 14 of 2007, 
therefore the correct definitions, fines and regulation of these activities of the diamond industry must be 
correctly interpreted according to those provisions. 
 to obtain diamonds from other 
243 Section 45. 
244 Section 48A. 
245 Section 59. 
246 56 of 1986. 
247 Section 59(a), (b). 
248 56 of 1986. 
249 56 of 1986. 
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countries250 while ensuring compliance with the KPCS which is the relevant 
international agreement, in respect of any unpolished diamonds it handles.251
 
 
The SDT and the Regulator function as a checks and balances system for the 
diamond industry which enables in a practical manner lawful diamond trade. 
Chapter VI of the Diamonds Act252 deals with the export of polished and 
unpolished diamonds. This chapter must be read together with the Diamond 
Export Levy (Administration) Act253 which is an Act providing for administrative 
matters in connection with the imposition of an export levy on unpolished 
diamonds (but not including synthetic diamonds).254
 
 Polished diamonds must be 
registered for export in terms of section 71.  
The Diamonds Act255 expressly provides for statutory controls relating to 
offences relating to illegal acts, offences relating to diamond trade, offences 
relating to the export of diamonds, offences relating to the functions of the 
Regulator, inspectors and police officials and offences relating to fraudulent 
conduct.256 Penalties in respect of these offences are provided for in section 87 
of the Act. Further, the magistrate’s court has jurisdiction to impose such 
penalties in respect of the Diamonds Act. 257
 
 The Act provides a guide for 
magistrates to impose appropriate sanctions where offences have been 
committed under the Act. Having considered the basic structure of South African 
diamond law, it is important to consider how the same law has impacted 
international diamond trade in an effort to end trade in illicit diamonds, particularly 
conflict diamonds. 
 
                                                 
250 Section 16(2)(a). 
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1.5  Conflict Diamonds 
The diamond industry throughout the world has been plagued by the presence of 
what has come to be known as conflict diamonds or ‘blood diamonds.’ Often 
rebel groups in such conflict areas exchange diamonds to fund conflicts. It is not 
desirable that these diamonds should enter the legitimate diamond chain hence a 
monitoring process known as the KPCS and System of Warranties was created 




There is no doubt that conflict situations offend the very spirit and purport of the 
Bill of Rights in South Africa. The human rights abuses that have existed in the 
diamond industry nationally and internationally previously have been condemned 
throughout the world as awareness of these abuses was made known to the 
international communities through film making and efforts by various NGOs. It 
can therefore be said that the KPCS is one of the efforts supported by 
governments to curb abuses of human rights that have been evident in conflict 
diamond trade. In South Africa the Bill of Rights contains specific provisions that 
affect the diamond industry and human rights upliftment as captured in the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act260
 
 as follows: 
‘Human dignity  
10. Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their 
dignity respected and protected.  
Life  
11. Everyone has the right to life.  
Freedom and security of the person  
12. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom and security of 
the person, which includes the right   
                                                 
258 See Appendix A and B. 
259 diamondfacts.org/conflict/eliminating_conflict_diamonds.html 16 march 2009. 
260 108 of 1996. 
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a. not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just 
cause;  
b. not to be detained without trial;  
c. to be free from all forms of violence from either public or 
private sources;  
d. not to be tortured in any way; and  
e. not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or 
degrading way.  
(2) Everyone has the right to bodily and psychological 
integrity, which includes the right   
a. to make decisions concerning reproduction;  
b. to security in and control over their body; and  
c. not to be subjected to medical or scientific experiments 
without their informed consent.  
Section 13 is also relevant to the diamond industry as no 
person may be subject to slavery, servitude and forced 
labour to mine diamonds for the benefit of another.’ 
 
In South African law, regulations under the Diamonds Act261 define conflict 
diamonds as ‘unpolished diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to 
finance conflict aimed at undermining legitimate governments. This definition is 
as described in relevant United Nations Security Council (UNSC) regulations 
insofar as they remain, in effect, or in other similar UNSC resolutions which may 
be adopted in the future, and as understood and recognized in United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 55/56,262 and 56/263263 or in other similar 
UNGA resolutions which may be adopted in future.’264
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The UNGA Resolutions stated in the Government Gazette above are examples 
of the many resolutions adopted by the international community to deal with the 
problem of conflict diamonds. The common purpose of these resolutions is to 
‘break the link between the illicit transaction of rough diamonds and armed 
conflict as a contribution to prevention and settlement of conflicts.’265 The 
resolutions are clear about the fact that rebel groups use diamonds to finance 
their military activities with the objective of undermining legitimate 
Governments.266
 
 It is no secret that these rebel groups murder, rape and torture 
civilians and attempt to destroy the dignity of other human beings. 
It is therefore evident within the UN resolutions that legitimate trade in diamonds 
must be performed according to the KPCS as part of the ‘effective and 
pragmatic, consistent with international law’ strategies of international trade in 
diamonds. Parties to the KPCS are required to report on the progress of this 
system in their countries. This allows for accountability insofar as ensuring that 
the written resolutions are effective in eliminating illicit diamonds. 
 
1.5.1 The History of the Adoption of the Kimberley Process Certification 
Scheme 
Conflict diamonds were first noted by the world media during a brutal conflict in 
Sierra Leone in the 1990s. The United Nations, governments, the diamond 
industry and non-governmental organizations recognized a need for a global 
system to prevent conflict diamonds from entering the legitimate diamond supply 
chain. This international effort gave rise to the KPCS which requires that 
‘participating governments must ensure that each shipment of rough diamonds is 
imported/exported in a secure container, accompanied by a uniquely numbered 
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The timeline of the KPCS can be traced from 1998 where in June 24 the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted a resolution which prohibited direct or 
indirect export of unofficial Angolan diamonds. These would include all diamonds 
not accompanied by a Certificate of Origin issued by the government of Angola. 
The Angolans showed no co-operation with the result that sanctions came into 
force against Angola on 1 July 1998. 
 
In the year 2000 awareness over conflict diamonds was raised by various Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and journalists which resulted in a forum 
which was held in the South African mining town of Kimberley. This process gave 
rise to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. The World Federation of 
Diamond Bourses and International Diamond Manufacturers Association also 
met in Antwerp to pass a resolution creating a body known as the World 
Diamond Council (WDC). The duties of the council included inter alia the 
development and implementation of a tracking system for the export and import 
of rough diamonds to ensure that such diamonds are not used for illegal 
purposes. Present at the meeting were delegated from all the main diamond 
producing and importing countries except Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (DRC) and India.268
 
  
For the first time in 2001 the term ‘Kimberley Process Certification Scheme’ was 
officially used. The Israeli banks issued a notice to their clients warning them of 
the conflict diamond issue and strongly advising their clients not to deal in such 
diamonds. Further sessions were held in different countries from the period of 
2001-2003 to set out the requirements of the Kimberley Process Certification 
Scheme. In 2003 one of the highlights of the KPCS included President Bush’s 
signing of the US law known as the Clean Diamonds Trade Act269 implementing 
regulations that make the US KPCS compliant.270
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In July 2004 the DRC was removed from the KPCS for the purposes of review 
because it was found that it could not account for the origin of the large quantities 
of diamonds it was officially exporting. The Chairman of the KPCS stressed at 
that stage that the removal of the DRC was necessary as a safeguard to the 
credibility and integrity of the Kimberley Process Certificate System.271
 
 The DRC 
has since been re-admitted to the KPCS as a participant. However the removal 
and review of the DRC in 2004 proves the legitimacy of the process. Therefore 
those who trade in certified diamonds are able to trade with confidence knowing 
that the diamonds they are dealing with are from areas free of conflict. 
In 2005 the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, previously known as the Ivory Coast, made 
a representation to the KPCS Plenary meeting held in Moscow that it would no 
longer issue KPCS certificates. This meant that the Côte d’Ivoire would suspend 
the official export of its rough diamonds. The UNSC responded to this 
representation by imposing sanctions on the import of diamonds from the 
Republic of Côte d’Ivoire.272 By 2008 Côte d’Ivoire was back on the member list 
of the participants of the KPCS,273 however the issues surrounding full 
observation of the KPCS were not entirely settled though the Republic of Côte 
d’Ivoire remained is listed as an official member of the KPCS. It has been 
established that presently Côte d’Ivoire has at least met the minimum 
requirements of the KPCS as participant.274
 
 
It is clear that the KPCS has been met with opposition or certain political barriers 
in certain countries which is not the ideal situation. It is offensive to human rights 
that a State would not take urgent steps to act in the best interests of its citizens 
when dealing with matters related to trading in conflict stones. It is submitted that 
                                                 
271 diamondfacts.org/conflict/eliminating_conflict_diamonds.html. See Timeline of Kimberley Process. 
272 diamondfacts.org/conflict/eliminating_conflict_diamonds.html 
273 http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/structure/participants_world_map_en.html 20 Nov 2007. See 
Kimberley Process Plenary November 15 – 17, Moscow Russian Federation (2005) available 
www.kimberleyprocess.com/download/getfile/16 24 February 2010. 
274 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kimberley_Process_Certification_Scheme. 21 January 2009. 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?lang=e&id=ENGPOL300572006. 25 January 2009. 
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excluding defaulting diamond traders from the legitimate diamond trade stream is 
an important step in ensuring compliance with the KPCS. It is submitted that the 
economic impact of being excluded from legitimate global diamond trade might 
persuade deviating countries to reconsider their participation in KPCS. On the 
other hand one cannot ignore the real existence of black market diamond trade. 
 
In 2006, a report was released on Brazil bringing to the attention of the KPCS 
authorities that in Brazil roughly half of their diamond exports were not accounted 
for. The report proposed that Brazil must be suspended from the process. 
Interestingly the response of the Brazilian Ministry of Mines and Energy was that 
it took upon itself to suspend official exports of Brazilian rough diamonds in order 
to make them KPCS compliant.275
 
 
In 2007 Turkey and Liberia became members of the Kimberley Process 
Certification Scheme. In the same year the DRC was re-admitted into the 
KPCS.276
 
 By 2008 members of the KPCS appeared as shown below as in 
Figure1. It must be noted that certain countries in this list are noted as having at 
least fulfilled the minimum requirements of the KPCS. 
Figure 1: World Map and List of Kimberley Participants 
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It is apt to mention at this stage that in 2009 there was a rising concern about the 
status of Zimbabwe as a participant in the KPCS. It has been highlighted in 
media reports that the World Diamond Council has called for the removal of 
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Zimbabwe from the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. It has been 
reported that the decision whether or not to remove Zimbabwe from the KPCS 
will be taken in November 2009. Speaking for Zimbabwe it has been reported 
that the Zimbabwean ministry of mining has given strong undertakings that the 
KPCS requirements are strictly adhered to in Zimbabwe.277
 
 Therefore it appears 
that there will be a need to address Zimbabwe’s participant status through a 
more formal process of enquiry in light of these conflicting statements. 
The concern over the legitimacy of Zimbabwean diamonds was raised in respect 
of the supply of diamonds from Zimbabwe’s Marange field. The Marange field 
was taken from African Consolidated Resources Plc and given to the State 
owned Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation in 2006. At the time as many 
as 20 000 illegal miners were swarming onto the property and engaging in 
diamond smuggling activities which were costing the nation significant weekly 
losses. Human Rights Watch accused Zimbabwe, through its security forces, of 
ordering the killing of more than 200 people as a method of driving illegal workers 
from the Marange field in 2007 while the KPCS statistics showed that Zimbabwe 




It is submitted as shown in this study that the KPCS is mostly concerned with the 
curbing of fueling of conflict that arises when illegitimate government opposition, 
usually in the form of rebel forces who have no regard for human rights use 
illegal diamond trade to fund their activities. In the case of the Zimbabwe and the 
Marange diamond field concern, which is still to be investigated, it will be 
important to see how the KPCS will deal with a situation when the potential or 
actual violation of human rights in diamond trade is done seemingly for the 
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protection of the industry and State interests by a legitimate or recognized 
government agency. 
 
On the other hand it is accepted and correctly so that at the core of the KPCS 
humane diamond trade is the goal. Therefore it is submitted that it does not 
matter what interests are being protected whenever diamond trade is coupled 
with human rights abuses, turning a blind eye to such violations will allow the 
atrocities to spread like contagion. It is submitted that if anything the abuse of 
human rights in diamond trade must be dealt with in a manner that ultimately 
condemns human rights violations in all circumstances. This will prevent a double 
standard from being adopted where State interests are being protected. This 
means that in cases similar to the alleged circumstances around the Zimbabwe 
Marange diamond field, it is proposed that ideally the State should not seek to 
deal with illegal mining in a militant manner but rather to use policing methods 
that will preserve human dignity.  
 
1.5.2 The Specific Legal Requirements under the Kimberley Process 
Certification Scheme 
This part of the study will explore the South African Diamonds Act279
 
 as part of 
the South African Republic’s statutory effort and contribution to the fight against 
trade in conflict diamonds. This will be done by considering some of the specific 
legal requirements and regulations established under the KPCS. 
Joelle Burbank argues that natural resources have great potential to generate 
conflict and the proceeds from these resources can be used to fund the 
generated internal conflict.280
                                                 
279 56 of 1986. 
 The objective of legal regulation of natural 
resources in any Constitutional State is to harness the proceeds and revenue 
generated for economic growth and ensure that natural resources do not assume 
280 Burbank J. The Effect of the Kimberly Process on Governance, Corruption and Internal Conflict paper 
presented under the auspices of The Fund for Peace under Globalization and Human Rights Series (2006) 
1.  
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the role of generating and funding internal conflict.281
 
 South Africa is a 
Constitutional State that has achieved some success in keeping its natural 
resources from being used to fund internal conflict. 
Another objective is to ensure that core values of accountability, good corporate 
governance, sufficient policing and reporting and transparency are upheld in 
order that no opportunities for corruption exist. Corruption of governmental and 
other agencies, bodies and institutions involved in one way or the other in 
diamond trading can compromise a legitimate regulatory system. In the case of 
diamond trading, opportunities are created for the entrance of conflict diamonds 
into the system as well as their exit.282
 
 This means that in terms of international 
good codes of practice a business entity ought to take it as part of their social 
responsibility to actively exclude conflict diamonds. Unfortunately Africa and 
many other regions in the world still need State driven moral regeneration that 
will cause corruption to be destroyed from its governing structures. 
It is therefore submitted that the practical implementation of the principles in 
South Africa’s diamond legal regulation system can prevent incidences of conflict 
diamonds getting into the legitimate trade system. According to Global Witness, 
an independent advocacy body that is active in reporting on international efforts 
pertaining to clean diamond trade, the main methodology of ensuring that conflict 
diamonds are excluded from an effectual diamond trading system is to tighten 
the internal control mechanism.283
 
 This internal commodity control mechanism 
would plug holes that could be used to divert legitimately extracted diamonds out 
of the legal channel and into the unregulated zone ultimately ending up funding 
internal conflict. 
                                                 
281 Ibid. 3. 
282 Ibid. 
283  Global Witness Report ‘Kimberly Process at Risk’, November (2006) 2. 
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The Diamonds Act284 obliges the SADPMR to ensure compliance with the 
KPCS.285 The KPCS requires member States or participants as referred to in the 
language of the process to establish proper export and import control regimes.  
Members or participants are encouraged to issue licenses to mines and to 
ensure the operation of licensed mines only. Small-scale diamond mining, 
usually called artisan miners should be licensed. Member States are required to 
submit statistics on rough diamond trade and production in order to identify any 
possible trade in illicit diamond production and trading.286
 
 
It is important to mention at this stage that concerning small-scale diamond 
mining or artisanal mining as is commonly known, the Diamonds Act 287 of South 
Africa does not specifically mention the term small-scale mining in relation to 
diamonds. However, the fact that the Diamonds Act288 prioritizes equitable 
access to diamonds means that methods are in-built in the Act to ensure that 
mining licences are distributed in a manner that will assist all South Africans who 
qualify to participate meaningfully in diamond production and trade.289
 
 
With regard to small-scale mining generally, South African law is not silent on the 
issue as it is dealt with under the National Environmental Management Act.290 
The regulations291
                                                 
284 56 of 1986. 
 under this Act provide that ‘Government encourages and 
facilitates the sustainable development of small-scale mining in order to ensure 
the optimal exploitation of small mineral deposits and to enable this sector to 
make positive contributions to the national, provincial and local economy. In this 
regard, a National Small-Scale Mining Development Framework has been 
285 Section 4(c) of the Diamonds Act 56 of 1986. 
286 Burbank J. ‘The Effect of the Kimberly Process on Governance, Corruption and Internal Conflict’ paper 
presented under the auspices of The Fund for Peace under Globalization and Human Rights Series (2006) 
5. 
287 56 of 1986. 
288 56 of 1986. 
289 This is in line with what author is stating in his submission, see Burbank J. ‘The Effect of the Kimberly 
Process on Governance, Corruption and Internal Conflict’ paper presented under the auspices of The Fund 
for Peace under Globalization and Human Rights Series (2006) 5. 
290 107 of 1998. 
291 GN 435 of 23 February 2001. 
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developed to assist first-time small-scale mining entrepreneurs to overcome 
constraints facing initial development.’292
 
 This process will be driven by a national 
steering committee appointed to facilitate the possibilities of assisting small-scale 
mining in South Africa. 
The usual process for national governments, especially developing states such 
as South Africa, is to domesticate international law and practices into its legal 
system. This domestication of international law will take the form of governments 
passing legislation giving effect to their international obligations under a certain 
convention or international instrument. South Africa should be applauded for 
initiating the internationalization of its best practice diamond trading regulations.  
 
It can be said as expressed in the name of the KPCS that South Africa has taken 
ownership of the KPCS and made a contribution to global scheme clean diamond 
trade. It is no wonder that the KPCS is hinged on two essential forms of 
regulation namely internal and external diamond commodity control mechanisms. 
The internal control mechanism is the domestic regulation of diamond trading 
mainly by national law such as the Diamonds Act293
 
 as will be considered below. 
For purposes of clarity on the actual trade practice concerning the provisions of 
the Diamonds Act294 KPCS, the legal requirements for application, certification, 
non-compliance, shipment and packaging will now be investigated together with 
the applicable regulations. This analysis of the above legal requirements will 
ensure that the practicalities of the KPCS are made easier to understand. The 
first point established by the Diamonds Act295
                                                 
292 2.1 Minerals and Mining. 
 is that it defines the process as ‘the 
international certification scheme for the international trade in unpolished 
diamonds negotiated in the KPCS.’ That scheme relate of course to the 
293 56 of 1986. 
294 56 of 1986. 
295 56 of 1986. 
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international understanding among participating States as recorded by 
Resolution 55/56 as adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations.296
 
 
In terms of section 4 and section 16 of the Diamonds Act,297
 
 the KPCS is 
mandatory in diamond trade and must be applied by both the Regulator and the 
State Diamond Trader. Section 16(a) provides that the State Diamond Trader 
shall comply with the KPCS in respect of all the unpolished diamonds it handles. 
Further, with regard to unpolished diamonds registered for export, section 60(3) 
provides that such a diamond must be handled in compliance with the KPCS. 
 Failure to attain such compliance empowers the SADPMR to confiscate such an 
unpolished diamonds. The forfeiture of an unpolished diamond for lack of 
compliance with the KPCS ensures that conflict diamonds, illicit diamonds and 
diamonds potentially linked with any other corrupt activity are excluded from 
legitimate trade. This stringent dealing with failing rough diamonds illustrates 
South Africa’s commitment to legitimizing the process while ensuring that South 
Africa has no part in the fuelling of conflict through illicit diamonds. 
 
In terms of section 69(f) and section 69B(e) of the Diamonds Act298 which deals 
with the release of unpolished diamonds for export and import respectively, such 
diamonds must be accompanied by a prescribed KPCS certificate.299
                                                 
296 See Appendix C. 
 This 
certificate certifies that such a diamond has satisfied the minimum standards of 
the KPCS in respect of diamonds for export and satisfies the requirements of the 
KPCS in respect of diamonds for import. The use of the word ‘minimum’ 
requirements of the KPCS in respect of diamonds to be exported as opposed to 
requirements of the KPCS in respect of diamonds due for import creates an 
impression that there is a varying standard of compliance, with a lesser standard 
of compliance for diamonds to be exported. Perhaps this is because South 
297 56 of 1986. 
298 56 of 1986. 
299 See Appendix A and B. 
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Africa’s diamonds are by implication not linked to conflict sources as a general 
rule. 
 
The regulations that prescribe the exact manner in which the KPCS must be 
found in the Regulations300 as amended and corrected by various subsequent 
government notices. The regulations provide that a KPCS Certificate is a forgery 
resistant document issued by the appropriate authority of a particular 
participant.301
 
 The KPCS certificate can be said to be a document of dignity in 
diamond trade as it must accompany all legitimately obtained rough diamonds for 
all purposes, including scientific research as contained in section 2K(1)(a) of the 
regulations. 
Kimberley Process Certificate' means a forgery resistant 
document in a particular format which identifies a 
consignment of unpolished diamonds as being in 
compliance with the requirements of the Kimberley Process 
Certification Scheme, and which in relation to export, is 
issued and validated by the Board and in relation to import 




                                                 
300 GN R680 in Government Gazette 10684 of 1 April 1987. 
301See Appendix A, sample document. It is also important at this stage to take note of some of the useful 
definitions under the regulations as these are important for understanding the relevant diamond trade 
jargon. These definitions also relate to understanding the practical meaning of compliant packaging and 
shipment required in terms of the KPCS and Diamonds Act provisions. These definitions include the 
following regulatory terms, “'Participant' means any state or a regional economic integration enforcing the 
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme;  
'Regional Economic Integration Organization' means an organization comprised of sovereign states that 
have transferred competence to that organization in respect of matters governed by the Kimberley Process 
Certification Scheme;  
'Transit' means the physical passage across the territory of a Participant or a non-Participant, with or 
without transshipment, warehousing or change in mode of transport, when such passage is only a portion of 
a complete journey beginning and terminating beyond the frontier of the Participant or non-Participant 
across whose territory a consignment passes.” 
302 Ibid. 
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Section 6 of the regulations provides for documents that are to accompany a 
consignment (or shipment) of rough diamonds in a situation where those 
diamonds are presented to the Board303 for export and registration. These 
documents are listed as a return in the form of Form N (i) or N (ii) in duplicate, a 
custom’s bill for the export of South African goods, an attested declaration of 
foreign currency proceeds, an export declaration in the form of KPC (ii)304
 
 and 
any additional information that may be required by the Board from time to time. 
Section 6A and 6B also contains regulations in bold pertaining to the KPCS for 
export and import of unpolished diamonds. It will not be necessary to rewrite the 
regulations here suffice to say that all rough diamonds (excluding synthetic 
diamonds, diamond powder or a partly processed diamond having at least 14 




Regulation 6A and 6B clearly lists specific requirements for the Kimberley 
Process Certification Scheme. The requirements can be summarized by showing 
that what is required is the relevant prescribed KPC Form (ii) which must be used 
in such circumstances together with other relevant import and export documents 
depending on the nature of the transaction. Export must be made to a 
participating State and the diamonds in question must have been examined and 
bear the seal of the Board as having complied with the Kimberley Process 
Certification Scheme. Further, the consignment must be carried in a prescribed 
tamper resistant container. After all the requirements have been met a registering 
officer must issue a KPCS certificate as prescribed in KPC (i)306 and the original 
certificate must be permanently attached to the diamond container.307
 
 
                                                 
303 The Board as defined in the preamble of the Diamond Amendment Act 29 of 2005. Reads as follows ‘to 
establish the South African Diamond and Precious Metals Regulator; to provide for its objectives and 
functions; to provide for the Constitution of its Board and the management of the Regulator by the Board.’ 
304 See Appendix A. 
305 Regulation 6A(1). 
306 See Appendix A. 
307 Regulations 6A (3);(4). 
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A record of compliant consignments must be kept by the Board on computer 
records and such records must be kept for a period of three years. In terms of the 
regulations failure to comply with the regulations for KPCS in the exportation or 
importation of diamonds is a criminal offence.308 The regulations although 
technical in nature are clear particularly for those industry participants whose 
business is based on legitimate business practices free from diamonds that 
potentially fund conflict as desired in South African law. Further, the regulations 
encourage international trade by increasing communications309
 
 and friendly trade 
relations with other participating States. 
From the understanding of the basic requirements of the KPCS and the 
regulations above, it is clear that national governments have a role to play in 
international diamond regulation, and this role begins at home as South Africa 
has done, in an exemplary manner one must add, by passing appropriate 
legislation. Global Witness sets certain standards for national governments to 
play in order to ensure the triumph of legitimate diamond trading. Governments 
should inter alia: 
 
‘(a) Effectively enforce and implement national legislation that 
provides for strong internal controls. 
(b) Develop stronger monitoring mechanisms for the artisanal 
mining sector. Small effective and well equipped teams 
must be trained and motivated to monitor internal controls. 
 
(c) Develop better cross border coordination of Kimberly 
Process authorities and law enforcement officials including 
police, customs officials and the military to curb smuggling. 
These policing agencies can and should also target 
                                                 
308 Regulations 6A (6); (8). 
309 Regulation 6A(7). 
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members of the diamond industry that are likely to trade in 
conflict diamonds. 
(d) Take appropriate action to arrest/penalize traders that are 
found to be involved in the smuggling of conflict and illicit 
diamonds. 
(e) Carry out rigorous audits and inspections of diamond 
companies’ implementation of the KPCS and the self-
regulation. This should include periodic random checks of 
imports and exports and random audits of company books 
to verify compliance with the Kimberley Process 
Certification Scheme. 
(f)  Require that diamond companies have their financial 
auditors audit the system of warranties.’310
 
 
As much as South Africa is to be applauded for its efforts in the participation and 
creation of the scheme and the application thereof in the form of the Diamonds 
Act311
 
 of South Africa, its ongoing maintenance processes should be tested 
against these standards or global benchmarks. This test must be done in order to 
determine a conclusion to be reached in answering the question as to whether 
South Africa sufficiently meets the intended objectives of the international 
diamond legal regulation system.  
At this point South Africa seems to have ensured through the laws and 
regulations considered above that the international standards set by the 
participating State membership have been met. Therefore, South African 
diamond trade laws certainly appear to practically deter the proliferation of 
conflict diamonds by insisting on strict compliance with the regulations of the 
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. 
 
                                                 
310 Global Witness Report ‘Making it Work: Why the Kimberly Process Should Do More to Stop Conflict 
Diamonds’ November (2005) 5 – 6. 
311 56 of 1986. 
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Although the concern over conflict diamonds is one that has soiled diamond 
trade in the international community and in many ways is still a threat because of 
corruption that permits the smuggling of illicit diamonds into the clean stream, it 
must be noted that this is not due to a lack of solid international law and practical 
processes. This view has been supported by author Mayer D. who proposes that 
corporations must clearly acknowledge that they together with their trade 
associations reject bribery, corruption, tax evasion to counter the rise of 
illegitimate business and this can be achieved by a strict adherence to the rule of 
law. The author in this case argues that what is required in international trade is 
the enforcement of what he terms, trustworthy capitalism.312
 
 Clearly it offends the 
principles of trustworthy capitalism to trade in blood diamonds. 
In the application of the KPCS there has been no trace of reported commercial 
case law where trade for example the illicit313
 
 source of the diamonds being 
traded was challenged. In South Africa the courts have not heard a case where 
the subject for determination involves conflict diamonds. In fact one can safely 
state that conflict diamonds have not been an internal South African problem on 
the surface of the legitimate KPCS compliant sales.  
It is submitted that the African States who have had a history of conflict diamonds 
will consequently manage to deal with these matters if they are brought to justice 
in their courts although this may be difficult for various limitless reasons such as 
the arrest of rebels, subjecting them to criminal prosecution for crimes against 
humanity, tracing the buyers of conflict diamonds to bring them to book as well. 
These tasks of cleaning up African diamond trade will not be carried out in 
countries where the State is inefficient or fallen. Hence it has become the broad 
proposal of this study that the focus of eradicating conflict diamonds should be to 
correct the mistakes of the past in the most sensitive manner without overly 
dwelling or being trapped by the painful past mistakes made by humanity in 
                                                 
312 Mayer D. Corporate Citizenship and Trustworthy Capitalism: Cocreating a More Peaceful Planet The 
American Business Law Association, Inc. American Business Law Journal 44 Am. Bus. L.J. 237; 271; 272. 
313 In relation to the diamonds originating from conflict areas. 
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diamond trade. Perhaps the focus of the international community now should be 
the rehabilitation of the affected communities as clearly aimed in the UN 2015 
Millennium Goals. This is exactly the initiative taken on by the Diamond 




ONESKY315 is a non-profit non-governmental (NGO) which has its focus in the 
sustainable use of the global environment. One Sky is registered in the province 
of British Columbia. This NGO focuses on pursuing solutions including 
appropriate technology green building and renewable energy in order to aid, 
sustain and develop personal human growth in harmony with the environment. In 
aiming to achieve this sustainable use of the global environment this NGO has 




‘We think of ourselves as social change agents in a world of 
shared challenges doing our best to “promote sustainable 
living globally”.  We work in some difficult and challenging 
places and we take on some of the world’s most pressing 
issues.  Our hope is that we can serve to inspire others and 
to inspire ourselves to live under One Sky.  The following 
pages explain some of the ways we approach this.’317
 
 
The projects of DDII intend in the initiatives for the rebuilding of communities 
affected by human rights abuses brought about by rebels through unlawful 
diamond trade. In the United Nations Millennium Development Goals Report 
2007 it was reported that over a million African and South American artisanal 
diamond diggers live in absolute poverty. This is because most of their countries 
                                                 
314 www.ddiglobal.org/pages/projects-tclp.php 20 October 2009. 
http://www.onesky.ca/projects/detail/leading_from_within 16 February 2010. 




are recovering from the ravages of war and are disadvantaged by working 
outside of the formal economy. One of the projects engaged in by the DDII 
among many other projects is to ensure that fair returns are promoted for 




The DDII is concerned with projects around the development of diamond 
standards that are in line with the KPCS. It is concerned with investigation the fair 
pay for diamond trade from those areas of the informal diamond sector. It is 
concerned with the using of artisanal diamond digging to empower women and to 
encourage environmental conservation and other initiatives that will support 
sustainable life after diamond mining. It is concerned with displaced children in 
areas of Sierra Leon and the DRC. Above all the DDII initiative is said to be 
aiming to achieve the global success of the KPCS when fully implemented.319
 
 
In the western world the KPCS is contained in the American Clean Diamonds 
Act320 which provides for penalties and statutory regimes for prosecuting those 
charged with smuggling conflict diamonds. This Act has been however criticized 
as having failed to date of prosecuting anyone. This is mainly because it is 
difficult for the prosecutors to discharge the burden of proving that the diamonds 
in question come from a conflict area. This is because often diamonds are small 




                                                 
318 www.ddiglobal.org/pages/projects-tclp.php 20 October 2009. 
319 Ibid. For example, the DDII initiative is running a project known as the ‘DDII’s Tukudimuna Project’. 
This project ‘seeks to prevent and remove children from working in the diamond mines in the Mbuji-Mayi 
region of DRC; to understand the dynamics and the political economy of child labour in artisanal diamond 
mining; and to find sustainable and replicable methodologies to end this practice.’ 
320 HR 1584. 
 
321 Tina Muscarella Gooch Conflict Diamonds or Illicit Diamonds: Should the Difference Matter to the 
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme? Natural resources Journal (2008) 48 Nat. Resources J. 189; 202. 
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Perhaps this obvious gap or impasse in the law for enforcing penalties for 
violating the KPCS is the reason why such matters concerning conflict diamonds 
have not entered the realms of legal persecution. On the other hand one may 
choose to be an optimist and adopt the view that the KPCS is working efficiently, 
however, this is dangerous naivety. Another safety guideline often adopted by 
the western world is to refuse to accept diamonds from conflict prone or 
suspected conflict diamonds altogether. This is of course the prerogative of any 
sovereign State in protecting its diamond trade interests. 
 
Much of this study leans towards a heavier reliance on the academic writing and 
international law against trading in conflict diamonds. These writings serve an 
important compass in the determination of the direction that the international 
community needs to take in eradicating conflict diamonds. Unfortunately these 
reviews are considered as the main sources of guidance and regulation for the 
eradication of conflict diamonds. It is submitted that this body of law and legal 
commentary will continue to advise the international community on the law and 
practical steps that have to be taken in order to keep diamond trade as clean as 
possible. However more of the voice of affected communities and their ideas on 
how to solve these conflict stones issues need to be captured as well. This is 
very important so that solutions are not only one sided elitist views on the 
problems faced by affected countries. 
 
It is important to truly understand the true picture of the sad realities and dangers 
of trading in conflict diamonds. To fuel conflict by illegal trade constitutes serious 
crimes322
                                                 
322 It must not be ignored that often war is accompanied by rapes and other kinds of sexual violence and in 
some cases genocide. See Article edited by Crook John R. Contemporary Practice of the United States 
Relating to International Law: Brief Notes The American Society of International Law (2008) 102 A.J.I.L. 
894. 
 against humanity. Therefore the combined international efforts to 
eradicate trade in the conflict diamond have metaphorically cleaned up diamond 
trade from the blood of war victims. Much has been written about blood 
diamonds in the international community and the common stance in the 
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submissions is clear, such illicit trade in diamonds is condemned. Obviously 
trading in illicit diamonds can cause even the most innocent of dealers to partake 
in such trade if such conduct is not regulated in law. 
 
At the same time law alone does not solve the entire situation of illicit diamond 
trade because there will always be criminal elements surrounding diamond trade. 
On the other hand at least at present there exists a process which forms a fresh 
start for clean diamond trade as resolved by various United Nations efforts. This 
basic understanding of the true effects of conflict diamonds is important for other 
areas of study, for instance, politics. It is important to note further that there are 
other criminal and political aspects that influence international trade in diamonds 
but this study is not mainly concerned with those aspects as much as it is with 
diamond trade. It is useful however to set out the broad relationship between 
socio-political aspects and the global economy. 
 
The US as a leading nation has had to set an example in the condemnation of 
trading in conflict diamonds. This was done when in addition to existing law in 
May 2008 the US tightened controls on blood diamonds. The US Department of 
the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control issued new regulations to strictly 
regulate trade in rough diamonds in support of the Kimberley Process 
Certification Scheme. The new regulations323 provide inter alia that the US 
government is committed to strengthening the international Kimberley Process 
Certification Scheme.324
 
 The truth is some of the weapons used by rebels came 
from illicit sources from developed nations. 
The US regulations325
                                                 
323 
 set out the following standards; firstly it is required that all 
rough diamond imports should be entered under a formal entry using US 
www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/ 26 November 2008, www.state.gov/e/eeb/diamonds 26 November 2008. 
324 Crook John R. Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law: Brief Notes 
The American Society of International Law (2008) 102 A.J.I.L. 894; 900. 
325 As required by the US’s commitment to clean diamond trade as per executive order 13312 
Implementing The Clean Diamond Trade Act. See http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/diamonds/ 25 March 2010. 
The US Rough Diamond regulations 21 May 2008 require strict account for all rough diamonds handled in 
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Customs and Border Protection Entry Summary, under government form CBP 
Form 7501. Informal entries valued less than $ 2,500 USD will not be allowed 
any longer under these regulations.326
 
 It is clear in this case that the law maker’s 
intention is to discourage potential seepage of blood diamonds through informal 
channels. This will affect the honest small scale diamond dealer by indirectly 
benefiting him or her to formalize his or her rough diamond exports into the US in 
a KPCS compliant manner. 
Further, it is required in terms of the regulations that rough diamond importers 
and exporters be required to file an annual report that includes the total amount 
of imported diamonds and export activity and stockpile activity from the period 
dating back to September 2008. The government of the US has strengthened the 
observation of the KPCS through the US Census Bureau which in terms of the 
regulations will oversee the authenticity of the KPCS Certificate. The US 
                                                                                                                                                 
the US. Rough Diamond Control Regulations promulgated under 56936 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 184 
/ Thursday, September 23, 2004 / Rules and Regulations available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/77549.pdf 25 March 2010. The Regulations provides 
follows: ‘On July 29, 2003, the President issued Executive Order 13312, to implement the Clean Diamond 
Trade Act (Pub. L. 108–19) and the multilateral Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for rough 
diamonds (KPCS). The Clean Diamond Trade Act requires the President, subject to certain waiver 
authorities, to prohibit the importation into, and exportation from, the United States of any rough diamond 
not controlled through the KPCS. This means shipments of rough diamonds between the United States and 
non-Participants in the KPCS generally are prohibited, and shipments between the United States and 
Participants are permitted only if they are handled in accordance with the standards, practices, and 
procedures of the KPCS set out in these regulations. The Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets 
Control (OFAC), acting pursuant to Executive Order 13312 and delegated authority, published the Rough 
Diamonds Control Regulations, 31 CFR part 592 (the Regulations), as an interim final rule on August 4, 
2003 (68 FR 45777). The Regulations, which are described in detail in the preamble to the interim final 
rule, implement the Clean Diamond Trade Act and the KPCS. OFAC requested public comments on the 
Regulations. No public comments were received. However, based on its experience and that of other 
agencies that also participate in the implementation and administration of the Clean Diamond Trade Act 
and the KPCS, OFAC is revising the Regulations in four respects: (1) To specify that the ultimate 
consignee is responsible for retaining the original Kimberley Process Certificate accompanying an 
importation into the United States; (2) to require the ultimate consignee to report the receipt of a shipment 
of rough diamonds to the relevant foreign exporting authority within 15 calendar days of the date that the 
shipment arrived at a U.S. port of entry; (3) to advise persons engaged in the diamond trade of a pending 
requirement of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (Customs) that customs brokers, importers, and filers 
making entry of a shipment of rough diamonds either submit through Custom’s Automated Broker 
Interface (ABI) system the unique identifying number of the Kimberley Process Certificate accompanying 
the shipment or, for non-ABI entries, indicate the certificate number on the Customs Form 7501 Entry 
Summary at each entry line; and (4) to clarify the country-of-origin reporting requirements for 
shipments…’ 
326 Crook John R. Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law: Brief Notes 
The American Society of International Law (2008) 102 A.J.I.L. 894; 900. 
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Government Accountability Office (GAO) is also another US government agency 
that has oversight of the trade in rough diamonds.327
 
 The US diamond laws 
pertaining to diamond trade bear a striking resemblance to South African 
diamond law thus illustrating international uniformity in the battle against the 
removal of conflict diamonds from clean diamond trade. 
It has been submitted that the lessons from Sierra Leone and blood diamonds 
are important to the international community when negotiating for positive 
change in the protection of human rights. While public awareness concerning 
blood diamonds was being created by various NGO groups it became quite 
apparent that the diamond industry itself wanted to see the end of trading in 
conflict diamonds. Through successful negotiations supported by a multi-
stakeholder forum, the banning of conflict diamonds became an international 
reality. It is submitted that one of the obstacles that had to be overcome included 
getting the WTO328 to develop policing mechanisms, criminal penalties and 
enforcement mechanisms against trading in blood diamonds.329
 
 
One of the concerns about diamond trade and conflict diamonds includes the 
debate of the impact of diamond mining on the environment itself. In her 
submissions, writer Kelley Kori argues that laboratory diamonds are a viable 
alternative to natural diamonds for environmental conservation purposes but 
warns that in the case of conflict diamonds, laboratory diamond producers may 
attempt to manipulate the market by creating doubt as to the cleanliness of the 
source of the natural diamond that has been purchased.330
 
 
                                                 
327 Crook John R. Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law: Brief Notes 
The American Society of International Law (2008) 102 A.J.I.L. 894; 901. 
328 Bhagirath Law Das The World Trade Organization A Guide to the Framework for International Trade, 
Zed Books Ltd. (1999) 47. 
329 Amadon C.D. Human Rights Committee Examines Ongoing Crisis in Darfur: Anguish and Alienation 
21 CBA Record 20; 70. 
330 Kelley K. Are Mined Diamonds Forever? The Emergence of Lab Diamonds and the Suppression of 
Conflict Diamonds Georgetown International Environmental Law Review (2008) 20 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. 
Rev. 451; 459. 
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While this market manipulation may be a reality since illicit diamonds continue to 
be a threat in diamond trade, writer argues that this problem can be solved by 
internal legal mechanisms of each country through the application of the KPCS 
methods.331
 
 The submissions made by the writer in this case are cogent as the 
abandonment of natural diamonds all together for the sake of avoiding all 
uncertain or potential conflict diamond trade may lead to a devastation of 
economies that are supported by legal and environmentally sound natural 
diamond production. 
Since it has been established that the KPCS methods are the appropriate 
international regulatory response to conflict diamonds, it is important to test 
whether the scheme has been effective or not otherwise the doctrine of 
effectiveness of this law will be mocked. Having noted that the regulations and 
processes under the KPCS are strictly and practically government enforced 
perhaps it is advisable to take the view that because of the monitoring the 
scheme is effective. However, when it comes to prosecuting or challenging in 
court the breach the KPCS rules implementation seems generally difficult for 
many countries particularly for the reason that the origin of the diamonds may be 
difficult to link to a conflict area in a particular arrest or charge. 
 
It has been submitted that there are countries who are struggling with the 
implementation of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. In Côte d’Ivoire 
(Ivory Coast), for example, it was found in 2006 that there were still large 
volumes of diamonds originating from a rebel-held area therefore the UNSC 
imposed a diamond embargo but this only resulted in diverted trade of conflict 
diamonds through neighboring countries.332
                                                 
331 Ibid. 
 Countries such as Brazil and 
Venezuela have also had struggles with the implementation of the KPCS and as 
a result illicit or conflict diamonds were entering legitimate diamond trade. 
Ultimately the fact that is if countries are unwilling to clean up their own trading 
332 Gooch T.M. Conflict Diamonds or Illicit Diamonds: Should the Difference Matter to the Kimberley 
Process Certification Scheme? Natural resources Journal (2008) 48 Nat. Resources J. 189; 208. 
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systems such problems will continue to exist. Therefore it is proposed that there 
should be more Government accountability333
 
 though methods that will prove that 
their diamond trade is KPCS compliant. 
1.5.2 The American Clean Diamonds Trade Act HR 1584 
The American law on conflict diamonds is listed clearly in the findings section of 
the American Clean Diamond Trade Act.334 It has been found that these findings 
are in agreement with the South African Diamonds Act335 regulations which aim 
to eradicate trade in conflict diamonds. It is stated in the findings section of the 
American Clean Diamond Trade Act336
 
 that conflict diamonds have led to 
devastating conditions for innocent victims caught in the middle of diamond 
conflicts. It is important in cases of human rights violations to see that the leading 
nations are participating in the condemnation of such violations. 
The American Clean Diamond Trade Act337
 
 provides that ‘Funds derived from the 
sale of rough diamonds are being used by rebels and State actors to finance 
military activities, overthrow legitimate governments, subvert international efforts 
to promote peace and stability, and commit horrifying atrocities against unarmed 
civilians. During the past decade, more than 6,500,000 people from Sierra 
Leone, Angola, and the DRC have been driven from their homes by wars waged 
in large part for control of diamond mining areas. A million of these are refugees 
eking out a miserable existence in neighboring countries, and tens of thousands 
have fled to the United States. Approximately 3,700,000 people have died during 
these wars.’ 
                                                 
333 For suggestions on codes and methods of government accountability see also, Marisa B. Van Saanen 
Paul Collier, Law and Codes for the ‘Resource Curse’ Symposium, Corporate Social Responsibility in the 
Extractive Industries: Yale Law School (2008). The writer here suggests that codes such as the Kimberley 
Process are important accountability tools for both the government and traders in the management of 
diamond resources in developing worlds. 
334 HR 1584. 
335 56 of 1986. 
336 HR 1584. 
337 HR 1584. 
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The American Clean Diamond Trade Act338 condemns trade in conflict diamonds. 
It calls for compliance with the KPCS and acknowledges the negative impact that 
trading in illicit diamonds has over legitimate diamond sources in Sub-Saharan 
Africa for countries such as South Africa, Namibia, Botswana and Tanzania.339
 
 
This Act came into force in 2003 making it an important step for the international 
community to see an influential country such as the US make an effort to 
criminalize trade in conflict diamonds.  
1.6 Diamond Laws of Some African Countries 
The study of international trade in light of the diamond mining sector must include 
a consideration of diamond laws of other African countries. A few of these 
countries’ diamond laws will be highlighted. This allows for a comparative study 
of South African diamond laws to determine where it is in legal development in 
comparison to other African States. Further, this consideration allows for a 
contribution to the Pan-African ideal while pointing out the effectiveness of the 
South African diamond regulation framework against trade in conflict diamonds. 
The countries considered here have in the past been the subject of conflict 
diamonds (with the exception of Nigeria) so it will be interesting to see how they 
have recovered in law to curb trade in conflict diamonds particularly in light of the 
development of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. 
 
Having studied the South African Diamonds Act340 it becomes more evident that 
the States of different countries in whichever part of the world should seek to 
develop their diamond regulation laws to improve their diamond industries. If you 
take for instance chapter seven of the South African Diamonds Act,341
                                                 
338 HR 1584. 
 it lists 
control measures that the government can exercise in controlling diamond 
trading. In line with international diamond trading standards, the government 
should strictly monitor, inspect and police the production, processing and trading 
339 Section 2(7), (8) and (9). 
340 56 of 1986. 
341 56 of 1986. 
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of diamonds. This chapter supports in South African law the Kimberly Process 
standards that governments exercise greater control over diamond activities in 
general to ensure that ‘conflict diamonds’ are excluded from the system.342
 
 
Chapter Seven of the South African Diamonds Act343
 
 provides for offences 
related to illegal acts and provides that any person who contravenes various 
provisions of the Act, particularly sections that are created to discourage rough 
diamond smuggling under the Act will be guilty of an offence. Naturally such 
conduct will attract criminal sanction and thus strengthen government internal 
control mechanisms of keeping diamond trade clean. With regard to the 
regulation and encouragement of clean diamond trade section 83 is directly 
relevant. Section 83(a) which criminalizes the delivery of an unpolished diamond 
in pursuance of an invalid agreement and (c) in particular, which criminalizes the 
contravention or failure to comply with conditions for a certificate under the Act 
are important statutory offences that will ensure that KPCS requirements are 
adhered to in South Africa. 
South African diamond regulatory system is water tight and therefore it is highly 
unlikely that the system can be compromised to allow conflict diamonds to enter 
it, or divert legitimate diamonds out and into illicit diamond trading markets. South 
Africa has efficient policing strategies and the State is reasonable and politically, 
stable political peace and respects human dignity. It is important however the 
KPCS is always respected. 
 
This contrasts sharply with the situation that obtained in Côte D’Ivoire during the 
civil strife. Huge diamond rich fields were in areas under rebel control. The 
diamonds were used to fund and fuel the internal strife since the proceeds were 
used by rebels to purchase armaments. The fact that Côte D’Ivoire proceeded to 
ban exports of diamonds had no effect. Diamonds found their way out to ready 
                                                 
342 Global Witness Report ‘Kimberly Process at Risk’, November (2006) 2. 
343 56 of 1986 section 82. 
 93 
markets such as those in Liberia, Mali and other countries that certified diamonds 
in terms of the KPCS.344
 
 
According to Global Witness, the Ministerial Order banning export of diamonds 
was necessitated by the fact that the country’s diamond mines are outside 
government control.345 During the civil strife in Sierra Leone in the 1990s, the 
government structures had broken down to such an extent that no government 
control of diamond mining could be exercised. An intelligent act taken by Belgium 
was to designate neighboring countries such as Mali as possible buyers of 
‘conflict diamonds’ from that country.346
 
 
In South Africa, there is neither diamond mining that can be done outside of the 
licensing and permit procedures nor diamond trading that can be done outside 
the registration procedures laid down in the Diamonds Act.347 Further, although it 
is possible, South Africa is not notorious as a destination for diamonds from 
conflict torn States. A huge possibility for conflict diamonds to have entered the 
South African system was during the civil war in Angola with the rebel movement 




The first country to consider in this section of the study is Angola. Angola is a 
participant of the KPCS. This means that the diamonds traded officially by it are 
free from conflict as required by the warranty of the KPCS.349 The existing 
Diamond Law of Angola, in the form of the Mining Law 1992,350 gives exclusive 
mineral rights to ENDIAMA,351
                                                 
344Global Witness Report ‘Kimberly Process at Risk’, November (2006) 11. 
 the State National Diamond Company to go into 
345 Ibid. 
346 Ibid. 
347 56 of 1998. 
348 Luvhengo Victor Multinational Corporations and Human Rights Violations in Africa Conflict Zones: 
The Case Study of Angola 1992 – 2005. A research report to the Department of International Relations, 
Master of Arts, University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. 
349 See figure 1. 
350 (1/92). 
351 The Angolan Mining Law provides that, ‘1.  The mining rights, exploration, reconnaissance,  
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joint venture with private foreign and local investors. Further this law makes 
provision for small-scale mining. The legislation was drafted by the Angolan 
Government with the assistance of the World Bank and the British Geological 
Survey.352
 
 This control by the State is evident in South African diamond trade 
laws in a similar fashion. 
The Angolan laws provide that all minerals belong to the State and this is 
enshrined in their Constitution. The Ministry of Geology and Mines regulates the 
manner in which exploration, development and activities of prospecting and 
mining ought to run. The Ministry grants prospecting licences which are issued 
for a maximum period of 5 years. Prospective licence or mining title holders must 
submit work plans and feasibility studies prior to licenses or mining titles being 
granted. They must also demonstrate that they have a programme which will 
allow for the training and employment of Angolans.353
 
 
The Angolan Mining Law 1992,354 not only makes reference to the important of 
marketing their diamonds,355 it also uniquely provides for a protection zones 
section in the law which will ensure the future existence of the diamond by 
preventing extinction of the diamond.356
                                                                                                                                                 
 exploitation, processing and marketing of diamonds throughout the  national, including the continental 
shelf and exclusive economic zone,  
  
will be exclusively granted to ENDIAMA - UEE, or companies  
mixed in that it participates, in accordance with Law No. 1 / 92.  
2.  The rights referred to in the preceding paragraph may be exercised  
directly by ENDIAMA-UUT, or joint ventures in which  
she participates in accordance with Law No. 1 / 92, and will be assigned a case,  
through a concession contract to be approved by decree of the Council of  
Ministers, under the same law.’ 
352 http://www.mbendi.co.za/indy/ming/af/an/p0005.htm 14 October 2009. 
353 Ibid. 
354 (1/92). 
355 Article 8 read together with a recurring theme of marketing the diamond. It is submitted that this is the 
ideal manner in which the State is protecting its mineral resources by upholding the integrity of the 
diamond. 
356 Article 15 which provides as follows: ‘ 1.  Are protection zones:  
 a) the areas corresponding to the tracks of land surrounding areas  
 restricted to establish a distance up to 5 km, from the limits  
 external demarcation of mining;  
 b) the areas corresponding to the occurrences of diamonds found in  
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The Angolan diamond mining laws have a similar spirit to the South African 
diamond laws. Not only does State control diminish conflict but it allows for the 
use of the country’s resources to empower its people through training and 
providing employment for the Angolans. This is in line with the BEE efforts and 
equitable access to diamonds captured in the South African diamond laws. 
 
1.6.2 The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
The DRC is currently a participant of the Kimberley Process Certification 
Scheme. This is a major step in eradicating conflict diamonds in a country which 
has seen much tragedy as a result of conflict diamonds. The conflict diamonds in 
the DRC revolve around poorly paid diggers who are taken advantage of by 
rebels.357 It was reported that358 that since the KPCS became operative in the 
DRC officially traded diamonds are accounted for and come from reliable 
sources, although this process is constantly being monitored in the case of the 
DRC. Legitimate diamond trade in the DRC can do much to improve the 
country’s infrastructure and economy. The summary report provided the following 
information on the KPCS and the DRC in 2004.359
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 under a prospecting license, plus a full surround  
 establish a distance up to 5 km, from the outer limits of  
 deposits or deposits protected in the period elapsing between the  
 discovery of occurrences grants from royalties "  
 2.  The buffer zones shall be marked on the ground through  
 marks and signs, clearly visible and legible, facing outwards  
 and located at the vertices of geometric figures that define, so  
 as the point of intersection with the roads and public  
 containing the word 'protection zone diamonds - Stay  
 prohibited "and an indication of the operating company.  
 3.  Protection Areas referred to in b) of paragraph 1 shall  
 remain with the same or other limits, where, in  
 occurrences of diamonds protected areas are demarcated exploration  
 craft.  
 4.  AREAS; PROTECTION is established by the Ministry of  
 Geology and Mining, at the request of the utilities and are intended to prevent  
a subtracção, extinção e tráfico ilícito de diamantes,  subtraction, extinction and illicit diamonds.’ 
357 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7060420.stm  
358 www.kimberleyprocess.com/download/getfile/61 24 February 2010. Summary of Review Visit Report on 
the DRC conducted by the KPCS fraternity. 
359 Ibid. 
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‘Diamond production in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) today is largely artisanal, with the active participation 
of at least 700,000 Congolese Creuseurs. The lead 
authority with responsibility for the implementation of the 
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme ( KPCS) in the 
DRC is the Centre d’Evaluation, d’Expertise et de 
Certification des Substances Minérales Précieuses et Semi-
précieuses (CEEC). The main elements required to 
implement the KPCS in the DRC are in place. However, 
further efforts are needed to tighten controls over artisanal 
mining and improve coordination between the various 
authorities involved in the implementation of the KPCS. 
Other improvements should also be made on import 
procedures and production statistics.’360
 
 
In 2008, four years after the initial report summarized above, a report by the 
Chair of the KPCS fraternity addressed the plenary on the DRC’s KPCS 
compliance strategies and stated that a Working Monitoring Group would 
continue to investigate that the DRC is adhering to the requirements of the 
KPCS.361 It is submitted that the efforts of the KPCS fraternity have been 
significant in at least conscientising the DRC about the unlawfulness of trading in 
conflict diamonds through the international bodies KPCS Working Monitoring 
Group. However, the DRC mining legislation362
 
 does not make any reference to 
the KPCS. 
The DRC mining legislation is contained in the Mining Code.363
                                                 
360 www.kimberleyprocess.com/download/getfile/61 24 February 2010. 
 The objective of 
this law was to secure interests of mining operators as well as protect the 
Congolese State. This law applies together with a regulation text referred to as 
361 www.kimberleyprocess.com/download/getfile/820 24 Frebruary 2010.  
362 Law No. 007/2002 of July 11 Relating to the Mining Code. 




 The law allows for the granting of mining rights for 
exploration and exploitation to eligible individuals as well as legal entities. 
In terms of the DRC Mining Code the Exploration Licence is real property and 
exclusive right. The right may be ceded and it is also transferable. This position is 
distinguishable in South African law. In terms of the Diamonds Act365
 
 certain 
conditions have to be met before a licence can be transferred and this is only 
limited to natural persons. The section provides that, 
‘ transfer of licences by juristic persons is prohibited, unless 
a licensee is a natural person who has acquired the 
approval of the Regulator to transfer his licence in terms of 
s 34, he shall not in any manner dispose of his licence or 




In terms of the Congolese Mining Code, the Mining Registrar is responsible for 
making decisions regarding applications made for obtaining exploitation licenses. 
One of the conditions for granting of the license is the demonstration by the 
applicant that there exists an economically profitable deposit. This must be done 
through a presentation of a feasibility study with a technical framework plan for 
the development, construction and exploitation work for the mine.367
 
 This method 
of granting relevant mining licenses is in line with South African and Angolan 
mining law with a slight difference in the naming of the registering authority. 
One of the interesting attributes of the Congolese Mining Code is that it 
addresses the issue of small-scale mining. A licence known as the ‘Exploitation 
Certificate of Small Scale Mining’, issued by the Congolese Mining Registrar 
                                                 
364 www.miningcongo.cd/pdf_divers/guide_of_mining_investor.pdf 20 March 2008. 
365 56 of 1986 section 33. 
366 Diamonds act 56 0f 1986 section 33. 
367 www.miningcongo.cd/pdf_divers/guide_of_mining_investor.pdf 20 March 2008. 
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confers the rights to its holder to exploit the mineral substances for which it is 
especially issued. This type of licence has a variable term of validity. However, 
such term may not exceed ten years including renewals.368
 
  
The Congolese Mining Code369 makes provision for artisanal exploitation of 
diamondous zones for which technical and economical factors do not allow an 
industrial or semi-industrial exploitation.370
 
 The regulation of small-scale mining 
in Congolese law is a plausible method of dealing with accounting for the 
production of diamonds which may come from sources other than those created 
by larger industry conglomerates. This is a positive step in ensuring some kind of 
equity in diamond production. The obvious danger is to have unregistered small-
scale miners as it would be difficult to account for the sources of such diamonds. 
However with the KPCS participation in place Congolese diamond mining law is 
greatly developing. 
The Congolese Mining Code371 provides for authorized trading houses372 access 
to which is regulated in law. Further in these trading houses are unlimited in 
number373this means that there is easier access to the industry however the 
number of purchasers per trading house is limited in law. It is submitted that this 
is to set up boundaries so that the industry is accessible but not flooded with 
limitless buyers. The authorised trading houses are subject to inspection or 
supervision by the DRC Mines Authority and are expected to pay due taxes in 
terms of the law.374
 
  
                                                 
368 www.miningcongo.cd/pdf_divers/guide_of_mining_investor.pdf 20 March 2008. 
369 Law No. 007/2002 of July 11 Relating to the Mining Code. 
370 www.miningcongo.cd/pdf_divers/guide_of_mining_investor.pdf 20 March 2008. 
371 Law No. 007/2002 of July 11 Relating to the Mining Code. 
372 Article 120. 
373 Article 121 
374 Article 126(a), (b), (c) and (d). It is submitted that the regulation of a trading house under the DRC law, 
although it does not distinguish diamonds per se, the regulation of a mineral trading house is in line with 
that of the South African Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 section 44 which provides that only registered premises 
may be used as diamond trading houses. 
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The implications of tax that arise of mining activities under the Congolese Mining 
Code375 are provided for in the same law as the mining code. This is unlike the 
South African Diamonds Act376 which must be read together with separate 
diamond taxation statute in the form of the Diamond Export Levy (Administration) 
Act.377 Further the Congolese Mining Code378 provides for the contingencies of 
mining such as fortuitous379 events, corruption of State civil servants380 and other 




As a result of the areas that the Congolese Mining Code383 regulates, it forms an 
elaborate document with many articles. However the most important aspect of 
the Congolese Mining Code384 related to the issue of dispute resolution. The 
Code provides for the following avenues of dispute resolution: administrative 
appeals,385 the judicial system386 and domestic387 or international arbitration.388 
Most importantly the Congolese Mining Code389provides for the encouragement 
and support of a partnership with the DRC State when exercising rights in terms 
of the Congolese Mining Code390
 
 
1.6.3 Sierra Leone 
Sierra Leone is a participant to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. This 
is a very important legal development to a country that was ravaged by war 
funded through conflict diamonds. Conflict diamonds were used by the brutal 
                                                 
375 Law No. 007/2002 of July 11 Relating to the Mining Code. Article 219, 220 -235. 
376 56 of 1986. 
377 14 of 2007. 
378 Law No. 007/2002 of July 11 Relating to the Mining Code. Article 219, 220 -235. 
379 Article 297. 
380 Article 307. 
381 Article 299. 
382 Article 313. 
383 Law No. 007/2002 of July 11 Relating to the Mining Code. Article 219, 220 -235. 
384 Law No. 007/2002 of July 11 Relating to the Mining Code. 
385 Article 312. 
386 Article 315. 
387 Article 318. 
388 Article 319. 
389 Law No. 007/2002 of July 11 Relating to the Mining Code. 
390 Law No. 007/2002 of July 11 Relating to the Mining Code. Article 332. 
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rebels to finance their military activities leaving thousands of civilians dead and 
many more maimed. 
 
The adoption of the KPCS by the Sierra Leonean government served to change 
the trajectory of the diamond industry. The objective of the KPCS is to eradicate 
trade in diamonds from rebel controlled regions. However, there are some 
challenges facing the efficacy of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. 
These challenges include the existence of corruption in the ranks of Sierra Leone 
officials who allow diamond smuggling to continue. Further challenges include 
illegal mining, environmental damage,391 poor working conditions, including child 
labour and corrupt practices that still persist in the country.392
 
  
The law applicable in Sierra Leone in relation to mining is the Mines and Minerals 
Act.393 With regard to the environment, the Mines and Minerals Act394
 
 provides 
as follows:  
‘in deciding whether or not to grant a mineral right, the 
Minister of Mines shall take into account the need to 
conserve the natural resources…. The Minister shall require 
environmental impact assessments as prescribed as a 
condition for granting a mining lease.’  
 
This law is important to Sierra Leone to address the negative environmental 
effects created by illegal mining. Often illegally mined areas are left bare without 
any environmental rehabilitation. 395
                                                 
391 See Kelley K. Are Mined Diamonds Forever? The Emergence of Lab Diamonds and the Suppression of 
Conflict Diamonds Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 20 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 451; 
464  - 465. Mining natural diamonds has been linked to grave environmental and social consequences 
particularly for developing countries. 
 
392 http://archives.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/africa/10/12/sierraleone.ap/ 26 June 2008. 
393 5 of 1994. 
394 5 of 1994. 
395 See Kelley K. Are Mined Diamonds Forever? The Emergence of Lab Diamonds and the Suppression of 
Conflict Diamonds Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 20 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 451; 
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The Mines and Minerals (Amendment) Act396 of Sierra Leone was introduced to 
provide for matters related to sale of precious minerals by licence holders and 
unlawful possession of precious minerals. According to the Mines and Minerals 
(Amendment) Act397 which is in line with the South African law on the unlawful 
possession398 the Mines and Minerals (Amendment) Act399
 
 of Sierra Leone 
provides that, 
 ‘any person who is in possession of any precious mineral 
and who fails to prove that he is in lawful possession of 
such minerals commits an offence.’400
 
 
The Diamond Cutting and Polishing Act401 is the most recent law relating to the 
diamond industry in Sierra Leone. This law came into force at the time when the 
KPCS is active in the diamond industry of Sierra Leone. It is therefore a statute 
that reflects the developments in law in light of the international aims of 
eradicating illicit diamonds. This Diamond Cutting and Polishing Act402 came into 
force on 5 April 2007 and provides for the control of diamond cutting and 
polishing, licensing of diamond cutters and polishers and defining the rights and 
duties of a licensee and other matters connected therewith.403
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
464  - 465. Mining natural diamonds has been linked to grave environmental and social consequences 
particularly for developing countries. 
396 1 of 1999. 
397 1 of 1999. 
398 Diamonds Act 56 of 1986. Sections 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25 that possession, sale, purchase, 
assistance by a non-licensed person, dealing, processing, erection and operation of machinery, export of 
unpolished diamonds is prohibited unless such activities are conducted within the lawful manner 
established within the Act. 
399 1 of 1999. 
400 Section 118 B(1). 
401 2 of 2007. 
402 2 of 2007. 
403 See short title. 
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The most important aspect of the Diamond Cutting and Polishing Act404 of Sierra 
Leone is that it makes the KPCS applicable in local legislation. In terms of 
section 7(1) of the Diamond Cutting and Polishing Act405 a licensee has a right to 
buy, deal in, export, import as well as cut, polish, crush, or set diamonds in tools, 
implements or other articles or otherwise alter diamonds for purposes of trade. 
Section 7(d) further states that ‘…carry on operations authorized by his licence 
only, emphasis, in accordance with the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme’. 
The statute’s use of the word only makes it imperative that the KPCS is observed 
in Sierra Leone. It is clear through the Diamond Cutting and Polishing Act406
 
 of 
Sierra Leone that there is a great effort to improve the local beneficiation 




Nigeria is a country that is not a large producer of diamonds, however diamond 
trade regulation does form part of Nigerian law. Nigeria will be used here as an 
example of an African country that is not part of the Kimberley Process 
Certification Scheme. Nigeria is considered here to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of laws in an African country without the Kimberley Process 
Certification Scheme. This study will demonstrate how Nigeria has opted to deal 
with the problem of illicit diamond trade which has plagued the African diamond 
producing countries.   
 
Nigerian law regulating diamond trade is contained in the Minerals and Mining 
Decree407 In terms of the Minerals and Mining Decree408
                                                 
 404 2 of 2007. 
 control of property in 
minerals vests in the State. Chapter II of the Decree regulates diamond trade. In 
405 2 of 2007. 
406 2 of 2007. 
407 No. 34 of 1999. 
408 No. 34 of 1999. 
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terms of section 147 of the Minerals and Mining Decree409
 
 only an authorized 
diamond miner or a licensed dealer may sell or buy an uncut diamond provided 
that such an uncut diamond has been lawfully obtained. Section 148 provides 
that uncut diamonds may not be exported from Nigeria or imported into Nigeria 
without clearance from the Minister.  
Similar to South African law, the Nigerian Decree provides in terms of section 
150 that every uncut diamond be registered by the licensed diamond dealer. 
Every transaction relating to that registered uncut diamond must be recorded. 
Further, section 151 provides that a person who has possession, control or 
power over an uncut diamond is guilty of an offence under the Decree unless he 
can prove that he lawfully obtained such a diamond. Section 154 makes it a 
statutory offence to contravene the licensing, registration and possession 
provisions stated in the Decree.   
 
It is clear that the Nigerian Minerals and Mining Decree operates in essence in 
the same manner as the South African Diamonds Act410
 
 and the MPRDA with the 
exception that the Decree does not make references to the Kimberley Process 
Certification Scheme. One may argue however that the Nigerian diamond trade 
legislation complies with basics of the KPCS as it strictly monitors its diamond 
trade and ensures the lawfulness of the method of obtaining diamonds dealt with 
in the Federation of Nigeria. 
1.6.5 Tanzania 
The discussion of Tanzanian diamond trade in this instance will be a brief 
commentary and acknowledgment of the structural form of the legislation that 
governs the diamond industry of this African State. Famous for the precious 
                                                 
409 No. 34 of 1999. 
410 56 of 1986. Sections 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25 that possession, sale, purchase, assistance by a 
non-licensed person, dealing, processing, erection and operation of machinery, export of unpolished 
diamonds is prohibited unless such activities are conducted within the lawful manner established within the 
Act. The MPRDA, section 2, is also similar to the above Nigerian diamond law in that establishes the 
State’s custodianship over its own mineral resources.  
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stone ‘tanzanite’ named after the country; Tanzania is a State that is largely 
endowed with mineral deposits. It is therefore only natural that a large industry 
player such as De Beers would formulate a partnership with the Tanzanian 
government to exploit the country’s diamond resources.411
 
 It is important to 
mention at the outset that Tanzania is a participant of the KPCS although like 
South Africa and Botswana conflict diamonds have historically not been a serious 
problem in Tanzania. 
It appears from the reported Tanzanian case in Commissioner General of Income 
Tax v Diamond Corporation Tanzania Limited412 that historically Tanzanian 
diamond trade has reflected above board trade practices. This case shows the 
foreign diamond companies’ trade methods that were generally observed in 
Tanzanian diamond laws. From this case one is able to see the foreign diamond 
company’s relationship with the State agencies that stood to collect tax from 
them. It is submitted that this case represents a historical perspective of 
Tanzanian diamond trade law. Further, it appears that Tanzania has had 
practices that were subject to careful government control with mining tax 




The case above cogently discussed and dealt with taxation for profits earned in 
Tanzanian diamond trading and illustrates that Tanzanian diamond trade has a 
historical background showing legally sound corporate practices that were 
enforced by legitimate court systems. This is very true for the history of South 
African diamond trade with the exception that South African diamond laws were 
historically unfair because of racial discrimination. 
 
                                                 
411 www.idexonline.com 29 October 2009 www.diamondnews.com/tanzania diamond.htm 29 October 
2009. 
412 (Civil Appeal No. 12 of 1970) [1970] EACA 2 (9 June 1970). 
413 See judgments of Mustafa J.A. and Law J.A. 
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In 2006, some of the controversies raised in national media pertaining to the 
Tanzania diamond industry involved issues surrounding a committee report 
probe of the Tanzanian Diamond Sorting Office (Transort) and its London 
Trading Centre which was to be tabled before the Tanzanian parliament. The 
investigating committee was tasked with a mandate of investigating Transort’s 
activities and methods of payment of royalties emanating from diamond sales. 
There was an apparent concern at the inception of the committee project that 
there needed to be a probe into the dubious nature of the contracts entered into 
with foreign companies who did not have the interests of Tanzania at heart.414
 
 
The Tanzanian government in an effort to protect its national mining interests 
formulated a minerals policy in 1997 however it has been reported in 2007 that 
the country still lacked a comprehensive approach to monitoring Tanzanian 
diamond trade.415 The law that is currently applicable to diamond trade in 
Tanzania is contained in the Mining Act.416 The law currently deals with national 
mining interests by seeking to benefit its citizens by encouraging mining firms to 
buy goods and services locally when they are available.417 The theme of the 
Tanzanian Mining Act418 reflects the sentiments of the South African Diamonds 
Act419
 
 which encourages the use of local beneficiation or use of local mineral 
related goods and services this in turn has a socio-economic effect of ensuring a 
form of broad-based economic empowerment. 
It is not necessary to expound on all the provisions of the Tanzanian Mining 
Act420
                                                 
414 www.nationmedia.com/eastafrican 29 October 2009. 
 it is important to consider a few of the main provisions of the Act as a 
comparator to the South African diamond regulations. The Tanzanian Mining 
415 Ibid. 
416 1998.  
417 www.miningmx.com 29 October 2009. 
418 1998.  
419 Diamonds Act 56 of 1986, see section 5 and 15, as amended, by the Diamonds Amendment Act 29 of 
2005 read together with section 26 of the MPRDA. 
420 1998.  
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Act421 regulates mined minerals and not petroleum which contrasts with the 
South African diamond legislation which tends to allow for the mineral and 
petroleum resources laws to be read together.422
 
 
The Tanzanian Mining Act423 is similar to the South African Diamonds Act424 in 
that it has inherent Constitutionally sound principles such as concern for the 
environment and sustainable development425 as illustrated in the Tanzanian 
Mining Act426
 
 and in particular and more expressly section 38(5) of the Act which 
provides that  
‘every applicant for a special mining licence shall 
commission and produce to the Minister an environmental 
impact assessment on the proposed mining operations from 
independent consulate of the international standing 
shortlisted by the applicant and approved, by the 
Government of the United Republic.’427
 
 
The Tanzanian Mining Act428 further provides substantially for the regulation of 
licences for mineral rights,429 the mining licence430
                                                 
421 1998.  
 and rights pertaining to 
provisions for additional requirements in respect of certain licences and primary 
422 Part I Preliminary Provisions point 3. In South African law, the Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 is read 
together with the MPRDA 28 of 2002 and both statutes regulate access to the use of the South African 
Republic’s mineral resources and petroleum. 
423 1998.  
424 56 of 1986 section 5(1) for example which regulates the support of the local beneficiation industry read 
together with the MPRDA sections 26 and 100. 
425 Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 read together with the MPRDA sections 37 - 46 and section 28 of the 
National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998. Section 22 of the Environment Conservation Act 73 
of 1989. 
426 1998 sections 34(I)(b), 35(3) and section 38(4)(d).  
427 See also ‘section 64.-(l) Where the mining operations intended to be carried out under a mining licence 
or a gemstone mining licence fall within a scale of operations set out in the Regulations, the applicant for 
the mining licence or the gemstone mining licence shall commission and produce an environmental impact 
assessment on the proposed mining operations from independent consultants…’ 
428 1998.  
429 Section 13. 
430 Section 46. 
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licences.431 With regards to exclusive primary area licences432 the dealer’s and 
broker’s licence433 the Tanzanian Mining Act434 contains elaborate regulatory 
terms of the Tanzanian mining industry. There appears therefore to be a rigorous 
approach to regulating access to the Tanzanian diamond industry as similarly 
provided for in the South African Diamonds Act.435
 
  
The Tanzanian Mining Act436 deals with criminal offences relating to licences 
however the Tanzanian laws pertaining to criminal prohibitions and offences are 
not as rigorous as those provided for in the South African Diamonds Act.437
 
  
On the point of prevention on conflict diamonds, the Tanzanian Mining Act438 
unlike the South African Diamonds Act439
                                                 
431 Sections 64 and 65. 
 does not mention the KPCS, which 
seems undesirable for a Tanzanian diamond relates law since Tanzania is a 
participant. It is possible however that Tanzania has other pressing legislative 
432 Sections 71 and 72. 
433 Part V sections 73 to 75. 
434 1998.  
435 56 of 1986 section 3 which provides for the SADPMR and sections 26 – 39 which provides for licences 
and permits in order to regulate access to the industry. 
436 1998 section 74(b) and section 81(c). See section 74 whole which provides for grant of licence and 
criminal sanction. The Tanzania Act states that ‘Grant of 74.-(I) An applicant for a Dealer's Licence Whose 
dealer’s application was properly made as provided in section 73 shall licence entitled to the grant of a 
dealer's licence for which he has applied unless - 
(a) he has previously held a dealer's licence and he is not entitled to renew that dealers licences as provided 
in subsection (4) of section 75; or 
(i) 
he has surrendered his dealer's licences without sufficient reason for so doing; 
(ii) 
(b) he has been convicted of a criminal offence relating to the buying and selling, or possession of raw gold 
or gemstones.’ See section 81 ‘Grant of 81.-(I) An applicant for a broker's licence whose broker's 
application was properly made as provided under section 80 shall licence be entitled to the grant of a 
broker's licence unless - 
(a) he is disqualified from holding a broker's licence under subsection(3) of section 80; 
(b) he previously held a broker's licence and was disqualified from obtaining a renewal of that licence 
under section 83; 
(c) he has been convicted of a criminal offence relating to the buying, possession, and export or selling of 
raw gold or gemstones. 
(2) A broker's licence granted under this section shall be valid for a period of twelve months from the date 
of issue.’ 
437 56 of 1986 sections 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25. 
438 1998.  
439 56 of 1986. 
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needs other than dealing robustly in law with conflict diamond provisions which 
may not be a pressing issue on their legislative agenda. In conclusion of the 
consideration of Tanzanian diamond law, is submitted that the consideration of 
the Tanzanian diamond regulations certainly creates an opportunity to exchange 
diamond law development ideals in order to ensure that Africa’s diamonds are 
dealt with in an optimal and most economically and environmentally sound 
manner. 
 
1.7 Conclusion  
This chapter has investigated the diamond regulatory framework of South Africa 
through a historical timeline by analyzing the progress in the developments which 
have resulted in modern diamond regulations. It is submitted that South Africa 
has significantly shifted away from economic unfairness. There are still 
challenges with the implementation of equality in practice as contained in the 
ideals of written law. It is submitted however that with positive changes in law 
have ameliorated the situation. 
 
It has been established in this chapter that with the dawning of the Constitutional 
era through the government of national unity, many developments have taken 
place in the country’s diamond laws. What is evident in the theme of the 
developments in South African diamond law is that South Africa has taken 
positive legislative action to develop more Constitutionally sound national 
diamond laws while taking part in the international understanding440
 
 and efforts to 
keep international diamond trade free from illicit and more specifically conflict 
diamonds.  
These developments in national diamond laws clearly illustrate that by 2009 
Constitutional values of fairness, equitable access to national resources and 
justice have been fully captured in South Africa’s legislation. This is evident in the 
form of enabling statutory law and regulations as well as the international laws as 
                                                 
440 In the form of the KPCS. 
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adopted by the United Nations. These laws are being actively applied internally 
and externally in South African diamond trade activities with the purpose of 
achieving international harmony for the common good of the Republic by 
encouraging broad based socio-economic empowerment and equal access to 
resources for all South Africans and the common good of mankind as a whole by 
enacting methods of diamond trade that will condemn and curb trade in conflict 
diamonds. 
 
The legislative survey of the South African Constitutionally based diamond laws 
when compared to the provisions of other diamond trading States illustrates 
legislative leadership which can be used as a basis and model for other States to 
strengthen their existing diamond laws.  
 
This is not to suggest that South African diamond law is a flawless model as it is 
possible and encouraged that South Africa undertakes to learn from the diamond 
laws of other countries. One of the main lessons from the diamond laws of other 
countries expounded in this chapter is that South Africa is on par with the most 
progressive statutory provisions that regulate the diamond industries of other 
foreign States. For example the environmental impact concerns, the internal 
procedures for licensing and other authorizations and finally the participation in 
the KPCS shows the progressive trend of national diamond laws. 
 
The constant re-evaluation of diamond law developments and study mirrored 
against other diamond trading States will assist South Africa to continue to 
develop a diamond industry that is flourishing. The industry can flourish through 
the attraction of foreign investment and national skills development by 
encouraging the use of local goods and services in diamond trade. State policy 
for the diamonds and minerals sector supports these developments. It is 
submitted in conclusion that South Africa has set cogent and rigorous laws to 
successfully eradicate conflict diamonds which perpetrates the violation of 
human rights while having achieved significant success in moving towards the 
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achievement of equity in the utilization of national mineral resources and for the 
purposes of this study, the utilization of national diamond resources. 
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Chapter 2: Diamond Sales and the Regulatory 
 
2.1 Introduction 
It is essential in this study of South African diamond regulation laws to investigate 
the extent to which the regulatory framework facilitates and promotes diamond 
trade through sales transactions as this is at the core of sustaining the industry. 
The ultimate objective of diamond related companies, as any other commercial 
entity, is to be involved in profitable business either by selling a product or 
providing a service. The diamond sales concern the selling of the finished 
diamond product either as a jewellery piece, a rough diamond or diamonds or cut 
and polished diamonds. The sale may also involve the sale of diamonds for 
industrial purposes. It may be some competition from the laboratory diamond 
sector however this study is only concerned with the diamond mineral as it 
occurs in nature. 
 
Diamonds by nature are luxury items of significant value that last for generations 
therefore properly managed diamond sales generally contribute to a diamond 
producing State’s GDP441
 
 in a significant way. 
Sales, whether national or international, form the economic base of all industry 
whether, the achieved are through the traditional markets, legally regulated 
structures or e-bay. International trade is one of the most regulated commercial 
activities and it is important to understand such regulation particularly for the 
purposes of this chapter. International trade or sales such as the recession that is 
taking place in international markets which have had a devastating impact on 
international trade in 2007-09. Other challenges include threats such as criminal 
elements as in the case of illegal supply of poached ivory as reported by 
investigations by the International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW).442
                                                 
441 
 In the 
www.dme.org.za 21 march 2010.  Report R61/2007. 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0441/P04413rdQuarter2007.pdf 25 March 2010. 
442 Brown Jonathan Illegal Trade in Ivory Boosted by eBay Sales’ 21 May 2007 The Independent 
Newspaper, UK. 
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same way diamond sales are also threatened by the existence of black market 
trading. 
 
Further, various laws in the form of tax incentives and other regulation are being 
adopted in many countries to bolster exportation of own products and services. 
This is a trend which is evident in South African diamond regulations as will be 
seen in the progression of this chapter.443 In South Africa the MPRDA and the 
Diamonds Act444
 
 both encourage local beneficiation of South African minerals in 
order to obtain a higher value for such products in the international market and to 
uplift the local beneficiation market skills and to attract revenue from cutting and 
polishing diamonds. 
However, questions arise in the case of diamond sales with regard to who is 
responsible for ensuring that issues of access and equity expressed in diamond 
laws are implemented in the diamond sales market, whether locally or 
internationally. Further, it is important to study the institutions or business and 
market structures involved in determining viable diamond prices and diamond 
trade. It will be shown herein that the study of international diamond sales from a 
legal perspective is imperative in any study of diamond trade. 
 
To avoid duplication of the discussion of the Diamonds Act445 in chapter one will 
endeavor to focus only on the aspects of the Diamonds Act446
 
 that relate only to 
the sales aspect of diamond laws. There will be a particular focus on the duties of 
the State organs, discussed in chapter one, in ensuring that such diamond sales 
are conducted within the confines of equity and fairness. There will therefore be a 
study of diamond market regulation in the broad sense as well as a particular 
focus on involvement of South Africa in international diamond market regulation. 
                                                 
443 Thomson Reuters West Corpus Juris Secundum: Internal Revenue P. Taxation of Foreign Earned 
Income and Income of Aliens and Foreign Corporations (2008) 2. 
444 56 of 1986. 
445 56 of 1986. 
446 56 of 1986. 
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The chapter will consider diamond sales regulations in order to cast light on how 
global economic influences drive and affect diamond sales. This is done through 
the study of the legal and economic participation of diamond stakeholders in 
South Africa insofar in both local and international markets. Diamond market 
issues will be analysed with reference to the world economic downturn which 
took place in 2008 and 2009 or global financial crisis (GFC). 
 
The view upon which this chapter is premised upon is that pertinent international 
market trends often have an influence on the national trends.447 It is however 
submitted with respect that though international diamond market forces are 
influential to national diamond trade trends and laws, South Africa remains a 
sovereign State endowed with all the legislative powers to make and adopt 
necessary laws and regulations to make its diamond sales internationally 
competitive. This State sovereignty is expressly recognized by the MPRDA.448
 
 
This chapter also examines important local institutions and other private business 
stakeholders in the diamond market such as the SDT as established under the 
Diamonds Act449 and the SADPMR. In the private sector study this chapter will 
examine450
 
 past traditional monopolies and of current important players in the 
diamond market such as the De Beers Group, which has gained a success and 
fame in diamond production and trade. 
The aim is to give a broader understanding of diamond laws and ultimately to 
illustrate whether or not the ideals expressed in South African diamond legal 
policies are being achieved from the diamond sales perspective which in 
                                                 
447 This view was confirmed by the Constitutional Court in Richter v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 
2009 (3) SA 615 (CC), where the court stated at page 368 E – F. of the judgment that: ‘In reaching this 
conclusion I am influenced by the fact that, as several of the parties noted, we now live in a global 
economy which provides opportunities to South African citizens and citizens from other countries to study 
and work in countries other than their own. The experience that they gain will enrich our society when they 
return, and will no doubt enrich, too, a sense of a shared global citizenship.’ 
448 28 of 2002 section 2(a). 
449 56 of 1986. 
450 Chapter 3 of this contribution. 
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essence together with mining, marketing and demand for product ultimately form 
the crux of the industry. The importance of co-operation between the State and 
private entities will be highlighted especially in forging economic relationships 
and strategies that will benefit all citizens of South Africa. 
 
2.2 The South African Diamond and Precious Metals Regulator 
2.2.1 The SADPMR Regulations  
The South African Diamond and Precious Metals Regulator, SADPMR (herein 
referred to as the Regulator), is established under of the Diamonds Act,451 as 
amended. The Regulator has a Board constituted by members which are 
appointed by the Minister in terms of the Diamonds Act.452 The day to day 
functions of the Regulator are the responsibility of appointed Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) appointed by the Minister subject to instructions and directions 
issued by the Board. The persons appointed as members of the Board and the 




The definitions of the SDT454 and the SADPMR455 must be understood as those 
defined in terms of the Diamonds Amendment Act.456 The amending law was 
subsequently created to further ensure that the policy on local beneficiation and 
broad-based economic empowerment is regulated.457
 
 
Since the defining provisions relating to the Regulator458have been clearly 
provided by the Diamonds Amendment Act459 and the latest diamond regulations 
as promulgated in the Government Gazette dated 4 April 2008460
                                                 
451 56 of 1986 section 3(1). 
 are crucial in 
452 56 of 1986 section 6(2). 
453 Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 sections 8(d), 17A and 17B(1)(d). 
454 Diamonds Amendment Act 29 of 2005 section 1(p). 
455 Diamonds Amendment Act 29 of 2005 section 1(o). 
456 29 of 2005. 
457 Diamonds Amendment Act 29 of 2005 Preamble. 
458 Diamonds Amendment Act 29 of 2005 section 1(o). 
459 29 of 2005. 
460 GN R386 in GG 30942. 
 115 
understanding the diamond trade structure. The Diamonds Amendment Act461 
has revolutionized the structures of the South African State as the custodian of 
the nation’s diamond resources. It is important to understand the provisions of 
the Diamonds Act,462 as amended by the Diamonds Amendment Act,463
 
 have a 
direct bearing on the ultimate working of diamond sales within the South Africa. 
The provisions of the Diamond Amendment Act464 are outlined in the preamble 
and the main objective of the Act is to provide for a more progressive statute that 
takes away some of the obsolete and unnecessary provisions of the Diamonds 
Act.465
                                                 
461 29 of 2005. 
 It is created to establish a more regulated approach to diamond trade in 
order to ensure that the policy goals of broad-based socio-economic 
empowerment policy are implemented. This is done by giving the Minister more 
462 56 of 1986. 
463 29 of 2005. 
464Act 29 of 2005 preamble. ‘To amend the Diamonds Act, 1986, so as to define certain words and 
expressions and to amend and delete certain definitions; to establish the South African Diamond and 
Precious Metals Regulator; to provide for its objectives and functions; to provide for the Constitution of its 
Board and the management of the Regulator by the Board; to provide for the chief executive officer and 
other staff of the Regulator; to provide for the finances of the Regulator; to establish the State Diamond 
Trader; to provide for its objectives and functions; to provide for the Constitution of its Board and the 
management of the Trader by its Board; to provide for the chief executive officer and other staff of the 
Trader; to provide for the finances of the Trader; to require diamond producers to offer a percentage of all 
diamonds produced in a production cycle to the State Diamond Trader; to do away with the requirement 
that licensees have to display their names and other particulars at their business premises; to require a 
licensee to retain a note of receipt of purchase in respect of unpolished diamonds for five years and not only 
two years; to provide that only synthetic diamonds are exempted from export duty; to repeal the provision 
providing for the deferment of payment of export duty; to make it obligatory that the registering officer 
examine unpolished diamonds registered for export and verify particulars furnished in respect thereof; to 
adjust the amount of the fine payable if the value of an unpolished diamond as assessed on behalf of the 
Regulator exceeds the value of the diamond as specified by the exporter; to provide anew for the release of 
unpolished diamonds for export; to require an exporter to, within three months from the date on which an 
unpolished diamond has been released for export, submit proof that the proceeds of the transaction have 
been repatriated to the Republic; to make it obligatory that the registering officer examine polished 
diamonds registered for export and verify particulars furnished in respect thereof; to make it an offence to 
sell synthetic or enhanced diamonds without disclosing that they are synthetic or enhanced diamonds; to 
replace certain obsolete provisions and to delete others; and to empower the Minister to make regulations 
regarding guidelines for, and the implementation of, broad-based socio-economic empowerment; and to 
provide for matters connected therewith.’ 
465 56 of 1986. 
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power to make such regulations as necessary in the industry to ensure the 
achievement of the diamond law objectives.466
 
 
This approach to regulated trade in the diamond sector is analogous to the 
regulation approach adopted in the National Ports Act467 which has similar 
objectives of ensuring fairness and regulated competition in the ports sector.468
 
 
This illustrates a trend in South Africa’s management of national resources. It 
appears that the main aim of these developments in law is to ensure equitable 
access while retaining merit practices in these industries. 
The relevant provisions related to the establishment of the Regulator can be 
found in Chapter II of the Diamonds Act.469 What is important to note is that the 
Regulator is a juristic person470 to which the Public Finance Management Act 
(PFMA)471 is applicable. In terms of the preamble PFMA472 is intended to 
regulate financial management in the national government and provincial 
governments ensuring that all revenue, expenditure, assets and liabilities of 
those respective governments are managed efficiently and effectively. The PFMA 
further provides expressly the responsibilities of persons entrusted with the 
management of those public funds.473
 
 This is a further administrative check and 
balances system in the law in order to ensure that the functions of the Regulator 
are fully accounted for in a transparent manner in line with democracy. 
                                                 
466 Preamble. See ‘and to empower the Minister to make regulations regarding guidelines for, and the 
implementation of, broad-based socio-economic empowerment; and to provide for matters connected 
therewith.’ 
467 12 of 2005. 
468 National Ports Act 12 of 2005 section 2 and 11. 
469 56 of 1986 section 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13. 
470 Public Finance Management Act section 3. 
471 1 of 1999. 
472 1 of 1999. 
473 Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1991 section 5(1)(a) and (b) which provides for the establishment 
of the National Treasury where the Minister of Finance is the head of such a treasury and the department or 
departments responsible for financial and fiscal matters. Section 5 must be read together with section 6(1) 
and (2) of the Act which provides for the functions and powers of the National Treasury. 
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The main objectives of the Regulator as clearly outlined in chapter one of this 
study are to ensure that the diamond resources of South Africa are exploited and 
developed in the best interests of the people of South Africa, to promote 
equitable access to and local beneficiation and compliance with the KPCS.474
 
 
The objectives herein outlined must now be taken and related directly to diamond 
sales transactions for the purposes of this chapter. 
The objective of enhancing local beneficiation by the Regulator is important in the 
diamond industry. South Africa is a dual economy with features resembling third 
and first world economies.475 Traditionally the diamonds produced in South Africa 
were typically exported as raw materials and their value were generally 
beneficiated outside the Republic.476 This brought about the bare minimum of the 
total value that the product could fetch in the international markets.477
 
 
In response to the above trade scenario the Regulator is now tasked with the 
responsibility of ensuring local beneficiation of diamonds produced within the 
Republic in order to enhance South Africa’s involvement in diamond trade.478
                                                 
474 Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 section 4(a), (b) and (c). 
 
This means that South African diamond producers can be more skilled to 
produce a more finished product. This means all the revenue which such sales 
475 See Address by Mr. Tito Mboweni, Governor of the Reserve Bank of South Africa titled ‘South Africa’s 
Economic Policy Challenges’ at the XVI meeting of the Central Banks Governors.’ Club held in Irkutsk, 
Russia, 2 September 2006. The governor stated that South Africa, in terms of financial and banking 
services was ranked higher than some developed states such as Spain, United Kingdom, France and Ireland. 
(2006) 5. 
476 Robinson I.C and Von Below M.A. The Role of the Domestic Market in Promoting the Beneficiation of 
Raw Materials in South Africa The Journal of the South African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy Vol. 90 
no. 4 Apr. (1990) 91 p 92 - 94. 
477http://www.dme.gov.za/ministry/Presentations/COM%20presentation%20to%20DME%20Beneficiation
%20Launch%2031%2003%202009.ppt 02 March 2010. Baxter R. Chief Economist Chamber of Mines, to 
the Launch of DME Draft Beneficiation Strategy Facilitating Minerals Beneficiation in South Africa 31 
March (2009). In this paper is a useful definition of beneficiation as relates to raw materials where it is 
explained as follows: ‘The term beneficiation, used broadly to describe the successive processes of adding 
value to raw materials from their extraction through to the sale of finished products to consumers, covers a 
wide range of very different activities. These include large-scale and capital-intensive operations like 
smelting and technologically sophisticated refining as well as labour-intensive activities such as craft 
jewellery”. Minerals Policy White Paper, October 1998.’ 
478 Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 section 5 and 15 as amended by the Diamonds Amendment Act 29 of 2005 
read together with section 2 and 26 of the MPRDA. 
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and beneficiation can produce is ultimately kept within South Africa. It is 
submitted that with time South Africa will have a diamond cutting and polishing 




In practice this means the Regulator would have to accept and promote 
endeavors to provide world-class training and facilities to be invested in the local 
beneficiation industry in order to achieve this goal. The obvious benefits of job 
creation, skills development and value addition are now within reach of South 
Africa’s diamond industry. This ultimate objective to be reached through statutory 
means ensures the development of the diamond industry for the best interests of 
South Africa. It is submitted that there is a sense of commitment by the State 
through this law to commit itself to investing necessary resources to enhance the 
nation’s diamond trade. 
 
The objective to promote the best interests of the people of the South Africa is 
captured through-out the Diamonds Act481 as a prevalent theme. It is  expressed 
clearly in the Act that when the Regulator is considering an application for any 
licence or permits under the Diamonds Act,482 it must have due regard to the 
broad-based socio-economic empowerment Charter contemplated in the 
MPRDA.483
 
 This is an important development theme for South Africa particularly 
in the Constitutional era. 
                                                 
479 http://diamonddepot.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=14&Itemid=10  02 March 
2010. Belgium, China, India, Israel, Russia and the US, among other countries including some of the more 
experienced cutters in Southern Africa are among those who are known for their diamond cutting skills. 
‘Cutting a rough diamond takes great skill. A well-cut diamond reflects light within itself, from one facet to 
another, as well as through the top of the diamond, bringing out its spectral brilliance. The most popular cut 
is the 57 facet round brilliant. After a stone has been cut, it is then polished and classified again, this time 
by its cut, colour, clarity and carat weight, also known as the "Four Cs."’ 
480 Ibid. 
481 56 of 1986. 
482 56 of 1986 sections 4(a) and section 5(2)(a). 
483 28 of 2002 section 100. 
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The Regulator’s legal responsibilities include, inter alia, considering applications 
for licences with the aim to achieve equitable access to and local beneficiation of 
South African diamonds.484 This task may be costly and expose the Regulator to 
tremendous public liability therefore it must insure itself against various risks and 
liabilities.485 The Regulator is responsible for appointing an expert in respect of 
market prices and for that person to be the State’s diamond valuator and to 
advise the Minister of Minerals and Energy on related or incidental matters in 
diamond regulation.486 Further, no one in South Africa may trade in diamonds 
without a proper licence487
 
 therefore the Regulator is in control of such licensing 
and will assist small scale miners with appropriate licenses so that they are able 
to participate in the formal diamond market economy. 
The proper appointment of the State valuator is crucial in diamond sales so that 
the true market value of diamonds sold is correctly reflected. This must be done 
carefully so that no revenue is lost to South Africa through national trading 
endeavors. Improper valuations have plagued artisanal diamond diggers488 in 
many African countries489 as a result of the lack of proper returns being attached 
to diamond sales in those unregulated areas.490
 
 
The Regulator is crucial in the determination of the market price of diamonds 
through the use of government diamond valuator’s expertise as stated in section 
5(1)(c). This is most beneficial as it promotes a uniform standard for diamond 
pricing. This removes the danger of individuals and especially monopolies 
                                                 
484 Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 section 4(a), (b) and section 5. 
485 Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 section 5(1)(b). 
486 Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 section 4 and section 5(1)(a), (b), (c) and (d).   
487 Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 section 20. The section provides expressly that, ‘No person shall purchase any 
unpolished diamond unless-  
        (a)     he or she is a licensee; or  
        (b)     he or she is the holder of a permit referred to in section 26 (e).’ 
488 http://www.worldlabour.org/eng/node/259 29 October 2009. 
489 www.un.org 29 October 2009. www.ddiglobal.org  29 October 2009. 
490 Diamonds Act 56 of 1986. The proper valuation of diamonds under the Diamonds Act is well provided 
for under sections 5(1)(c) which provides for a Regulator appointed person with expertise in diamond 
valuations to act as a government diamond valuator. Sections 59B 5, 6, 7 and 8, sections 65, 65A and 72 
also provides for the regulation of diamond valuations. 
 120 
inequitably controlling, influencing and dominating the market in a manner that is 
contrary to the South African industrial and economic policies. These policies are 
aimed at increasing participation by small and new entrants, market accessibility 
and equity and fair competition. It is submitted that for larger diamond producers 
instead of stockpiling to influence the diamond markets, they may take the route 
of scaling down on mining operations so that the diamonds are left in the ground 
until the market is fit. 
 
It has been beneficial to have a regulated equity determined diamond market in 
South Africa. Regulation has led to the prevention of the situation where a 
dominant producer is able to control the market using anti-trust491 offensive 
methods. Practically to achieve this in an unregulated market, a dominant 
producer would keep elaborate diamond stock-piles of and starve the market of 
the stones until they are able to introduce them to the market at the value set by 




                                                 
491 Antitrust also known as anti-monopoly law which relates to a body of laws and regulations designed to 
protect trade and commerce from unfair business practices. wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn 03 
January 2009. See American Natural Soda Ash Corporation and Another v Competition Commission and 
Others 2005 (6) SA 158 (SCA) 167 A - E. 
492 Sivier L. Competition Law Narrative Division X – Enforcement by the Regulatory Authorities Chapter 
16 Fair Trading Act 1973 The Making of a Monopoly Reference to the Competition Commission 
Competition Law Narrative extracted from the United Kingdom's Butterworths Competition Law Service 
par. E. (2007) 1. See Competition Act 89 of 1998. See Chapter 2A on complex monopoly conduct inserted 
as section 10A of the Competition  Act and described as follows:  
‘(1) Complex monopoly conduct subsists within the market for any particular goods or services if-  
        (a)  at least 75% of the goods or services in that market are supplied to, or by, five or fewer firms;  
       (b)  any two or more of the firms contemplated in paragraph (a) conduct their respective business affairs in 
a conscious parallel manner or co-coordinated manner, without agreement between or among themselves; 
and  
        (c)  the conduct contemplated in paragraph (b) has the effect of substantially preventing or lessening 
competition in that market, unless a firm engaging in the conduct can prove that any technological, 
efficiency or other pro-competitive gain resulting from it outweighs that effect.  
(2)  For the purposes of subsection (1) (b) 'conscious parallel conduct' occurs when two or more firms in a 
concentrated market, being aware of each other's action, conduct their business affairs in a cooperative 
manner without discussion or agreement.’ 
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The powers of the Regulator are exercised within certain statutory limits. In terms 
of the Diamonds Act493 persons who feel aggrieved by the decisions of the 
Regulator with respect to the issuing of licences may appeal to the Minister.494 
The Minister upon considering the appeal may confirm, set aside or vary the 
decision appealed against. Where appropriate the Minister may substitute the 
decision complained of with a decision that in his opinion ought to have been 
taken by the Regulator.495 This inherently means that the rules of natural and 
administrative justice apply. Such decisions may have to be tested against the 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act.496
 
 The underlying rationale is to promote 
equity and further socio-economic justice while at the same time ensuring that 
the industry continues to be competitive and profitable. 
The court’s interpretation of the appeal process497 was considered in Mofschaap 
Diamonds (Pty) Ltd v The Minister for Minerals and Energy and Others.498 The 
case dealt specifically with the review of a decision of an organ of State under 
the MPRDA and is distinguishable in that manner. However the court’s 
interpretation and application of the provisions relating to this type of appeal 
serves as a useful guide to understanding the relationship between the Regulator 
and the Minister who may have to test its decisions in an appeal.499 The decision 
of the court above made the important point that an appeal procedure is only 
truly available when the State organs have acted independently in the decision 
making process not under the scheme of the deconcentration of public power.500
 
 
                                                 
493 56 of 1986 section 39(1)(2). 
494 Diamonds  Act 56 of 1986 section 39 (1). Such an appeal must be launched according to the prescribed 
manner within prescribed time limits section 39(2). 
495 Diamonds  Act 56 of 1986 section 39 (2). 
496 4 of 2000. 
497Diamonds  Act 56 of 1986 section 39 (1)(2). 
498 (3117/2006) [2007] ZAFSHC 51 (14 June 2007). See also De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v Ataqua 
Mining (Pty) Ltd and Others Case Number: 3215/06 in the High Court of South Africa (Orange Free State 
Provincial Division), judgment delivered on 13 December 2007. 
499 Chapter 1. 
500 See chapter one paragraph 1.4.2 headed as The Mineral and petroleum Resources Development Act 28 
of 2002. 
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In terms of section 39(2) on appeal the Minister shall consider the appeal lodged 
by an aggrieved person and take the decision to confirm, set aside, vary the 
decision or substitute for that decision any other decision which the Regulator in 
the opinion of the Minister ought to have taken. It is clear that the appeal process 
to the Minister provided for in section 39 recognizes the need to view the Minister 
as independent of the Regulator and in this manner provides a system of 
ensuring that the Regulator’s exercise of public powers is kept within the limits of 
fair administrative action. 
 
In the interests of diamond trade, section 59(a) provides that the Regulator shall 
implement, administer and control all matters relating to the purchase, sale, 
beneficiation, import and export of diamonds. Section 59(b) provides that the 
Regulator shall establish Diamond Exchange and Export Centres (DEEC) which 
will facilitate all matters pertaining to diamond trade. The Regulator is therefore 
the central controlling body in these matters. It is submitted that the tenor of the 
Diamonds Act501
 
 is such that a self regulatory approach is favored in contrast to 
the command and control method. As such, the Regulator is in the best position 
to account for the specific needs of the industry and the best interests of the 
country in making decisions related to its duties and responsibilities. This means 
the Regulator can take decisions to direct that sales flow into a particular 
direction to ensure that the local markets are sufficiently supplied with diamonds. 
Further in terms of section 75 of the Diamonds Act,502
                                                 
501 56 of 1986. 
 the Regulator in 
connection with the export of diamonds is endowed with powers to take a 
decision as to whether any diamond is an unpolished or a polished diamond. 
This provision may become relevant in cases where a partly processed diamond 
is to be imported or exported. It will depend on the finding by the Regulator 
whether that diamond is a rough one or not so that the correct law is applied in 
such a situation. 
502 56 of 1986. 
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Section 95(1) places the Regulator in a unique and necessary position of 
influencing the content of regulations to govern various activities related to the 
diamond industry. This exemplifies delegated legislation whose contents are 
determined not by Parliament but by the Regulator who is closer to the diamond 
market. Of importance to diamond marketing is the setting of guidelines for 
broad-based socio-economic empowerment in terms of the existing mining laws 
or charters as well as any matter which the Minister may consider necessary or 
expedient to prescribe or regulate in order to achieve objects of the Diamonds 
Act.503
 
 The Regulator can utilize this section to influence regulations that affect 
the export of diamonds. He or she can use this section to influence the local 
diamond trade and also adopt international trends and practices in the interests 
of the local diamond market. 
The regulations mentioned in the preceding paragraph are crucial to the diamond 
sales aspect of the diamond industry.  It is therefore essential to consider them 
carefully as they control the manner in which those involved in diamond sales are 
to conduct business. The regulations determine the implementation of equitable 
access regimes to the diamond market and beneficiation (an important aspect of 
the broad based socio-economic empowerment504
 
 and the best interests of the 
people) in South Africa. The regulations are dated 2008 which means that the 
diamond industry has been rather slow in ensuring some of the equity goals that 
ought to have been introduced by regulation at an even earlier stage. 
Apart from the objectives of the Regulator as contemplated in the Diamonds 
Act,505
                                                 
503 Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 section 95(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g) and (h). Further section 96 provides 
that the Regulator shall to consult the Minister in respect of exercising its powers as the Minister 
determines periodically. 
 the Regulator’s functions with regard to diamond trade includes 
implementing, administering and controlling all matters relating to the purchase 
504 This is in line with, for instance, statutes such as Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 
2003. 
505 56 of 1986 section 5(1) and (2) in particular. 
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and sale of diamonds.506 Further the Regulator is responsible for the 
establishment of Diamond Exchange and Export Centres (DEEC) which facilitate 
the buying of diamonds and matters connected with such activity.507 Since the 
diamond industry is regulated in this manner, it is submitted that the Regulator 
will promote a clear partnership between the public and private sector in the 




The DEEC framework requires that all rough diamonds intended for export must 
be offered via a tender process at a DEEC for sale.509 However, in the case of 
large producers, the Minister of Minerals and Energy (DME) may waive the 
requirement to offer all rough diamonds on the DEEC.510 This waiver is, for 
practical reasons, to ensure that the DEEC tendering process is not 
overwhelmed by large volumes of very small rough diamonds.511
 
 The activities of 
the DEEC appear to be accommodating the practical requirements of private 
business in order to apply the diamond regulations effectively. 
                                                 
506 Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 preamble, section 59 which provides that, ‘The Regulator shall-  
        (a)     implement, administer and control all matters relating to the purchase, sale, beneficiation, import and 
export of diamonds; and  
        (b)     establish diamond exchange and export centres, which shall facilitate the buying, selling, export and 
import of diamonds and matters connected therewith.’ 
507 Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 section 59(b).  www.sadb.co.za 23 November 2009. In terms of section 48A 
of the Act, ‘All unpolished diamonds intended for export purposes must first in the prescribed manner be 
offered at a diamond exchange and export centre.’ 
508 www.sadb.co.za 23 November 2009. 
508http://www.dme.gov.za/ministry/Presentations/COM%20presentation%20to%20DME%20Beneficiation
%20Launch%2031%2003%202009.ppt 02 March 2010. Baxter R. Chief Economist Chamber of Mines, to 
the Launch of DME Draft Beneficiation Strategy Facilitating Minerals Beneficiation in South Africa 31 
March (2009). 
509 Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 section 48A. 
510 Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 section 61(2A) read together with sections 74 and 74A. With regard to further 
exemption from the DEEC section 64  provides for temporary exemption from the diamond exchange and 
export centre if the diamond exported is removed, for example, for exhibition section 64(1)(a)(i). 
511 TABLING OF THE DIAMOND EXPORT LEVY BILL, 2007 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY TREVOR A 
MANUEL, MP MINISTER OF FINANC 19 JUNE 2007 (Ministry of Finance).  
See also speech by Minister Lindiwe Hendricks, introducing the Diamonds Amendment Bill at the National 
Assembly. www.sadpmr.co.za 23 November 2009. Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 section 61(2A) read together 
with sections 74 and 74A. 
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The existing type of co-operation between the Regulator and the private sector in 
regulating diamond sales is not a partnership in the true sense because the 
Regulator must interact with the public and private sector in a manner that will be 
most beneficial for all in the diamond industry while still maintaining its role as a 
guardian of the industry.512
 
  
The regulations513 promulgated under the Diamonds Act514 will be considered in 
depth below. These regulations have been amended by subsequent legal 
developments and are made by the Minister of Minerals and Energy, in 
consultation with the SADPMR.515
 
 
The study of these legal consequences of the regulations have been used as a 
developmental tool to inform even other branches of industry on the best practice 
processes for a successful State appointed Regulator. It is submitted that 
although each industry’s Regulator and ministerial or departmental 
consequences may be influenced by different industry peculiarities there are 
important legal themes in the ambit of the SADPMR which are common to many 
other South African industries. These include equity and access516
 
 to South 
Africa’s natural resources for benefit of all in South Africa. 
Regulation 2Z provides that in order to keep proper records of diamond sales 
every producer is required to have submitted a completed Form J(viii),517
                                                 
512 Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 sections 4, 5, 59, 75, 78, 79, 85 and 96. 
 for 
diamond sales when involved in such sales as part of national or international 
513 GN R680 in GG 10684 of 1 April 1987. Regulations published under any form of law are an important 
tool to bridge the gap between the objectives of a written statute and the ‘how’ or practical aspects of 
achieving those statutory objectives. Often regulations are promulgated once the department responsible for 
implementing that law has thoroughly consulted with the stakeholders and persons affected by that law 
within the Republic. The regulation then is implemented to deal with any lacunae in the law to make the 
statute possible to implement and to deal with any industry related contradictions. 
514 56 of 1986. 
515 Diamonds Amendment Act 29 of 2005 preamble. 
516 Particularly Constitutional goals revolving around affirmative action and broad based socio-economic 
empowerment. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996 section 9(2), MPRDA section 100, 
Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 section 5. 
517 Annexure A to 4 April 2008 Regulations. 
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trade transactions. This form requires each producer to fully disclose its 
identification information together with a certified copy of the permit or right. 
Although this form is simple to complete and to submit, the consequences that 
follow it are crucial for the producer who intends to engage in diamond sales. The 
Regulator issues to the producer a unique registration number which must 
always be reflected in all engagements with the Regulator. 
 
The unique registration number issued by the Regulator gives the persons 
involved in the diamond trade peace of mind because the transactions can be 
accounted for in a lawful manner. Traders who deal with such lawful diamonds 
are assured that the diamonds are KPCS certified diamonds.  
 
It must be noted that there are other important diamond industry related forms 
marked in the regulations from Form J (i) – (vii) as required in terms of section 57 
of the Diamonds Act.518 The most crucial form that affects a diamond producer is 
Form J (viii) because it is a diamond register for a permit to sell diamonds.519 
Section 57 of the Diamonds Act520 provides for registers in respect of unpolished 
diamonds. The Act requires that every producer, manufacturer of synthetic 
(laboratory) diamonds, dealer or diamond beneficiator shall keep or cause to be 
kept the prescribed register to record prescribed particulars.521
 
 
The availability and accessibility of the regulations and the necessary forms that 
will assist diamond producers to engage as diamond dealers are in compliance 
with the Constitution and Diamonds Act522
                                                 
518 56 of 1986 section 57(1) of the Act provides that, ‘Every producer, manufacturer of synthetic diamonds, 
dealer or diamond beneficiator shall keep or cause to be kept the prescribed register, in which shall be 
entered the prescribed particulars in respect of unpolished diamonds and polished synthetic diamonds.’ 
 ideals of access to information and 
necessary documentation to be readily available in the public domain. This is 
519 GN R680 in GG 10684 of 1 April 1987 p 5 – 12. Section 13(h) of the regulations which provides that, 
‘(h) Form J(viii) is a diamond register for a permit to sell, export and import unpolished diamond.’ 
520 56 of 1986. 
521 Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 section 57(2), (3) provides for the time frames in which records are to be 
entered. 
522 56 of 1986. 
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also in keeping with the Promotion of Access to Information Act523
 
 which is aimed 
at giving effect to the Constitutional right of access to any information held by the 
State for the purposes of exercising or protecting rights. 
Access to information allowing South Africa’s private and public sectors to 
register as part of the diamond industry as contained in the regulations prove that 
the objectives of equity and access to diamond sales in order to secure 
participation by all the people in diamond industry are being addressed. 
However, the Regulator clearly has not over-prescribed how the industry should 
be regulated. This is an important aspect particularly when dealing with a 
resource that is limited524
 
 and the danger is that the State must also control over-
subscription to a limited resource industry.  
2.3 The Regulator’s Industry Report: Facilitating Diamond Sales 
Having considered parts of the diamond regulations it is essential to follow up 
with a consideration of the SADPMR and its involvement in facilitating diamond 
sales. The information used in this part of the chapter is available in the public 
domain525
 
 as part of the Regulator’s 2008 Annual Report. The report forms a 
very important to the study of the activities of the SADPMR. It provides insight to 
the actual methods employed by the Regulator to facilitate diamond sales 
particularly regarding transparency and accountability on the part of the 
SADPMR. 
The Executive Committee chaired by the Chairperson of the Board sits at least 
four times a year as may be necessary in order to monitor the performance of the 
                                                 
523 2 of 2000. 
524 The issue of the recognition of limited availability of resources was raised in the (Phambili II) Bato Star 
Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental affairs and Others 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC).The court in casu 
was considering equitable access by all to the South African hake industry. The court stated that all access 
to national resources must be granted according to the availability of the resource to be allocated. In this 
case the court used the measure of the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) as a descriptive measure to determine 
whether or not quotas given to the industry participants in this case were fair in the circumstances. 
 
525 www.sadpmr.co.za 27 October 2009. 
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SADPMR. The Board ensures that matters pertaining to the diamond industry are 
in line with policy and the Executive Committee recommends proposals for 
adoption to the Board.526
 
 
There is also a Finance Committee, an Audit and Risk Committee and a 
Technical Committee as well as an additional Management Committee (MANCO) 
which consists of executive management, line managers and senior staff 
members as established in September 2007 for the sole purpose of involving 
senior staff in the formulation and revision of policies and guidelines and these 
proposals are made as recommendations to respective Board Committees. It is 
clear that with a management structure with vast expertise the SADPMR is able 
to successfully regulate the industries pertaining to it. To oversee the SADPMR’s 
legal compliance issues, the Regulator has a Legal Services Division which was 




It is important to note that the diamond industry allowed a transitional period 
permitting old licences to continue while this new regulatory regime was coming 
into place and this period lasted until the 30 June 2008 dead-line date.528 The 
2008 report shows that from 1 July 2007 to 31 July 2008 the largest amount of 
licences issued were that of diamond dealers, diamond beneficiation and export 
permit to diamond beneficiators. In 2008 there were fewer applications for 
licences to carry on a diamond trading house or diamond research and in the 
same period there were no applications for permits to possess unpolished 
diamonds.529
 
 These permit and license statistics inform the diamond sales trends 
in South Africa. 
                                                 
526 Ibid. 
527 Ibid. 
528 South African Diamond and Precious Metals Regulator Annual Report (2008) 14. 
529 South African Diamond and Precious Metals Regulator Annual Report (2008) 14 – 17. 
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This report illustrates a very interesting picture for the value of the diamond 
particularly in relation to the national economy. The report highlights the 
importance of making a full account of the possession of unpolished diamonds 
for in the South African State’s record books.530 The report also illustrates that 
there is hope for the local beneficiation industry as more licences were issued 
and this is in line with State policy for improving the market in that area.531
 
 
Support for local beneficiation illustrates that the Regulator is behind the 
proposals for State supported marketing of South African brands and hallmarks. 
True to its mandate in terms of the Diamonds Act532 the SADPMR has 
established the South African Diamond Exchange and Export Centre in terms of 
the Diamond Amendment Act533 and the centre has been in operation since 14 
January 2008.534 This is a very important aspect of South African law in 
regulating diamond sales. The DEEC hosts diamond tenders for various mines 
and independent licensees and from its inception a significant number of goods 
and viewers have passed through the DEEC. In March 2008 alone after only 




It is important to note that the DEEC also records and monitors market behavior 
by recording all the statistics pertaining to the number of parcels that are 
received by the DEEC, the number viewers and the amount of exports made. 
The statistics on diamond trade as reported from the year 2007 reveal that a total 
number of 14 953 664, 89 carats of large scale diamonds were sold to the value 
of R 8 104 415 793.00.536 In medium scale diamonds 592 602, 32 carats were 
sold to the value of R 498 661 005.00537
                                                 
530 Ibid. 
 and in small scale diamonds 142 898, 
531 Ibid. See aims of the SADPMR www.sadpmr.co.za 27 October 2009. 
532 56 of 1986 section 59. 
533 30 of 2005. 
534 South African Diamond and Precious Metals Regulator Annual Report (2008) 1 – 17. 
535 South African Diamond and Precious Metals Regulator Annual Report (2008) 23 – 24. 
536 South African Diamond and Precious Metals Regulator Annual Report (2008) 25 – 26. 
537 Ibid. 
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75 carats were sold to the value of R 292 915 105.00.538 Statistically the report of 
the SADPMR reveals that from the period of the year 2000 to 2007 there has 
been a steady trade in large scale diamonds.539
 
 From the statistics it would 
appear that the diamond industry is still proving to be a sustainable economic 
activity that brings significant revenue into the country. 
As previously mentioned one of the threats to legitimate diamond sales is the 
existence of criminal elements which contrary to law are attempting to deal in 
diamonds.540 The SADPMR is aware of this issue and as a result they have 
provided rough diamond valuation services to the South African Police 
Service.541 In both Kimberley and Johannesburg diamond valuation services 
were provided to the Police for the valuation of diamonds that were confiscated in 
illegal transactions and for the audit of State diamonds that were used in 
operations against the suspected criminals.542
 
 
It is submitted that dissemination of information concerning equal access to the 
diamond industry will prove helpful for dealing with such undesirable elements. It 
is clear that the Diamonds Act,543 the Diamonds Amendment Act,544
 
 the 
regulations under these statutes and the Constitution and other industry specific 
law such as the MPRDA, all serve the purpose of encouraging all groups in 
South Africa as natural or legal persons in the diamond industry by obtaining 
proper licences to avoid black market sales. 
The SADPMR also reports a successful application of the KPCS which is an 
international effort to combat trade in conflict diamonds. This has been very 
important for compliant countries as they are able to benefit from legitimate 
diamond sales and benefit also through taxes and duties payable. South Africa 
                                                 
538 Ibid. 
539 Ibid. 
540 South African Diamond and Precious Metals Regulator Annual Report (2008) 34. 
541 Ibid. 
542 Ibid. 
543 56 of 1986. 
544 29 of 2005. 
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has had successful trade with other KPCS compliant countries such as Australia, 
Brazil, Botswana, Canada, Central African Republic, Chinese Taipei, China (The 
People’s Republic), Democratic Republic of Congo, India, Israel, Lebanon, 
Malaysia, Mauritius, Namibia, Sierra Leone, Switzerland, Tanzania, Togo, United 
Arab Emirates, US of America and Zimbabwe.545
 
  
In the endeavor to monitor KPCS compliance South Africa through the support 
and initiatives of the Regulator is also involved with the following working groups 
namely, the Working Group of Diamond Experts (WGDE), Working Group on 
Statistics (WGS), Working Group on Monitoring (WGM), Working Group of 
Alluvial and Artisanal Producers (WGAAP) and the Participation Committee 
(PC).546 These working groups are chaired by various countries and they also 
form international groups that share information and ensure that the KPCS 
countries maintain standards in terms of the scheme. Recently Liberia was 
welcomed as the newest member of the KPCS.547
 
 
It is interesting to note that the SADPMR supports and encourages uniform 
dealing with diamond resources and sharing of knowledge with other African 
producers. It has been reported that the DRC has indicated its desire to move for 
diamond legislation that is similar to that of South Africa which is viewed as 
having benchmark diamond legislation.548
 
  
2.4 The State Diamond Trader 
One of the most important features of diamond sales in South African law is the 
involvement of the statutory creature in the form of the State Diamond Trader. 549
                                                 
545  South African Diamond and Precious Metals Regulator Annual Report (2008) 35. 
 
It is important to note that the mining giant De Beers assisted the SDT to set up 
the operations of the SDT in accordance with the requirements of the Diamonds 
546 South African Diamond and Precious Metals Regulator Annual Report (2008) 37. 
547 Ibid.  
548 Ibid. 
549 Diamonds Act 56 of 1986. State Diamond Trader established in terms of section 14 and definition of 
State Diamond Trader inserted by section 1 of the Diamonds Amendment Act 29 of 2005. 
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Act.550 This act by De Beers exemplifies initiatives of broad-based socio-
economic empowerment in assisting the country to sell its own diamonds.551
 
 It is 
submitted that there has been a generally positive relationship created between 
the State and the private sector in ensuring that the State policy on minerals is 
achieved. 
The SDT is an organ of State to which the Public Finance Management Act552 is 
also applicable. This means that financial dealings pertaining to the SDT are 
subject to the scrutiny the South African Auditor General. The objectives and 
functions of the SDT are very similar to that of the Regulator, in that it is to 
promote equitable access to and local beneficiation of the Republic’s diamonds. 
It must comply with the KPCS but it is a body with a distinguishable mandate and 
that is to trade in diamonds.553
 
 
In terms of the Diamonds Act,554 the SDT may acquire diamonds from other 
diamond producing countries and enter into agreements with any person 
including the State for the performance of any function or the rendering of a 
particular service. The SDT is controlled by a Board whose members are 
appointed by the Minister.555 In terms of the Act556 the Minister has the power to 
appoint a chief executive office in concurrence with the SDT Board and such a 
chief executive officer will manage and control the daily functioning of the SDT 
subject to the directions and instructions issued by the Board.557
 
 
The SDT is by nature a State business entity that engages in buying and selling 
of diamonds. The SDT is empowered to acquire and supply unpolished 
                                                 
550 56 of 1986. See www.debeersgroup.com 20 August 2008. 
551 www.debeersgroup.com 20 January 2007. See internal report by Smith N.  De Beers Reveals Canny 
BEE Deal 9 November (2005). 
552 1 of 1999. 
553 Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 Part 2 section 15 and 16. 
554 56 of 1986 section 16(2)(a);(b). 
555 The Minister is also entitled to dissolve such a Board and appoint a new Board if good cause is shown. 
556 Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 section 17G. 
557 Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 Part 2 section 17 (whole). 
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diamonds to local diamond beneficiators.558 The SDT is also empowered to 
promote the diamond industry through research, support and development.559 
The provision was inserted into the Diamonds Act560 by the Diamonds Second 
Amendment Act561
 
 which illustrates a trend or effort by the State to continue its 
self development in being able to deal efficiently with diamond trade. 
In terms of the Diamonds Act562 there is an important provision for the diamond 
industry in terms of the obvious legal and commercial implications of the State’s 
stringent control and involvement in the industry. This includes the obligation on 
diamond producers to offer unpolished diamonds to the SDT.563 In terms of this 
provision diamond producers are to offer unpolished diamonds to the SDT. The 
amount of diamonds produced in a production cycle to be offered to the SDT for 
buying and local beneficiation is periodically determined by the Minister and 
published in a Government Gazette. This means that the individual diamond 
producers must constantly update themselves with the latest figures as 




In terms of the Diamonds Act565
                                                 
558 Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 section 59A(a). 
 the percentage of diamonds contemplated as 
diamonds to be offered to the SDT may be based on carats and value and will 
form a representative sample of the production cycle of any diamond producer. 
This is almost a picture of a ‘first fruits offering’ of a diamond producer to the 
State however within the boundaries of an equitable commercial transaction. 
Therefore the State will protect and give permissions and authorizations to 
producers as long as such producers respect at all times the State’s 
custodianship over the diamonds. The custodianship also includes the ability of 
559 Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 section 59A(b). 
560 56 of 1986. 
561 30 of 2005. 
562 56 of 1986 section 59B. 
563 Ibid. 
564 Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 section 59B(1)(a). 
565 56 of 1986 section 59B(1)(b). 
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the State to investigate the minerals mined and participate in the trade of such 
diamonds. 
 
The process of offering diamonds to the SDT by a diamond producer can be 
succinctly outlined as follows. At the end of every production cycle a diamond 
producer must offer at a fair market value all its unpolished diamonds produced 
in that production cycle (with only a percentage of those diamonds to be 
considered by the SDT in accordance with section 1(a)(b)) to enable the SDT to 
inspect those diamonds for the purpose of selecting some of the diamonds for 
buying.  
 
The SDT will have one week to buy the selected diamonds after the government 
diamond valuator has verified the diamond prices offered by the diamond 
producer or if the producer and government valuator cannot agree on the prices, 
the Regulator566 will appoint an independent valuator to fix a price regarded as a 
fair market price. If the SDT fails to purchase the diamonds offered within the 
prescribed one week period, the producer may withdraw all its diamonds.567
 
 
Having established that the SDT is expected in law to supply unpolished 
diamonds to local beneficiators and not dealers or exporters,568 the SDT’s 
clientele are limited in this regard. The aim is for the SDT to invest in the local 
diamond market. In practice it has been reported by the SDT’s executive that the 
aim is to obtain a portion of the large unpolished diamond production of South 
Africa569 to invest it in the local markets in order to facilitate developmental 
support services.570
                                                 
566 In terms of section 59B(8) if the Regulator has had to step in to appoint an independent diamond 
valuator, the cost of such valuation is borne by the diamond producer and the SDT equally. There appears 
to be an unintended valuation costs incentive for agreeing to the fair market value as determined by the 
government diamond valuator without involving the Regulator. 
 
567 Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 section 59B(1), (2) (3), (4), (5), (6), (7) and (8). 
568 Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 section 59A as per Diamond Amendment Act 29 of 2005 and Diamond 
Amendment Act 30 of 2005, which effectively extends the power of the Regulator and the SDT. 
569 www.statediamondtrader.gov.za 25 February 2009. 
570 These services include access to training, development strategies, finance and access to national as well 
as international jewellery markets. 
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‘As the fourth largest diamond producer in terms of value 
worldwide (behind, Botswana, Russia and Canada), South 
Africa can proudly say that it is in the centre of the 
constantly changing global diamond industry. Our 
knowledge and experience of the diamond industry enables 
us to impact positively in the on-going changes. Our 
position in international diamond affairs is well articulated in 
conference presentations, diamond industry publications 
and the electronic media. Our ultimate goal is to further 
enhance our leadership role in international diamond affairs 
and to build a globally competitive diamond industry that is 
capable of growing the industry and the wealth of its 
employers and employees. We maintain our position as the 
fourth largest diamond producer. During the year under 
review, we produced approximately 13 million carats valued 
at US$1.2 billion (ZAR7.8 billion). Over 50% (by value) of 
diamonds we produced are economic to cut and polish in 
South Africa. Our cutting and polishing industry is respected 
and competitive in beneficiating rough diamonds of greater 
value, where the cost of manufacturing is less than the 
polished diamond price. The industry employs 28 000 
people: 13 000 in mining; 9 000 in jewellery retail; 3 000 in 
jewellery manufacturing; 2 100 in cutting and polishing and 
900 in sorting and valuing diamonds. The average 
                                                 
571 South African Diamond and Precious Metals Regulator Annual Report (2007) 
http://www.sadpmr.co.za/UploadedFiles/58abf416735a4ed2a249dfd818e41e1c.pdf  08 March 2010. 
 136 
cost of labour in South Africa can be compared to that of 
Israel and Belgium. Going forward the South African 
diamond industry needs to focus on improving levels of 
beneficiation and access to rough diamonds. The 
government is currently finalising a piece of legislation that 
is aimed at enforcing the promotion of equitable access to 
and beneficiation of our diamond resources. This legislation 
is aimed at setting a clear mandate for the South African 
Diamond Board.’ 
 
The diamond industry by its nature is one that is closed and highly protected 
especially in the light of the fact that those already benefiting from it may not 
necessarily wish to share the benefits derived from such a resource. Therefore it 
is up to the State to find equitable means to allow interested and qualifying 
peoples of South Africa to become part of the industry. While empowering the 
people through diamond trade laws the State has also engaged in a form of 
social engineering to root out unfair competition in the industry. It is submitted 
that South African diamond laws may be used as an African bench-mark to show 
how the State can control the country’s resources for the benefit of all peoples. 
 
It is clear that without these Constitutional developments and their 
implementation, the diamond industry might have remained closed to new 
entrants. This would have left local beneficiators under-prepared when 
attempting to compete with international markets as a result of lack of 
development or State investment in local beneficiation. It is recommended 
therefore that the Regulator and the SDT should continue to make 
recommendations for providing more incentives for the continual enhancement of 
the local beneficiation so that South Africa’s diamond products can successfully 
fly the South African flag in the international markets. 
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2.6 The Impact of the Diamond Export Levy (Administration) Act 14 of 2007 
on Diamond Sales 
The promulgation of the Diamond Export Levy (Administration) Act572 did not 
come about without serious debate and consideration as it radically altered the 
position pertaining to the supply of diamonds to the local market for beneficiation. 
The Diamond Export Levy (Administration) Act573 which came into effect on 1 
November 2008 came about as a result of the need to further regulate the 
diamond industry. On 23 August 2007 the National Assembly held a debate with 
the Minister of Finance concerning what was then ‘The Diamond Export Levy Bill, 
2007.’574 What essentially emerged from this debate is that the imposition of an 
export levy on rough diamonds as contained in the Diamonds Act575 was 




It was established during the Parliamentary debate concerning the Diamond 
Export Levy Bill, 2007, which the intention of the imposition of an export levy on 
rough diamonds was to facilitate adequate and regular supplies of rough 
diamonds to local cutters and beneficiators.577 In terms of the Diamonds Act,578 
prior to amendments in line with the Diamond Export Levy (Administration) 
Act,579
                                                 
572 14 of 2007. 
 the export levy on rough diamonds was set at fifteen per cent with 
generous and open-ended exemptions. It was proposed in the debate that the 
Diamond Levy Bill, 2007 would reduce the export levy on rough diamonds to five 
573 14 of 2007. 
574 See National Assembly Debate Minister of Finance (MP) dated 23 August 2007. This debate is helpful 
in clarifying the South Africa’s interests which were to be protected under the proposed Diamond Export 
Levy Bill. 
575 56 of 1986, particularly in light of the amendments made to the Diamonds Act in 2005 by the Diamonds 
Amendment Act 29 of 2005 and the Diamonds Second Amendment Act 30 of 2005. 
576 National Assembly Debate Minister of Finance (MP) dated 23 August 2007. 
577 This terminology suggests that the government had to create a legislative framework to direct the flow 
of rough diamonds into South Africa to be accommodated by local capacity. This means that the bill 
contained certain incentives that would allow more rough diamonds to be beneficiated locally. 
578 56 of 1986. 
579 14 of 2007. 
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The Diamond Export Levy Bill, 2007, proposed the following relief measures or 
exemptions (which are incentives) that would fall in line with local demand as 
there would be no need to force diamonds into the local market beyond its 
capacity. The incentive based approach to regulate the levy is meant to 
encourage producers to supply the local market with rough diamonds and the 
remainder can be exported tax free. Secondly, the Diamond Export Levy Bill, 
2007, made reference to three types of producers. The large producers, whose 
annual sales is in excess of R3 billion; the medium producers, whose annual 
sales are between R20 million; and R3 billion and small producers, whose annual 
sales do not exceed R20 million. In the case of small producers there are anti-
avoidance measures which would prevent producers from splitting sales across 
several controlled companies for purposes of qualifying as small producers and 
thereby avoiding the levy.581
 
 
The debate surrounding the diamond Export Levy Bill, 2007, also dealt with the 
issue concerning the capacity of local beneficiators to handle diamonds by 
providing relief to them as well. It was accepted that it is not always possible for a 
diamond beneficiator to cut and polish 100 per cent of the diamonds it has 
purchased. In such instances the Regulator may grant a beneficiator permission 
to export rough diamonds if the local beneficiator will cut and polish at least 80 
per cent of the diamonds it has purchased. Upon issue of such permit, the 
diamond beneficiator is exempt from the export levy in respect of the 20 per cent 
                                                 
580 National Assembly Debate Minister of Finance (MP) dated 23 August 2007. See section on revised levy 
rate. 
581 The relief measures proposed in the bill were as follows; for large producers the Minister of Minerals & 
Energy may waive the requirement to offer all rough diamonds on the DEEC further, if a large producer 
has met certain conditions, such a large producer would be exempt from the diamond export levy. Medium 
producers can obtain relief from the diamond export levy if 15 per cent of that producer’s total annual gross 
sales are to local diamond beneficiators. Small producers may have the exemption granted to them 
provided that their total annual sales do not exceed R20 million. 
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remainder or off-cuts that may be exported.582
 
 This regulatory framework is a 
classic example of a plausible model for regulated competition in the diamond 
industry. 
The debate around the Diamond Export Levy Bill, 2007, acknowledged that the 
historical context and the nature of how the local diamond market players 
operate shows that there is a higher local beneficiation requirement on large 
producers. This means that in addition to the requirement to sell a certain 
percentage of their output to the SDT, usually ten per cent, large producers also 
have a forty per cent local sales requirement, whereas medium producers have a 
fifteen per cent requirement and small diamond producers simply offer their 
diamonds to the DEEC.  
 
The main point of the export levy as captured in the Diamond Export Levy Bill, 
2007, is that it would not be tax deductible for income tax purposes (because of 
its penalty or punitive nature). This is because it is a levy that can be fully 
avoided if producers meet the requirements necessary to supply local 
beneficiators. This means that the diamond export levy in essence operates as a 
type of penalty for a producer who fails to meet the local supply requirements. 
 
The bill was subsequently enacted in the form of the Diamond Export Levy 
(Administration) Act.583 It will therefore be important in light of diamond sales law 
to consider the effects of some of its provisions on South African diamond trade. 
The Act is essentially concerned with the regulation of the export levy on 
unpolished diamonds (excluding synthetic diamonds),584
 
 probably because of the 
obvious trade value involved in the two different types of diamonds. 
                                                 
582 See parts 1 – 4 of debate. 
583 14 of 2007. 
584 Preamble. 
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The Diamond Export Levy (Administration) Act585 must be read in conjunction 
with the Income Tax Act586 and the Diamonds Act587 particularly when assigning 
the meaning of words or expressions unless the context is clearly contrary. In 
terms of the Diamond Export Levy (Administration) Act588 persons who qualify to 
register with the Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service for the 
purposes of this Act are clearly defined and relate to persons involved in 
diamond trade, for instance, producers, diamond dealers, diamond benefactors 
and holders of diamond export permits. By virtue of the undertakings or entities 
to which the Diamond Export Levy (Administration) Act589
 
 applies, it is clear that 
it is a law that has an impact in the diamond industry, particularly sales (exports). 
This explains the expedient attention and activity around its creation. 
The Diamond Export Levy (Administration) Act590 expressly provides for an 
assessment period that is determined by whether the registered person involved 
is a natural591 or juristic person.592 This distinction is in line with principles of 
income tax law where companies and individuals have distinguishable tax 
assessment periods depending on the financial year end of each institution. 
However, it is the prerogative of the Commissioner to increase or decrease the 
assessment period.593 The Diamond Export Levy (Administration) Act594
                                                 
585 14 of 2007. 
 provides 
for the maintenance of records of registration, import and export of unpolished 
diamonds, their description and value and retention of all documented records 
the in prescribed manner relating to exemptions and other commercial 
586  58 of 1962. This means that the levy payable is calculated subject to the assessment periods as 
determined by the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 and further provided for within the Diamond Export Levy 
(Administration) Act 14 of 2007. 
587 56 of 1986. 
588 14 of 2007 section 2 and 3. 
589 14 of 2007. 
590 14 of 2007. 
591 Diamond Export Levy (Administration) Act 14 of 2007 section 4(2)(a). 
592 Diamond Export Levy (Administration) Act 14 of 2007 section 4(2)(b). 
593 Diamond Export Levy (Administration) Act 14 of 2007 section 4. Section 5 of the same provides for 
payment of the levy in accordance with the return submitted in terms of section 4. 
594 14 of 2007 section 7. 
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transactions relating to the submission of returns under this Act.595
 
 Clearly this 
provision is necessary for evidentiary purposes and accountability in diamond 
sales and levies. 
It is not intended here to delve into the Diamond Export Levy (Administration) 
Act596
 
; however, a few aspects thereof have been pointed out in order to 
insightfully study the structure of the Act and its impact on the diamond sales 
aspect of the diamond regulatory framework in South Africa. It has been 
established in law that the purpose of the export levy is mainly regulatory in 
nature and not intended for the purpose of raising revenue. The raising of 
revenue may be achieved through import credit and exemptions only if deemed 
necessary for instance to fund the activities of the Regulator. However, where the 
Regulator is running on budget there is no need to raise revenue from export 
levies. 
One of the crucial provisions in the Diamond Export Levy (Administration) Act597 
is that it provides for diamond producers or diamond beneficiators to elect598 in 
respect of an assessment period that any person buying an unpolished diamond 
at a DEEC from that producer or diamond beneficiators during that assessment 
period is not subject to a levy in respect of that diamond.599 This election must be 
submitted to the Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service in the 




                                                 
595 Diamond Export Levy (Administration) Act 14 of 2007 section 7(1). 
596 14 of 2007. 
597 14 of 2007. 
598 Pursuant to the Diamond Export Levy (Administration) Act 14 of 2007 section 6 of the which provides 
for the form, manner and place to be determined by the Commissioner for the purposes of registrations, 
returns, forms etc.  
599 Diamond Export Levy (Administration) Act 14 of 2007 section 8(1), which provides as follows: 
‘Notwithstanding section 2 (1) of the Levy Act, any producer or diamond beneficiator may elect pursuant 
to section 6 of the Levy Act in respect of an assessment period that any person purchasing an unpolished 
diamond at a diamond exchange and export centre from that producer or diamond beneficiator during that 
assessment period is not subject to the levy in respect of that diamond.’ 
600 Diamond Export Levy (Administration) Act 14 of 2007 section 8(2). 
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The election is granted so long as it is within a prescribed format and it allows an 
encouragement of buyers of diamonds from the DEEC. The rest of the Diamond 
Export Levy (Administration) Act601 provides for the manner that assessments 
are to be determined, time limits applicable to them, the interests, refunds and 
application of the Income Tax Act602 while the schedule to the Diamond Export 
Levy (Administration) Act603 provides a table for the amendment of laws as 
expressly provided for in the third column of the table in the Schedule.604
 
 For 
purposes of assessing compliance with certain conditions diamond producers are 
able to consult the Government Gazette periodically to ensure adherence to 
regulations established in this statute. 
2.7 Impact of Certain International Conventions on Diamond Sales 
By virtue of their commercial nature as subjects of international trade, diamonds 
are subject to international law of sale of goods. The Conventions that are 
relevant to diamond sales for the purposes of this subject include the Uniformity 
of International Sale Laws Under the United Nations Convention on Sale of 
Goods, 1980 (CISG), South African Law on International Agency and South 
African Legislation On Cross-Border Insolvency. Each aspect of these 
international instruments will be considered in depth in the dedicated subsequent 
chapters of this study; however, for the purposes of this chapter it is important to 




                                                 
601 14 of 2007. 
602 58 of 1962. 
603 14 of 2007. 
604 See amended sections of the Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 as contained in the Levy Act Schedule, e.g. 
section 1, definition of unpolished diamond, section 60 relating to export an import of unpolished 
diamonds, section 61A registration of unpolished diamonds for import, section 44 temporary exemption 
from diamond exchange and export centre, section 65A examination and valuation of unpolished diamonds 
for import, section 67 fine in case of difference in values section 69B release of unpolished diamonds for 
import.  The Diamonds Amendment Act 29 of 2005 is also amended by repeal of section 66 and 68 and the 
Diamonds Second Amendment Act 30 of 2005 is also amended by the insertion of section 74 in the form of 
section 74A dealing with relief for certificated purchases. 
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2.8 Conclusion 
This chapter elucidated the regulatory framework of the core aspect of the 
diamond industry particularly the sales element. What emerges from the 
overview is that there are national laws that have set up clear regulations on how 
the import and exports or international trade in diamonds ought to be 
approached. The first point that comes across clearly in South Africa is that there 
is a regulated model of diamond sales. This regulated model of sales is 
controlled at the helm by the SADPM Regulator and the SDT. These State 
bodies are crucial to ensuring that the diamond related Constitutional goals are 
achieved in local markets as well as international markets.  
 
Considering that all market participants are by nature competitors, this chapter 
has provided the relevant insight on how fair competition can be achieved in 
diamond sales and local diamond beneficiation. It has also emerged from the 
study that the regulatory framework as reflecting the Constitutional values has 
assisted diamond stakeholders to participate freely on the market without 
infringing on the right of other market entrants without compromising the market 
integrity of the diamond industry. 
 
Further, this chapter provides an academic insight on the State’s role in ensuring 
that diamond sales are handled with the strictest accountability from the State’s 
perspective. Through statutorily prescribed means of registering diamonds to be 
sold, accountability and oversight of all diamonds by the South African State is 
plausibly achieved. The most important contribution being in the tax incentives 
provided to producers who participate in State efforts to enhance the local 
diamond industry. 
 
In conclusion it is submitted that the State bodies created in the Diamonds Act605
                                                 
605 56 of 1986. 
 
are clearly identifiable with their specific mandates and this allows for optimal 
structures that regulate diamond sales law in South Africa. It is also submitted 
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that the law reflects measurable processes to ensure equitable access to 
diamond market. It is submitted that South Africa reflects diamond trade laws that 
are extremely sophisticated and it is submitted that with participation of new 
groups in the private sector, the diamond sales aspect will be enhanced for the 




Chapter 3: De Beers and its Participation in South African Law 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the South African diamond industry, whether it is mining, exploration or trade, 
the contribution made by the De Beers606
 
 family of companies has been crucial in 
the development of the diamond sector. It is therefore essential to consider the 
extent of De Beers’, general participation, influence where and involvement in the 
reforms of South African laws on diamonds. This producer based case study for 
the application of South African diamond laws as they have developed over time. 
This chapter aims at providing insights on the practicalities of legislative 
measures now applicable to the diamond industry particularly where a prominent 
diamond producer is involved. What will be evident in this chapter is the manner 
in which De Beers while being hosted by South Africa has showed commitment 
to the rule of law of the country by adhering to legal principles as illustrated in 
their dealings with tax law, labour law, patents laws, commercial law, 
environmental law and maritime law all of which are important to the diamond 
industry. 
 
The diamond industry, through efforts of diamond entities such as De Beers is 
recognized as having added to or influenced diamond regulations. The company 
has made a significant contribution to the socio-economic status of South Africa 
because of the vast amount of human resource that the company utilizes.  
 
De Beers achieved a successful presence at the forefront of exercising economic 
rights in the diamond industry as well as the respect of the rule of law particularly, 
in respect of unfair discrimination. De Beers has partnered with the State to 
                                                 
606 For the purposes of this chapter the use of the identification ‘De Beers’ is a general and generic term to 
identify the diamond producer being discussed in this chapter. For correct reference to juristic persons 
forming part of De Beers, kindly refer to www.debeersgroup.com 16 September 2008. 
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ensure that mineral resources are accessible to all the peoples of South Africa 
through various BEE partnerships.607
 
 
It is clear that De Beers is a diamond producer that is in transformation and this 
must be acknowledged and studied. To define the meaning of transformation of a 
pioneer previously white owned entity according to Constitutional principles, the 
case of (Phambili II) Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental 
affairs and Others608
 
 is a useful guide. The court stated that when measuring 
transformation of a company, one must determine the ownership, distribution of 
wealth created through access to resources and the extent to which the company 
in question employs people from historically disadvantaged sectors of 
community.  
This chapter will be considering some of these transformational aspects of De 
Beers. It is submitted that although necessary to employ black people in a 
previously white dominated industry or company it also injures the dignity of such 
employed black people to be paraded just for the sake of proving that a company 
is complying with legislation. True transformation will come when the law no 
longer forces the employment of black people but such hiring takes place 
naturally on merit and hard work which the peoples of South Africa are perfectly 
capable of with the right educational tools and skills development. This applies by 
analogy to the employment and empowerment of women. 
 
The influence and involvement of De Beers will be considered in this chapter in 
order to dismiss past notions that the involvement of De Beers in diamond 
industry is just another vehicle for upholding dominant capitalist ideals. Prior to 
the 1994 elections transformation and the upliftment of black peoples would have 
been the last priority for many of the diamond companies, however this is no 
longer the problem. The participation of De Beers in South African laws illustrates 
                                                 
607 DBCM is 26 per cent owned by BEE Company Ponahalo Holdings. 
608 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC). 
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how industry laws are based on sound considerations of equity and commercial 
freedom both of which are foundational to democracy.  
 
The De Beers Group is historically tied to Anglo American group which itself is 
one of the major participants in global diamond mining and trading. Famous for 
their slogan ‘A Diamond is Forever’, De Beers group have always had notoriety 
in diamond trade in South Africa and the world diamond markets. Obviously the 
leadership advantage of De Beers is also largely due to the advantages obtained 
during the apartheid era where the intention of the law was to boldly enrich one 
race group to the exclusion of another. It must be noted that there are other 
diamond producers in South Africa whose involvement in diamond trade is also 
quite significant.  
 
All diamond producers regardless of size are significant contributors to the 
economy of South Africa and there is no doubt that they may even more so 
because of potentially lower overheads and larger profits that are common in 
smaller dealers in comparison with larger companies. De Beers, the State and 
other diamond producers all have an important economic role, however, De 
Beers have had a special role in international law as well as national law on this 
point. 
 
The name ‘De Beers’ is used in the introductory parts of this chapter as a general 
generic term for the entire group, however, it is important to note that within this 
group are certain juristic persons that have specifically registered company 
names in accordance with national law. These juristic persons will be 
distinguished as this chapter progresses. De Beers as a group specifically 
produce to sell its products to a group of clients called Sight holders.609
                                                 
609 De Beers has mining interests in South Africa, Namibia, Canada, South African Sea Areas (SASA) and 
recently Russia. They are the most influential diamond producers who often sell diamonds up to 25 carats 
mostly required for industrial purposes.  
 The sale 
of diamonds is dictated by the requirements of the market and De Beers 




 export and bring into the country revenue in foreign currency. They 
are therefore also affected by threats and recession facing the international 
markets in the same manner as all other sectors. 
The specific selection of De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd (DBCM) for analytical 
study purposes is not to ignore the contribution made by other producers but to 
simply highlight the most influential and internationally recognizable diamond 
producer that has set the pace for other diamond producers. De Beers has 
contributed more to the industry as their activities are not only limited to land 
mining but also the more expensive offshore mining. This means that to study De 
Beers diamond trade involvement is to study a company whose influence in the 
global diamond industry is extensive and important.  
 
De Beers related companies that form part of the large family group. One of the 
companies to be discussed in more detail in this chapter is specifically De Beers 
Marine (Pty) Ltd DBM a company contracted by DBCM to mine in the South 
African Sea Areas (SASA) under license ML3/2003.  
 
This chapter will also consider DBCM’s diamond sales activities through its 
Diamond Trading Company (DTC) and the Diamond Trading Company South 
Africa (DTCSA) and its involvement in an international landmark case that deals 
with anti-competitive behavior in international law. The analysis of the application 
of modern law to De Beers will illustrate that there has truly been a significant 
shift in its activities to reflect more equitable diamond law practices. 
 
3.2 Sir Ernest Oppenheimer and the Early Days of De Beers 
History reveals that De Beers Consolidated Mines Limited was consolidated 
upon registration of the amalgamated De Beers and Kimberley mines in 1888. 
This merger resulted in a company which became dominant in diamond mining in 
                                                 
610 Through the Diamond Trading Company (DTC), this is the rough diamond distribution arm of the De 
Beers Group. More information about the DTC can be found on www.debeersgroup.com 14 September 
2008. 
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southern Africa. In 1929 Sir Ernest Oppenheimer became the chairperson of De 
Beers Consolidated Mines Limited and took the helm in steering the company 
through the world depression in the 1930s611 which was threatening all 
industries, including the diamond business.612
 
 
According to writer Viljoen Christie although De Beers controlled the upward 
market power within the diamond industry, it was in fact a mining scene that 
offered capital owners an advantage of building mining empires.613 In her paper 
Viljoen argues that De Beers distinguished themselves from the original diamond 
industry supply trends of countries such as India and Brazil,614 who were 
traditional earlier suppliers, by controlling the entire network of the diamond 
supply chain which created a monopoly which had its original power held by 
minority elites. These elites gained their earlier wealth through primitive 
techniques based on the ‘hard labour of a quasi-slave nature.’615 The writer 
acknowledges the race-bar that was created by the rise of the De Beers 
monopoly,616
 
 it is submitted that to this day the Republic of South Africa is still 
grappling with the negative legacy of the rise of monopolies of this nature. 
                                                 
611 Hebert I. The Diamond Diggers South Africa 1866 to the 1970s, Crompton Press (1971) 111 describes 
Sir Ernest Oppenheimer as the third great man in diamonds. 
612 Chilvers The Story of the De Beers Group (Issued by De Beers Consolidated Mines), undated, 9. 
Viljoen C. Evolution of Market Power In the Diamond Industry Supply Chain (800 B.C. – 1930 A.D.): Why 
De Beers Was So Different September (2008) 1. http://www.ekon.sun.ac.za/ehssa/Viljoen.pdf 23 March 
2010. See Wagner P. A. The Diamond Fields of Southern Africa The Transvaal Leader Publishers (1914) 
171, 241 where the writer records that the diamond mining methods used are clearly not as sophisticated as 
modern day methods with a concern for environmental damage. The writer also mentions that the greater 
concern in early diamond mining seemed to be more concentrated on economic advantage rather than 
environmental safety. 
613 Ibid. Abstract. 
614 Viljoen C. Evolution of Market Power In the Diamond Industry Supply Chain (800 B.C. – 1930 A.D.): 
Why De Beers Was So Different September (2008) 3 http://www.ekon.sun.ac.za/ehssa/Viljoen.pdf 23 
March 2010. 
615 Viljoen C. Evolution of Market Power In the Diamond Industry Supply Chain (800 B.C. – 1930 A.D.): 
Why De Beers Was So Different September (2008) 1 http://www.ekon.sun.ac.za/ehssa/Viljoen.pdf 23 
March 2010. Abstract. 
616 Viljoen C. Evolution of Market Power In the Diamond Industry Supply Chain (800 B.C. – 1930 A.D.): 
Why De Beers Was So Different September (2008) 2 http://www.ekon.sun.ac.za/ehssa/Viljoen.pdf 23 
March 2010. 
 150 
Wagner Percy Albert, in his book on diamond mining in Southern Africa stated 
that the economic value of the diamond is essential to capitalist ideals in that if 
the demand for the diamond would cease even the richest of mines will be 
relegated to geological curiosity exercises.617 Wagner admits that the diamond 
industry was directed at the wealthier classes of buyers particularly those of 
countries such as the US who were all apparently fascinated by the costly and 
popularized ‘stones of fire.’618
 
 It is submitted that De Beers at this time was not 
seeking to share the wealth of the country of South Africa. 
Wagner submits that De Beers as a leading earlier diamond producer achieved 
more of their success through the De Beers Company and the London Diamond 
Buying Syndicate which rigidly carried out a ‘traditional valorization policy’ which 
was made successful by the merging of leading interests in the industry.619
 
  
It is notable based on the submission above that De Beers not only had 
assistance from discriminatory laws but its success also came about as a result 
of businesses talent which was supported De Beers’s vision to be a dominant 
producer. It is submitted that while De Beers is the focus of this study, by virtue 
of its proverbial market success as a group, it is submitted that one reading this 
analysis must also take into account that there were other earlier producers who 
were also significantly benefited by the discriminatory laws. It is important to keep 
a realistic view of this historical fact so as to avoid focusing on the flaws of one 
particular company’s history. This submission is based on the argument that it 
was against the law for blacks to have mining rights of any kind.620
 
 
                                                 
617 Wagner P. A. The Diamond Fields of Southern Africa, The Transvaal Leader Publishers (1914) 241. 
618 Ibid. 
619 Wagner P. A. The Diamond Fields of Southern Africa, The Transvaal Leader Publishers (1914) 241, 
242. 
620 See www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/ruling.html 27 October 2009. 
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It is submitted621 that the social engineering that came with the western model of 
the establishment of colonial capitalist relations into southern African states, such 
as Namibia, Angola and South Africa, all contributed to apartheid. The countries 
mineral resources were suddenly in the hands of the elite minority which lead to 
the imposed patterns of foreign dominance and exploitation of the Namibian 
people (and their resources), for example, which is likened by the writer to 
apartheid well known South African racist regime.622
 
 Companies such as De 
Beers were as the author submits allies of apartheid. 
The black labourers working conditions were grim, particularly in light of the fact 
that they could not work in the industry in any other capacity other than to provide 
manual labour were grim.623 The work was hard and the days extremely long 
with absence of proper medical aid and onslaughts of camp fever. The shelter for 
the workers consisted of makeshift hovels which were a breeding ground for 
disease.624
 
 From this account of history it is evident that diamond trade was 
developing but without respect for human rights, at least for those who were not 
the capitalist elite. 
It is reported625
                                                 
621 See collection of papers edited by Cooper A. Allies in Apartheid: Western Capitalism in Occupied 
Namibia, The Macmillan Press Ltd (1988), essay by Melber H. Introduction II: Socio-Economic 
Interaction of Colonial Capitalist Relations in Namibia Before and During Germs Rule 8; 9. 
 that death and mine accidents were the order of the day in early 
mining activities. It has been submitted that underground accidents were caused 
by competition to increase production in the struggle for total control of the four 
main mines in the 1880s. De Beers was known for pushing its workers to the limit 
in order to catch up with the greater productive capacity of the Kimberley Central 
mine. It was reported that the attitude among De Beers’s management at the 
622 Ibid. 
623 Roberts Brian Kimberley: Turbulent City, Pioneer Press (Pty) Ltd (1976) 24, 221. 
624 Ibid. 
625 Turrel R. V. Capital and Labour on the Kimberley Diamond Fields 1871 – 1890, Cambridge University 
Press (1987) 159. 
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time was that regulations were harassments. This led to a fire breaking out in the 
De Beers underground mine in 1888.626
 
 
In the earlier days of Sir Ernest Oppenheimer set about to create a system of 
rationalized diamond sales which included companies associated with De Beers. 
This system, known as the Central Selling Organization (CSO),627 purchased, 
sorted evaluated and marketed rough diamonds. This, together with its ability to 
stockpile large quantities of rough diamonds, enabled it to maintain the stability of 
rough diamond prices by balancing supply and demand, which greatly influenced 
diamond trade to this day.628
 
  
It is stated in Chilvers, a De Beers historical record book, that Sir Ernest 
Oppenheimer believed that the only way in which diamond trade would become a 
success was not only through marketing strategies and policies but co-operation 
between diamond producers. This vision was essential in allowing diamond 
resources in South Africa to be managed in a manner that best represents lawful 
and proper trade. This approach by Sir Ernest Oppenheimer created a cogent 
way forward by suggesting that the few controlling diamond producers be 
permitted to manage the diamond resources for the benefit of all by producer co-
operation. This approach has led to a lawful and functional present day model of 
DBCM. Clearly this philosophy agreed with the ‘too many cooks spoil the 
                                                 
626 Ibid. Out of a workforce of 67 white workers and 625 black workers, only 24 white workers died and 
178 black workers died. 
627 See http://www.miningbasics.com/diamonds-and-cso 24 March 2010. The CSO is described as an 
organisation established by the South African company De Beers Consolidated Mines in 1930 to promote 
the marketing of diamonds from its own mines. It has since been expanded to include other producers. 
While the Central Selling Organization has been successful in establishing a marketing agreement with 
Russia, which is a major diamond producer, some mines there have been selling some of their diamonds 
outside this agreement in recent years. However, companies from most other diamond producing nations 
are still permitting their rough gems to be sorted, valued and distributed through the CSO. It is therefore 
important to have an understanding of the relevance of this organisation in modern international diamond 
trade. 




 theory. One the other hand De Beers can be criticized as not creating 
an environment that would support resources and power sharing.  
The management of diamond resources in this co-operative manner wiped out 
the possibility of illicit diamond trading that could possibly end in diamonds either 
entering conflict torn zones or being introduced into the system from conflict 
zones outside the country’s borders. For example, as history presently shows us 
that it becomes dangerous if diamond management is left to un-cooperative 
disorganized rebel groups who may use diamond trade for militant activities thus 
bringing about conflict over the management of diamond resources.630
 
 The 
activities of De Beers Group in diamond mining and trading were in conformity 
with the law existing at the time and the Group has had much diamond business 
related involvement with such laws. 
The history of De Beers discussed above by De Beers themselves obviously 
does not mention the apartheid conditions from which it developed. 
Notwithstanding De Beers has contributed significantly to the economy and 
infrastructure of South Africa over the last 120 years. It is essential that their 
contribution be noted as it is more appropriate to use diamonds to build schools, 
hospitals and roads rather than promoting war through people trying to fight for 
the control of the country’s diamond resources.631
 
  
It is submitted that ‘a worker is worthy of his or her wages’ and it this sense De 
Beers group ought to be acknowledged for their contribution in diamond trade. 
Further, in modern times as a result of seeking to develop humanity De Beers as 
a company has also been active in developing and promoting the KPCS of 
                                                 
629 It is submitted that where there are no lawful controls in diamond trade, that is where problems with 
conflict diamonds or illicit diamond trade obtains a breeding ground to the detriment of a thriving diamond 
producing country. 
630 Though South Africa has not traditionally had a problem with the presence of conflict diamonds due to 
relative political calm and stability, it is proposed that the diamond legislative framework has contributed to 
the best practices of diamond trade within the country. 
631 Chilvers The Story of the De Beers Group (Issued by De Beers Consolidated Mines), undated, 9. 
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diamond production and trade.632 However having acknowledged the contribution 
of De Beers to the development and practices of the South African diamond 
trade, the views of other learned authors633
 
 as discussed in this study are 
important in that they provide a proportionate account and analysis of De Beers’s 
activities. 
3.3 De Beers and the 1996 Constitution 
De Beers as a group have been actively involved in Constitutional mandates for 
the promotion of equal access to diamond resources for all South Africans an 
ideal sought through transformation and black economic empowerment.634
 
  
The Constitutional ideal is to ensure that the affirmative action goals635 and 
similar positive rights are upheld and promoted by individuals, the State and 
economic influences such as De Beers. The protection of environmental rights as 
expressed the Bill of Rights636 is highly prioritized by DBCM in their activities. It is 
submitted that even if mistakes were made in the past, the presence of De Beers 
and other important participant as key players in the diamond industry has been 





                                                 
632 According to De Beers’s modern diamond trade practices keeping conflict diamonds out of legitimate 
trade forms part of their mandate. Further, De Beers gives a firm guarantee that their diamonds are 100 per 
cent conflict free. See http://www.debeersgroup.com/Sustainability/Ethics/Conflict-diamonds/ 24 March 
2010. 
633 Viljoen C. Evolution of Market Power In the Diamond Industry Supply Chain (800 B.C. – 1930 A.D.): 
Why De Beers Was So Different September (2008) 1 and See Wagner P. A. The Diamond Fields of 
Southern Africa, The Transvaal Leader Publishers (1914) 171, 241 and 242. 
634DBCM is 26 per cent owned by BEE Company Ponahalo Holdings representing a wide range of 
shareholders in communities, gender and disabled, employees and retired De Beers’s workers, as well as 
leading empowerment business people. www.debeersgroup.com 20 January 2007. See internal report by 
Smith N.  De Beers Reveals Canny BEE Deal 9 November (2005). 
635 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996 section 9(2). 
636 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996 section 24. 
637 Other significant players in the industry include Rio Tinto, Petra Diamonds, Alrosa, BHP Billington. In 
South Africa, other important diamond producers include Trans Hex, Alexkor Ltd, Rex Diamond Mining, 
Messina Diamonds and Benguela Concessions. There are also approximately 1500 alluvial diamond 
diggers who as a group are also significant suppliers to the diamond industry.  
 155 
3.3.1 De Beers and its Compliance with Diamond Laws 
Having studied the diamond laws of South Africa in the preceding chapters, it is 
necessary to consider the extent to which De Beers can be said to be in 
compliance with these laws. This part of the study will consider in a parochial 
manner compliance of De Beers with the Diamonds Act638 in relation to taxation, 
compliance with the transformations goals of the MPRDA639 and the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa Act640
 
 and compliance with principles of fair 
market competition.  
The three listed aspects of this part of the study are isolated specifically as they 
are often or recently have been a cause for concern in the diamond industry 
particularly when dealing with a large corporate entity such as De Beers. It is 
therefore crucial to analyze and determine the diamond law compliance status of 
a flagship diamond producer. Further, in terms of general compliance with 
licensing and other diamond trade issues De Beers has illustrated sound 
practices therefore it will not be necessary to repeat that discussion. 
 
With regard to compliance with the Diamonds Act641 and tax exemptions, De 
Beers was subject to an investigation by the Standing Committee on Public 
Accounts (SCOPA).642 This was reported by the Parliamentary Monitoring Group 
in January 2008, which was the time when an investigation into De Beers and 
compliance with the Diamonds Act643
                                                 
638 56 of 1986. 
 was under SCOPA’s consideration. It 
emerged from the investigation that De Beers had allegedly entered into an 
agreement, on 3 December 1992 with the South African Diamond Board. In 
terms of the agreement De Beers was permitted to export to London a stockpile 
of unpolished locally mined diamonds to the total of 20 million carats valued at 
639 28 of 2002. 
640 108 of 1996. 
641 56 of 1986. 
642 http://beta.parliament.gov.za/live/commonrepository/Processed/20090730/57733_1.doc 
http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20070611-interaction-minister-minerals-energy-scopa-62nd-report-2005-
sa-diamond-board 23 October 2009. 
643 56 of 1986. 
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USD 822 million. This transshipment of diamonds was not accompanied by 
payment of export duty. There was however no documentary evidence produced 
by the South African Diamond Board showing that it had authorized such a large 
shipment of diamonds to London.644
 
This is part of the controvecy that 
surrounded this transaction. 
SCOPA had to determine the legality of the above agreement. It was established 
in the SCOPA hearings and subsequent report that the point of contention in this 
instance revolved around the payment of export duties in terms of sections 59,645 
62646 and section 63647 of the Diamonds Act.648 The investigation focused on the 
applicability of section 63 which gave the South African Diamond Board powers 
to grant an exemption from export duty to a producer if the diamonds of the 
producer, among other things, were first allocated or offered to a diamond cutter 
or tool maker pursuant to the old section 59 of the Diamonds Act.649 In terms of 
the old section 59 the Board could enter into an agreement with a South African 
producer provided that such a producer has endeavored to supply unpolished 
diamonds to South African cutters and tool makers.650
 
 
It was established by SCOPA that the intention of the old section 59 of the 
Diamonds Act651
                                                 
644 http://beta.parliament.gov.za/files/docs/090204report.rtf 10 August 2009. 
 was to ensure the application of the South African State policy. 
This policy of Parliament intended the economic development of South Africa to 
encourage the cutting and polishing of diamonds locally. The alleged agreement 
allowing the export of diamonds concluded by De Beers and the South African 
Diamond Board in this case was criticized as being a strategy of exporting large 
645 Section 59 prior to substitution by section 17 of the Diamonds Second Amendment Act 30 of 2005. 
646 Section 62 prior to repeal by s. 19 of the Diamond Export Levy (Amendment) Act 14 of 2007. 
647Section 63 of the Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 prior to amendments by s. 10 of the Diamonds Amendment 
Act 10 of 1991, s. 115 (1) of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act 8 of 2007 and subsequently repealed by s. 
19 of the Diamond Export Levy (Amendment) Act 14 of 2007. 
648 56 of 1986. 
649 56 of 1986. 
650 http://beta.parliament.gov.za/files/docs/090204report.rtf 10 August 2009. 
651 56 of 1986. 
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numbers of diamonds shortly before the end of apartheid officially ended652 and 
the agreement was simply a façade to permit De Beers to loot the diamonds out 
of the country as suggested by the SCOPA chairman in the reports. 653
 
 
The matter above was still not finalized in 2007. However it was provided in 
subsequent reports that De Beers is still expected in terms of the SCOPA reports 
to co-operate with the DME and the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) in order 
to make full account of De Beers’s exports from the period of 3 December 1992 
to 19 March 1998.654 On 27 May 2008655
 
 in the proceedings of the National 
Assembly it was reported to Parliament in a speech as follows: 
‘We are happy to indicate that despite years of 
procrastination and obfuscation that have characterized this 
process, at the hearing, all parties were prepared to co-
operate and were awaiting the recommendations from 
Parliament. We are happy therefore to present this first 
report that seeks to assist with the way forward to resolve 
this matter of principle, law and national interest. …The 
message that we are sending to one and all is that 
Parliament will never equivocate where matters of public 
interest are concerned, whether it relates to public 
institutions or private capital.’656
 
 
The implications for finding De Beers in the wrong in this matter mean that there 
will be large amounts of tax liability against De Beers as a result of the exported 
                                                 
652 Michael Hamlyn Business Report News Article: MPs Challenge De Beers Over Mysterious Exports 13 
June 2007. 
653 http://beta.parliament.gov.za/files/docs/090204report.rtf 10 August 2009. 
654 http://beta.parliament.gov.za/files/docs/090204report.rtf 10 August 2009. 
655 www.parliament.gov.za/live/commonrepository/.../122503_1.doc - 10 August 2009. 
656 Mr. N.T. Godi CONSIDERATION OF FIRST REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC ACCOUNTS 
– INVESTIGATION RELATING TO EXPORT AND SALE OF DIAMONDS, IN TERMS OF 
DIAMONDS ACT, 1986 (27 May 2008). www.parliament.gov.za/live/commonrepository/.../122503_1.doc  
- 10 August 2009. 
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diamonds. With regard to compliance with the Diamonds Act657 in this case, it 
seems that that is questionable in light of the fact that the large disposition on 
diamonds certainly did not enhance the local cutting and polishing industry as 
intended in the Diamonds Act.658
 
  
On the other hand the matter opened a door for vast amounts of legislative 
amendments to take place. The main problem with De Beers’s actions in this 
case is that the export of diamonds is seen in a negative light. This is a situation 
similar to that of unlawful dispositions in company law. SCOPA investigated as a 
result of concerns about the export’s detrimental effect on South African diamond 
interests. For De Beers it seems that they are eager to cooperate with the 
Government on finalizing the investigation.659
 
  
It is submitted that the export of diamonds was within the commercial prerogative 
of De Beers however the lack of taxation casts suspicion to the transaction. 
Perhaps the best way forward is to remedy the tax liability if it is so established. 
The next step would be to focus on the Constitutionally of future accurate 
business transactions in diamond trade and a stern reminder that diamond 
exports must be done with respect to South African diamond law at all times. 
 
Perhaps it was the concern about the unknown governmental regime that 
motivated the export. Be that as it may in this case De Beers fell short of 
compliance with the actual objectives of the Diamonds Act,660
                                                 
657 56 of 1986. 
 however, whether 
a law was offended or not is still to be considered more carefully. What is 
important now is that decisions taken by De Beers should no longer be motivated 
by political panic but rather the respect for the cogent State policy expressed in 
the diamond laws. 
658 56 of 1986. 
659 Mr. N.T. Godi CONSIDERATION OF FIRST REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC ACCOUNTS 
– INVESTIGATION RELATING TO EXPORT AND SALE OF DIAMONDS, IN TERMS OF 
DIAMONDS ACT, 1986 (27 May 2008). www.parliament.gov.za/live/commonrepository/.../122503_1.doc  
- 10 August 2009. 
660 56 of 1986. 
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With regard to transformation objectives as established in South African diamond 
laws De Beers appears to be committed to these goals as will be illustrated 
below. This commitment to transformation however will be considered herein in a 
parochial manner as this study does not wish to be overly pre-occupied with 
racial differences. While affirmative action measures of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa Act, 1996661 are absolutely necessary in South Africa. 
This study seeks to achieve is a progressive South African view of respect for 
national diversity based on equality. This State endeavor to assist the historically 




What one can aim for in a truly transformed company is equality among race 
groups on the basis of ubuntu or menswaardigheid. This is a process that 
requires individual introspection as racism in the law may be removed but if it not 
removed from the hearts and minds of South Africans, transformation will suffer. 
Often racism is viewed as only based on the oppression by white people of the 
black people. While this is a classic case of apartheid it must be acknowledged 
that racism goes deeper than that. Racism involves discrimination on the basis of 
race, colour or creed therefore black people may also be just as racist. This 
offends moral and Constitutional values because no single person decides on the 
colour of their skin so judgment should not simply be passed on that basis alone. 
Transformation will take place when these negative attitudes are exposed and 
dealt with positively. 
 
In achieving transformation, a company like De Beers, for example, must avoid 
tokenism in applying transformation targets as this undermines the true dignity of 
the equity. Tokenism occurs when a person is appointed in order to fulfill a racial, 
gender or disability profile without being truly given the power or the necessary 
                                                 
661 108 of 1996 in terms of section 9(2). 
662 108 of 1996. 
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tools and training for the purposes of functioning optimally and competently in 
that appointment or position of responsibility.  In positions of this nature the 
candidate normally gets ignored such that they are seen as less valuable 
because they are different. This leads to the candidate being unable to compete 
freely and fairly within the working environment. Fortunately where 
transformation is properly executed it becomes a true tool for empowering 
individuals. 
 
De Beers transformation strategies are commendable not only through their 
famous Black Economic Empowerment agreement that was signed between De 
Beers and Ponahalo Holdings (Proprietary) Limited. They also have engaged in 
investing in empowerment programmes such as the recently reported Women in 
Mining projects. De Beers acknowledge the need for transformation and through 
projects of this nature are able to invest in true transformation. In a media release 
De Beers stated the following:  
 
 ‘De Beers Consolidated Mines (DBCM) in the Northern 
Cape celebrated and shared their “Women in Mining” 
projects at a function this week with the Minister of Minerals 
and Energy Buyelwa Sonjica, and with leaders from the 
mining sector, provincial government and women in 
technical positions from both Kimberley Mines and Finsch 
Mine. Women make up 52% of the adult population in 
South Africa and 41% of the working South African 
population, but only constitute 16.8% of all executive 
managers and 11.5% of all directors in the country. The 
mining industry aspires to a baseline of 10% participation of 
women in technical disciplines by May 2009. In DBCM we 
acknowledge that this is an area of strategic importance 
which requires a special focus and currently (2008)10% of 
our employees across the country are women employed in 
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technical disciplines. In the Northern Cape our operations 
have embarked on various initiatives achieving a 12% level 
of employees in technical disciplines being women. To 
advance this programme Finsch and Kimberley Mines have 
recently appointed 26 ladies to the ‘Women in Mining 
Development Programme’; a technical leadership 
experience in mining, metallurgy and engineering.’663
 
 
On the point of De Beers working within the limits of fair market competition, De 
Beers has been viewed as dominant in the diamond markets. Even in the 
international domain concerns about De Beers’s dominant role is still a cause for 
concerns among the EU competition authorities particularly in light of the 
international decision allowing De Beers to purchase Russian diamonds from the 
company Alrosa.664
 
 In South African law De Beers has appeared before the 
Competition Tribunal on several occasions in order to test that it is not in a 
position to abuse its dominant position. The issue of anti-competitive behavior 
will be dealt with more extensively in the subsequent parts of this chapter.  
In a matter before the Competition Tribunal in DB Investments SA v De Beers 
Consolidated Mines Ltd & De Beers Centenary AG665
 
 the court issued a merger 
clearance certificate. It was established in the matter that such a merger would 
not result in the substantial lessening of competition within either the either of the 
diamond industry or natural resource sectors. This decision is an example of De 
Beers’s involvement and compliance with all aspects of diamond laws. 
3.4 De Beers in Litigation 
With regard to De Beers’ contribution to diamond laws, it is important to consider 
some judicial decisions where De Beers has had some involvement. The study of 
                                                 
663 Media release 30 May 2008. www.debeersgroup.com 18 September 2009. 
664 De Beers Diamond Deal Faces Fresh EU Scrutiny 18 September 2009. 
http://www.busrep.co.za/index.php?fArticleld=5170123 18 September 2009. 
665 Case Number: 20/LM/March 2001. 
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these cases will be limited to some reported South African judgments, a 
landmark international judgment of the Luxembourg court and some modern 
South African unreported judgments. The cases considered span over a period 
of time including the pre-Constitution era. The consideration of these judgments 
serves to illustrate the common problems and points of dispute that are a 
common concern typically for a diamond producer. This means that the 
precedents set herein is an essential educational tool from a practical as well as 
academic point of view to bringing legal solutions to those problems experienced 
by diamond producers. 
 
What is interesting about the judgments is that they illustrate sound application of 
laws (commercial law, taxation laws etc.) pertaining to the diamond industry. It 
seems however that none of the judgments addressed ‘the elephant in the court 
room’ which was the unjust manner in which the socio-economic rights of black 
people in the diamond trade industry and their participation in the South African 
formal economy. It is however understandable that that was never an issue 
raised before the courts in such clean cut commercial cases. 
 
The consideration of some of these decisions affords an opportunity to consider 
whether or not South African diamond laws are being applied in an equitable 
manner, equity being one of the main ideals of Legislature in South African 
diamond laws. It is important however at all times to distinguish in litigation the 
client in this case De Beers from perhaps the over-eager or misguided efforts of 
a legal counsel. This happens in law and that is the reason why courts are 
approached to interpret laws to achieve the best possible outcome. 
 
Clearly a system of law based on the dominant class’s legal ideals only may be 
problematic if such an ideal is not based on equity. Such a situation would be a 
very obvious threat to the South African Constitutional democracy. De Beers 
influence on the law as will be considered in case law in this chapter generally 
illustrates De Beers’ respect for the core values of justice and the rule of law 
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which must be upheld by South African courts in the development and 
interpretation of South African diamond laws. De Beers group are no stranger to 
the courts as evident in the discussed reported judgments part of various 
matters.666
 
 This is not just a record demonstrating that they are litigious but it is 
significant to note their involvement in interpretation of diamond laws from a 
practical perspective, in light of the freedoms that South Africa enjoys as a young 
democracy. To avoid turning this work into a De Beers law report, only a few 
selected cases will be considered in this chapter. 
3.4.1 Offshore Diamond Mining and Payment of Tax 
In De Beers Marine (Pty) Ltd v The Commissioner for the South African Revenue 
Service (SARS)667 the main consideration in this case revolved around the 
interpretation of the word ‘export’ within the context of the Customs and Excise 
Act,668 particularly section 20(4)(d). Section 20669
                                                 
666 This includes, inter alia, matters such as, De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v Minister of Mines & 
Another 1956 (3) SA 45 (W), Rabinowitz & Another v De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd & Another 1958 
(3) SA 619 (A), De Beers Industrial Diamond Division (Pty) Ltd v Ishizuka 1980 (2) SA 191 (T), 
Commissioner For Inland Revenue v De Beers Holdings (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 286 (T), De Beers Holdings 
(Pty) Ltd v Commissioner For Inland Revenue 1986 (1) SA 8 (A), De Beers Industrial Diamond Division 
(Pty) Ltd v General Electric Company 1987 (4) SA 362 (T), De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v 
Commission For Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration & Others  (2000) 5 LLD 276 (LAC), De Beers 
Marine (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service 2002 (5) SA 136 (SCA), National Union 
of Mine Workers & Others and RSA Geological Services (A Division of De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd) 
(2004) 25 ILJ 410 (ARB), National Union of Mineworkers v De Beers Consolidated Mines (Pty) Ltd (2006) 
27 ILJ 1909 (LC) and most recently, RSA Geological Services (A Division of De Beers Consolidated Mines 
Ltd) v Grogan NO & Others (2008) 29 ILJ (LC). The fact that De Beers fight their battles in court show 
that they are an entity that is willing to use sophisticated and civilized methods that are acceptable in a 
society based on justice. 
 has since been interpreted to 
667 2002 (5) SA 136 (SCA). 
668 91 of 1964. 
669 Section 20 at present provides as follows ‘Goods in customs and excise warehouses 
(4) Subject to section 19A, no goods which have been stored or manufactured in a customs and excise 
warehouse shall be taken or delivered from such warehouse except in accordance with the rules and upon 
due entry for any of the following purposes-  
        (a)     home consumption and payment of any duty due thereon;  
        (b)     re-warehousing in another customs and excise warehouse or removal in bond as provided in section 
18;  
[Para. (b) substituted by s. 6 (a) of Act 84 of 1987.]  
        (c)     ......  
[Para. (c) deleted by s. 6 (b) of Act 84 of 1987.]  
        (d)     export from customs and excise warehouse (including supply as stores for foreign-going ships or 
aircraft.)  (This provision was the focus of the case). 
[Sub-s. (4) amended by s. 14 (a) of Act 45 of 1995 and by s. 41 (1) of Act 19 of 2001.]  
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accommodate the decision of the SCA in this judgment. It is submitted however 
that any influence of interpretation of the law must be tested against what is 
justifiable influence in order to ensure that powerful diamond producers will not 
be perceived as using litigation as a tool to bully the legal system or the courts to 
suit their own commercial ends. 
 
The facts of the case illustrate that it involved De Beers Marine (Pty) Ltd 
(DBM)670 a company belonging to the De Beers group. DBM is based in Cape 
Town and carries on business providing contracting and consulting services in 
the exploration, evaluation, mining and management of underwater diamond 
deposits. The facts show that for its business purposes, at the time DBM owned 
five mining vessels that carried vertical drilling equipment for the recovery of 
diamond bearing gravels from the seabed.671
 
  
The mining activities in question were being carried on in marine mining 
concession areas. The marine concession areas were in this instance divided 
into a grid pattern of blocks which are further divided into sub-blocks of 50 meters 
X 50 meters. Vessels carried on drilling operations in these blocks in order to 
cover the whole area and would spend up to two years at sea exploring and 




The refueling of these vessels however would take place at sea.673
                                                                                                                                                 
(4) bus No person shall, without the written permission of the Controller, divert any goods entered for 
removal from or delivery to a customs and excise warehouse, except goods entered for payment of the duty 
due thereon, to a destination other than the destination declared on entry of such goods or deliver or cause 
such goods to be delivered in the Republic except in accordance with the provisions of this Act.  
 Since the 
chosen bunkering point was located 50 miles offshore it was thus outside the 
pollution zone and just south of the boundary line (the boundary line being 
[Sub-s. (4) bis inserted by s. 4 (d) of Act 95 of 1965 and substituted by s. 14 (b) of Act 45 of 1995 ].’ 
670 and whose diamond mining activities involve marine aspects will be considered in a more in depth 
manner in this chapter. 




described in the founding papers as the boundary between the northernmost 
South African marine concession and the southernmost Namibian marine 
concession areas). The mining vessels were for the most part exploring on the 
Namibian concession area, however, they had to cross the boundary and return 
to the rendezvous point to bunker. When they were fuelled up they returned to 
the Namibian concession area.674
 
 
It was established in the case that in terms of section 20 of the Customs and 
Excise Act675 delivery of goods from a warehouse for the purposes of export 
does not attract excise duties and fuel levies. On the other hand if the disclosed 
purpose of the delivery is for home consumption which is defined in section 1 of 
the Act as ‘consumption or use in the Republic’ it would attract the relevant duties 
and levies.676 It was argued by counsel for DBM that export meant ‘to take out’ of 
the Republic whereas counsel for SARS argued that export meant ‘to take out’ of 
the Republic ‘for import into a foreign country for commercial purposes’, therefore 
the Commissioner’s argument had additional elements of defining the destination 
of the goods taken out.677
 
 
Nienaber JA in the Supreme Court of Appeal took the correct view that export in 
this case should be interpreted in light of the ordinary commercial meaning of the 
word as intended by Legislature and therefore the Commissioner’s interpretation 
of export was correct.678
 
 It is submitted that the basis for arguing that the court 
was correct in casu is based on the specific commercial considerations that are 
specific to this case.  
The commercial circumstances were such that the bunker fuel used was subject 
to relevant duties and levies which would not be in issue if such fuel was 
intended for export into another country for commercial import purposes. It is 
                                                 
674 141 A - D 
675 91 of 1964. 
676 141 I. 
677 142 E. 
678 142 I - 143F. 
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submitted that while SARS should lawfully refund tax to persons or grant 
exemptions to tax in terms of the Customs and Excise Act679
 
in appropriate 
circumstances, this case is distinguishable as there was no lawful ground for 
avoiding tax liability (in the form of bunker fuel duties and levies) in this case. The 
commercially sound interpretation of export in this case, accepted by the court, 
demonstrated that the fuel in question was being consumed within the Republic 
for DBM’s internal benefit as a result tax liability attached as opposed to such 
products being consumed imported into Namibia. The point of where the fuel was 
actually consumed, Cape Town or Namibia is arguable however it is my 
submission that the circumstances the bunker fuel was not exported in light of 
the interpretation accepted by the SCA. 
He further stated that when interpreting export one may not simply interpret such 
as a removal without considering the ‘purpose of removal’ of such exported 
goods. The court finding for the Commissioner rejected the interpretation of 
export given by DBM stating that it would ultimately result in no duties and levies 
being payable in respect of the bunker fuel supplied to its vessels on the high 
seas which would benefit DBM and prejudice other taxpayers.680
 
  
Some interesting points in the case are that when one reads the facts it seems 
that the papers used to declare where the fuel was destined seemed incorrect. In 
this regard the court held that it is usual practice in commercial activities that 
what is declared is not necessarily what takes place.681
 
 For instance goods may 
have been declared as goods intended for export but end up being consumed in 
the Republic, which occurs in commercial activities on a regular basis. Thus the 
fact that the bunker fuel in this case was entered for the Congo or Gabon 
ultimately was not in issue before the court.  
                                                 
679 91 of 1964. 
680 143 G. 
681 142 B. 
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The legal position above was similar to that of an earlier judgments of 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue v De Beers (Pty) Ltd,682 an appeal from a 
decision of the Transvaal Income Tax Special Court taken by a full bench in the 
Transvaal Provincial Division, and later on appealed by De Beers in De Beers 
Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue.683
 
 Having considered 
these judgments it becomes clear that that tax law implications must be brought 
before the courts as an open forum in order to ensure that whatever tax liability is 
attached to De Beers or any other business entity that is an active economic 
participant. Tax liability must be justifiable and in line with the law as contained 
within South African statutes. While that is an obvious point to make it is 
submitted that more important point to note in these case discussions involves 
the significant contribution to the interpretation of tax law and other business law 
which has been enriched in case law by active commercial entities such as De 
Beers. 
Further, the interpretation to the applicable tax laws given by the courts in their 
judgments against large companies like De Beers must be cogent in order to 
ensure that even a powerful diamond producer is not abused through unclear tax 
practices. The judgments above form a significant practical interpretation and 
application of law. It is submitted that in a country where the rule of law is 
respected, it is not justified to call for tax liabilities that are unlawful based on the 
notion that certain companies are able to afford to pay such taxes. On the other 
hand it is essential that the correct amount of tax is paid by companies at all 
levels. 
 
3.4.2. Patents and Diamond Laws 
The diamond industry, like any other important industry, is held together by strict 
patents which must be protected in law. The protection of intellectual property in 
this industry is critical to the progress and success of the diamond sector. A 
                                                 
682 1984 (3) SA 286 (T). 
683 1986 (1) SA 8 (A). 
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patent is defined as an exclusive right granted by a government to an inventor to 
manufacture, use and sell an invention for a certain number of years. It may also 
refer to a document that proves this right.684 The case pertaining to patent rights 
and De Beers to be considered in this chapter is De Beers Industrial Diamond 
Division (Pty) Ltd v Ishizuka.685
 
 The diamond industry survives through special 
inventions and designs therefore it is essential that the exclusive use of such 
inventions is protected in order to protect the commercial interests of the inventor 
and the company that uses the benefit of such an invention. 
This was an appeal from the decision of the Commissioner of Patents where it 
was held that De Beers were unsuccessful objectors in this case. The facts 
illustrate that in 1968 a certain Ishizuka from Japan had made an application for 
a patent under an international agreement numbered as 68/1735 and effective 
from 23 March 1967. This patent covered an invention entitled as a ‘large sized 
high temperature high pressure apparatus.’ In December 1969 a company known 
as Adamant Laboratories (Pty) Ltd gave notice of opposition to the granting of 
the patent on the grounds of obviousness of the invention. The matter was heard 
9 years later. By then the entitlement of the invention was amended to an 
‘apparatus for producing high temperature and high pressure’ further the name of 




The notice of opposition given by De Beers was also amended setting out the 
grounds of opposition as ‘obviousness, anticipation, insufficiency and “that the 
alleged invention as set out in the claims is not an invention defined in the 
Act.”’687
                                                 
684 A. S. Hornsby Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary: International Student’s Edition 7 ed (2005).  
 When the matter was initially heard by the Commissioner of Patents, he 
took the decision that the objection based on non-invention is not a competent 
685 1980 (2) SA 191 (T). It must be noted that this case made reference to ‘protection of the monopoly’, 
however it must be noted that laws pertaining to the diamond industry have so developed so as to 
accommodate in national and international anti-competitive laws to which De Beers subscribes and 
therefore they are no longer a monopoly of diamonds. 
686 192 A. 
687 The repealed Patents Act 37 of 1952. 
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ground of opposition as established in terms of section 23(1) of the now repealed 
Patents Act.688
 
 The letters for the patent were subsequently granted by the 
Commissioner in terms of the South African Patent Application No. 68/1735. 
De Beers appealed against the Commissioner’s finding and order. The invention 
in question was described as ‘an apparatus for producing high temperature and 
high pressure to be used for the production of diamonds and for various high 
pressure experiments.’ In the description of the invention in question it was 
explained that there was an already existing and known apparatus ‘formed of 
opposed punches, a die, a reaction chamber defined between the punches and 
die and containing reaction materials, means for providing a relative motion 
between the punches and the die to compress the reaction materials and gaskets 
provided between the punches and the die.’689
 
 
From the facts it appeared that the inventor had noted the deficiencies of the 
already existing apparatus and provided formulas to solve the deficiencies in the 
existing apparatus. One of the deficiencies being that a larger apparatus would 
be needed in order to produce larger diamond crystals and since he had 
succeeded in producing such a larger invention with sufficient capabilities to 
produce the required temperature and pressure he was entitled to patent the 
invention and hence the application in question. However, the court needed to 
get over the obstacle presented in the case where the court had to decide as to 
how to deal with the impasse which revolved around the fact that the description 
of the latter invention was substantially the same as an already existing 
apparatus with a few additional features which did not exist in the prior 
                                                 
688 37 of 1952, repealed. 
689 193 D. This description of the already existing machine obviously relates to the scientific, chemical and 
mechanical properties of the invention which may not be crystal clear to a non-engineering mind, however, 
these scientific attributes of the new apparatus were used by the court to determine whether such a machine 
formed an invention in terms of the repealed Patents Act 37 of 1952 as that would be the basis of the 
objector’s case. 
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apparatus, for example, a laminates steel frame and a different manner of 
regulating the die in the frame body of the new apparatus.690
 
 
The different manner of die regulation became the point of contention as this 
additional feature created or provided for a ‘new’ method of the functioning of the 
latter apparatus. The court therefore had to determine whether De Beers had a 
right to claim that feature and successfully object to the granting of the patent. 
 
In dealing with the question of objecting to a patent as a result of an existing 
feature of an invention forming basis of the objector’s claim, Nicholas J gave 
guidance by stating that in such claims ‘the question of substance is whether the 
feature is essential to the invention or not.’691 The court also outlined the 
importance of an objectors claim by stating that it is a legal tool used ‘to define a 
monopoly, so that others know the exact boundaries of the area within which 
they will be trespassers.’692
 
 
Having made a point concerning contextual interpretation of the word ‘regulating’ 
the court found that the word ‘regulate’ used in the claim meant a mechanism 
that adjusts and corrects. The court did not accept the objector’s definition that 
‘regulate’ means maintaining and keeping. Therefore having considered the 
mechanical and technical attributes of the invention the court held that ‘in the 
invention something more is provided which could correct and adjust 
misalignments during the course of application of a load in the device.’693
 
 In 
conclusion to this point it became clear that the court took the view that this new 
apparatus was an invention providing something new, an advancement with 
special features and thus worthy of patent. 
                                                 
690 194 A - 195A. 
691 195 E. 
692 195 F. With De Beers in this case being an obvious monopoly protected in terms of the existing laws of 
that time were acting well within their rights to object to an approval of a patent if they felt that the new so-
called invention contained integers or ‘essential constituent elements’ (195 D) that reflected an apparatus 
that they had a right to protect as an apparatus whose features belong exclusively to the monopoly. 
693 197 B - G. 
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On the grounds of objection based on anticipation694  the court held that since it 
was conceded that the elements of the prior art apparatus referred to in claim 1 
were essential integers of the applicant’s claim therefore the grounds of objection 
relied on by the objector did not constitute anticipation. On the grounds of 
objection based on obviousness in this case, it was established by the court that 
the decision on obviousness revolves around the following elements: ‘what is 
common knowledge in the art at the effective date of the patent in suit, whether 
the invention was a step forward on such common knowledge, whether the light 




It was established in the objector’s claims that as a whole the invention contained 
a combination of a number of integers which were a combination of integers from 
the prior apparatus with two new integers. This combination in law is not a bar to 
a valid patentable invention as long as the combination of integers is placed in 
such a manner that when inter-elated the apparatus produces a new or improved 
result.696 The objector’s arguments for obviousness in this case were also 
rejected by the court. The appeal was dismissed with costs.697
 
 
The question of patents in diamond production activities was also raised in the 
case of De Beers Industrial Diamond Division (Pty) Ltd v General Electric 
Company698
                                                 
694 The objector relied on the publication of the US Patent No 2722174 (Albers) and this patent was the 
only grounds it had relied on to prove anticipation. 
 in this case the respondent was a patentee of a patent entitled as ‘A 
Composite Compact Components fabricated with high temperature filler metal 
and method of making the same.’  De Beers as appellant in the matter launched 
695 200 H. Further, the onus of proving the alleged obviousness of the invention is borne by the objector. 
696 201 A. Clearly the conclusion of this case and the decision of the court turned on this legal principle 
particularly in this case. In the diamond industry, designs are created to keep abreast with technological 
advances, as much as a monopoly may wish to protect its patent rights, the courts do not have a duty to halt 
technological advancements by denying patents simply because they contain integers which may already 
exist in prior products. The court’s mandate at the end of the day is not to regulate the designs themselves 
but to protect patents by ensuring that the invention represents something new in terms of patents law. 
697 206 H. 
698 1987 (4) SA 362 (T). 
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an application for the revocation of this patent. And the respondent opposed the 
application and filed a special plea seeking that the proceedings be stayed in 
order to give the respondent sufficient opportunity to amend the specification of 
the invention.  The application to amend was opposed by the appellant however 
when the matter was set down for hearing before a Commissioner of Patents and 
the Commissioner granted the amendment. On appeal by De Beers in this case 
the court once again dismissed the application on the basis that De Beers in this 
case failed to discharge the onus on it to prove its case.699
 
 
The cases on patents above where De Beers’ involvement in litigation 
contributed to the court’s interpretation of the language of Patents Law as 
pertaining to the diamond industry particularly where the rights of significant 
corporate entities such as De Beers need to be protected in law.  What is 
interesting in the two cases is the old order legal policy of protecting monopolies 
in law. Further, the court’s seemed to protect such monopolistic entities with vigor 
however this was always done within the confines of justifiable law. 
 
3.4.3 De Beers and the Repealed Precious Stones Act 44 of 1927 
Another example of De Beers in litigation to be considered in this chapter 
involves the case of Rabinowitz and Another v De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd 
and Another.700 Although this case deals with the Precious Stones Act701
                                                 
699 362. A further reading of this judgment is essential as it covers areas of the Patents Act 37 of 1952 (now 
repealed) which are illustrated in the judgment of the learned MacArthur J. This judgment is useful in 
showing how such provisions are open to interpretations which the court had to necessarily make a positive 
statement on which of the parties had interpreted the application of the Patents Act correctly in these 
circumstances. However arguably from a jurisprudential perspective it seems that the courts have taken 
generally took harsher stance against the monopoly in most cases. 
 which 
has been repealed it forms an important historical lesson as to the courts 
application of diamond laws. This case is pre-Constitution in nature and deals 
with the transference of mineral rights and the application of common law to such 
transference. It is important to note that though diamond regulations are heavily 
legislated, it is important not to ignore the application of Roman-Dutch law. 
700 1958 (3) SA 619 (A). 
701 44 of 1927 repealed. 
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Further, as part of understanding the historical contribution to the development of 
laws that have repealed the old Precious Stones Act702 it is important to show the 
progression of the law that lead to the repeal of the Precious Stones Act.703 The 
Precious Stones Act704 was replaced by the Precious Stones Act,705 which was in 
turn repealed by the Minerals Act.706 The Minerals Act707 with the exclusion of 
certain exceptions was repealed by the MPRDA708
 
 on 1 May 2002. 
The facts of the case illustrate that Rabinowitz and another approached the 
appellate court to prove that they were the rightful holders of discoverer’s 
certificates and not De Beers who were the respondents in the matter.  In the 
judgment of Schreiner J.A. with De Beer J.A. (no relation to the respondent), 
Beyers J.A, Van Blerk J.A. and Price A.J.A concurring Rabinowitz’s appeal was 
unsuccessful as in the lower courts’ decisions.709 The claim had resulted from a 
history of over 30 years where in 1927 a syndicate referred to as the Port 
Syndicate had acquired 24 prospecting licenses under the Cape Precious Stones 
Act710 where the holders of the certificates could prospect certain Crown land in 
the then Namaqualand. On 1 April 1927 the Port Syndicate sold its interest to an 




It was agreed that upon delivery of the prospecting licences the agent was to pay 
the syndicate an agreed sum together with certain legal expenses incurred by it. 
It was also agreed that if a discoverer’s certificate was held by the syndicate such 
a certificate should be delivered to the agent who would pay the syndicate £ 10 
                                                 
702 44 of 1927 repealed. 
703 44 of 1927.repealed. 
704 44 of 1927 repealed. 
705 73 of 1964. 
706 50 of 1991. 
707 50 of 1991. 
708 28 of 2002. 
709 637 H. 
710 11 of 1899. 
711 626 C – D. 
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000,00. It was also agreed that after the payment for the certificate was made, 
the agent would float the company and take over all assets including recovered 
diamonds (which the syndicate would receive 30per cent of the vendor’s shares), 
however, the agreement to float the company was not followed through.712
 
  
On 6 April 1927 the deceased Solomon Rabinowitz a member of the Port 
Syndicate signed, prior to his death, a power of attorney irrevocably and in rem 
suam713 in favour of a certain Sandenbergh who had fraudulently presented 
himself as Jeppe’s nominee. The documents signed allowed Sandenbergh to 
deal as he saw fit with licence No. 13077 and gave him power over all 
discoverer’s claims that might be granted in respect of an area pegged by the 
licence. This meant that Sandenbergh could also transfer these rights to further 
parties. Further, pursuant to licence No. 13077 the Mining Commissioner issued 
Solomon Rabinowitz a discoverer’s certificate in terms of the Cape Precious 
Stones Act.714 The certificate was a specialized one in that it carried a right to 
select 20 claims on the proclamation of an alluvial digging place. No such 
proclamation had taken place until the 1952 amendment of the Union Precious 
Stones Act715 as such discoverer’s claims could not be selected in the Cape until 




The discoverer’s certificate issued by the Mining Commissioner to Solomon 
Rabinowitz was apparently also delivered to Jeppe or his apparent 
representative Sandenbergh in pursuance of the agreement on 1 April 1927. On 
16 November 1927 the 1952 amendment of the Act came into force, the same 
                                                 
712 626 F. 
713 This is a doctrine drawn from Scottish law, this means that one is acting as attorney as to his own 
property. 
714 11 of 1899. 
715 44 of 1927 repealed. 
716 626 H – 627 A. In reading this paragraph of facts it appears from the onset that the Mining 
Commissioner issuing a discoverer’s certificate in terms of Act 11 of 1899 (Cape), such an issue of the 
certificate would stand only if empowered by Act 19 of 1952, an amending Act which permitted the issue 
of such a certificate in the Cape at the time. 
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date upon which a receipt reflecting the agreed payment was given to the 
members of the Port Syndicate by the agent Jeppe on behalf of H.M. 
Association. On 27 January 1928 the agent ceded all the rights acquired in the 
agreement to his principal, H.M. Association who agreed to take over the 
business of the Port Syndicate. On 29 August 1928 Sandenbergh also ceded the 
discoverer’s certificate to H.M Association.717
 
 
H.M. Association subsequently went into liquidation but ceded its certificate to 
Voltas Syndicate who comprised of two companies and a deceased estate. On 4 
July 1947 Solomon Rabinowitz died and was survived by his wife who was also 
sole heir and second appellant in the matter. The first appellant was a son of 
Solomon Rabinowitz who had discovered that the discoverer’s certificate was 
registered in his father’s name in the Mining Commissioner’s books and there 
was no amendments made reflecting change in ownership of interests in the 
certificate. With the permission of Solomon’s widow, the son took steps to 
register ownership in the certificate by endorsement of a duplicate certificate in 
the Commissioner’s office. Thereafter the son applied to the Minister of Mines for 
authority to select 20 claims in terms of the 1952 Amendment Act, which 
repealed the Cape Precious Stones Act718 and governed the relationship 
between parties in the matter.719
 
  
In light of the facts above the court considered the applicable law very carefully 
by going through the relevant wording of the provisions of the 1952 Act. The 
court found that there was nothing in the language of the Act excluding a 
company from being a holder of ‘a right and interest’ in connection with claims 
represented by a discoverer’s certificate.720
                                                 
717 627 B – C. 
 With regard to whether registration 
had been correctly effected allowing ownership to pass to the company should it 
be found that a company is able to hold such a right, the court held that the 
718 11 of 1899. 
719 627 D – H. 
720 632 G. 
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procedure requiring registration of transfer of discoverer’s certificates was only 
applicable in the Transvaal.721 The court held that the common law position 
should prevail in this matter where it is sufficient that rights are transferred by 
cession with the full recognition of a practice that if such rights are represented 
by a document, that such a document be delivered to the transferee.722
 
 This case 
is important to the understanding of the protection of common law rights in 
diamond trade activities. 
3.4.4 De Beers and Labour Laws 
With regard to De Beers having to deal with laws pertaining to labour relations it 
is important to consider that aspect of their activities in this chapter although 
succinctly as it is very well established that in diamond trade that De Beers very 
well contribute to the socio-legal climate of diamond laws through the 
employment that such an industry provides. This section considering De Beers 
and Labour Law will consider two reported judgments which cast a light on two 
issues pertaining to labour relations. The first case deals with dismissal of 
employees for misconduct while the second case deals with retrenchment. 
Retrenchment is obviously a threat which a reality in mineral companies which 
have a limited lifespan.723
 
 Retrenchment may also be a direct result of the 
influence of crashing world markets on a diamond producer therefore these 
judgments are essential to understanding the influence and participation of De 
Beers in diamond laws.  
To illustrate how De Beers handles misconduct it is important to consider the 
facts and outcome of RSA Geological Services (a Division of De Beers 
                                                 
721 636 A. Further the court explained that such registration is not equivalent to registration required for 
instance in the registration of ownership in a house or shares. 
722 636 F – G. It is clear from this case that the rights represented by the discoverer’s certificate were so 
ceded to the respondents and the appellants had no case. 
723 A case of this nature before the courts provides invaluable insight as to how the industry is to handle the 
consequences of a mine closure. It is important to note that the Koffiefontein mine was eventually sold to 
Petra Diamonds Ltd (Petra) in July 2007 for US$ 12 million. See De Beers Living Up to Diamonds from 
Natural Resources to Shared National Wealth: Operating and Financial Review (2007) 9. 
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Consolidated Mines) v Grogan NO & Others.724
 
 This is a case that illustrates how 
a diamond producer in law may protect its mining interests in labour related 
matters. This matter revolved around the dismissal of employees as a result of 
alleged misconduct. One of the main problems in this case is that the culprits 
were not identified. Therefore this case provides unique guidance as to what an 
employer particularly a diamond producer whose product requires heavy security 
and protection even in its rawest form is entitled in labour law to deal with 
threatening employee conduct. 
The facts of the case show that the appellants RSA Geological Services, a 
division of De Beers, were operating the Kimberley Micro Diamond Laboratory, 
KMDL, where they tested samples of kimberlite for diamondiferous potential. This 
process allowed KMDL to determine the amount of diamonds in the kimberlite in 
order to invest resources accordingly. Diamonds recovered in this difficult and 
tedious process were recorded in terms of law and kept safe and the remainder 
of the kimberlite would be kept by KMDL in order to avoid distorting the results in 
the subsequent reports to clients. In April 2002, however, information was 
received by the management of KMDL from a secret informer stating that 
kimberlite samples were being dumped down two boreholes.725
 
  
The boreholes in question were subsequently excavated and 453 kilograms of 
kimberlite was recovered from them. What linked this recovered kimberlite to the 
kimberlite used for sample testing was the fact that the recovered kimberlite was 
stored in the same sample bags marked with tags from the sample bags. The 
security staff interviewed all the employees about the discarded kimberlite, 
without obtaining any useful information, however, after some interviews and a 
polygraph test a certain Chaka admitted to throwing a sample down the 
                                                 
724 (2008) 29 ILJ 406 (LC). This matter was an application for review from the private arbitration before 
Grogan, the details of the private arbitration are obtainable as cited in National Union Of Mineworkers & 
Others and RSA Geological Services (A Division of De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd) (2004) 25 ILJ 410 
(ARB). 
725 409 E – G. The informer was subsequently subjected to a polygraph test which indicated that he was 
telling the truth. 
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borehole726 and in his statement he also implicated two other employees. The 
security invited the employees to submit to a polygraph test which, it was 
proposed by the employer that it would end any further investigations if the 
results showed no deception. Initially the employees were amicable to this 
suggestion however due to advice from the first respondent, National Union of 




The process manager of KMDL warned the employees that they would be 
dismissed if they were withholding information. The process manager also 
provided the employees with an anonymous number which they could contact in 
order to volunteer information for the investigation, however, none of the 
employees contacted the number. The process manager together with the 
human resource of KMDL further encouraged the employees to cooperate with 
the investigation however the employees collectively refused to assist with the 
investigation as they stated that they did not know about the discarding of the 
kimberlite sample. The employees were all given letters of suspension effectively 
suspending them from work. These letters bore an anonymous number which 
any of the recipients could use to contact and give information to assist with the 
information, however, these letters were returned. After a disciplinary enquiry the 
employees were found guilty and dismissed. The employees’ appeals and 
conciliation attempts before the CCMA were unsuccessful and the whole matter 
was referred to private arbitration.728
 
 
The main questions to be considered by the arbitrator was whether any of the 
dismissed employees discarded the sample or failed to assist the employer in 
identifying the culprits who had actually discarded the sample. There were fifteen 
employees, whose individual circumstances of dismissal were considered by the 
arbitrator. The arbitrator found that the dismissals of employees, Chaka, who had 
                                                 
726 409 G – J. 
727 410 A. 
728 410 A – E. 
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voluntary admitted to discarding the sample and four other employees were fair 
as they were implicated. Further, there was strong evidence pointing to their 
participation in this illicit act.729
 
  
On the face of the matter it initially appeals to reason upon the reading of the 
facts initially that the arbitrator’s decision was correct in that it identified the 
employees who had participated in the scam and allotted the appropriate 
sanction, however there were some unclear cases for instance where the 
employer felt that the superintendent of KMDL should also have been dismissed 
for not being able to pick up from the surveillance camera that a scam was taking 
place. These unclear aspects of the case were considered more carefully by the 
labour court. 
 
The matter subsequently came before the labour court for review at the instance 
of the employer. The review was based on the grounds that the arbitration award 
was unjustifiable on the facts. Counsel for the employer argued that the arbitrator 
had applied an incorrect time period in determining the period of the discarding of 
the sample.730 Further, employer’s counsel argued that the arbitrator erred in 
basing his decision on the financial motive of the employees without considering 
the non-financial motive tendered by the employer. The financial motive for the 
employees was payment of overtime while the non-financial motive explained by 
employer’s witnesses was that the dumping would reduce the unpleasant 
workload, make the work easier, allowing the employees more time to relax. 
Counsel for the employer argued that using these incorrect criteria allowed the 
arbitrator to arrive at an erroneous conclusion of exonerating and re-instating ten 
of the fifteen dismissed employees.731
 
 
                                                 
729 411 A – H. 
730 It was common cause that the arbitrator had considered the period up to March 2000 as the end of the 
period in which the sample was discarded, however it was argued by the employers that the dumping had 
continued until May 2002. However it became apparent on review and it was accepted by the employees’ 
counsel that the exact period of dumping could not be determined precisely. 
731 412 E – F. 
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The court accepted the arguments made by the employer and an order allowing 
the review and substitution of the arbitrator’s award was granted.732 The court 
rejected the finding by the arbitrator as to the time period of dumping. Further, 
the facts proved prima facie that many of the employees may have taken part in 
the discarding of the sample because an opportunity to discard the sample 
existed even during normal working hours and further the sheer scale of the 
scam showed that all the employees could have known about it. From the facts 




The court went into an extensive consideration of the evidence given before the 
arbitrator and established that the dearth of co-operation with the employer to 
investigate the matter proved that the employees were not innocent.734 One of 
the more important contributions of this case involves the further understanding 
of labour jurisprudence of the concept of ‘derivative misconduct’, which is 
described as a form of misconduct that is inferred from the employees’ failure to 
offer reasonable assistance to an employer to identify actual individuals 
responsible for the misconduct.735
 
  
On the argument of derivative misconduct in this case the court held that 
derivative misconduct may diminish the culpability or fault of the employee for the 
principal misconduct however it does not diminish the standard of proof. This 
means that De Beers had to prove in this case on a balance of probabilities that 
the employees knew or must have known about the principal misconduct and 
chose to be unjustifiably secretive about what they knew. By proving this 
                                                 
732 420 A. The order stated that the dismissals of all 15 employees was fair. 
733 413 E – 414I. 
734 416 A. The court stated that ‘anyone who was innocent would have testified as the risk of losing one’s 
job was great.’ 
735 418 G. Derivative misconduct is often found in cases where a group of employees of individuals decide 
to participate in some form of misconduct but others chose not to expose them or identify them, for 
instance in a group of strikes a person can be assaulted, it becomes difficult to determine who exactly 
struck the blows unless other members of that strike expose the culprit. Therefore, derivative misconduct 
distinguishes between those who participated in the principal misconduct and those who knew about it but 
fail to disclose it. The question as to who must bear sanction is determined according to this maxim. 
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knowledge the employer is also able to prove that dismissal is a fair sanction for 
the principal misconduct by way of participating in and lending support or 
associating themselves with the offence.736 The court held that derivative 
misconduct is only an appropriate charge if employees who participated in the 
principal misconduct are distinguishable from those who knew about it and 
elected silence. The court held that this was not a case of derivative misconduct 




This case is shows how important it is for employers to recognize that at times 
threats to a business may come from within in the diamond industry. The solution 
in cases of this nature is to investigate what would potential drive employees to 
act in this manner. One of the common complaints faced by diamond producers 
is the low salary rate miners often complain of, this may be one of the causes of 
turning to corruption & crime to make illicit profits. Having said that, however, 
South Africa cannot as a country adopt and tolerate a culture of deriving income 
from criminal activities. 
 
With regard to retrenchment De Beers’ involvement in labour laws was dealt with 
in National Union of Mineworkers v De Beers Consolidated Mines (Pty) Ltd738 
which involved the retrenchment employees of DBCM at the Koffiefontein mine. 
This diamond mine was reported as having run at a consistent loss over its 
inconsistent operative years which culminated in a R75 million rand loss in the 
budget year of 2005. In 2005 DBCM seriously contemplated closing the mine, 
however, instead of closing the mine cost-saving measures were implemented 
and only 36 employees were retrenched.739
                                                 
736 Although derivative misconduct was not fitting in the circumstances of this case because all the 
employees were charged with the principal conduct, there are elements of ‘derivative misconduct’ in that 
clearly the employees did not use the informer telephone number to offer any assistance which may have 
assisted with the investigation. Some of the employees simply refused to testify in that way supporting and 
associating themselves with the offence. 
 
737 419 C – D.  
738 (2006) 27 ILJ 1909 (LC). 
739 912 A.  
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The strategy of implementing cost saving measures in 2005 and retrenching 
fewer employees in 2005, suggests an intention of the employer to take a 
decision that would at least assist the economic state of the employees by 
keeping the mine running albeit at a loss. This means that the employer is not to 
be viewed as a draconian business entity with little consideration for the 
employee masses. However, with the difficult task to save jobs and keep the 
mine running ultimately the employer caught in such a situation has to face the 
economic fact that it is impossible to support itself and its employees if the raw 
material mined in that particular mine causes significant financial losses. This is 
the reason negotiations pertaining to retrenchments at mines have to be 
conducted within the parameters of what is within the Labour Relations Act740
 
 
and consequently the decisions taken from proper consultation may be beneficial 
for all parties involved. 
The facts of the case show that the Koffiefontein mine was operating under an 
‘old order’ mining right which was to expire in 2006. DBCM attempted to sell the 
Koffiefontein mine. In order to be successful in this strategy DBCM needed to 
secure a purchaser of the mine by 20 January 2006. Negotiations took place 
between DBCM and the potential purchaser. The National Union of Mineworkers 
(NUM) was kept fully informed about any developments in the sale negotiations 
as an interested party however the sale fell through. DBCM then undertook to 
inform the Union that it had given the Department of Minerals & Energy 14 days 
notice of intention to close the mine which would also be followed by a notice in 
terms of section 189 of the Labour Relations Act.741
 
 
It must be noted that in terms of the MPRDA if a seller of a mine has an old order 
mining right, such a seller must convert such a right prior to the sale. Therefore in 
casu in order to sell the Koffiefontein old order mining right, DBCM had to convert 
                                                 
740 66 of 1995. 
741 66 of 1995. 912 F – J & 913 A.  
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the old order mining right and then apply for Ministerial consent in terms of 
section 11 of the MPRDA to transfer the mining right to the purchaser. 
 
DBCM gave a notice in terms of section 189(3) of the Labour Relations Act742 to 
the Union on 26 January 2006 showing DBCM’s intention to commence 
consultations regarding a potential retrenchment of 329 employees. Consultation 
meetings were held with NUM however no agreement was reached.743 On 28 
March 2006 DBCM informed the Union that it intended to issue notices of 
termination of employment as contemplated in the retrenchment consultations, 
these letters were delivered by DBCM on 31 March 2006 showing that the 
contracts of employment would terminate on 30 April 2006.744
 
 
The Union referred the matter to the CCMA with one of their main complaints 
being that the notices pertaining to retrenchment were given in contravention to 
section 189A (8) read with section 64(1) of the Labour Relations Act745 and as a 
result the notices were premature and unlawful. Further, the Union contended 
that because the employer had failed to consult adequately in respect of the 
proposed retrenchments, all the effected dismissals were unfair. The employer 
denied these contentions therefore the Union made an urgent application to the 
labour court for an order including, inter alia, a notice declaring the notices of 
termination dated 31 March 2006 null and void and an order interdicting DBCM 
from giving notices of termination of employment contracts until the periods 
mentioned in section 64(1) (a) read with section 189A (8) (a) of the Labour 
Relations Act746 have elapsed.747
 
 
The labour court dealt with the matter by dealing firstly with the question of 
validity of the dismissal notices. The court established that because of the 
                                                 
742 66 of 1995. 
743 913 D. All mining operations had ceased at this stage. 
744 911 F. 
745 66 of 1995. 
746 66 of 1995. 
747 912 A – B. 
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number of employees affected section 189A was applicable as expressed within 
the provisions of the section. In terms of section 189A(3) a CCMA appointed 
facilitator must be present in such circumstances to assist the parties engaged in 
consultations subject to certain conditions which did not apply in this case and as 
a result no facilitator was appointed. Further the court pointed out that in terms of 
section 189A (7) which provides that ‘if a facilitator is appointed…and 60 days 
have lapsed from the date on which notice was given in terms of section 189(3) 
an employer may give notice to terminate the contracts of employment in 
accordance with section 37(1) of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act.’748
 
 In 
this case the Union would be left with various choices set out in the statute in 
response to the employer’s actions within the Act. 
The court further pointed out the provisions of section 189A (8) of the Labour 
Relations Act749as being directly relevant to the dispute. This provision750 stated 
that, if a facilitator is not appointed as in the present case, ‘a party may not refer 
the dispute to a council or CCMA unless a period of 30 days has lapsed from the 
date on which the notice was given in terms of section 189 (3)’ therefore the time 
periods were of essence in this case. Further and most importantly section 189A 
(8)(b) provided that once the periods mentioned in section 64(1)(a)(i) have 
elapsed an employer may give notice to terminate the contracts of employment in 
accordance with section 37(1) of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act751 
once again leaving certain choices to a registered Union to respond in such 
circumstances.752 The Labour Relations Act753
 
 contained clear provisions with 
regard to the time periods within which an employer may terminate contracts for 
operational requirements. 
                                                 
748 75 of 1997. 914 E – I. Section 189A (7)(a) empowers employer to terminate employment contracts.  
749 66 of 1995. 
750 Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 section 189A (8). 
751 75 of 1997. 
752 915 A - C. 
753 66 of 1995. 
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After considering the arguments of both parties Senior Counsel with regard to 
whether the notices were given within the correct periods of the Labour Relations 
Act,754 the court took the view that the notices to terminate the employees’ 
employment contracts were given prematurely and therefore in breach of section 
189A(8)(b)(1). This could be deduced from the fact that the Union had referred 
the dispute, in accordance with section 189A (8) (a), in respect of the 
retrenchments to the CCMA on 30 March 2006 therefore according to section 
189A (8) (b) (i) in these circumstances an employer must wait for the periods in 
section 64(1) (a) before it can give notice to terminate.755 The court accepted the 
Union’s contention based on the reasoning set out above that the notices were 
invalid and were of had no force or effect.756
 
 
With regard to the interdictory part of the Union’s prayer counsel for the Union 
argued that the Union was entitled to the interdict because the period from the 
referral of the dispute until a certificate of outcome had been issued had not yet 
elapsed.757 Therefore, according to counsel’s argument, it was not important that 
30 days had already passed since the referral was received by the CCMA as 
long as the certificate of outcome was not issued the relevant period had not 
lapsed and it therefore remained unlawful for DBCM to issue notices of 
termination. This argument was rejected by the court on the basis that the use of 
the word ‘periods’ by Legislature in section 189A (8)(b)(l) meant that it was 
sufficient that one of the periods must have elapsed therefore it was not 
necessary for both periods to elapse.758
                                                 
754 66 of 1995. 
 The court concluded this point by 
refusing to grant the interdict as DBCM became entitled to issue the notices of 
755 916 D - J.  
756 917 G. 
757 918 A - E. It is important to note that this matter was argued more than 30 days after the referral to the 
CCMA. Counsel for the Union argued that in terms of section 189A(8)(b) only once the periods mentioned 
in section 64(1)(a)(i) and section 64(1)(a)(ii). 
758 918 A - I.  919. The court warned that if the contention expressed by the Union’s counsel in this case 
were accepted by the court, it would not only bastardize the Legislature’s intention of making these periods 
mutually exclusive. This would result in an unfortunate consequence where an employer would be exposed 
to the risk of being unable to give notices of termination for an uncertain period of time that hangs on the 
issue of a certificate of outcome if it is ever issued. 
 186 




On the issue raised by the Union stating that there had not been adequate 
consultation in this matter, the court disposed of that point expeditiously by 
pointing out that this point was not raised in the founding affidavit but only raised 
in the replying affidavit; as a result a fair opportunity was not given to DBCM to 
address the point. Further the court stated that since this matter was one based 
on section 189A (13) read together with section 189A (14)760 which required the 
court to grant necessary relief if the employer fails to comply with fair procedure. 
It was held by the court that on the facts there was no proof of such non-
compliance with fair procedure and the consultations held were sufficient.761
 
 
The court pointed out that it had the power to determine on the facts whether 
there had been sufficient consultation or not. In answering this question the court 
very importantly pointed out that DBCM was facing a crisis of having to close its 
Koffiefontein mine, however, its involvement in post-retrenchment activities within 
the community showed that it was not a company that was slack in observing its 
duties in terms of law in circumstances of this nature. The Union was successful 
in nullifying the initial notices of retrenchment because the notices were issued 
pre-maturely however from the case it becomes clear that apart from a 
miscalculation on the part of DBCM with regard to the 31 March 2006 notices, 
the process followed was fair although not in accordance with correct time limits. 
 
The cases above form a very strong basis from which one is able to study the 
lawful socio-legal influences of an influential diamond producer on South African 
diamond industry labour relations and other aspects of the regulatory framework 
of South African legislation. This is a crucial expansion of knowledge that will 
mark that important link between law and commerce. 
                                                 
759 920 A. 
760 Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
761 920 D - G.  
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3.4.5 De Beers and the MPRDA 
De Beers in the Constitutional dispensation observe all the South African 
diamond laws as previously shown is the earlier parts of this chapter. The legal 
compliance around the MPRDA is generally uneventful for De Beers in the like 
manner. However in a recent judgment involving the application and 
interpretation of the MPRDA with regard to the mining of tailings dump, De Beers 
successfully challenged the provisions of the Act. The landmark case on De 
Beers and the MPRDA is captured in the  South African judgment of De Beers 
Consolidated Mines Ltd v Ataqua Mining (Pty) Ltd and Others.762
 
  
This matter reflects a case where De Beers were practically influential to the 
development of diamond law in South Africa. This matter involved an impasse in 
law with regard to licenses for mining the tailings dump which were found in the 
matter to not have been provided for in the MPRDA.763
 
 This case is important to 
the development of diamond legislation which has led to a creation of an 
amending bill which would deal with this gap in law. 
The arguments raised by De Beers in this case show their understanding of the 
law and the technicalities that apply in the minerals’ industry and this has led to 
the proposal of amending legislation will deal with this issue. This case as dealt 
with in depth in chapter 1 of this study and it clearly demonstrates a situation 
where a notable and successful diamond mining entity, De Beers is able to 
influence policy on legislation to govern laws on diamond regulation or mineral 
resources. Further, the arguments raised by De Beers in this case support the 
empowerment Constitutional mandate within the confines of Constitutional 
principles and values such as right to compensation in a case of expropriation 
and the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of property. 
 
                                                 
762 Case Number: 3215/06 in the High Court of South Africa (Orange Free State Provincial Division), 
judgment delivered on 13 December 2007. 
763 28 of 2002. 
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Other decisions of the court pertaining to the MPRDA and the application of 
South African common law are also fully applicable to De Beers even though 
they do not necessarily involve De Beers as a party in the proceedings. An 
example of such case law includes the case of Anglo Operations Ltd v Sandhurst 
Estates (Pty) Ltd764 where the court dealt with the ambit of mineral rights for open 
cast mining where the rights of the surface owner and the holder of mineral rights 
were conflicting. In this case the court held that the English law doctrine of 
subjacent support does not form part of South African law.765
 
  
It was held that conflicting rights between holders of servitutal rights and owners 
of servient properties must be resolved by applying South African law. The court 
in this case found that where the ambit of mineral rights is not expressly provided 
for in statute, the common law must be applied. In this case the common law 
position was that a holder of the mineral rights may do what is reasonably 
necessary to remove minerals provided it is done in a manner that is least 
injurious to the surface owner’s interests.766
 
 The scenario illustrated above in this 
case clearly shows that as developed as South African mining laws are and as 
much as there is an inclination in such matters to rely on English law, the courts 
are committed to the proper application of South African common law principles 
where appropriate. These common law principles as shown in this case are 
perfectly cogent to protect neighborliness in the exercise of one’s mineral rights.  
3.5 De Beers Marine (Pty) Ltd: Legal Compliance in Diamond Mining 
As briefly mentioned in the initial parts of this chapter, there will be a focused 
study of the inner workings of the company contracted to mine diamonds on 
behalf of DBCM.767
                                                 
764 2007 (2) SA 363 (SCA). 
 That specific entity is De Beers Marine (Pty) Ltd, (DBM) and 
this entity works according to South African diamond laws and this is expressed 
in their daily diamond law business protocols. Some of these strategies are also 
765 Ibid. 
766 Ibid. Meepo v Kotze & Another 2008 (1) SA 104 (NC); Michael O. Dale Mining Law Annual Survey, 
Juta (2002). 
767 DBCM ultimately belong to the Anglo-American group of companies. 
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expressed under the licence held by De Beers and operated by De Beers Marine 
as mining Licence ML 3/2003 and Environmental Management Programme 
Report.768 The mining licence together with the report form an important 
document769 insofar as it illustrates how DBCM being a concession holder in the 
sea areas through DBM apply the Diamonds Act,770 apply environmental laws 




Since this work is concerned about diamond regulation laws it is important to 
study the legal aspects to be prioritized in law by a concession operator under its 
mining licence. DBM has been selected for this purpose particularly for their 
involvement in the more expensive and perhaps more curious sea diamond 
mining and exploration. Thus it will form a useful and unique study for legal 
analysis purposes to concentrate on the sea areas mining licence held by DBM 
as they produce the most valuable product for the concession holder, DBCM.  
 
One of the most important concerns for DBM is the protection of the value of the 
diamond. They therefore work with various intelligence teams and informers to 
ensure that the integrity and safety of their product is not compromised.772
 
 DBM 
also has an elaborate legal compliance team that is tasked with ensuring that all 
in-house processes, procedures and business undertakings comply with the law. 
These are implemented through updated training of employees and an audit of 
these legal strategies is conducted from time to time by reputable companies. 
                                                 
768 DBCM’s Environmental Management Programme as compiled by Lesley Roos, De Beers Marine (Pty) 
Ltd, P. O. Box 87 Cape Town 8000. 
769 The document is a very thorough and substantial document therefore only selected aspects thereof will 
be considered in this chapter. 
770 56 of 1986. 
771 It is important to note that DBM is strategically chosen as a point of analytical study to the practical 
understanding of the application of diamond mining laws in the South African context. Obviously this 
study will be concerned with the legalistic perspective of sea areas mining and the scientific or geological 
aspects will be left to experts in such a field though it will be interesting to see the marriage between law 
and many aspects of the scientific processes and regulations in diamond mining. 
772  Even persons visiting De Beers premises are investigated in order to ensure that they are not acting in a 
manner that would promote industrial espionage.  
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Examples of in-house processes, procedures and business undertakings to 
comply with law include the undertaking by DBM to employ a company known as 
SRK Consultants773 to analyze the socio-economic impact of offshore diamond 
mining. This study revealed that the investment of ZAR 900 million made by DBM 
would attract an economic value of ZAR 100 million per annum during the 
lifespan of the mine. This would have the impact of creating 155 positions of 
permanent employment which would according to DBM records take into account 
the Employment Equity Programme designed to alter the profile of the company 
to reflect the broad demographic profile of the country.774 This entire project was 
also reported as having the potential of contributing up five per cent growth to the 
GDP.775 This example of legal compliance with mining laws is in line with the 
socio-economic concerns of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
Act776 the MPRDA and the Diamonds Act.777
 
 
DBM also complies with Environmental laws in their mining activities and this is 
further evidenced by the South African Bureau of Standards approved 
implementation of the ISO14001 Environmental Management System (EMS). All 
of DBM activities are ISO14001 certified and this is in line with the laws related to 
effect an environmentally sound diamond mining activity. The ISO14001 has 
elaborate and express action plans for dealing with all potential environmental 
challenges. To further conserve the environment, DBM also uses seawater in the 
sampling and mining treatment process. 
 
DBM also keeps within their Environmental Management Plan an elaborate list of 
interested and affected parties (IAPs), the contact persons of those parties and a 
very elaborate method of communicating information with such parties. This is an 
important initiative that will ensure that all law pertaining to the mining activity is 
                                                 
773 Environmental Management Programme Report for South African Sea Areas Mining Licence ML 
3/2003. Page iii. 
774 Environmental Management Programme Report for South African Sea Areas Mining Licence ML 
3/2003. A3 – 11.  
775 Ibid. 
776 108 of 1996. 
777 56 of 1986. 
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observed. Among the IAPs are the relevant bodies such as the Department of 
Minerals and Energy, Provincial Government, Other offshore mining and 
petroleum companies, statutory bodies such as SANParks, the fishing industry, 
marine specialists, the Northern Cape Provincial Coastal Committee and other 
parties such as the University of Cape Town and dolphin protection bodies. It is 
after full consultation with these bodies that DBM operations were able to 
legitimately conduct diamond mining operations. 
 
What is most interesting about DBM is that it produces the high quality diamonds 
which allows DBCM to be a step ahead of its competitors particularly if there any 
factors beyond De Beers control that are likely to impact on sales. It is an 
economically plausible strategy for DBCM to stockpile its diamonds as it allows 
the market to survive and ultimately contribute to significant economic activity in 
South Africa. It has also taken great financial effort on the part of DBCM to 
maintain the value of the diamond and shows exceptional business talent by 
making profits from the probable market illusion of the scarcity and virtue of 
diamonds and other ethical business concepts. 
 
It is submitted that any complaints about the South African diamond industry 
should be kept in perspective through a balanced view of what is taking place in 
some unprotected mining environments. It is important to acknowledge that 
diamond mining practices in South Africa, particularly for De Beers are in line 
with the spirit and purport of the Bill of Rights.778 When comparing De Beers’s 
efforts to enhance the diamond industry with those of the DRC, for example, a 
grim picture is painted about the DRC’s mining practices.779
                                                 
778 Environmental Management Programme Report for South African Sea Areas Mining Licence ML 
3/2003. See application of  inter alia of for National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 chapter 
5 authorisations, section 24 and section 9 of Constitution of Republic of South Africa Act, 1996 in De 
Beers mining activities. 
 Perhaps the 
comparison is unfair considering that South Africa has always experienced 
relative political calm. However this comparison serves to illustrate the high 
779 Childress Sarah for Congo’s Military, A Mine of Difficulties (29 October 2009) 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125676476068414179.html 29 October 2009. 
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levels of human rights protection in South African diamond practices generally in 
the hands of the South African State and companies such as De Beers 
particularly in the Constitutional dispensation.780
 
 
As recently as 29 October 2009 in the DRC it was reported that even though 
military power has shifted significantly from rebel groups to the DRC national 
military there is still doubt as to whether minerals there are being mined legally or 
humanely. In fact it has been reported that mining is the only real source if 
income for many of the people in the DRC but it is grueling work with miners 
sometimes not taking baths for weeks as they sleep below the surface, their 
clothes are severely tattered and a miner is considered fortunate if he or she 
owns a pair of shoes. Women are still harassed on a regular basis.781
 
 
In a similar media report dated 10 October 2009 it was confirmed that there are 
further abuses by Chinese Mining companies in the DRC. It was stated in the 
report that when European and US companies are compared with the Chinese 
mines in the same country, the Chinese mines failed miserably. They are 
criticized for not caring about the environment, they are not transparent, their 
approach to safety is abysmal, they do not care to remunerate sick or injured 
miners, they have no commitment to social development as they rely heavily on 
illegally-sourced minerals and profit from the misery of artisanal miners.782
 
 With 
these sad realities surrounding diamond mining, South Africa must be 
commended for its efforts in humane diamond mining. 
 
 
                                                 
780 Environmental Management Programme Report for South African Sea Areas Mining Licence ML 
3/2003. See application of  inter alia of, environmental section 24 of  Constitution of Republic of South 
Africa Act, 1996 in De Beers mining activities. 
781 Childress Sarah for Congo’s Military, A Mine of Difficulties (29 October 2009) 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125676476068414179.html 29 October 2009. 
782 http://www.worldlabour.org/eng/node/259 29 October 2009. See Childress Sarah for Congo’s Military, 
A Mine of Difficulties (29 October 2009) http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125676476068414179.html 29 
October 2009. 
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3.5.1 Compliance with Mining Licence Conditions 
The mining licence held by DBCM under ML3/2003 issued by the Department of 
Minerals and energy in accordance with section 9(1) read with section 9(3) (e) of 
the Minerals Act783 is valid until 31 December 2015 or ‘until the mineral the 
mining of which is hereby authorized can no longer be mined economically by the 
holder of the land concerned.’ The licence specifically indicates that the mineral 
to be mined is diamonds. Further the licence expressly provides that the laws of 
the land are binding upon the holder thereof.784
 
 
An important caveat in mining as each mine has a specific life-span. One of the 
important undertakings by the concession operator is to ensure that long term 
effects of mining are assessed and strategies for surviving post-mining 
operations for each area must be projected and appropriately provided for. These 
aspects are all determined by the licence grantor through the use of information 
required in law as provided by various experts. 
 
The concession area covered by this licence is situated in about 500km north of 
the port of Cape Town and 5km to seaward of the coastal mining towns of 
Kleinzee in the South and Alexander Bay in the north. The area is contained 
within the boundaries of the predetermined sea diamond concession areas which 
can be viewed in the sketch plans contained in DBM documents. The closest 
coastal towns which have benefited from these mining operations include 
Alexander Bay, Port Nolloth and Kleinzee. Port Nolloth and Alexander Bay have 
small fishing harbors and are not able to accommodate DBM vessels. Kleinzee 
on the other hand has no harbour at all. It is reported that the closest ports of 




                                                 
783 50 of 1991. 
784 See Appendix E. 
785 DBCM’s Environmental Management Programme as compiled by Lesley Roos Environmental 
Management Programme Report for South African Sea Areas Mining Licence ML 3/2003 November 
(2005) A1-3. 
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3.5.2. Compliance with Environmental Laws 
It is most crucial to point out that at the foundation of DBM’s mining activities a 
very thorough Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) was carried out in 
respect of the application for mining rights in the southern African sea areas 
operated by De Beers. The preparation of the EIA involved a lengthy process 
commencing in 1991 where De Beers Marine commissioned the University of 
Cape Town’s Environmental Evaluation unit comprising of thirteen experts to 
undertake an EIA to determine the potential effects of deep sea diamond mining 
activities on the natural systems of the west coast of southern Africa.786
 
  
The EIA addressed both Namibian and South African concessions and additional 
assessments were conducted for the ML3 licence application process. This 
process resulted in the successful mining licence being granted to DBCM making 
DBM a concession operator for the in the sea area. DBM continues to update 
and review the existing EIA and Environmental Programme Report in order to 




It is important to note that according to the Environmental Management 
Programme Report which captures the legal requirements and practices of DBM, 
international as well as national law is closely and vigorously observed by the 
company in order to ensure statutory compliance. DBM has an environmental 
legal register which is audited as part of the company’s certification.788
                                                 
786  DBCM’s Environmental Management Programme as compiled by Lesley Roos Environmental 
Management Programme Report for South African Sea Areas Mining Licence ML 3/2003 November 
(2005) A7-2 – A7-3. 
 The 
certification and auditing of DBM is essential as it demonstrates compliance with 
agreed environmental performance standards through the actual implementation 
of measures defined within the law and the internal strategies adopted by the 
company to make those legal principles a reality. De Beers itself finds pride in 
787 Ibid. 
788 ISO 14001 standard. ISO stands for the International Organization of Standards which develops 
different kinds of standards. ISO 14001 is a series of documentation that relates directly to the Environment 
in the form of an Environmental Management System or EMS. Courtesy of Lorn Duquete Co. 
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that it views itself as having gone beyond compliance with regards to aspects of 
social responsibility. 
 
The diamond mining operations that that relate to the marine environment and 
are applicable under the licence ML3/2003 include the following Acts together 
with the regulations under such statutes:789
• Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996
 
790
• Air Quality Act 39 of 2004 
 
• Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act 45 of 1965 
• Dumping At Sea Control Act 73 of 1980 
• Environmental Conservation Act 73 of 1989 
• Hazardous Substances Act 15 of 1973 
• Marine Living Resources Act 18 of 1998 
• Marine Pollution (Control and Civil Liability) Act 6 of 1981 
• Marine Pollution (Intervention) Act 64 of 1987 
• Marine Pollution (Prevention of Pollution from Ships) Act 2 of 1986  
• International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution From Ships 
(MARPOL) 1973/78 as amended 
• Marine Traffic Act 2 of 1981 
• Maritime Zones Act 15 of 1994791
• Merchant Shipping Act 57 of 1951 
 
• Mineral and Petroleum Resources development Act 28 of 2002 
• National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 
• National Environmental management: Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004 
                                                 
789 DBCM’s Environmental Management Programme as compiled by Lesley Roos, List complied under 
DBM Environmental Management Programme Report for South African Sea Areas Mining Licence ML 
3/2003 November (2005) C2-6. 
790 As previously noted, not only is DBCM & DBM concerned with its mining operations and creating 
equal opportunities for equal access to the meaningful participation of all South Africans in the diamond 
industry but it is also concerned with the environmental provisions of the Constitution. This is evident in 
the fact that DBM, for instance, has implemented strategies in place to achieve these Constitutional goals. 
791 Note that South Africa is going through the process of application for the extension of the limits of its 
continental shelf, in terms of the United Nations Convention On the law Of the Sea or UNCLOS, 1982 
outcome of application expected in the earlier parts of 2009. This extension will be extremely important to 
SASA mining licences. 
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• National Environmental management: Protected Areas Act 57 of 2003 
• National Heritage Resources Act 25 of 1999 
• National Road Traffic Act 93 of 1996 
• National Water Act 36 of 1998 
• Sea Birds and Seals Protection Act 46 of 1973 
• Sea Fisheries Act 12 of 1998 
• Sea-Shore Act 21 of 1935 
• South African Transport and Services Act (specifically Harbour 
Regulations Applicable under the Act) 65 of 1981 
• Wreck and Salvage Act 94 of 1996 
 
The list of environmental laws that DBM adheres to in order to uphold 
environmental conservation in their diamond mining operations demonstrates 
that DBM’s commercial interests in mining are not contrary to the core 
Constitutional principles of environmental conservation in South Africa. While this 
may also seem like an arbitrary list that does not necessarily guarantee that the 
laws therein are observed, it is submitted that according to De Beers elaborate 
DBCM’s Environmental Management Programme as compiled by Lesley Roos, 
for De Beers Marine (Pty) there are listed and express practical steps for the 
management of DBCM vessels, work environment and other measures to ensure 
that these laws are implemented in practice. For example, in a case of 
discovering artifacts while exploring for diamonds at sea, the report has a step-
by-step process for declaring such an artifact. This is but a small example of how 
these practicalities are implemented with respect to the law. Each management 
structure has a plan for ensuring that legal compliance is achieved by DBM 
employees for example. 
 
Of course every entity involved in the marine industry is expected to adhere to 
these principles as well. When comparing South Africa as a diamond producing 
country to other countries where the rule of law is not respected in this manner in 
diamond production, some of the first warning signs that diamonds are being 
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produced in an illicit manner involve a lack of respect for human and 
environmental rights. Usually mine workers or employees in such illicit mining 
operations are prisoners or slaves forced to work in deplorable conditions, there 
is also usually no plan to protect, conserve or rehabilitate the mining 
environment.  
 
South African diamond producers such as DBM lead the pack in showing high 
concern for the environmental consequences of their operations. De Beers also 
contribute to the goal of ensuring that South African diamonds are not liable to 
fall under conditions that lead to illicit diamond dealing and trading activities. De 
Beers pride themselves to go beyond the basic legal compliance standards in 
these matters. This is done through practicable and implementable legal 
compliance company measures enforced and audited on a periodical basis with 
compliance reports being placed within the public domain for the purposes of 
attracting investment, creating trust among shareholders and public 
accountability. 
 
DBM shows exceptional plans to uphold the dignity of its employees, there are 
strategies included to maintain work-place safety, such as the implementation of 
the OHSAS 18001 international occupational health and safety management 
system (A3-13 of EMPR), they have a Corporate Wellness Programme, and 
other important Employee Assistance and Health Promotion Programs including 
HIV/Aids, substance abuse and other behavioral management aspects of human 
dignity. Further, with regard to maritime security DBM vessels meet the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) maritime security measures as 
updated and entered into on 1 July 2004 which adheres to the SOLAS, 1974 and 
the ISM Code. 
 
The DBM environmental management report records that there are plans in 
place for dealing with rehabilitation of the deepwater marine environment where 
mining operations have an impact. Benthic or seabed community surveys have 
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been conducted and full reports by experts made public to ensure conservation. 
Further, a full scoping report calling for Interested and Affected parties (IAPs)792 
to raise their views was completed. In order to mitigate the impact of emitted 
sound pulses which may affect the hearing sensitivity of mammals an 
Assessment of Potential Acoustic Impacts on Marine Mammals Report was 
compiled and measures proposed to manage the situation.793
 
 These reports and 
assessments are essential background checks upon which sound mining 
practices can be approved in the South African sea areas. 
The report also provides that part of the prospecting and mining operations 
conducted by DBM may involve other marine specific environmental 
considerations such as a discovery of a shipwreck with possible artifacts. The 
designated DBM Operations Manager is tasked with keeping a record of such a 
discovery and they must inform the appropriate authority. If the discovery is 
declared as a heritage object, this must be done in compliance with the National 
Heritage Resources Act.794 With regard to vessels used at sea DBM’s 
Operations Manager, Environmental Manager and Vessel Masters are tasked 
with keeping duties that will minimize disruption to other legitimate users of the 
sea by respecting theirs rights, effectively managing waste flows and air pollution 
by using the ‘cradle to grave’ philosophy795  promoting reuse, recycling and being 
conservative in using natural resources.796
 
 
                                                 
792 DBM have a very strong communication and information sharing relationship with IAPs. This is in line 
with the aims of the National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 which encourages cooperative 
governance, see preamble. This shows the extent of their interest in vigorously protecting the environment 
while respecting the laws of the country. DBM have a database of IAPs whose records are updated 
regularly to ensure their full participation in environmental management strategies. 
793 DBCM’s Environmental Management Programme as compiled by Lesley Roos Environmental 
Management Programme Report for South African Sea Areas Mining Licence ML3/2003 (2005) C1-5; B1-
20 - B1-23. 
794 25 of 1999. 
795 This philosophy refers to the overall maintenance of an asset from its inception to disposal or renewal. 
By effectively managing an asset in this way, it increases the usefulness of that asset at minimal cost. See 
www.troy.edu/physicalplant/general/ 20 July 2008. 
796 DBCM’s Environmental Management Programme as compiled by Lesley Roos Environmental 
Management Programme Report for South African Sea Areas Mining Licence ML3/2003 (2005) B1-9.  
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The DBM employees described above must respect the maritime environment in 
respect of their ships by respecting the presence of other vessels, managing 
potential fuel spills when vessels are refueled at sea, ensure that air conditioning, 
refrigerator systems and fire suppression systems are replaced with non-ozone 
layer depleting products and equipment. The relevant employees/officers are to 
report and maintain hazards during incidental loss of equipment (obstacles). 
They must also ensure that no DBM vessel is painted with paint that has toxic 
compounds that will cause damage to the marine environment. Further, 
shipboard wastes and emissions must comply with MARPOL797 standards. The 
water used in the vessel must be maintained through desalination units while use 
of potable water from Port Nolloth is done conservatively. These strategies are 
some of the practical implements of ensuring that the requirements of legislation 
applicable in environmental management of DBM are observed.798
 
 
The strategies exercised by DBM to achieve its legal obligations pertaining to the 
environment illustrates an involvement of formidable experts in creating 
strategies that will ultimately ensure that when the mining activities cease, there 
will certainly be no problem of environmental restoration  on either the land or the 
deep seas area for present and future generations. 
 
It is clear from the practices adopted by De Beers even as illustrated in one of 
their companies in the form of DBM that they are not just a company that simply 
mines diamonds and goes home. It is clear from the study above that De Beers 
take the environment in which they are actively gaining a livelihood very 
seriously. The depth of the EIA799
                                                 
797 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution From Ships (MARPOL) 1973/78 as amended. 
 on the sea areas illustrates the Constitutional 
mandate of ensuring that mining operations are done with the least amount of 
damage. Should damage be unavoidable De Beers has in place elaborate 
798 DBCM’s Environmental Management Programme as compiled by Lesley Roos Environmental 
Management Programme Report for South African Sea Areas Mining Licence ML3/2003 (2005) B1-9. 
799 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996 section 24. National Environmental Management 




 schemes in place to ensure that the environment is least 
disturbed. 
Further, the diamond mining practices are humane and protective reflecting that 
they are a company that is committed to social responsibility. Mining personnel in 
the whole company are given necessary information on issues that affect them 
such as learning business skills and other initiatives such as worker concerned 
issues. This is effectively done through information and public accountability and 
the involvement of ‘interested and affected persons’ in any of their proposed 
projects.  
 
The strategies explained above to achieve fairness and equity in De Beers 
companies reflected in the business of De Beers above illustrate Constitutionally 
sound principles of sustainable development and protection of the environment, 
fairness and equity. These strategies are subject to available resources however 
and it is proposed that perhaps during the recession, with diamond sales being 
affected the most in many instances on the basis of being viewed as luxury items 
particularly if not being traded for industrial purposes, the implementation of 
some of these procedures may have been thwarted by lack of turn-over, 
particularly where certain mining operations have had to be shut down. 
 
3.6 De Beers: The Diamond Trading Company (DTC) and Diamond Trading 
Company South Africa (DTCSA) 
It is important at this instance to focus on De Beers801
                                                 
800 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996 section 24 and enabling mining legislation the 
Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 encourages the conservation and 
rehabilitate the environment after a mining activity is made possible by section 38(1)(d) specifically where 
it is provided that a holder of a reconnaissance permission, prospecting right, mining right, mining permit 
or retention permit must as far as practicable rehabilitate the environment affected by the mining activity.  
This strategy is also in line with the spirit of the National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998. 
 and how they have 
structured their sales practices to align them with the developments in diamond 
 
 
801 See www.debeersgroup.com 20 January 2006, for correct reference to company legal entities or juristic 
persons that form part of this large diamond producer. 25 January 2006. 
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industry regulations. It is important to note that in South African diamond 
production, there are other significant players in the diamond industry and these 
include Rio Tinto, Petra Diamonds, Alrosa, BHP Billington and their contribution 
to the South African and world diamond markets and participation in diamond 
laws is significant. 
 
Further, to have an understanding of other diamond stakeholders with interest in 
South Africa one may consult the Department of Minerals and Agency, 
Directorate: Mineral Economics (Minerals Bureau), Republic of South Africa 
Directory D13/2004 for complete list of African (Mining Related) Government 




When it comes to diamond sales, particularly diamond jewellery the most striking 
feature of De Beers’s diamonds is the ‘Forevermark’ brand which is also a 
company that forms a separately managed division within the De Beers family of 
companies. The Forevermark branding is an internationally recognizable brand. 
Every Forever mark diamond comes with a quality assurance and integrity 
certificate. These diamonds are aesthetically pleasing as diamonds are expected 
to be as they are crafted by a select group of diamantaires803 and are exclusively 
available at select jewellers.804
 
 On the other hand there is also the sale of 
unpolished diamonds and industrial diamonds. De Beers sell their diamonds to 
various Sight holders and it is the market needs of these Sight holders that 
dictate which diamonds are sold. 
The first port of call when it comes to De Beers’s diamond sales is to understand 
the structure of the arm of De Beers known as the Diamond Trading Company 
(DTC). This company distributes rough diamonds and is the world’s largest 
supplier of rough diamonds. The company handles nearly half of the world’s 
                                                 
802 Damarupurshad Ashok A Work in Progress (2004). www.dme.gov.za 15 September 2007. 
803 De Beers Diamond Jewellers (DBDJ). 
804 www.Forevermark.com 14 July 2009. 
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diamond supply in value. The DTC is active in sorting, valuing and diamond 
beneficiation and is represented internationally in countries such as the United 
Kingdom, South Africa805 as well as joint venture operations in Botswana and 
Namibia with the governments of those countries. Most DTC diamonds are sold 
through the London Sales Office however where the DTC is in a joint venture 
with a particular country, the diamonds produced there are generally sold to 
clients for cutting and polishing in those countries.806
 
  
The DTC was initially formed in 1934 and was established as a standalone 
company within the De Beers family in July 2004. The main sorting activities of 
the DTC are broken down into production sorting and aggregation. Production 
sorting is the classification of diamonds into various sizes, shapes, colours and 
clarities.807 Sorting of diamonds on behalf of the DTC takes place in the five 
centres namely DTCSA, for South Africa, NDTC, for Namibia, DTCB, for 
Botswana, DTC, for London and production of diamonds currently purchased 
from the Russian diamond company, Alrosa DTC London. Aggregation takes 
place in London at present however there has been a proposal that this process 
will be moved to Botswana. The valuing of the diamonds is connected with the 
associated sorting of diamonds and the DTC’s sorting categories correspond with 
the price items in the DTC price book.808
 
 The relevance of this brief history of the 
DTC is to establish its global placement in relation to South African diamond 
trade. 
                                                 
805 www.debeersgroup.com 27 June 2007. In South Africa the DTC is wholly owned by De Beers sells to 
South African based clientele. 
806 In South Africa De Beers has been active to assist the government’s SDT in conducting diamond trade 
and there has been evidence of the State and De Beers work together to achieve BEE goals in the industry 
however the two entities are separate in South Africa such that the relationship between the two entities is 
governed by the Diamonds Act 56 of 1986. 
807 www.debeersgroup.com 27 June 2007. There are about 12,000 categories used by the DTC for 
production classification. Once classification is completed the process of aggregation takes place. 
Aggregation is concerned with the blending of categories of rough diamonds those that bear a similarity 




The DTC’s sorting, valuing and sales operations in South Africa have been 
merged into one company which effectively created a single operation known as 
DTCSA and falls in line with the South African State policy on diamond trade. 
DTCSA is based in Kimberley and sorts and values about 13 million carats per 
annum of rough diamonds produced by DBCM in South Africa and it is this 
branch also that forms the sales division for the DTC in South Africa. It is very 
important to note the socio-economic investment made by De Beers in this 
instance as the decision to locate the company’s headquarters in Kimberley was 
made to assist with the efforts in the Northern Cape Province in order to improve 
local skills and provide employment in the region.809
 
 
It is important to mention that where diamond sales are concerned Be Beers are 
bound by their own ethical code of conduct known as the Diamond Best Practice 
Principles supported by an Assurance Programme and audited by a third party 
know as the Société Genérale de Surveillance (SGS) and a fourth party by 
United Registrar of Systems Ltd (URS) who further review the quality of work and 
competencies of SGS. This code is made applicable to the entire De Beers 
Family of Companies, all DTC Sight holders or clients and certain third parties 
and covers company conduct in three main areas, that being, business 
responsibilities, social responsibilities and environmental responsibilities.810
 
 
3.6.1 De Beers Operating and Financial Review 2007/2008: Industry Report 
De Beers Group have taken initiatives to make industry reports available to the 
public. The aspect diamond sales will be considered under the 2007/2008 report. 
The management of De Beers has chosen to subscribe to the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI) G3 Sustainability Reporting Guidelines which also forms part of 
De Beers’s Communication on Progress to the UN Global Compact. These 
                                                 
809 Ibid. This endeavor is a classic example of socio-economic empowerment which can be achieved when 
the public and private sector work together to achieve common statutory goals in the exploitation of the 
country’s resources. 
810 www.debeersgroup.com 20 January 2006. These internal business systems adopted by De Beers are an 
example of the strategies that can be adopted by diamond producers to ensure the utmost integrity of the 
diamonds on the markets and these strategies give various clients the confidence they require where 
diamond sales are involved. 
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accountability reporting procedures undertaken by De Beers allow significant 
public empowerment through the provision of knowledge and research on the 
industry activities. Further such reporting causes peace of mind for De Beers’s 
national and worldwide clientele. With an awareness of the company’s cogent 
purpose, vision, values and principles through reporting of this nature, it is not a 




One of the values is articulated as follows in the De Beers Report ‘being united in 
purpose and action, we will turn the diversity of our people, skills and experience 
into an unparalleled source of strength’. This quotation is in line with South 
African common law values such as ubuntu. The report is also a very honest look 
at the challenges that are a threat to the sustainability of the industry in Southern 
Africa. These challenges are being acknowledged and dealt with through various 
company efforts. For example increases in fuel costs which exert pressure on 




With regard to diamond sales it is reported that the DTC achieved sales of 
US$5.92 billion in 2007 and US$6.15 billion in 2006. The demand for rough 
diamonds remained healthy throughout 2007. The DTC increased prices in the 
second half of 2007 in order to accommodate the rise in polished diamond price 
growths. With regard to jewellery sales, retail growth in countries such as China, 
India and the Gulf States continued to experience exponential growth in jewellery 
sales813
 
 in 2007, the US sales underperformed in light of the expectations of 
analysts and retailers. This is due to uncertain economic conditions which have 
lowered sales. 
                                                 
811 De Beers Living Up to Diamonds from Natural Resources to Shared National Wealth: Operating and 
Financial Review (2007) Preface. www.debeersgroup.com 16 January 2008. 
812 Ibid. 
813 Ibid. De Beers having had significant growth in sales in 2006 De Beers Diamond Jewellers (DBDJ) 
opened 8 new stores in 2007 and now has 23 locations globally. 
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It emerged from various studies that 2008 was a difficult year for all industry 
because of the global economic crisis. De Beers reports that in spite of those 
concerns reports total sales to the tune of USD 6.89 billion. These were from 
Operating Company 2008 sales DTC, DTC Botswana, Namibia DTC, DTC South 
Africa and Diamdel. The total sales for De Beers in 2008 were despite the 
economic crisis up by 16.4 per cent the sales in 2007.814
 
 
3.6.2 De Beers and the Russian Diamond Company Alrosa 
With regard to the purchase of rough diamonds De Beers has not been left 
untouched by legal controversy both in their US and Russian commercial 
activities. With various class action suits in the US alone, De Beers was 
challenged, while not accepting the allegations in those actions have undertaken 
to settle these suits in order to protect their clientele, shareholders and 
consumers.  
 
It is submitted that the willingness to accept a settlement so quickly points to a 
lack of desire to continue with a particular case on principle which in itself creates 
an uncertainty as to whether or not that action is concerned about a breach in 
principle of law or making generous compensation with the least effort. Further, a 
company’s reputation is an important asset and therefore paying to protect the 
same is a natural reaction in business. However, whenever moneys are passed 
around or ‘pay offs’ are made to deter people from approaching the courts, 
suspicions will always be raised as such willingness to settle matters so rapidly 
may also indicate a form of admission of guilt. 
 
It is important to analyze how these legal controversies affect De Beers’s 
diamond sales as will become clear in the consideration of the involvement of De 
Beers’s in the purchasing of rough diamonds from the Russian company 
                                                 
814 De Beers Living Up to Diamonds from Natural Resources to Shared National Wealth: Operating and 




 This case has been selected as it deals with the international trade 
context and pairs the same aspect with international law on preventing anti-
competitive behavior which De Beers has been associated with on many 
occasions in diamond sales.  
On 5 March 2002 De Beers notified its Trade Agreement with Alrosa to the 
European Commission who then raised concerns on the grounds of competition 
regarding the operation of the notified trade agreement. To resolve these 
concerns De Beers gave certain commitments to the European Commission 
which involved an undertaking by De Beers to have a staggered phase out of all 
rough diamond purchases from Alrosa with no purchases to be made from 1 
January 2009. These commitments were audited by a Trustee816 and were 
accepted by the European Commission on 22 February 2006.817 However, there 
was a change in the initial agreement when the Court of First Instance 
Luxembourg818 announced in July 2007 that it had annulled the European 
Commission’s decision to accept the commitments offered by De Beers to cease 
all purchases of rough diamonds from Alrosa from 1 January 2009.819
 
 
An analysis of the annulment of the Commission’s decision will be considered 
below. The annulment came about when the Luxembourg Court of First Instance, 
in the case of Alrosa Company Ltd v Commission of the European 
Communities820
                                                 
815 The commercial implications surrounding dealings between Alrosa and De Beers made much industry 
news in the period around July 2007. See Matthews Charlotte Business Day (South Africa) (12v July 2007) 
EU’s Reversal of Alrosa Ban Lifts Anglo, which off course owns a substantial stake in De Beers. 
 sat to hear an application by Alrosa for the annulment of the 
816 Grant Thornton UK LLP. 
817 Cited as Commission decision 2006/520/EC. 
818 An appellate body for testing decisions of the European Commission. 
819 www.debeersgroup.com 17 September 2008. The relevant documents pertaining to the COMP/B-
2/38.381: De Beers/ALROSA Trade Agreement containing Commitments for De Beers and the Trustee 
Mandate Documents are made available to the public domain via their website. Although the document 
pertaining to the Trustee’s Mandate is marked ‘strictly private & confidential contains business secrets’ and 
dated 10 December 2006, these documents have been made accessible to the public domain. This means 
there is no stealth pertaining to any commercial activities that the two companies have particularly 
considering the judgment given by the Court of First Instance Luxembourg. 
820 T-170/06 the Court of First Instance of the European Communities (Fourth Chamber, Extended 
Composition) (11 July 2007). 
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Commission Decision making binding the Commitments made by De Beers to 
bring an end to the purchasing of Alrosa rough diamonds with effect from 2009 
after an implementation of a process of progressive reduction of purchases 
leading up to that final stoppage of all rough diamond purchases. The application 
was also for bringing these proceedings to an end.821
 
  
In this case the applicant Company, Alrosa had taken the decision to challenge 
the Commission’s decision. The decision was based on Articles 54 and 55 of the 
Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA Agreement).822 The EEA 
Agreement which provides that any abuse by one or more undertakings of a 
dominant position within the territory covered under the Agreement or in a 
significant part of the area shall be prohibited by the Commission because such 
abuse is contrary to the aims of the Agreement. The subsections go on to list the 
examples of abuse envisaged in the Articles however relevant to this case is 
subsection (c) which provides for dealing with problems that relate to 
transactions that may place protected parties at a competitive disadvantage. 
Article 55 allows the EC Commission and the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) 
Surveillance Authority823
 
 to give effect to prohibit abuses in terms of Article 54 of 
the EEA Agreement. 
According to Dr. John Temple Lang,824
                                                 
821 This application was essentially based on the EC Regulations, Article 9 in particular of Council 
Regulations (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid 
down in Articles 81 [EC] and 82 [EC] OJ 2003 L 1, p 1. The matter was heard before a Fourth Chamber 
with an Extended Composition or Panel of decision makers formulated by H. Legal, President, I. 
Wisziewska-Bialecka, V. Vadapalas, E. Moavero Milanesi and N. Wahl as Judges. 
 who has investigated in his writings the 
role of the courts in the achievement of the aims of the European Community 
822 OJ No L1, 3.1.1994, p 3; and EFTA State’s Official Gazettes. 
823 www.etfasurv.int 16 September 2008. Is a term used to refer to three EFTA States presently 
participating in the EEA Agreement which are Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland and are set 
up in terms of Article 108(1) of the EEA, Section 2 which deals with surveillance procedure. 
824 Lang J.T. Fifty Years of European Community Law: Part I: Article: The Development by the Court of 
Justice of the Duties of Cooperation of National Authorities and Community Institutions under Article 10 
EC 31 Fordham International  Law Journal  (2008) 1483. 
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Treaty (EC Treaty),825 the Community legal system is fundamental and very 
different from other legal systems such as the US legal system. The rules of the 
European Community law now European Union law are primarily enforced and 




Dr. Lang continues to explain that although national law and Community law are 
not separate bodies of law applied by separate institutions and there should be 
no line of demarcation between the two institutions.827
 
 Dr. Lang’s explanation 
provides important insight as to the balance between EU Community law and 
national legislation, a very important understanding of the categorizations of the 
systems of law applicable in this case especially when dealing with Community 
competition law as national law may have an unfortunate implication of 
contradicting Community law. This means that whatever legal arguments are 
made by parties in cases involving Community law, although such legal 
arguments may be couched in national law, it is imperative that they are 
interpreted by the Community Institutions in a manner that will not conflict with 
Treaty aims. 
Dr. Lang goes on to explain that when considering Treaties there are two types 
of States. There are ‘dualist’ States which regard international law as being quite 
separate from national law and ‘monist’ States which regard and accept more 
readily the idea that treaty obligations once accepted and ratified become part of 
national law without implementing legislation.828
                                                 
825 The achievement of the aims of the EC Treaty were the points of focus in the Alrosa and De Beers case 
considered herein and Dr. Lang provides academic insight on how the national courts interact with 
Community legal systems to achieve a balance between the two systems while regulating Community 
interests being protected.  
 Having studied the manner in 
which South Africa implements Treaties it is quite evident that South Africa is a 
826 Although in the Alrosa and De Beers case the Court of First Instance of Luxembourg can be labeled as a 
Community Institution because of the nature of its mandate and involvement in the case. Dr. Lang’s 
submissions become important insofar as they show that national law and community law are to be 




State that reflects both monist and dualist principles. Therefore it is important at 
all times to have an understanding of international anti-competitive law and its 
interaction with South African law, for example in the form of the Competition 
Act829
 
 when considering the Alrosa case. As a sovereign country South Africa 
has its own legal identity while remaining sensitive to the international legal 
systems and the achievement of certain Treaty aims of the international 
community. 
When considering international law against municipal law, it is important to 
consider the Constitutional provisions that set out the requirements for such law 
becoming part of the municipal law.830 It has been submitted that since the 
promulgation of the Constitution South Africa has entered into a significant 
number of international agreements or treaties. In South Africa for an 
international agreement to be considered part of municipal law for the purposes 
of section 231 of the Constitution, it must be such that parties are subject to the 
national law, only central government may bind the Republic.831
 
 
In the Alrosa case, when taking a decision the Court of First Instance established 
the following legal and factual scenario. In terms of Article 7(1) of the 
Regulations832 where the Commission acting on a complaint or on its own 
initiative finds that there has been an infringement of Article 81 or of Article 82 of 
the Treaty (Meaning the Treaty Establishing The European Economic 
Community or EEC Treaty, signed in Rome 25 March 1957833
                                                 
829 89 of 1998. 
) in that there is 
unfair economic competition, it may require the undertakings and associations of 
830 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996 section 231. 
831 Olivier M. Informal International Agreements under the 1996 Constitution 22 South African Yearbook 
of International Law (1997) 63. 
832 Council Regulations (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002. See paper III of the regulations which deals 
with Commission Decisions, headed as ‘Finding and termination of infringement.’ 
833 Note that this treaty will be amended by the Treaty of Lisbon (amending the Treaty on European Union 
and the Treaty establishing the European Community) signed at Lisbon 13 December 2007 it is submitted 
that it will come into force in the middle of the year 2009, part of its objective is to make the EU more 
democratic with improved standards of openness, transparency and accountability. 
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such undertakings to bring such infringement to an end. Hence the Commitments 
taken by De Beers in the case COMP/B-2/38.381: De Beers/Alrosa.834
 
 
Article 9 of the Regulations provide that a Commission may adopt a decision 
requiring that an infringement be brought to an end and the undertakings (or 
entities) concerned may make commitments to meet these concerns. The 
Commission may take a decision to make those commitments binding on the 
entities involved and if those decisions are adopted there will be subsequently no 
grounds for action by the Commission.  The Commission may however upon 
request or its own initiative reopen proceedings if there is a significant change in 
the circumstances that brought about the adopted decision.835
 
 
The facts of this matter are as follows: Two companies were involved, namely, 
Alrosa Company Ltd (Alrosa) which is an important diamond entity established in 
Mirny Russia and is actively involved in the production and supplying of rough 
diamonds and fine jewellery, and De Beers SA Luxembourg (part of leading 
diamond producers, the De Beers group). On 5 March 2002 these two 
companies notified the Commission of an agreement dated 17 December 2001 
for Alrosa to supply rough diamonds to De Beers. This agreement was entered 
into by the two companies (De Beers being represented by two of its 
subsidiaries).836
                                                 
834 These documents are available for public view in the De Beers Website. Further, in terms of Article7(1) 
to stop infringement the Commission may impose behavioral or structural remedies (whichever is least 
burdensome) which are proportionate to the infringement committed…to bring the infringement effectively 
to an end. 
 The purpose of notifying the Commission of this agreement was 
835 Para 3. Article 9(1)(2). These processes are naturally subject to rights of the undertakings to be heard 
and to have access to relevant information as kept in the file by the Commission. (As per Article 27 and 
Regulation 773/2004). 
836 Para. 12. The agreement provided that Alrosa would supply De Beers with USD 800 million a year of 
rough diamonds for a period of 5 years, (USD 700mllion in 5th year)  from the date of confirmation by the 
Commission to the contracting parties that such an agreement did not infringe Articles 81 (or merit an 
exemption there from) or Article 82. It must be noted that prior to this agreement De Beers and Alrosa 
already had established a commercial relationship. The provisions of the Treaty  are expressly stated as 
follows: ‘The structure of Article 81 
 (1) The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all agreements between 
undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade 
between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition within the common market, and in particular those which:  
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in order to obtain an exemption837 from the Commission from the consequences 
of Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty.838
 
 
On 14 January 2003 the Commission sent a statement of objections to the trade 
agreement of the companies under case cited as COMP/E-3/38.381 in which it 
was contended that the agreement was capable of being an abuse of a dominant 
position which is prohibited in terms of Article 82. The two companies sent written 
submissions in response to the objections on 31 March 2003. On 1 July 2003 the 
Commission sent a supplementary statement of objections which expressed that 
the trade agreement of the parties was also capable of constituting an anti-
competitive agreement which is prohibited in terms of Article 53(1) of the EEA 
                                                                                                                                                 
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions;  
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment;  
(c) share markets or sources of supply;  
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at 
a competitive disadvantage;  
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations 
which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such 
contracts. Article 81(2) makes prohibited agreements void and thereby unenforceable: (2) Any agreements 
or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be automatically void. Article 81(3) provides a 
possible justification for certain agreements that would otherwise be prohibited: (3) The provisions of 
paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of:  
- any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;  
- any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;  
- any concerted practice or category of concerted practices,  
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or 
economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which does not:  
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these 
objectives;  
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the 
products in question.  
Article 82, providing for the law on abuse of dominant position. 
"Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or in a 
substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market insofar as it may affect 
trade between Member States.  
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:  
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions;  
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers;  
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing 
them at a competitive disadvantage;  
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary 
obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject 
of such contracts.’ 
837 Regulation No 17 dated 6 February 1962 implementing Articles 81 and 82, dealing with competition, in 
terms of the EEC Treaty. 
838 Para. 8 – 10. 
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Agreement and could not be exempted under the Article 53(3) and an abuse of 
dominant position in terms of Article 54 of the EEA Agreement. Parties made oral 
representations to the Commission on 7 July 2003.839
 
 
On 14 December 2004 Alrosa and De Beers jointly submitted commitments 
designed to meet the concerns raised by the Commission. These commitments 
provided for a progressive reduction in sales from USD 700 million in 2005 to 
USD 275 million in 2010 and to be capped at that level. On 3 June 2005 the 
Commission published a notice in an Official Journal stating that it had received 
the commitments from the two companies during a Commission investigation on 
the competition issues raised in the EEC Treaty. The notice also invited 
interested third parties to submit their comments within a month.840
 
 
After having considered the outcome of the market test, comments of third 
parties and subsequent commitments from De Beers, on 22 February 2006 the 
Commission adopted a Decision 2006/520/EC which as previously mentioned 
involved De Beers committing to have a staggered phase out of all rough 
diamond purchases from Alrosa with no purchases to be made from 1 January 
2009, this adoption of the decision also brought the matter to an end. However, 
on 29 June 2006 Alrosa brought an application to the First Court Of Instance, 
Luxembourg for the annulment of the Commission decision. The Commission 
lodged a defence and eventually the matter was heard on 19 April 2007.841
 
 
It is interesting to note that the Commission had taken a role of being guardian of 
the diamond market in this case.842
                                                 
839 Para. 14 – 17. 
 The fact that the two companies had worked 
840 Para. 19 – 20. The Commission intended to make these commitments binding subject to the outcome of 
the market test of the points of the two companies’ agreement. 
841 Para. 27 – 35. 
842 This is confirmed by the Commission’s actions of protecting the market in terms of the EEC Treaty and 
the Regulations there under by virtue of prohibiting the abuse of dominant position and removing unfair 
competition. It must be noted however that the market dominance factor was only in relation to De Beers’s 
position and not Alrosa in this case. Therefore by virtue of De Beers’s willingness to enter into negotiations 
and make submissions for certain commitments to address the concerns of the Commission illustrates that 
De Beers were concerned about dealing with anticompetitive concerns in their business dealings in this 
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hand in hand with the Commission all along to find common ground means that 
the Commission’s work of rooting out abuse of dominant position and rooting out 
unfair competition was respected until the Alrosa felt that it would not benefit their 
commercial position to cancel their trade agreement with De Beers. This decision 
to appeal by Alrosa shows that laws pertaining to the protection of international 
markets are essential however such laws may have an adverse effect on the 
parties’ freedom of contract. Where such freedom of contract is so affected that it 
makes no commercial sense it should be open to parties to challenge such 
decisions as illustrated by Alrosa’s conduct in this case. 
 
The enquiry and outcome of the First Court Of Instance, Luxembourg continued 
as follows, the court was quick to acknowledge that Alrosa was not the company 
to which the Commission’s decision came about therefore the grounds for 
admissibility of action at the instance of Alrosa had to be established. On this 
point the court explained that the matter was one involving considerations of 
public policy to determine the admissibility of the action. The court firstly 
established that the action was admissible at the instance of Alrosa because it 
caused Alrosa immediate and direct legal effects in that Alrosa could no longer 
supply rough diamonds to De Beers and the decision would have an effect on 




Alrosa argued three essential points as a basis for its argument. They firstly 
argued that their right to be heard was infringed844 secondly that the 
Commission’s decision infringed Article 9 of Regulations No 1/2003845
                                                                                                                                                 
case. There is evidence that through the commitments made De Beers were trying to cooperate with the 
guardian of the market, i.e., the Commission. 
 and thirdly 
843 Para. 38 - 40. Alrosa was not the addressee of the decision therefore other grounds for admissibility of 
their action had to be considered. 
844 This point of argument naturally raises eyebrows in law as the right to be heard forms the basis of 
natural justice in forums of law particularly where adverse decisions have to be taken that will naturally 
affect a party. 
845 Para. 42. On this point Alrosa stated that in terms of the Article 9 of the Regulation 1/2003 it is not 
permitted that an undertaking (in this case Alrosa as an entity) be indefinitely bound by commitments it has 
not voluntarily subscribed to. 
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Alrosa argued that the commitments themselves were excessive in nature and 
thus in breach of principles of freedom of contract and proportionality.846
  
 It is 
important to note that these arguments are cogent in nature, however, on the 
point of freedom of contract there must be a balance between such freedom and 
the prevention of over-subscription to a particular market which may in turn 
create unfair competition. Therefore the guidance provided in this case to 
balance the interests of undertakings against anti-competitive laws is essential 
and therefore it will be crucial to look at the rationale of the court in this case in 
detail. 
Alrosa argued that Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 afforded the Commission and 
the companies involved with an opportunity to arrive at a mutual decision such 
that the final binding commitments are not ones offered only by one party. 
Further, in terms of the regulation decisions taken by the Commission ought not 
to be for an indefinite period as this infringes on freedom of contract which n this 
case would have the effect that any supply of rough diamonds to De Beers by 
Alrosa would be curbed for an indefinite period, thus making it impossible to 
continue even with the ordinary ad hoc contracts to supply rough diamonds 
which De Beers and Alrosa had done in the past. Alrosa argued that to uphold 
the Commission’s decision solely on the basis that De Beers is in a dominant 
position on the markets downstream from the market for the supply of rough 
diamonds amounted to a legal boycott of Alrosa by De Beers with effect from 
2009 as per commitments.847
  
 
Alrosa also argued that the Commission’s decision was fundamentally flawed as 
a result of what Alrosa alleged to be an erroneous preliminary assessment. 
Alrosa pointed out that the main concern expressed by the Commission in their 
initial assessment of the trade agreement and the EEA Agreement was that the 
                                                 
846 Para. 42. 
847 Para. 46 – 51. Alrosa argued an error in law in this instance by stating that the effect of the 
Commission’s decision in this case was to the effect that I prohibited perfectly lawful conduct for an 
indefinite period. They argued that this was directly in conflict with the principle of a free market economy 
enshrined in the laws of the member States and captured in precedent as well.  
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exclusive supply commitment laid down in the trade agreement would result in 
strengthening De Beers’ market power by excluding Alrosa from the market for 
the supply of rough diamonds which would have the consequence of depriving 
other purchasers of access to the notable diamond source which it represented. 
Since this was the Commission’s main concern Alrosa argued that in terms of 
precedent it was necessary in this case for the Commission to conduct a detailed 
assessment of the foreclosure effect of De Beers’ conduct in this instance 
especially since this situation presented a unique legal challenge under EC 
Article 82 because it involved an exclusive supply commitment or trade 
agreement with a dominant purchaser.848
  
 
Alrosa continued to argue that the Commission’s decision itself had anti-
competitive effects in that it barred the largest buyer on the market from access 
to Alrosa’s rough diamonds and as a consequence reducing its output because 
there would have been no guaranteed alternate purchasers with the same 
amount of buying power. Further, De Beers would be barred from accessing 
Alrosa output therefore other purchasers would have gained greater market 
advantages in their negotiations with Alrosa and thus be able to impose artificial 
prices.849
 
 The arguments raised by Alrosa seem to be a delayed reaction to the 
realities of market dynamics as influenced by the Commission’s decision and 
hence the application. 
On the argument on proportionality Alrosa argued that the Commission’s 
decision had infringed Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 in that it had gone beyond 
what is necessary to achieve the objects of the treaty.  They believed that the 
Commission took a decision that was so stringent that it completely ruled out the 
possibility previously open to Alrosa of entering into a contractual relationship 
with De Beers which would disadvantage Alrosa. The Commission responded to 
                                                 
848 Para. 53 – 55. This suggests that Alrosa was alleging that the Commission had taken a decision in a 
draconian manner while at the same time failing to inform itself fully by assessing the market foreclosure 
effect. It was their argument that had the Commission done that proper assessment they would have 
amended the notified agreement to deal with such an effect in order to avoid any foreclosure effect.  
849 Para. 56. 
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Alrosa’s arguments by stating that they were unfounded on the basis that 
according to their interpretation of the relevant provisions of law relating to abuse 
of dominant position only De Beers was the undertaking concerned with the 
proceedings giving rise to the Commission’s decision and they were the only 
ones permitted of offering commitments that could be made binding by the 
Commission, further the Commission has power to impose such commitments 
without reference to a specific time period.850
 
 
On the argument of contractual freedom, the Commission contended that its 
decision had not infringed on such freedom as it is an error for Alrosa to argue 
that its decision was equated to a prohibition of lawful conduct. The Commission 
contended that contractual freedom is limited by the prohibition of anti-
competitive practices as contained in the treaty.851 This argument was taken from 
the essential application consequence theme of limiting certain freedoms to 
protect other freedoms. What is interesting to note is that the Commission made 
out its response against Alrosa mostly by way of what seems mostly as a bare 
denial of the allegations made by Alrosa852
 
 with the obvious conclusion to their 
defence stating that the Commission’s decision was not disproportionate or 
unduly affecting Alrosa’s business interests. 
In light of the arguments of the parties the court found that the Commission was 
well within their rights in terms of Article 9 Regulation 1/2003 to make 
commitments offered by the undertakings binding where those commitments are 
sufficient in addressing concerns raised by the preliminary assessment. However 
the legal effect of the Commission’s decision in this case was not a mere 
acceptance of a proposal by a negotiating undertaking but it was a binding 
measure implemented by the Commission in the exercise of its prerogatives in 
terms of Article 81 and 82 of the EC intended to put to an end any infringement of 
the competition rules. This means that the Commission’s decision may have 
                                                 
850 Para. 63 – 67. 
851 Para. 68 – 89. 
852 See Para. 77 – 85. 
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indirect legal effects on an undertaking to put it in a position that it would not 
have been able to create on its own.853
 
 
The court made it clear that as soon as the commitments were made binding and 
the Commission had taken a decision in casu, the Commission was acting as 
sole author and assumed responsibility for that decision. In simple language the 
court was stating the principle that the Commission, when taking a decision it is 
doing so within its powers and does not have to be dictated to by the 
undertakings concerned. In this case participation of the undertakings permitted 
the Commission to take a decision in a more expedient manner as it did not have 
to prove infringement of competition rules fist in terms of Article 85 of EC, 
however, this did not mean that the undertakings were to decide on best way 
forward for the Commission.  
 
The point is that the Commission may take decisions to penalize undertakings 
involved in the infringement of competition rules. Further, in terms of para. 91 
and 98 the court found that it is open to the Commission to make the 
commitments binding for an indefinite period of time if this period achieves the 
purposes of the Treaty and is applied according to the principles of 
proportionality as set out in Article 5 of EC and established case law (the 
proportionality of a measure forms an objective review). Where there is a choice 
of procedure to be followed in implementing a measure, the Commission must 
have recourse to the least onerous measure. 
  
On the point of proportionality the court found that the Commission had gone 
beyond its powers in law by taking a decision prohibiting absolutely any future 
trading relations between the De Beers and Alrosa (even if those commitments 
are offered by an undertaking voluntarily). This type of decision would only have 
been justifiable if it was re-establishing relations which existed prior to the 
infringement of competition rules. However, the fact that the commitments were 
                                                 
853 Para. 87 – 88.  
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given voluntarily also did not mean that the court could not review whether the 
Commission’s decision based on those commitments was in fact well founded.854
 
 
Essentially when testing the proportionality of the measure approved by the 
Commission, the court defined the nature infringement of competition rules. The 
court found that in the opinion of the Commission the trade agreement between 
Alrosa and De Beers constituted an exclusivity of distribution for the benefit of De 
Beers and this would be an abuse of the dominant position. The Commission 
believed that De Beers was enhancing or maintaining its dominant position by 
reducing access to an alternative source of rough diamonds for potential 
customers and in turn hindering Alrosa from competing with De Beers. However, 
this decision was not taken with due consideration of a complex economic 
assessment and therefore the decision was by default subject to judicial review in 
order to test the proportionality of the measure adopted. The court held that the 
decision of the Commission was invalidated by an error of assessment as there 
were other less onerous solutions that could have been adopted instead of 
permanent prohibition of transactions between DeBeers and Alrosa. In 
conclusion the court annulled the Commission’s decision.855
 
 
It is interesting to note that the Commission was in essence seeking to prevent in 
its view some kind of self-imposed commercial ‘under dogging’ by Alrosa without 
properly assessing the market effects. The question thus arises as to whether the 
Commission is entitled to prevent commercial suicides of undertakings in such 
instances or should the freedom of contract dictate the market? The answer to 
this question is that the Commission can adopt necessary measures to uphold 
the spirit of the Treaty subject however to established principles of proportional 
measures and what is a proportional measure in each situation is determined by 
a proper assessment of the market effects.  
 
                                                 
854 Para. 103 – 106. 
855 Para. 113 – 126 and Para. 205.  
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From the study of the case above an investigation of the position of De Beers in 
international law pertaining to anti-competitive behavior has been investigated in 
depth. Therefore is important now to consider the South African court’s view of 
De Beers in South African diamond trade particularly in matters of market 
dominance. 
 
3.6.3 De Beers Trade and Anti-Competition Law in South Africa  
Having studied the De Beers and Alrosa case which deals with international anti-
competitive laws in the diamond sales context, it is imperative that national 
competition legislation be briefly856
 
 considered in this chapter insofar as it affects 
all market related sales. Naturally the competition laws in South Africa are 
designed to protect a broad spectrum of commercial transactions. This chapter 
will touch upon the competition aspects of South African legislation and 
specifically product sales. The understanding of this can then be interpreted and 
adapted to accommodate diamond sales regulation laws. 
Competition is regulated by the Competition Act.857  This Act is essentially aimed 
at preventing anti competitive and restrictive practices and promoting free 
competition in the public interest and within the limits of the law. The Preamble 
expressly states that one of the objectives of the Competition Act858
 
 is to ‘create 
greater capability and an environment for South Africans to compete effectively in 
the international markets.’ It further expressly provides as one of its objects the 
establishment of independent institutions to monitor economic competition and 
give effect to the international law obligations of the Republic. 
The overall contribution of the Competition Act859
                                                 
856 This is done so as to make an important legal point that affects diamond sales without deviating from the 
main purpose of this study which is to focus on diamond sales as potential subjects of international sales 
opposed to a study of competition laws. 
 is to facilitate trading and 
business practices that are simultaneously competitive and in the public interest. 
857 89 of 1998. 
858 89 of 1998. 
859 89 of 1998. 
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Diamond trade and sales transactions must be done within this framework. The 
Competition Act860 specifically is to be interpreted in a manner consistent with the 
Constitution which itself provides in section 22 for the right to freely choose a 
trade, profession or occupation. The Competition Act861
 
 may therefore be seen 
as giving effect to this Constitutional right. It is also provided that the Competition 
Act has to be interpreted in compliance with the international law obligations of 
the Republic. Finally, the Act expressly states that one of the purposes it serve is 
to promote competition in order to expand opportunities for South African 
participation in world markets and recognize the role of foreign competition in 
South Africa. 
The case of South African Raisins (Pty) Ltd and Another v SAD Holdings Ltd and 
Another862 is an important case will serve to illustrate the extent of competition 
law in South Africa as heard before the Competition Tribunal of South Africa 
where an interdict was sought and granted to prevent restrictive practices that 
promoted anti-competitive behavior contained in a company’s articles of 
association. The claimant company, South African Raisins (Pty) Ltd, was 
established to compete against the respondent company, SAD Holdings Ltd and 
its wholly owned subsidiary for the production of grapes for processing into 
raisins. This judgment is helpful in demonstrating the national law approach to 
issues of abuse of dominant position in industry related markets.863
 
  
The facts of the case illustrate that the whole matter  came about when the South 
African dried fruit market was changing from one being controlled by State and 
producer regulation (for example, large regulatory boards such as the Dried Fruit 
Board) to one that is market oriented. Therefore the issue before the court in this 
                                                 
860 89 of 1998. 
861 89 of 1998. 
862 2005 JOL 18309 (CT). 
863 When considering this judgment one is able to see the similarity between South African law and 
international laws particularly those laws contained in the Rome Convention as considered in the Alrosa 
Company Ltd v Commission of the European Communities T-170/06 The Court of First Instance of the 
European Communities (Fourth Chamber, Extended Composition) (11 July 2007) although the conclusion 
of each of the cases was vastly different. 
 221 
case was whether the anti-competitive practices observed by the former State 




The co-operatives were responsible for single-channel marketing of agricultural 
products in terms of Marketing Act865 (now repealed by the new order Marketing 
of Agricultural Products866). It is worth mentioning that single market channeling 
involved as a rule that producers would be criminally liable if they do not sell their 
entire crop in good and bad years to the relevant co-operative which would 
commit itself to purchase the entire crop from its members. Although this method 
is based on a market domineering model it also had its benefits in that the 
producers were guaranteed purchasers albeit without market freedom.867
 
  
The activities and functions of the co-operatives were so dominant in the market 
because their activities covered all areas of agricultural output including 
financing, storage, processing, packaging, distribution, sales and exports. The 
regulation of this type of market dominance is one of the objectives in the 
creation of the Competition Act,868 as amended and applied together with 
regulations there under, in order to provide for a Competition Commission and 
Competition Tribunal that will investigate inter alia restrictive practices and 
abuses of dominant position which have their roots in South Africa specifically in 
apartheid and discriminatory laws.869
 
 
The claimant established that the respondent company and its subsidiary which 
had altered its structure of being a co-operative previously responsible for the 
packaging and distribution of raisins among other products into a new business 
                                                 
864 1. Introduction as per Lewis DH, Presiding Member, with whole bench concurring. 
865 59 0f 1986 repealed. 
866 47 of 1996 repealed. 
867 2005 JOL 18309 (CT) 1 Introduction as per Lewis DH, Presiding Member, with whole bench 
concurring. 
868 89 of 1998. 
869 2005 JOL 18309 (CT) 1 Introduction as per Lewis DH, Presiding Member, with whole bench 
concurring. 
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structured as a corporation but retaining the same relationship between itself and 
a large number of producers in the sector. The claimant was also able to prove 
contravention of the Competition Act870 by showing that the practices of the 




This case forms an important contribution to an understanding of laws relating to 
anti-competitive behavior in South African markets. A reading of the Competition 
Act872 reveals a striking similarity to international European Union legal systems. 
The South African Competition Tribunal in this case went as far as uprooting anti-
competitive behavior contained in the respondent company practices even 
though retrospective application of the Competition Act873 was in question in this 
case. The Tribunal took the view that although the Competition Act874 was not to 
be applied retrospectively; it had the power to deal with agreements that at any 
stage still had the market effect of promoting anti-competitive behavior in the 
relevant market under consideration.875
 
 
The Competition Tribunal has also dealt with this concern over anti-competitive 
behavior in876
                                                 
870 89 of 1998. 
 the case involving De Beers who have a pervasive influence on 
competition in diamond production and sales as illustrated in the following 
unreported case of De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v Anglovaal Mining 
871 2005 JOL 18309 (CT) 2. The claimants proved their case by establishing four points. They showed that 
the horizontal agreement between grapes for raisins producers that constituted a prohibited restrictive 
horizontal practice was in violation of section 4 of the Competition Act, the vertical agreement between 
grapes for raisins producers and SAD and its subsidiaries constituted a restrictive practice in violation of 
section 5 of the Competition Act 89 of 1998, that SAD was abusing its dominant position in the market by 
denying claimants access to an essential facility in violation of section 8(b). The Tribunal investigated each 
of these allegations and found in favour of the claimants. 
872 89 of 1998. 
873 89 of 1998. 
874 89 of 1998. 
875 2005 JOL 18309 (CT) 5. This case also draws important parallels between the agricultural and diamond 
markets in terms of defining what is meant by the relevant market. The Competition Tribunal also 
considered that when it comes to relevant market it will consider the national as well as international or 
world market influence of a particular participant. 
876 The insight provided by the decision of the tribunal being of assistance particularly in this work. 
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Limited.877 This case involved the consideration of a large merger between the 
De Beers Consolidated Mined Ltd (DBCM) and Anglovaal Mining Ltd, parties 
represented in the case. The Competition Tribunal granted this merger and 
issued a merger clearance certificate without conditions and the reasons for the 
decision appear in the discussion of facts and the decision of the tribunal. It is 
clear in this case how the tribunal undertook to consider the effects of this merger 
on market competition in order to show accountability to the diamond market and 
the laws pertaining to the prevention of the creation of monopolies so as to guard 
against negative effects of such a merger.878
 
 
The reasons for the tribunal’s decision in this case provide an important reflection 
of considerations and measures that the competition tribunal will take into 
account to ensure that there is no abuse of dominant position in diamond 
markets in South Africa. Further, the case will illustrate the unique position of the 
diamond industry in that if a particular firm already enjoys a position of power 
because of its success in the industry, such power will not be arbitrarily 
diminished provided that the firm is not engaging in any market dominance that 
raises public interest concerns. 
 
The merger transaction involved De Beers as the primary acquiring firm. The 
primary target firm was Saturn Partnership;879
                                                 
877 Case No: 36/LM/Mar00, Competition Tribunal of the Republic of South Africa. The clearance was 
given by the court on 15 may 2000 prior to some of the amendments expressed in the Diamonds Act 56 of 
1986 that have altered the methods of diamond trade in South Africa. 
 the merger meant that De Beers 
was to acquire the whole of Anglovaal Mining Limited’s interest in Saturn. The 
tribunal evaluated the merger by setting out the history behind the firms and the 
interests of De Beers as of 1980. It was shown from this background that in 1980 
South African Base Minerals Limited, owned mineral rights to a certain Venetia 
farm and had subsequently entered into an agreement with De Beers allowing 
De Beers exclusive prospecting rights for precious stones in the farm with a term 
878 Part 1, approval. 
 879 Saturn Partnership was a partnership between Anglovaal Mining Limited (which had an 87.5 per cent 
interest) and Industrial and Commercial Holdings Limited (ICH) which held the 12.5 per cent remainder 
interest in the partnership. 
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in the agreement that De Beers would establish a mine if a discovery on the farm 




De Beers discovered significant diamond deposits on the farm and established 
the Venetia mine. South African Base Minerals Ltd ceded the mineral rights to 
Saturn Mining, Prospecting and Development Company (Pty) Ltd. In 1996 Saturn 
Company sold the mineral rights to De Beers in return for a right to 50 per cent of 
the share of the pre-tax profits of the Venetia mine and this resulted in the 
structuring of the Saturn Partnership in question. As per agreement between the 
parties, Saturn holds a right to a 50 per cent share of the pre-tax profits of the 
Venetia diamond mine which is wholly owned by De Beers and Saturn is a 
channel for these profits and it conducts no other business except to collect 
profits on behalf of its partners.881
 
 
The tribunal determined the impact of competition firstly by establishing the 
relevant product market which the tribunal stated that it was a market which 
involved the production and sale of diamonds. The relevant geographic market 
was also identified clearly by the tribunal to be the production and international 
sale of diamonds by De Beers and other producers through the Central Selling 
Organization controlled by De Beers.882 With regard to impact on competition De 
beers contended that the transaction in question was no more than De Beers 
acquiring a greater stake in the royalty stream afforded by a mine that they 
already owned independently from Saturn.883
 
 
At the hearing, however, it emerged that the pre-merger control that De Beers 
alleged to have over the Venetia mine was not as well noted as contended in its 
submissions to the Commission. The true terms of the agreement between De 
                                                 
880 Part 4, background. 
881 Ibid. 
882 Note that the structure of diamond sale bodies has been significantly altered by the legislative 
amendments pertaining to Diamond Law. 
883 Part 6 – 8. 
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Beers and Saturn obligated De Beers to produce above certain levels for as long 
as Saturn remained in existence. De Beers had also made an offer to buy out 
Industrial and Commercial Holdings Limited (ICH) in order to allow De Beers to 
have 100 per cent interest in Saturn which would result in the dissolution thereof 
should such an offer be accepted by ICH. The effect of dissolving Saturn is that 
De Beers would not be limited by a contractual production constraint which 




It was held that in most industries, the fact that a merger gives rise to a dominant 
firm which has power to reduce production in one of the biggest producers might 
have a significant impact on the competition since control over production by a 
dominant producer is a classic manifestation of market power.  However the 
circumstances are unique in the diamond industry. De Beers already had much 
power in the industry through its control downstream over the marketing of 
diamonds via the Central Selling organization that it does not need unfettered 
control over production at the Venetia mine level to influence the market.885
 
 
It was held therefore in light of these circumstances before the tribunal that in the 
case of diamond competition, in this instance, removal of the constraining 
influence on production exercised by Saturn over De Beers had no material 
influence in the market for the production and sale of diamonds given the market 
power already enjoyed by De Beers downstream. Further, the merger in this 
case raised no public interest concerns as there would be no loss of employment 
to any parties resulting from this merger.886
 
 This decision reflects a value 
judgment in that the impact on the market was seen in light of how the merger 
would affect not only diamond production and sales but other socio-economic 
aspects of the merger particularly on the issue of employment of persons. 
                                                 
884 Part 9. Impact on Competition. 
885 Ibid. 
886 Part 10 – 11. 
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In South African law wrongful competition or unlawful competition is actionable 
as confirmed in the Constitutional court case of Phumelela Gaming & Leisure Ltd 
v Grundlingh & Others.887 It was established by the court in this case that any 
form of competition will pose a threat to rival business. However, not all 
competition or inference with property interests will constitute unlawful 
competition.888 The test to be applied in determining actionable competition is 
whether according to the legal convictions of the community the competition or 
the infringement on the goodwill is reasonable or fair when observed through the 
lenses of the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. Other factors that will 
be taken into account include the honesty and fairness of the conduct involved, 
the morals of the trade sector involved, the protection afforded by existing 
positive laws, the importance of competition on the South African economic 
system, the question as to whether parties are competitors in the first place, 
conventions with other countries and the motive of the actor.889
 
 
The test established by the court in this case forms an important basis for 
ensuring that the South African economic system promotes free trade while 
simultaneously sustains what can be termed an ‘athletic competition economy’ 
which has room for all competing parties, that being, the gold medalist, the silver 
medalist and the bronze medalist and the finalists all forming part of the 
competition and al being able to perform at their best. Further, the principles 
established in the court in this case were observed by the undertakings in the 
Alrosa Company Ltd v Commission of the European Communities890 as through 
out the process no malice was detected on the part of the undertakings.891
                                                 
887 2007 (6) SA 350 (CC). 
 
888 361 G – H; 362 A. The court further clarified this point by explaining that the role of the common law in 
the field of unlawful competition is to determine the limits of what constitutes unlawful competition. 
889 362 B – D.  
890 T-170/06. The Court of First Instance of the European Communities (Fourth Chamber, Extended 
Composition) (11 July 2007). 
891 Further reading on the South African legal position on competition Laws, see Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa Act, 1996, Matthews v Young 1922 AD 492,  Kruger v Coetzee 1966 (2) SA 428 
(A), Atlas Organic Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v Pikkewyn Ghwano (Pty) Ltd 1978 (4) SA 696 (T), Schultz v Butt 
1986 (3) SA 667 (A), Elida Gibbs (Pty) Ltd v Colgate Palmolive (Pty) Ltd 1988 (2) SA 350 (W), Taylor 
and Horne (Pty) Ltd v Dentall (Pty) Ltd 1991 (1) SA 412 (A), Dress Designs (Pty) Ltd v GY Lounge Suite 
 227 
 
It is important to note that similar to market effects and market assessments 
required of the Commission in the European Union context in competition 
regulation, South African law also requires that submissions pertaining to the 
relevant market and convincing evidence of the ‘scale of economies’ in terms of 
the Competition Act892 before a competition Tribunal is able to take a decision.893
 
 
The principles established in this case illustrate important relevance to diamond 
sales and one of those principles is that diamond producers have an ability to 
participate freely in the markets subject to general principles of freedom of 
contract as long as such exercise of freedom in the market does not permit a 
violation of other participant’s rights to freely compete in the naturally competitive 
sales environment. What the law demonstrates above is that in South Africa 
there no longer exists a diamond monopoly. 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter forms a crucial market case study aspect of South African diamond 
regulations and in particular diamond trade. It is respectfully submitted that it is 
important to discuss laws pertaining to an industry such as diamond mining while 
making reference to the practical legal contributions made by De Beers. De 
Beers Group has had a significant impact on the history of diamond trade in 
South Africa and even in modern times it is still a powerful diamond trading entity 
that continues to participate meaningfully to the Constitutionally inspired 
democratically sound diamond laws. This chapter has established the reasons 
for acknowledging the presence of De Beers in South Africa has been beneficial 
and critical to the country’s diamond mining industry and the economy at large. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd & Another 1991 (2) SA 455 (W), Payen Components SA Ltd v Bovic Gaskets CC 
& Others 1994 (2) SA 464, Van Heerden and Neethling P. Unlawful Competition 1 ed, Lexis Nexis 
Butterworths (1995), Van Heerden and Neethling P. Unlawful Competition 2 ed, Lexis Nexis Butterworths 
(2008) 78, Neethling P. and Visser Law of Delict 5 ed, Lexis Nexis Butterworths (2006). 
892 89 of 1998 section 8(d)(i). 
893 Competition Act 89 of 1998 section 8(d)(i). 2007 (6) SA 350 (CC). 
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What has emerged from this chapter is the practical understanding of past and 
modern laws of diamond trade as interpreted by the courts both national and 
foreign. These cases are important to the understating of the peculiarities of the 
diamond industry. The chapter also outlines the significant contributions of De 
Beers’s structures in the form of the DTC and DTSA who have been instrumental 
juristic persons in the raising of revenue for the economy of South Africa as 
publicly accounted for in the group’s financial reports and reviews. Further, De 
Beers are actively involved in wealth sharing through BEE initiatives and other 
social responsibility programmes. 
 
Though De Beers are only expected to be responsible for their own mines, they 
have been leaders in many areas of diamond trade and their contribution must 
not go without notice in a diamond regulations law contribution. 
 
Further, the influence of De Beers on the development of diamond laws must be 
studied in order to note that though De Beers is a dominant force in socio-
economic and socio-legal spheres, through studying their influence on the courts 
in litigation it becomes evident that South Africa is developing more sound 
principles for achieving justice in the Republic as noted in the case of De Beers 
Consolidated Mines Ltd v Ataqua Mining (Pty) Ltd and Others.894
 
 For this reason 
De Beers influence on diamond laws and regulations should be applauded as it 
has richly expanded the knowledge base of the commercial laws pertaining to 
diamond mining. 
It is important to mention that though the decisions considered herein may 
pertain to laws that may have subsequently been repealed or amended, the body 
of precedent remaining for consideration still forms a rich source of knowledge of 
how courts have applied laws pertaining to diamond regulations in South Africa 
                                                 
894 Case Number: 3215/06 in the High Court of South Africa (Orange Free State Provincial Division), 
judgment delivered on 13 December 2007. 
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particularly where a monopoly is involved. In terms of the Competition Act895
 
 
monopolies are highly discouraged in South African law particularly in light of 
private business as the law is moving toward opening up more equitable access 
to many of the South African markets. Therefore anti-competitive behavior is the 
mischief to be curbed in South African law in the Constitutional order. This 
means that the laws themselves have changes to reflect equitable principles 
particularly on the point of fair diamond markets.  
Further Constitutional and humane diamond trading is evident in the De Beers 
ethos where principles such as ubuntu are at the core of their business strategies 
for dealing with their working environments. De Beers in the Constitutional 
dispensation demonstrate a commitment to environmental sustainability in their 
mining activities by adhering to the rules of law pertaining to environmental 
safety, conservation and rehabilitation, while also upholding worker’s rights by 
ensuring the safety of their staff. Further, it has also been established in case law 
that when a mine is to be closed or mining activities are proposed De Beers do 
effectively engage with the affected and interested communities all to ensure that 
principles of fairness and human dignity are respected. In conclusion it has 
emerged that diamond trade daily activities have been significantly altered by the 
developed Constitutional laws that uphold humane diamond trade in South 
Africa. 
                                                 
895  89 of 1998. 
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Chapter 4: Private International Law/Conflict of Laws and Diamond Trade 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Having established that diamond sales often have an international trade aspect 
to them, it is important to determine in such circumstances the law which is likely 
to be applied to such transactions in case of a legal dispute involving a foreign 
law element.896 States in the Third World group produce and export their 
diamonds among themselves and/or between each other. These States have 
looked for markets in First World States on account of the high prices which 
these First World States are willing to pay for diamonds as a result of their 
stronger currencies. The other reason is that most diamond mining companies in 
developing states are owned and operated by multinational companies 
incorporated in the First World States.897
 
 As a result of this regime, international 
trade in diamonds will constantly have a foreign law element. 
This chapter seeks to capture the Constitutional898 goal of having due regard to 
international law and foreign law when interpreting national law.899 Free and 
equitable trade and trade practices,900 equality before the law901
                                                 
896 See cases with foreign law element, for example, the case of Laurens NO v Von Hone 1993 (2) SA 104 
(W), Marcard Stein & Co v Port Marine Contractors (Pty) Ltd and Others 1995 (3) SA 663 (A), Society of 
Lloyd’s v Price; Society of Lloyd’s v Lee 2006 (5) SA 393 (SCA). 
 and application 
of legal principles that uphold such values are important aspects of the law on 
private international law. This chapter will show how the courts in South Africa 
have taken decisions that reflect the Constitutional values and these are directly 
relevant to the diamond industry. This chapter will show the importance of 
looking to international law for best practices in matters of private international 
law. 
897 The World Bank, Washington DC, USA World Bank. World Development Indicators (2001) 396. An 
example of such a diamond trading multi-national is Anglo-American. 
898 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996 section 39 and section 233. 
899 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996 section 233 which provides for the application of 
international law and states as follows: ‘When interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any 
reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with international law over any alternative 
interpretation that is inconsistent with international law. 
900 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996 section 22 and 23. 
901 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996 section 9. 
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The traditional diamond trading routes and relationships resemble a colonial 
hangover since most former colonies export to former colonizers. Diamond 
producing entities have also sought to benefit from advanced financial and 
transport and communication systems servicing first world trading routes and 
markets. It would for instance be cheaper and more convenient for Côte D’Ivoire 
to export diamonds to France, its former colonial master than for the same 
country to export to Armenia.902
 
 
Be that as it may, diamond trade transactions may involve more than one State 
entity. This means diamond trade transactions may involve more than one legal 
regulatory framework particularly when considering that various States may be 
involved. These States may be involved in providing transport systems, banking 
and financial services, insurance, airports, personnel, markets and storage 
facilities. The involvement of various legal systems brings into the picture the 
aspect of conflict of laws in diamond trade transactions. 
 
Conflict of laws essentially refers to the body of rules within a national legal 
system that local courts would select as appropriate to govern disputes with a 
foreign element.903
(i)  which court has jurisdiction to resolve the dispute; 
  Conflict of laws is therefore not supranational and therefore 
not similar to public international law, it is not a legal system regulating the 
relations between States but implies the assessment of a body of rules in a 
national legal framework in order that the most appropriate rules can be selected 
to govern and resolve a dispute. Conflict of laws is part of the private law of each 
country that deals with cases with a foreign element. Unlike public international 
law, private individuals are involved and not State entities. Three main issues 
involved in conflict of laws are; 
                                                 
902 This is because there are already pre-existing trade usages and trends that make it almost natural for 
such a state to continue to export according to this trend. 
903 Forsyth C.F Private International Law 4 ed (2003) 3; 5. 
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(i) choice of law which that court will apply and that would 
govern the dispute; 
(ii)  recognition and enforcement of the judgment.904
 
 
Diamond trade transactions constitute a significant part of international trade and 
commerce. Disputes that arise in this field are replete with foreign elements and 
questions involving conflict of laws ultimately arise.  It is therefore unlikely that a 
discussion of diamond trade could exclude conflict of laws. This chapter will 
discuss conflict of laws in relation to international commercial and sales 
agreements involving diamonds. 
 
4.2 The Nature of Diamond Trade Transactions 
Diamond trade transactions are not difficult to regulate when they involve for 
instance South African citizens resident in South Africa and where the cause of 
action arose in South Africa and the country is also the place of business for 
these parties. The South African courts would ordinarily have jurisdiction and 
South African law such as the Diamonds Act905
 
 would be applicable. The 
judgments would also be enforceable in South Africa. Complications arise where 
the dispute involves one or both parties who are neither citizens nor permanently 
resident in South Africa. Further, some difficulties would arise where it is not 
clear where the cause of action arose and there is no specific legal system 
selected as the proper law of the contractual agreement. 
Since diamond transactions are by nature marked by contractual agreements of 
commercial nature this part of this chapter will be limited to giving a general 
overview of conflict of laws in such relevant contractual scenarios where conflict 
of laws would arise. This means that this chapter will be branded by commercial 
considerations and scenarios that may commonly characterize diamond trade 
transactions. It is submitted that this understanding of conflict of laws as related 
                                                 
904 O’Brien S. Smith’s Conflict of Laws Cavendish 2 ed (1988) 315 – 324.  
905 56 of 1986. 
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to the diamond industry can be useful for application in other areas of commerce 
as well as making an essential academic contribution to other areas of 
international trade. 
 
4.2.1 International Contractual Relationships 
A number of common law rules that govern international contractual agreements. 
Some of these rules have found way into international conventions that seek to 
codify common rules to apply when a court is determining choice of law to apply 
to cases with a foreign element. Important rules that courts refer to when a 
contractual case with a foreign element has come before them include lex loci 
contractus (law of the place of contracting), lex loci solutionis (law of place of 
performance) lex monetae (law in whose currency the debt is expressed).906
 
 
Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Efroiken & Newman907 is an example of a 
decision where the appeal court investigated various legal systems as expressed 
in the forms above. This case illustrates that the choice of law as applied by the 
forum court is capable of bringing about an outcome that may effectively nullify a 
contract as a result of a technicality that may be present in one system of law 
and absent in another system of law.908
 
 The courts have had to re-consider the 
approach to choice of law and the latest guidelines reveal that the choice of law 
must take into account good relations with other States involved in the matter. 
In the context of diamond trade contracts, this would imply the law of the country 
where the contract was made, or law of the place where the contract was 
performed. Usually diamond contracts express monetary obligations in the US 
                                                 
906 Forsyth C.F. Private International Law 4 ed (2003) 4, 5 – 11.  
907 1924 AD 171 p 173 where the court stated as follows in its investigation: ‘When a contract is to be 
performed by an agent in another country it must be interpreted according to the law in force in that other 
country and the construction of documents. Even if the contract is partly to be performed in one country 
and partly in another, each part must be performed according to the country of performance.’ See Edwards 
A.B. as updated by Kahn E. Conflict of Laws: Contract Volume 2(2) Law of South Africa (2003) par. 328. 
908 Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Efroiken & Newman 1924 AD 171 p 186 - 191. The court 
considered the law of the place of performance as well as the intention of the parties and found that the 
proper law to be applied in this case was American law and in terms of that law the contract was not 
properly performed. 
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dollar albeit without necessarily intending that the contract be governed by US 
law. It is important to note that most of these rules apply where the contract does 
not specify the proper law to govern it.  
 
Notwithstanding these positions, it is submitted that the proper law of the contract 
is one chosen by the parties or if this is not chosen, the law with which the 
contract is most closely connected.909 Only where the choice of both parties to 
the contract does not provide any useful guidance as to the proper law to govern 
the contract will the courts seek to assign to the contract a chosen law in 
accordance with the above stated maxims and others.910 The courts would in the 
main weigh the factual links between the contractual agreement and the various 
relevant legal systems. The one ordinarily applicable as the proper law would be 




4.2.2 Passing of Ownership: Movable Property and the Lex Situs Principle 
As in any ordinary contract of sale, passing of ownership and risk in the 
commodity subject to the sale contract also arises in international diamond sale 
agreements. Diamonds are movable property and any case dealing with passing 
of ownership and risk in South African law of sale is a useful guide as to how 
local courts are likely to consider disputes in this area. 
 
Conflict of laws regarding ownership of movable property was considered by the 
court in the case of Marcard Stein & Co v Port Marine Contractors (Pty) Ltd and 
Others.912
                                                 
909 Forsyth C.F. Private International Law 4 ed (2003) 294 - 295. 
 In this case the issue that arose was which system of law governs the 
910 Ibid. 
911 Morris J. H. C. The Conflict of Laws 3 ed (1984) 234. 
912 1995 (3) SA 663 (A), See also Ultisol Transport Contractors Ltd v Bouygues Offshore 1996 (1) SA 487 
(C), Epol (EDMS) BPK v Sentraal-Oos (KOÖPERATIEF) BPK en Andere 1997 (1) SA 505 (O), Nedcor 
Bank Ltd v ABSA Bank Ltd 1998 (2) SA 830 (W), MT Argun Sheriff of Cape Town v MT Argun , her 
Owners and All the persons Interested in her and Others; Sheriff of Cape Town and Another v MT Argun, 
her Owners and All persons interested in her and Another 2001 (3) SA 1230 (SCA), MV Mega Section 
Bridge Oil Ltd v Fund Constituting Proceeds of the sale of the MV Mega section (Formely MV Aksu) and 
Others 2007 (3) SA 202 (C). The case of Marcard Stein & Co v Port Marine Contractors (Pty) Ltd and 
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transfer of ownership of a ship. This case is also useful in illustrating the 
application of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act913 in a scenario involving 
conflict of laws.914
 
 The creditor in this case was a German Bank, Marcard Stein & 
Co (Marcard Stein). This bank submitted a claim based on a cession to it of the 
claim of London Steamship. The alternative claim was based on a mortgage 
bond registered over the vessel in favour of Marcard Stein for US $ 16, 5 million 
on 1 June 1992.  
Marcard Stein objected to the claims of other creditors on the ground that on 29 
May 1992 the then owner of the vessel, Verena Shipping Co (Verena) sold the 
vessel by bill of sale executed in London to Alvo Shipping Co Ltd (Alvo). The 
referee unable to deal with the issues arising from the alleged sale and delivery 
of the vessel sought to obtain a ruling by the court thereon. This resulted in six of 
the creditors who had proved claims against the fund making an application to 
the trial court for an order inter alia, that the sums claimed by them be paid to 
them from the fund.915
 
 
 The court a quo found that the applicants had made out a case for the relief 
which they sought and granted the order. However, with leave of court a quo 
Marcard Stein appealed to the Appellate Division seeking a reversal of the 
decision of the court a quo citing as respondents the six applicants and the fund. 
The appeal court stated that the case before it hinged on the basic question of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Others has been discussed in depth in this chapter as it reflects the most current position that reflects the 
sentiments of most national and international jurisdictions when choosing the most appropriate system of 
law in cases involving international sales. Therefore this case forms a classic example of guidelines for the 
selection of proper law particularly in commercial transactions that affect and are most pertinent to 
diamond trade. 
913 105 of 1983 section 6 in particular which is a section dealing with the law to be applied in admiralty 
matters. 
914 The facts of the case are that a corporation known as London Steamship Owners Mutual Insurance 
Association Ltd (London Steamship) arrested the vessel MV Gulf Trader on 20 May 1992 while she was 
berthed in the East London Harbour in pursuance to an action in rem instituted by the corporation for the 
payment of a sum of US $ 870 048, 89 in respect of an unspecified maritime claim. The name of the vessel 
was subsequently changed to the MV Vicky. Again on 23 May 1992 the same vessel was arrested at the 
instance of another company Gulf & Continental Bunker Fuels Co Ltd (Gulf & Continental) in an action 
for the recovery of US $35 625, 00  for the supply of bunkers during April 1992.914 
915 666 E - G. 
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whether in law the execution of a bill of sale by itself (without delivery) resulted in 
the ownership of the ship MV Gulf Trader aka MV Vicky passing from Verena to 
Alvo. 
  
In dealing with this question the court extensively dealt with the concept of 
passing of ownership in corporeal movable property and conflict of laws916 with 
the result that the application was dismissed with costs as was clearly outlined by 




 In his judgment, Corbett CJ declared that it is a fundamental principle of South 
African common law that ownership in corporeal movable property does not pass 
by virtue of a contract of sale alone. A proper delivery of the goods of contractual 
description must be made to the purchaser. However when a South African court 
exercises its admiralty jurisdiction, as it was in this case, it is required to apply 
English admiralty law including relevant principles of English private international 
law. It was agreed by all parties that in terms of English domestic law that ‘a ship 
is regarded as a personal chattel (any tangible movable property) and that a bill 
of sale, duly sealed, signed and delivered would have caused the property in the 
vessel to pass to the purchaser and delivery was not necessary.’918
 
 
On the basis of these facts, the court held that the general principle of English 
private international law to be applied to the transfer of corporeal movable 
property is the lex situs. This means the law to be applied is the law of the place 
where the property is to be found at the time of the transaction in question (in this 
case, South African law).919
                                                 
916 667 A. 
 The actual situs of the vessel was established in this 
917 673 H. 
918 667 B - D The court also took notice that the law of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas applied to the 
same effect. 
919 667 F. 
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case as the vessel was not on the high seas but located at the East London 
harbour for at least nine or ten days at the time of the sale.920
 
 
It was held by the court that there are five reasons for choosing the lex situs as 
choice of law in English law this instance, mainly:921
 
  
‘1. That the rule refers the passing of ownership to the 
system of law  
pertaining to the jurisdiction which has effective power over 
the property in question. 
2.  That the rule is normally simple to apply and makes for 
certainty in that it does not lead to multiple solutions since 
the property can only be in one place at a time. 
3.  That it satisfies the expectations of the reasonable man, 
for a party to a transfer naturally concludes that the 
transaction will be subject to the law of the country in which 
the subject-matter is at present situated. 
4.  That property passes at the place where the goods 
themselves are.  
5.  That commercial convenience imperatively demands that 
proprietary rights to movables shall generally be determined 
by the lex situs.’ 
 
With regard to the question of delivery, the court held that in order to transfer 
ownership in a res or chattel by way of constitutum possessorium there should 
exist an agreement to the effect that the transferor should hold the property in 




                                                 
920 672 A. 
921 670 B. 
922 673 A. 
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4.2.3 Diamond Sales and the Lex Situs 
The principle of passing of ownership in the context of international trade applies 
in case of any other chattel including diamond sales. However, the location of a 
diamond at the time of sale cannot stricti sensu be compared to that of a ship 
even though diamonds are also registered for trade purposes. This is because 
diamonds are personal chattel and more capable of being easily located for the 
purposes of sale and passing of ownership and therefore they do not require an 
artificial situs. It is submitted that the situation may be different where the 
diamonds are being sold while en voyage and being sold via a negotiable bill of 
lading. However, the important aspect of diamond sales in the context of 
international trade is that the lex situs923
 
 is the system of law to be applied when 
diamonds are being sold. 
The concept of lex situs was confirmed in Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co 
Ltd v Custodian of Enemy Property,924 Boyd v CIR925
 
 where it was confirmed by 
the court in both cases that respect of shares (which are incorporeal movable 
property and are not capable of physical location) that for all purposes in law a 
bearer share is ‘situated’ at the place where the company is incorporated. A 
share which is registered in the name of a member in the register of members is 
‘situated’ at the place where such a register is kept. 
4.3 Prescription of Claims and Debts 
The prescription of debts is an important area in conflict of laws which affects 
international trade, whether such trade involves diamonds or any other 
commodity. A debt created must be brought into the jurisdiction of a court for 
enforcement within the prescribed period or such a debt prescribes.926
                                                 
923 Utisol Transport Contractors Ltd v Bouygues Offshore and Another 1996 (1) SA 487 (C) confirmed this 
position. 
 Each 
jurisdiction has its own unique system of law for determining the period. Diamond 
924 1923 AD 576. 
925 1951 (3) SA 525 (A). 
926 In South African shipping law, which upholds the Hague-Visby Rules claims based on bills of lading 
must be enforced within a year to avoid prescription of such claims. 
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dealers must be aware of the periods of prescription that may affect their 
commercial transactions in the context of international trade. This international 
trade law question involving a conflict of law aspect was settled by the Supreme 
Court of Appeal in two matters heard together referred to as Society of Lloyd’s v 
Price; Society of Lloyd’s v Lee.927
 
 These two appeals heard together as one case 
will form an essential in providing guidelines as to the system of law to be applied 
in matters of determining the prescription period in international trade 
transactions. 
It was heard on appeal that a provisional sentence summons alleged that the 
English court was a court of competent jurisdiction because the original contract 
of insurance in question had made English law to be applicable to the 
agreement.928 The plea was three pronged namely, (1) that Lloyd’s claims had 
become prescribed by virtue of the provisions of the South African Prescription 
Act,929 (2) that the English court did not have international jurisdiction in terms of 
South African law to grant judgments and (3) that it would be against public 
policy as determined by South African courts to recognize and enforce the 
judgments in South Africa. The court a quo judge had taken the view that Lloyd’s 
claims had prescribed and as a result refrained from making any findings on 
point (2) or (3) above.930
 
 
On the issue of prescription it must be noted that the claims (embodied in the 
provisional sentence summons) were based on default judgments issued by the 
English court more than three years but less than six years. The defendants were 
                                                 
927 2006 (5) SA 393 (SCA). This case discussed the via media approach to conflict of laws which was 
earlier considered in Laurens NO v Von Hone 1993 (2) SA 104 (W). It is submitted that this approach 
contributes to the more amicable co-existence of States in commerce in global trade. It works in a manner 
that can be summarized as follows by commercial men and women, “Yes, all States have their unique way 
of conducting matters and making decisions but how does one find the best way forward in light of all these 
legal system conflicts seeing that nations are required by trade laws to co-exist and co-operate?” The via 
media approach then steps in to suggest the best system of law that will be most equitable in the 
circumstances. 
928 397 B. 
929 68 of 1969. 
930 399 A-C. 
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served with the summons in South Africa. Lloyds argued that English law ought 
to apply to determine the issue of prescription in terms of the English Limitation 
Act,931 which provided that an action cannot be brought upon any judgment after 
the expiration of six years from the date on which the judgment became 
enforceable. It also provided further that no arrears of interest in respect of any 
judgment debt shall be recoverable after the expiration of six years from the date 
on which such interest became due.932
 
 
In terms of the South African Prescription Act,933 which the respondents argued 
ought to apply, the claims would have prescribed after the lapse of three years 
unless the judgments of the English courts were deemed to be judgment debts. 
In such a case the prescriptive period would be thirty years.934
 
 The court of 
appeal dealt with the special plea of prescription by considering firstly the 
question of which system of law between the two ought to apply to determine the 
question of prescription.  
According to the appeal judge in this case, Van Heerden JA, the via media 
approach was useful since it was developmental in nature and is acceptable in 
the area of private international law. He therefore took the view that the South 
African Prescription Act935
                                                 
931 1980 section 24. 
 is one which is substantive in nature, and therefore 
not one to be determined according to the lex fori. Further by taking the via 
media approach to this conflict of laws, the appeal court was able to consider all 
sources of conflict in law (both the lex fori and the lex causae) and guided by 
policy to determine the most flexible and sensitive manner as to which law was 
applicable. In answering this question the court stated that in terms of South 
African private international law procedural matters are governed by domestic 
law of the country where the matter is being heard, (the lex fori). However, 
matters of substantive law are governed by the law which applies to the 
932 399 C - F. 
933 Act 68 of 1969. 
934 399 F - G. 
935 68 of 1969. 
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underlying transaction or occurrence, also known as proper law or lex causae. 
This principle is the same under English law.936
 
  
The court of appeal in making the decision as to the law to be applied warned 
against the bias in favour of the lex fori but advised that a court should follow the 
via media approach which is aimed at serving individual justice, equity, 
convenience with consideration for international harmony in disputes with an 
international character.937
 
 With these considerations in mind it was held by the 
court that harmony of law suggests that claims which are alive and enforceable in 
terms of the law of the country under which such claims arose (in this case 
English law) should also be enforceable in South Africa. It was stated that the 
legal system which has the closest and most real connection with the agreement 
should be chosen and be applicable.  
The court of appeal also denied the application of the lex fori on the basis that 
the provisional sentence summons was not a matter of procedural execution, as 
argued by defendant’s counsel, but a means of obtaining an enforceable 
judgment on the basis of an English judgment already obtained. In effect the 
provisional sentence worked as a second judgment.938 Therefore as a result the 
court found that the lex causae was applicable in this case with the result that the 
English Limitation Act939 was applicable. In terms of the English Limitation Act,940  
the provisional sentence summonses were not prescribed as they were brought 
within the six year period contemplated in the Act.941
 
 
It is submitted that the appeal court in this matter correctly applied the via media 
approach. As re-iterated by Van Heerden JA in concurrence with Van Zyl J in a 
                                                 
936 399 G. 
937 404 F. 
938 406 D. 
939 1980. 
940 1980. 
941 406 F. 
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similar case of Laconian Maritime Enterprises Ltd v Agromar Lineas Ltd942 where 
the matter dealt with the plea of res judicata943 parties have agreed that the law 
applicable to their respective transactions is English law, this means that they 
also agreed that the rules relating to procedure would be the lex fori.However, 
the effect of this is that parties may inadvertently in case of prescription rules 
agree to a situation where their rights continue to exist under the English law but 
become extinguished when the lex fori procedural law is applied. It was stated by 
the court that this cannot be said to be what the parties intended.944
 
  
The application of the lex causae prescription rule in this case gave rise to an 
equitable and just conclusion. It was also stated by the appeal court that 
provisional sentence is an established procedure for enforcing foreign judgments 
                                                 
942 1986 (3) SA 509 (D) 510 C - F. In this case the court stated the following principles: ‘the general rule of 
South African private international law was that classification was done in terms of the lex fori and, as there 
were no grounds for departing from the rule in the present case, it had to be applied. Further, in regard to 
the classification of the rules relating to the operation of res judicata that the court had to distinguish 
between rules of procedural law and rules of substantive law, the former being governed by the lex fori and 
the latter by the lex causae: it was however generally accepted and logical that the rules relating to res 
judicata were characterised as procedural and therefore governed by the lex fori. Further, that the 
proceedings in the US Court did not involve the same subject-matter as the present proceedings: the US 
Court was asked to recognise and enforce the award in terms of its legislation whereas the present Court 
was asked to enforce the arbitration award in terms of its legislation which differed from the US legislation, 
inter alia, in that it had no provision limiting recognition to awards made within three years prior to 
commencement of the proceedings.’ 
943Makhanya v University of Zululand 2010 (1) SA 62 (SCA) 71 par 27 C where the court stated that a 
claim which falls within the concurrent jurisdiction of both the High Court and a special court could not be 
brought in both courts. A litigant who did that would be confronted in one court by either a plea of lis 
pendens (the claim is pending in another court) or by a plea of res judicata (the claim has been disposed of 
by the other court). A claimant who has a claim that is capable of being considered by either of two courts 
that have concurrent jurisdiction must necessarily choose in which court to pursue the claim and, once 
having made that election, will not be able to bring the same claim before the other court. But where a 
person has two separate claims, each for enforcement of a different right, the position is altogether 
different, because then both claims will be capable of being pursued, simultaneously or sequentially, either 
both in one court, or each in one of those courts. See Res judicata is Latin for stating that ‘the matter has 
been decided’. It refers to the principle that a final judgement of a competent court is conclusive upon the 
parties in any subsequent litigation involving the same cause of action 
http://www.lectlaw.com/def2/q036.htm 09 March 2010.  
Laconian Maritime Enterprises Ltd v Agromar Lineas Ltd 1986 (3) SA 509 (D) 518 B, 521 B and 521 E 
where the court held that the plea of res judicata is a procedural point which must be decided according to 
the lex fori. 
944 Society of Lloyd’s v Price; Society of Lloyd’s v Lee 2006 (5) SA 393 (SCA).407 A - C. 
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in South Africa. In this case, the foreign judgment is not directly enforceable but 
constitutes a cause of action that is actionable in South African.945
 
 
The requirements that have to be met to qualify enforcement of a foreign 
judgment is that the court which pronounced such a judgment must have had 
jurisdiction to do so in terms of South African law, that the judgment is final and 
conclusive in that it must not have been superannuated. It must also not be 
contras bonos mores and it must not be fraudulently obtained. Further, it must 
not involve the enforcement of a penal or revenue laws of a foreign State, the 
enforcement of such a judgment must not be precluded in terms of the Protection 
of Businesses Act,946 as amended.947 The court investigated each of these 
requirements in depth and found that the English judgments were sound in law. It 
was held that the judgments were enforceable by way of provisional sentence 
and the appeals were upheld with costs.948
 
 
This case is extremely useful in matters particularly where a gap exists even after 
an enquiry as to the possible applicable systems of law. The main guidance 
proposed by this decision is to consider the system of law most real and closely 
connected to the dispute in question. It is submitted that the closest system of 
law approach coincides with the rationale behind the lex situs approach. On the 
other hand it is arguable that this is just another technical legal reneging by the 
courts where they refuse to commit to a system of law in the name of 
accommodating international harmony. The outcome of this case would have 
been the same if the lex causae was chosen without a long winded debate about 
procedural or substantive issues of prescription. Ultimately the lex causae was 
the most appropriate law to be applied in this case by any standard. 
 
 
                                                 
945 407 G - I. 
946 99 of 1978. 
947 408 A - C. 
948 414 H. 
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4.3.1 International Conventions 
4.3.1.1 The Rome Convention949
Unlike other fields in public law such as criminal law or human rights law, conflict 
of laws falls in the private branch of the law where very little international activity 
has occurred leading to international instruments or conventions. A notable 
international instrument is the 1980 Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Contractual Obligations. This Convention was originally thought to be restricted 
in application to States in the   European Economic Commission only as these 
are the Contracting States. However, one scholarly view reveals that the 
Convention is universally applicable and these views are based on interpretation 





The Convention’s current structure though makes it impossible for countries in 
other regions to be Member States thereby precluding them from directly being 
bound by the Rome Convention. South Africa is accordingly not party to this 
Convention in as much as it would wish its provisions to be applicable to it. 
Nevertheless it acknowledges its provisions and may borrow heavily from its text 
for interpreting conflict of laws situations. 
 
Article 2 of the Rome Convention provides that any law specified by this 
Convention shall be applied whether or not it is the law of a Contracting State.  
According to O’Brien, the Rome Convention can be applied to parties who are 
residents, domiciles or nationals of non Contracting States but involved in a 
dispute being heard in a Contracting State. The Convention would therefore 
apply for instance in a dispute between a Japanese corporate entity and a South 
African company provided the dispute is being heard in any of the Contracting 
states. The Convention essentially codifies commonly known choice of law rules 
and these are not different from the Roman-Dutch positions that most countries 
apply in their legal systems. 
                                                 
949 The 1980 Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations. 
950 O’Brien S. Smith’s Conflict of Laws Cavendish 2 ed (1988) 239. 
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The Convention therefore makes provision for such important issues such as 
party autonomy in choosing the proper law of the contract,951 what should be 
done where there is a tacit choice of law by the parties,952 and where there is no 
express or tacit choice of law.953 The Convention also provides for the application 
of ‘mandatory rules’ with which the law of the country has a close connection and 
these are applicable after regard is had to their nature, purpose and 
consequences upon application or non application.954 A further core provision of 
the Convention is that it does not allow for the chosen law to deprive the other 
party of legal protections afforded him by mandatory rules of the law of the 
country of his habitual residence.955
 
 
At this stage it is relevant to consider the implications of the articles explained 
above. Article 3 as a whole is important to the respect of freedom of contract and 
equity in contracts as it permits parties to settle conflict of laws by selecting the 
law to govern the contract in which they are entering into. Article 3(2) provides for 
even an even more flexible approach by making a provision that parties may 
select an alternative system of law to govern the contract subject to normal 
guidelines to protect the validity of the contract for all concerned as provided for 
within the confines of the Convention. 
 
Article 4(1) is important in resolving the conflict of laws issue in the case where a 
choice of law has not been made by parties in terms of Article 3. Article 4 
provides that the law to be applied in such a situation is that which is closely 
connected with the contract. This is the same standard for determining applicable 
law as established in South African law. Article 4(3) provides expressly that if the 
contract involves immovable property, it is presumed that the contract is most 
                                                 
951 Article 3 (1), see also C.F. Private International Law 4 ed (2003) 298 - 300 for a detailed discussion of 
this concept. 
952 Article 4 (1) and (2). 
953 Ibid. 
954 Article 7. 
955 Article 5 (2).  
 246 
closely connected with the country where the property is situated. Clearly the 
Convention provides a cogent code for conflict of laws that resembles the 
approach that has been adopted by South African courts in most cases that 
relate to the question of conflict of laws. 
 
Article 5 of the Convention deals with contracts whose object is the supply of 
goods and services to a particular person or consumer for a purpose which can 
be regarded as being outside his or her trade or profession, or a contract for the 
provision of credit for that object. This type of transaction is obviously prevalent in 
international diamond trade, particularly where goods have been purchased by a 
consumer on credit, as a basic example. The Article 5(2) provide that 
notwithstanding the provisions pertaining to choice of law in the Convention, this 
will not be permitted to operate in such a way that it deprives the consumer the 
protection afforded to him or her by the mandatory rules of the law of the country 
in which he or she habitually resides. Once again this is an illustration of a code 
that has respect for equity considerations. 
 
Generally the Rome Convention represents a positive development in the field of 
international trade law insofar as it marked by international contractual 
agreements and transactions. It is an attempt to promote uniformity in the law 
governing contractual agreements and codifies some of the most important rules. 
The fact that the Convention is not limited to Contracting States is also important 
since it would increasingly become universally applicable and acceptable to the 
international community. In itself the Rome Convention facilitates international 
diamond trading and makes the regulatory framework more clear, predictable 
and transparent. 
 
4.3.1.2 Convention on the Limitation Period in International Sale of Goods 
It is important for any analysis of diamond regulations law to consider 
prescription in international sales in light of the Convention on the Limitation 
Period in International Sale of Goods or Limitation Convention (New York, 1974) 
 247 
as amended by the 1980 Protocol (Vienna, 1980). Both entered into force 
together on 1 August 1988.956
 
 
It is important to note at the outset that the Limitation Convention, 1974 does not 
form part of South African law in that South Africa has neither acceded to nor 
ratified such Convention. It is nevertheless useful in the context of diamond 
regulations law as diamonds are subject to international sale transactions 
involving South African companies or entities. Thus the Convention may be 
considered by South African courts where matters of prescription or limitation as 
provided for in the language of the Convention arise. 
 
 In a country with active international sales as covered by the Limitation 
Convention, 1974 it is natural that the international instrument governing such 
transactions be considered as it may provide guidance on choice of law rules 
applicable to such issues as prescription Further, if the Convention proves not to 
be a red herring in South African law, then it should be made part of South 
African domestic legislation. 
 
The Limitation Convention, 1974 arose from a belief that an adherence to 
uniform rules governing the prescriptive period in international sale of goods will 
contribute to the improvement of world trade that clearly included diamond 
trade.957 The Convention directly applies to situations where the buyer and 
sellers’ claims against one another arising out of an international sale contract 
cannot be enforced by reason of the expiration of a period of time whether such 
claims arise out of a breach, termination or invalidity of such contract.958
 
 
                                                 




957 Preamble.  
958 Part I Article I substantive provisions and sphere of application of the Convention. 
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Article 3 of the Convention provides that the Limitation Convention, 1974 shall 
apply only in circumstances where at the time of conclusion of the contract the 
parties’ places of business are situated in Contracting States or if conflicts of 
laws rules dictate that the law of the Contracting State is applicable.959 This 
would be a typical case where a South African court determining an international 
sale contract may be compelled to apply the provisions of the Limitation 
Convention, 1974 as provided by this provision. On the other hand it is open to 
parties to exclude the application of the Limitation Convention, 1974 if they so 
wish in terms of article 3(2).960
 
  
The Limitation Convention, 1974 expressly exclude certain goods and 
commodities from its ambit and these include goods bought for personal, family 
or household use, goods sold by execution, shares, investment securities, 
stocks, money, ships among others.961 An exception to this rule involves a 
situation where the seller before the conclusion of the contract did not have 
knowledge that such goods were being bought for such purposes,962
 
 this means 
that the Convention will apply to a sale involving diamond sales most likely as 
raw materials, that being rough diamonds for instance for purposes of 
transnational sales in the context of international trade but not as products strictly 
for personal use, for example, the Convention may not be relied on for a breach 
of contract involving a sale of a diamond engagement ring sold by a South 
African store for a private individual in the United States. 
The crucial provision of the Limitations Convention, 1974 is that it provides that 
the prescription period shall be four years.963 Articles 9 and 10 provide for the 
determination of the prescription period.964
                                                 
959 Article 3(1)(a)(b). 
 Articles 13 to 21 of the Convention 
960 Clearly it is the intention of UNCITRAL to respect parties’ freedom of contract as created by this 
provision of the Limitation Convention, 1974. 
961 Article 4(b) 
962 Article 4(b) – (f). 
963 Article 8. The Convention does provide in Articles 22 and 23 for an extension or recommencement of 
the limitation period subject to the provisions of the Convention. 
964 ‘Article 9  
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deal with the cessation and extension of the limitation period while the rest of the 
Convention deals with other technical matters such as the limit of the prescription 
period, effect of expiration of the prescriptive period, calculation of the period,  
international effect of the Convention. 
 
The Limitation Convention, 1974 when compared to South African contract law 
and the law of prescription is not entirely a red herring in spite of the 
sophisticated and well developed legal rules already well established in South 
African law. It is submitted that the Convention has two unique features which 
may further contribute to the development of South African law, particularly 
pertaining to international diamond sales and other international sales generally. 
The first feature is that it settles the issue of application of conflict of laws in 
South African courts. The adoption of the Convention will result in international 
harmony with regard to the uniform calculation of time to protect the enforcement 
of claims and ameliorate the situation where there are vast differences in 
systems of laws concerning the calculation of time for the enforcement of claims. 
 
The second useful feature of the Limitation Convention, 1974 is that it extends 
the overall limitation period to ten years maximum from the date of original 
commencement of the period.965 This maximum period of the Convention for a 
commercial claim is a glaring disparity with South African law on prescription in 
terms of the Prescription Act.966
                                                                                                                                                 
1. Subject to the provisions of articles 10, 11 and 12 the limitation period shall commence on the date of 
which the claim accrues. 
 It is submitted that the prescriptive period 
2.  The commencement of the limitation period shall not be postponed by: 
(a) a requirement that the party be given notice as described in paragraph 2 of article 1, or 
(b) a provision in an arbitration agreement that no right shall arise until an arbitration award has been 
made. 
Article 10 
1. A claim arising from a breach of contract shall accrue on the date on which such breach occurs. 
2. A claim arising from a defect or lack of conformity shall accrue on the date on which the goods 
are actually handed over to, or their tender is refused by, the buyer. 
3. A claim based on fraud committed before or at the time of the conclusion of the contract or during 
its performance shall accrue on the date on which the fraud was or reasonably could have been 
discovered.’ The Convention is limited to commercial contractual claims. 
965 Article 23. 
966 68 of 1969 section 11. The periods of prescription of debts shall be the following:  
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provided by the Convention is more accommodating to parties wishing to 
approach the courts to enforce their claims.  
 
A more extended period of time to enforce those claims is necessary in South 
African law if regard is had to geographic constraints involved in intercontinental 
contractual agreements such as those involving diamonds. While it is admitted 
that the parties wishing to enforce their claims may benefit if the Convention is 
adopted into South African law this may create a negative effect in the courts by 
resulting in an overflow of sporadic enforcement of international sales claims that 
may further burden the already sluggish judicial process.967
 
  
It is submitted however that the present South African law on prescription is not 
fundamentally different from that of various other countries in the world. While it 
is advisable to retain the current three year period before a debt/claim prescribes, 
it would be prudent to expressly provide for a different prescription regime where 
international contractual agreements and claims are concerned. This would be 
perfectly in tandem with the Limitation Convention provisions on prescription. The 
question that remains is whether or not South Africa should consider acceding to 
the Limitation Convention, 1974 and join the countries such as Belgium968
                                                                                                                                                 
        (a) thirty years in respect of-  
 in the 
quest to achieve international harmony on the time limits set for enforcement of 
claims in international sale of goods. 
           (i)  any debt secured by mortgage bond;  
           (ii) any judgment debt;  
           (iii) any debt in respect of any taxation imposed or levied by or under any law;  
           (iv)  any debt owed to the State in respect of any share of the profits, royalties or any similar consideration 
payable in respect of the right to mine minerals or other substances;  
        (b)  fifteen years in respect of any debt owed to the State and arising out of an advance or loan of money or 
a sale or lease of land by the State to the debtor, unless a longer period applies in respect of the debt in 
question in terms of paragraph (a) ;  
        (c)  six years in respect of a debt arising from a bill of exchange or other negotiable instrument or from a 
notarial contract, unless a longer period applies in respect of the debt in question in terms of paragraph (a) 
or (b) ;  
        (d)  save where an Act of Parliament provides otherwise, three years in respect of any other debt. 
967 The court rolls are generally full in practice and the allocation of trial dates particularly in actions is a 
process that can take years. 
968 Belgium is one of the countries that have recently acceded to the Limitation Convention, 1974, in its un-
amended form. The Convention will be in force in Belgium on 1 March 2009. 
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It is submitted that there appears to be no bar to South Africa becoming a 
Contracting State to the Limitation Convention, 1974 in its amended form seeing 
that the amended form of the Convention is in line with the objectives of other 
international instruments such as the United Nations Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods, 1980 (CISG).969
 
 
4.3.1.3 The Geneva Code on Bills of Exchange 
The Convention Providing a Uniform Law for Bills of Exchange and Promissory 
Notes (Geneva, 1930), The League of Nations and the 19 March 1931 
Convention for the Settlement of Certain Conflicts of Laws in Connection with 
Cheques are the result of one of several attempts made to harmonize the 
different national systems of law applicable to bills of exchange. An example of a 
situation showing a need to settle such conflict is evident in a situation where, for 
example, a bill of exchange in diamond trade may be drawn in Johannesburg, 
issued in Paris and endorsed in London and accepted in London payable at a 
bank in Cologne. The Geneva Convention and the Convention on Conflict of 
Laws in Connection with Cheques were adopted by most European Countries 
but not Great Britain, the US or the commonwealth countries.970
 
 These codes 
however may be considered for persuasive authority in the development of rules 
relating to conflict of laws in South Africa. 
4.3.2. Relevant Domestic Legislation 
4.3.2.1 Bills of Exchange 
Bills of exchange form a large part of international commerce due to recognized 
financial systems in the world. Many of the diamond trade transactions are 
evidenced by the use of bills of exchange. Fortunately for South Africa, the laws 
governing bills of exchange anticipates and makes provision for conflict of law 
                                                 
969The South African Legislature has stated in the Convention on Agency in the International Sale of Goods 
Act 4 of 1986 that the aims of the CISG should be borne in mind; see the Schedule of the Agency Act 
1986. www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/CISG.pdf 17 March 2010. 
970 Malan F.R. and J.T. Pretorius Malan on Bills of Exchange, Cheques and Promissory Notes 4 ed, Lexis 
Nexis Butterworths (2002) 269, example as given by authors. 
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scenarios involving bills of exchange. Conflict of laws concerning bills of 
exchange is contained in the Bills of Exchange Act.971 The Bills of Exchange 
Act972
 
  provides for ‘Rules if laws conflict’. 
The Bills of Exchange Act973  provides that if a bill drawn in one country is 
negotiated, accepted or payable in another, the rights, duties and liabilities of the 
parties thereto are determined by the validity of the bill as regards requisites in 
form is determined by the law of the place of issue.974
 
 This means that if A 
prepares a bill and it is issued in Durban, South Africa and negotiates it to B who 
is in Nigeria, any dispute regarding the form of the bill must be determined in 
accordance with South African law.  
With regard to validity of the bill as requisites in form of any supervening 
(subsequent) contract such as acceptance, indorsement or provision of an aval is 
determined according to the law where such a supervening contract was 
made.975
 
 Thus in keeping with the illustration above, if A and B complete the 
supervening contract regarding the bill of exchange in Nigeria where for instance 
B accepts and indorses the bill in Nigeria, the law to be applied is Nigerian law as 
that would be the place where the supervening contract is made. 
However the Bills of Exchange Act976 provides that a bill in not invalid by reason 
that it is not stamped in accordance with the law of the place of issue. Further a 
bill issued outside the Republic which conforms in form to the law of the South 
Africa may for purposes of enforcing payment thereof be treated as valid as 
between all persons who negotiate, hold or become parties to that bill in the 
Republic.977
                                                 
971 34 of 1964. 
 This provision is useful to the rapid movement of matters regarding 
972 34 of 1964 section 70. 
973 34 of 1964. 
974 Section 70(a). 
975 Ibid. 
976 34 of 1964. 
977 Section 70(a)(i) – (ii). 
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such bills of exchange within the Republic’s courts. Further the Act favours the 
validity of a bill of exchange rather than its invalidation. 
 
Section 70 (b) deals with interpretation of the contract and provides that ‘the 
interpretation of the contract of the drawer, indorser, acceptor or signer of an aval 
of a bill in determined by the law of the place where such contract is made, 
provided that if a bill is payable in the Republic is endorsed outside the Republic, 
the indorsement shall as regards the payer be interpreted according to the law of 
the Republic.’ This provision serves to simplify the determination of the 
substantive laws applicable to the payer of an endorsed bill of exchange 
regardless of endorser’s place of origin. Further this provision captures the rule 
that the law of the place of contract applies as the applicable law (lex contractus) 
where there is no chosen law and under certain circumstances. 
 
The duties of the holder with regard to presentment for acceptance or payment 
are determined by the law of the place where the act is done. If a bill is 
dishonored, a protest or notice of dishonour is determined by the place where the 
bill is dishonored.978 Where a bill is drawn outside the Republic but payable in the 
Republic and the sum payable is not expressed in currency of the Republic, in 
the absence of contrary indication the amount shall be calculated according to 




With regard to determination of date of payment  for a bill drawn in one country 
and payable in another, such date shall be determined according to the law of 
the place where the bill is payable.980
 
 Clearly the Legislature has resolved the 
legal lacunae regarding essential elements of a bill of exchange. 
                                                 
978 Section 70 (c). 
979 Section 70 (d). 
980 Section 70 (e). 
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It is submitted that South African bills of exchange law conforms to international 
expectations where cases with a foreign element are involved. The bills of 
exchange statutory framework does not go against the spirit of commonly 
accepted Roman Dutch rules on conflict of laws. In fact, the Bills of Exchange 
Act981
 
 codifies some of the principles and further seeks to incorporate commonly 
known choice of law rules within the statutory framework. 
4.3.2.2 Admiralty Jurisdiction 
Maritime Law, especially the carriage of goods by sea is crucial in the context of 
international trade particularly where the commodities are transported by sea. It 
should however be stated at the outset that the common mode of transport of 
diamonds is air transport for reasons of safety, security and low risk. In South 
Africa carriage of diamonds by ship is limited to circumstances where there is 
mining of sea areas involved as demonstrated by De Beers Marine (Pty) Ltd a 
Cape Town based company contracted to De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd for 
the purposes of mining the west coast sea area of southern Africa. Therefore, 
diamond shipment and admiralty law must be understood only in light of those 
diamond activities. (i.e. the mining of sea areas). 
 
Diamonds may however be subject to shipments within the area of imports and 
exports.982 This can therefore give rise to maritime claims. The Admiralty 
Jurisdiction Regulation Act983
 
 which states the law to be applied by South African 
courts may be of assistance in these instances. This provision indirectly makes 
provision for creating clarity with regard to choice of law rules applicable should 
such a situation present itself to a South African court in the exercise of its 
admiralty jurisdiction.  
                                                 
981 34 of 1964. 
982 Carriage of diamonds and other precious stones by sea is still practiced in countries such as India. Only 
in the case where a South African party has entered into contractual obligations with a party from India for 
instance for the receipt of diamonds and precious stones transported by sea, then admiralty law will play a 
role otherwise the general and safest manner for carriage of diamonds is by Air with hand to hand secured 
delivery. 
983 105 of 1983 section 6(1)(a). 
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The Jurisdiction Regulation Act984
 
 makes it possible for English statutes to be 
applicable to South African maritime matters as far as it reflects English admiralty 
law as it stood at the commencement of the Act, (i.e. 1 November 1983). In terms 
foreign law in the form of English law is applicable to maritime matters in the 
Republic. 
The Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act,985  provides that in respect of those 
heads of jurisdiction, which the colonial court of admiralty derived from the 
English, Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890, English law as at 1 November 
1983 (the date of commencement of this Act) is applicable. An English decision 
made after 1 November 1983 is still applicable as a useful precedent in South 
Africa, provided that it reflects English Admiralty law as at 1 November 1983. The 
decisions by the English courts made after 1 November must however be 




The meaning of section 6 was considered by the court in the court a quo as well 
as appeal case involving the vessel MV Stella Tingas. in MV Stella Tingas v MV 
Atlantica and Another (Transnet Ltd t/a Portnet and Another, Third Parties)987 the 
trial court had to determine whether in terms of the Admiralty Jurisdiction 
Regulation Act988
                                                 
984 105 of 1983 section 6. 
 it is obliged to apply the law which the High Court of Justice of 
985 105 of 1983 section 6(1)(a). 
986 6. ‘Law to be Applied and rules of evidence 
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law or the common law contained a court in the exercise of 
its admiralty jurisdiction shall: 
 
a. with regard to any matter in respect of which a court of admiralty of the Republic referred 
to in the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890, of the United Kingdom, had 
jurisdiction immediately before the commencement of this Act, apply the law which the 
High Court of Justice of the United Kingdom in the exercise of its admiralty jurisdiction 
would have applied with regard to such a matter at such commencement, in so far as that 
law can be applied; 
b. with regard to any other matter, apply the Roman-Dutch law applicable in the Republic. 
2. The provisions of subsection (1) shall not derogate from the provisions of any law of the Republic 
applicable to any of the matters contemplated in paragraph (a) or (b) of that subsection.’ 
987  2002 (1) SA 647 (D). 
988 105 of 1983 section 6. 
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the United Kingdom in the exercise of its admiralty jurisdiction would have 
applied as at 1 November 1983. Further the court had to determine whether the 
High Court of Justice would have applied the United Kingdom Pilotage Act.989
 
 
The maritime matter involved revolved around the issue of liability for loss or 
damage caused by a ship under compulsory pilotage. It was held that a claim for 
damage done by a ship was a matter in respect of which a South African Court of 
Admiralty had jurisdiction immediately before the commencement of the 
Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act990 on 1 November 1983.991
 
 
The Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act992 made English law applicable in the 
form of the provisions of the English statutes. The Pilotage Act,993 was made 
applicable ‘to all ships British and foreign’. However in this case it did not mean 




The application of an English statute is qualified by the extent to which that law 
existed and could be applied as of 1 Novemver 1983.995 Since, in this case, a 
South African statute existed there was no need to look to the English statute 
that was qualifying under the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act.996 The statute 
to be applied in the matter was the existing South African statute which was in 
the form of Paragraph 10 of Schedule 1 to Legal Succession to the South African 
Transport Services Act.997
                                                 
989 1983. 
 That Act could be applied in terms of section 6(2) of 
990 105 of 1983. 
991  MV Stella Tingas v MV Atlantica and Another (Transnet Ltd t/a Portnet and Another, Third Parties) 
2002 (1) SA 647 (D) 658 H-J. 
992 105 of 1983 section 6(1)(a). 
993 1983. 
994  MV Stella Tingas v MV Atlantica and Another (Transnet Ltd t/a Portnet and Another, Third Parties) 
2002 (1) SA 647 (D) 659 C-D. 
995  Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act 105 of 1983 section 6(1)(a). Staniland Hilton Shipping Volume 
25 par. 115-119 Law of South Africa (year) 66. 
996 105 of 1983 section 6(1)(a) that being the English statute in the form of the UK Pilotage Act 1983. 
997 9 of 1989 as amended by the National Ports Act 12 of 2005 section 76. 
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the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act.998 On appeal in MV Stella Tingas: 
Transnet Ltd t/a Portnet v Owners of the MV Stella Tingas and the MV 
Atlantica999
 
 this point was upheld. 
The Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act1000  empowers the court in the exercise 
of its admiralty jurisdiction to award damages in a foreign currency specifically in 
instances where the plaintiff has suffered loss in that currency.1001
 
 This section 
addresses conflict of laws in the calculation of currency by providing that such a 
calculation be done subject to any laws relating to exchange control, with 
fairness and equity in the decision of the court. 
4.3 Conclusion 
It is clear that South African conflict of laws branch is in tandem with trends in 
various parts of the world. The courts have followed choice of law rules that are 
commonly and almost universally applied and acceptable in various other 
jurisdictions. South Africa is an important diamond producing and exporting 
country and it is highly undesirable for its legal system to be fundamentally 
different from those of its trading partners, clients and markets. Persons and 
entities from these foreign countries are likely forge contractual and commercial 
relationships with South African persons and entities and disputes can not be 
dispelled in these relationships.  
 
It is therefore submitted that it is important that the South African legal system, 
and in this case the conflict of law regulatory framework, to be internationally 
acceptable and conform to commonly known principles and positions found in 
various other jurisdictions. This makes South Africa seem attractive as a 
diamond trading country thus eventually leading up to allowing greater economic 
                                                 
998 105 of 1983. 
999 2003 (2) SA 473 (SCA). 
1000 105 of 1983. 
1001 Section 5(2)(g) subject to the provisions of any law relating to exchange control, order payment to be 
made in such currency other than the currency of the Republic as in the circumstances of the case appears 
appropriate, and make such order as seems just as to the date upon which the calculation of the conversion 
from any currency to any other currency should be based. 
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activity in the international markets. It has been shown that conflict of laws in 
South Africa is remarkably developed to anticipate various scenarios as are likely 
to arise in international diamond trading and transactions. 
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Chapter 5: Financing Diamond Sales:  Documentary Credit 
 
5.1 Introduction 
There are various methods of payment in international trade but the four 
traditional methods of payment generally known in international trade are cash in 
advance or repayment, payment on account or open account, documentary 
collection and documentary credits. Documentary credit has been described as 
‘the life blood of international commerce’1002 as it has been in use for over 150 
years as a method of payment in international trade. Even with the development 
of paperless trade and new electronic forms of payment, traditional methods of 
payment such as documentary credit continue to dominate.1003
 
 
The discussion above leaves no doubt that in diamond trade the extent of the 
use of documentary credit is essential to the study of diamond trade laws. A 
more in depth consideration of the guidelines and rules pertaining to the use of 
documentary credit will follow in the successive parts of this chapter however for 
practical purposes it is very important to remember that the documentary credit 
practice requires strict compliance. 
 
                                                 
1002 Intraco Ltd v Notis Shipping Corporation of Liberia (“The Bhoja Trader”) [1981] 2 Ll R 256. 
1003 Laryea Emmanuel T. Payment for Paperless Trade: Are the Viable Alternatives to the Documentary 
Credit? Law and Policy in International Business (2001) http://www.allbusiness.com/lagal/3589079-
1.html. 24 September 2009. See article published by New York Times, 6 October 1893 Who Got Mrs. 
Fiske’s Diamonds: Her Letter of Credit is Restored to Her, but the Jewels Are Gone. True to the age old 
tradition of documentary credit, this newspaper article dating back to the 1800s shows the typical and 
prominent characteristics that are typical in diamond trade. Firstly the use of documentary credit in such 
transactions and secondly the threat of theft of precious stones. The article states that on 26 August 1893 
Mrs. Fiske reported to the police that a leather bag containing $ 4,000.00 worth of diamonds and a letter of 
credit for $ 20, 000.00 were stolen from her state room in the steamship where she had been a passenger. 
The article states that the leather bag was found without the jewels but the letter of credit was left behind 
suggesting that the thief had been familiar with banking practices and the character of the negotiable paper. 
The moral of the story as summarized by the article is that travelers should keep their valuable jewels in 
purser’s safes rather than in cabin trunks. Of course there is nothing in this article to suggest that the 
allegedly stolen diamonds were being sold but is an article simply used to place the use of letters of credit 
in a time frame that reflects the age of the payment and banking practice. Further, it must be noted that bills 
of exchange are also traditional method of payment in international trade, for further reading on this subject 
in South African Law, see Malan F.R. and J.T. Pretorius Malan on Bills of Exchange, Cheques and 
Promissory Notes 4 ed, Lexis Nexis Butterworths (2002). 
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The use of documentary credit operates as a form of financial guarantee for 
payment for the diamonds ordered.1004 As previously mentioned in preceding 
chapters international trade in luxury items, in this instance diamonds, forms a 
segment of the world markets that has been largely affected by the recent 
economic down.1005 As part of the main theme of this study this chapter will deal 
with the manner in which the law on documentary credit can be developed and 
structured in a manner that supports the diamond industry. The analysis made in 
this chapter is part of the contribution to the ideals of diamond trade legal 
developments as desired in the values contained in the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa Act.1006
 
 
For a diamond producing country such as South Africa, which has been active in 
international diamond trade through State and private sector ventures, it 
becomes increasingly important to study market practices of financing diamond 
sales that will sustain this industry in light of the effects of the recession. Not only 
should financing strategies be sustainable but they must also take into account 
the need to continue to support legitimate trade. 
 
This chapter intends to highlight that to continue to sustain international trade, 
documentary credit finance must be continued through custom usage and 
banking practices. The diamonds are a form of security, with each case being 
measured according to individual merits. 
                                                 
1004 Based on Barak D. Richman ‘How Community Institutions Create Economic Advantage: Jewish 
Diamond Merchants in New York’ American Bar Foundation 31 Law and Social Inquiry (2006) 383 - 394. 
1005 Bekink B. and Botha C. The Role of a Modern Central Ban in Managing Consumer Bankrupsies and 
Corporate Failures: A South African Public-Law Angle of Incidence South African Mercantile Law Journal 
Volume 21 (2009) 74. The authors submit that the global economy is showing clear signs of stress as was 
illustrated during the 2008, 2009 GFC. At p 88 of their article the authors explain the importance of 
financial stability in the global economy, it is clear that the maintenance of a stable financial system is a 
core for any economy, particularly the global economy. Chew I.K.H. and Horwitz F.M. Downsizing the 
Downside of Downsizing: A Revised Planning Model South African Journal of Labour Relations (2002) 25. 
The authors in this paper correctly argue, as was proven in time that in a global economy a world-wide 
recession and a financial crisis or major economic downturn in ode large economy such as the US, may 
have a worldwide domino effect. Mtyingizana B., Buhlungu S. The Global Economic Crisis: A 
Sociological Perspective Department of Sociology, University of Johannesburg and National Labour and 
Economic Development Institute (NALEDI) the authors in this paper investigate the social impact of 
shortages of skills development as a result of lack of sufficient funding arising out of the GFC.  
1006 108 of 1996. 
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This chapter is not intended to be an analysis of the world’s credit systems as 
that is a point that needs further consideration by economists. From a legal 
viewpoint the documentary credit method of finance forms a powerful legal tool 
for sustaining international trade in diamonds. Of course, banks are not expected 
to finance on credit all sorts of trade. However, when dealing with precious 
stones as specifically elucidated in this chapter, the documentary credit method 
of finance will continue to be useful. This consideration is topical and relevant to 
any diamond producing country that aims to uphold thriving international 
diamond trade.  
 
It is submitted however that only with sophisticated banking methods and banks 
as institutions of excellence can this type of finance be efficient. In light of this 
submission this chapter is going to consider the regulation of documentary credit 
in the international trade context by making ineluctable reference to the ICC UCP 
600.1007 These uniform customs have been developed delicately and laboriously 




The international nature of diamond trade was demonstrated in the Supreme 
Court case of The Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service and 
Another v TFN Diamond Cutting Works (Pty) Ltd.1009
                                                 
1007 ICC Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP 600) which came into force on 1 
July 2007. 
 TFN Diamond Cutting 
Works were involved in the purchase of rough diamonds from a variety of 
sources in South Africa and they would cut and polish the same for resale. Some 
of these diamonds were sold in New York. The implications of such transnational 
commercial transactions to international trade in general are significant and a 
www.exporthelp.co.za/documentation/ucp600.html 20 April 2010. 
www.exporthelp.co.za/.../LCs/UCP_600_Exporters_Guide_ABN.pdf 20 April 2010. 
1008 It is stated in the preamble of the UCP 600 that it is a document that contains 39 articles which form a 
comprehensive and practical working aid aimed at assisting bankers, lawyers, importers, exporters, 
transport executives, educators and everyone involved in using letters of credit in the international 
community. 
1009 [2005] 2 All SA 455 (SCA). 
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study of the financing elements of such transactions would necessarily be 
important as well. 
 
The trading of diamonds in the international context involves various aspects 
particularly in the sale contracts that are required of parties to the transaction. 
The purchaser must ensure that he or she is obtaining the diamond from a 
legitimate source, while at the time being certain about the quality of the 
purchase. In South Africa certificates from the Jewellery Council of South 
Africa,1010 an internationally recognized certification laboratory,1011 are used to 
support the integrity of diamonds sold in South Africa. Further, diamonds sold 
may also be tested in internationally recognized laboratories such as the 




The fact that international laboratories with international reputation are used 
demonstrates the commonly international quality control nature of diamond sales 
transactions and therefore it becomes crucial to understand the financial systems 
involved in such trading. It is submitted that while the sale of diamonds between 
local parties is simpler than a situation where parties are completing a diamond 
sales contract across national borders, methods of finance will also vary 
according to what is most practical in light of established trade customs.1013
 
  
Contracts that require credit may involve larger State entities, for example, it was 
reported in the Moscow Times business brief in 2009 that Armenia would use a 
loan received from Russia to buy rough diamonds from Russian Diamond 
                                                 
1010  Also referred to as JCSA http://www.jewellerysa.com/ 19 March 2010. See 
http://www.moneybiz.co.za/my_business/jewellery_industry.asp 19 March 2010. 
1011 Working together with Jewellers Association of South Africa (JASA) as an active representative body 
for protecting member interests of retail jewellery stores. Companies who sell this precious cargo to foreign 
entities have to ensure that it arrives safely and is cleared for insurance and export and many of these 
aspects of trade must be financed accurately in order to achieve the purpose of the contract of sale. See for 
instance, www.veritrade.co.za 20 July 2009. 
1012 www.egl.co.za/ 09 March 2010 www.mynhardts.com/other_services.htm 09 March 2010. 
1013 Ibid. 
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Company Alrosa. This is a classic example of financing a diamond deal between 
countries. Interestingly, in the same viewpoint in comparison with the South 
African context Armenia1014 is interested in purchasing rough diamonds in order 
to develop its gem cutting industry while South Africa wants to retain some of its 




The Armenian policy decision above to take a loan to finance the purchase of 
diamonds from Alrosa does not appear from the media report, however, it does 
emerge from the report that the Prime Ministers of these two countries met and a 
$ 500 million loan was granted by Russia to Armenia on condition that Armenia 
would buy diamonds from the Russian rough diamond provider for further cutting. 
The financiering of a purchase of diamonds through a loan between States 
affirms the position that often business transactions that support the economy 
cannot be done without the granting of credit when necessary.1016
                                                 
1014 Thursday, March 12, The Moscow Times Issue 4098 Business in Brief (2009). 
 Therefore the 
1015 Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 section 5(a), 15 and MPRDA 28 of 2002 section 26. 
1016 Thursday, March 12, The Moscow Times Issue 4098 Business in Brief (2009). See Emmanuel T. 
Payment for Paperless Trade: Are the Viable Alternatives to the Documentary Credit? Law and Policy in 
International Business (2001), http://www.allbusiness.com/lagal/3589079-1.html 20 September 2009. 
Itzikowitz A.J. and Du Toit S.F. (original text by L.J. Gering) Banking and Currency: Business of 
Commercial Banking Documentary Credits Volume 2(1) Law of South Africa (2003) 379. See also Willis J 
Banking in South African Law Juta (1981). The authors above show in their writings that business 
transactions involving credit are common in commercial contracts. See further, for example, Ex Parte 
Sapan Trading (Pty) Ltd 1995 (1) SA 218 (W) where the facts of the case as recorded by the court on 221 
A - J of judgment, a typical example of the use of credit in international trade is give. They are described as 
follows: ‘The applicant conducts its business from within the area of jurisdiction of this Court. The 
applicant's business consists of the importing and distribution to local plastic companies of certain goods. 
(Imports and exports forming a classic example of an international trade transaction in casu). Over the last 
three years the applicant has built up an extensive business relationship with Finetrade Vermittlungs 
GMBTT a company conducting its business in Hamburg, Germany. The applicant, apparently acting on 
behalf of a purchaser, ordered goods from Finetrade and effected payment to Finetrade by way of letters of 
credit established by the applicant in favour of Finetrade as beneficiary (emphasis).  
    2. In South Africa, Walon (Pty) Ltd was employed by the applicant to attend to the release of the goods 
from the docks, to procure the delivery of the goods to the purchaser and to pay import duties and other 
administrative charges payable to the appropriate authorities in respect of the release of the goods.  
    3. It was specifically agreed between the applicant and the seller that all of Walon's fees, as per invoice, 
occasioned in the process of releasing the goods from the docks and having them delivered to the 
purchaser, would be paid by the seller. Upon advice by the applicant, and until recently, the seller paid the 
applicant the sums which it had paid, or was obliged to pay, to Walon. Finetrade was obliged to make 
payment of 'C & F' charges to the applicant on demand. The particular letters of credit bear testimony to the 
mechanics of the agreement in existence between the applicant and the seller. Appearing on each of the 
letters of credit are the letters 'C&F', which letters stand for 'carriage and freight'. They indicate that 
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legal implications arising from such a deal provide for an in depth 
acknowledgment of the complexities of diamond trade and the applicable 
financial systems. 
   
As previously mentioned this work is being written at a time when there is a 
recession and the diamond prices and sales are somewhat being negatively 
affected. At present, the global credit crisis that is at the centre of the current 
global economic crisis has stolen international headlines on a daily basis and this 
article takes note of these reports as sources of non academic common events 
happening in the world and impacting on international diamond trade in many 
respects.1017
                                                                                                                                                 
Finetrade would make payment to the applicant of the 'C&F' charges, being all amounts incurred in the 
complete process of having the goods released from the harbour after arrival and having the goods 
delivered to the purchaser.  
 In spite of the recession in 2008 and 2009 documentary credit and 
    4. Seven letters of credit have been issued to effect payment in respect of the agreements forming the 
subject of these proceedings and which the applicant concluded with Finetrade in respect of purchases for 
local buyers. These letters are annexed to the applicant's founding affidavit and details of the particular 
agreements concluded between the applicant and Finetrade are set out in the letters of credit. It is the failure 
by Finetrade to pay the applicant's C&F charges arising from these agreements which gives rise to the 
cause of action between the applicant and Finetrade. 
    5. Four of the letters of credit have not been paid and it is the claim to the proceeds of these four letters 
of credit, viz R2 092 000, that the applicant seeks to attach. In respect of each of these letters of credit an 
account was received from Walon, and immediately upon receipt payment was demanded from Finetrade. 
All the amounts so I claimed, viz R2 156 234,68, should have been paid by Finetrade to the applicant by 31 
August 1993. R1 032 876,60 has been paid by the applicant to Walon, leaving a balance of R1 085 123,60. 
Only R339 840 has been paid by Finetrade to the applicant.’ In this case the court clarified the principle at 
224 D - G that ‘letters of credit were the most frequent method of payment for goods in the export trade, 
used because they introduced predictability and security into international sales transactions, in which 
typical sellers would be reluctant to ship goods to foreign buyers before receiving payment for them, and 
foreign buyers similarly reluctant to tender payment before inspecting the goods to ensure that they 
conformed to the contract.’ 
1017 It was reported in the United Nations Intergraded Regional Information Networks, Job Losses as 
Diamonds Lose Their Lustre, Africa News 11 February (2009) www.afrika.no/Detailed/17940.html 16 July 
2009 that there were many job losses in Botswana as a result of sales dwindling and the companies 
retrenching in order to cut costs. It is difficult times for Debswana Diamond Company, which is a joint 
venture between the South African diamond company, De Beers and Botswana’s government. This is most 
unsettling since Botswana, like South Africa, is one of the African countries that have used its rich mineral 
resources to fund development. The New York Times also painted a grim picture of the plunging diamond 
sales and prices. It was reported recently that the famed New York, Tiffany jewellery chain was struggling 
even after lowering prices. It was also further reported that many a diamond producer throughout the world 
were also suffering loss of business together with many other luxury businesses at this time. It was stated in 
this report by Gareth Penny, De Beers CEO, that market research from the US and China revealed that 
consumers still desired diamonds. He also stated that in 2008 the Diamond Trading Company (DTC) 
achieved record sales which only slowed in the fourth quarter as a result of the onset of the global 
economic downturn. Mr. Gareth Penny acknowledged representing De Beers that this downturn has had 
significant impact on sales of retail diamond jewellery, liquidity and demand for rough diamonds in the 
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bills of exchange still remain the main methods for payment for international 
diamond trade. It is thus very important to understand in the diamond sales 
context. This study is relevant particularly in times of global recession when the 
availability of liquid assets is an important concern. 
 
On the other hand technological advances which include on-line trading and 
exchange must also be investigated in order to determine their impact on 
financing of international trade transactions. A recent report claims that investors 
are now able to obtain their cut of diamonds more easily with the first online 
exchange of gems as a result of an initiative by the Dealers Organization for 
Diamond Automated Quotes (Dodaq) which was launched in Antwerp. This 
system offers a two-way auction for traders giving a platform for electronic 
transactions in polished diamonds with real-time pricing.1018
 
  
Fortunately South Africa seems to be sufficiently prepared to deal with these 
types of transactions by virtue of its relatively well developed electronic 
communication systems such as those regulated by the Electronic 
Communications and Transactions Act.1019
                                                                                                                                                 
cutting centres. To accommodate these market challenges De Beers has taken steps to reduce productions 
levels, costs and capital expenditure across all operations. All these reduced costs and business 
restructuring initiatives have been adopted in the case of De Beers to deal with the economic crisis. Sadly 
Be Beers have had to cease major production operations with resultant drops in production venture. See 
Jonathan Clayton, The Times (London) De Beers Stops mining in Botswana 9 March (2009). 
 A discussion of the impact of these 
new trading modes is necessary in order to determine their impact on traditional 
international trade financing mechanisms such as documentary credit. 
1018 Rosamun Urwin Investment: Investors Take Shine to Diamonds Online The Evening Standard 
(London) 13 February (2009). It was reported that the market is accepting this online trading auction. The 
institutional and private investors and people from all parts of the diamond industry are positive about the 
system because buyers in the past were exposed to heavy sales tax and since the jewels are in this way 
stored in a tax free zone, it makes it a cheaper method of trading despite of the global downturn Dodaq is 
optimistic. If online trade provides a tax free zone and a cheaper medium for diamond buyers, how do 
buyers effect payments, what financial systems are used. These are all pertinent modernistic legal 
developments that affect diamond trade and must be analyzed as an important aspect of diamond 
regulations. See Laryea Emmanuel T. Payment for Paperless Trade: Are the Viable Alternatives to the 
Documentary Credit? Law and Policy in International Business (2001), 
http://www.allbusiness.com/lagal/3589079-1.html 20 September 2009. Here the author suggests that 
documentary credit still prevails in spite of paperless trade developments. 
1019 25 of 2002. 
 266 
 
5.2 A Brief Discussion of the Use of Credit in Diamond Trade Transactions 
Diamond trade transactions have been historically carried out on the basis of 
credit sales through what is generally known as an executory contract. These are 
contracts where parties agree to exchange valuable items for money but time 
elapses between the moment the valuable item is passed to the buyer and the 
time the buyer makes payment. In the diamond credit sale, the buyer of 
diamonds receives the diamonds and pays the seller at a later date. The 
contracts are traditionally enforced by private sanctions and mechanisms,1020 and 
not State sponsored courts and judicial systems. The reason lies in the traditional 
practice in diamond transactions; family and community connections drove the 
traditional diamond industry more than any international practices could do.1021
 
 
Traditional diamond trade transactions were essentially premised on mutual trust 
and reliability between the contracting parties. It is therefore not a surprise that 
credit sales came to be the domineering method of sale in the national and 
international diamond markets. These credit sales are also based on mutual trust 
and reliability of the contracting parties and once these are guaranteed, the 
contract is concluded.1022
 
 It is submitted that the very nature of diamond trade 
revolves around precious luxury items which suggest that the parties involved in 
such trade will to some degree at least display some affluence. Having said that 
however it is essential to balance that view with the fact that it is not only 
oligarchs who purchase diamonds therefore it is prudent that where liquidity is 
not always guaranteed, giving credit is a good alternative to keep the diamond 
industry afloat. 
                                                 
1020 Obviously not referring to unlawful ‘private sanctions’ including illegal activities such to enforce 
payments extra judicially although this may have been a root cause of such activity especially when 
looking at black market diamond trade which of course has nothing to do with legitimate diamond trade 
transactions. 
1021 Based on Barak D. Richman ‘How Community Institutions Create Economic Advantage: Jewish 
Diamond Merchants in New York’ American Bar Foundation 31 Law and Social Inquiry (2006) 383 - 394. 
1022 Ibid. 
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Diamonds move through various stages from the day they are extracted from 
diamond mines to the time they are sold as jewellery in a jewellery shop. This 
movement of diamonds is applicable both in South Africa as well as in the 
international community. The basic path involved movement from a mine to the 
CSO in London. This subsequently distributes rough diamonds to brokers who 
then sell the diamonds to groups of specific merchants called ‘Sight holders.’1023
 
 
These Sight holders thereafter would sell the diamonds to various individual 
dealers who would deliver the diamonds to cutting and polishing houses. Dealers 
continued to sell the rough and polished diamonds to jewellery manufacturers for 
commercial sale. Most of the negotiations involved in each stage and transaction 
are concerned with the selling price, payment schedule, method of payment and 
credit security. All these processes involved both rich and poor traders and 
dealers and the speed with which each transaction is concluded and the next 
stage is reached militates against adopting a cash diamond sales system.1024
 
 
It has been asserted by author Barak D. that the prevalence of the credit sales 
system in diamond sales was also necessitated by liquidity constraints as most 
players are not engaged by heavily capitalized corporations; these could be self 
employed merchants or individuals who work for small family businesses. As a 
result, many dealers could not afford to transact on a ‘cash upfront’ basis. 
Further, dealers could match payments for credit purchases with anticipated 
income from downstream sales. These dealers could also get significantly better 
prices for their stones by extending credit to their buyers. This helped in giving 
prominence to the credit sale method of trading in diamond transactions.1025
 
 
The credit sale method is predominant in the world’s diamond markets today and 
these include New York, Antwerp, Mumbai and Israel. In New York, the field is 
                                                 
1023 Barak D. Richman ‘How Community Institutions Create Economic Advantage: Jewish Diamond 




dominated by Jewish merchants who have established intricate diamond trading 
networks and webs based on family, community and ethnic connections. 
Multilateral cooperation among various groups drive the diamond trade and 
transactions in New York and this emphasizes the importance of clean 
reputation, general notions of fairness and mutual trust. The credit sale method in 
New York, as in other Jewish dominated diamond trading centres has been 
described as trust based exchange because of this emphasis on moral rather 
than legal values and practices. While these values have formed the basis of 
traditional market sales in New York, it is interesting that the credit sale they 
introduced remains solid and universally acceptable as a method of trading and 
payment in the international and diamond trading industry to this day.1026
 
 
Presently, trading firms in Mumbai, Antwerp and Israel are based on traditional 
values emphasizing on mutual trust, good reputation, honesty and other socio 
demographic factors that would be absent in modern trade transactions involving 
other products. However, the pace at which technological developments and 
innovations are taking place has threatened the traditional role of small scale 
players in the diamond transactions and trading field. Highly developed 
machinery for cutting and polishing diamonds have removed diamond cutting and 
polishing from the hands of small scale, moral values based trading relationships. 
Highly capitalized and mechanized international corporations have swept most 
small scale players out of the system. It seems these have brought about the 
demise of traditional diamond trading and transacting systems and might in that 
regard bring the end of the credit sale as a method of sale and payment. It is 
however not yet clear whether there are any emerging trends favouring other 









5.2.1 South African Courts on Documentary Credit: General Points 
South African law contains a relatively rich source of judicial precedent and legal 
consideration of principles surrounding the international documentary credit. 
However, generally it is not a subject that has received much attention in legal 
writing or statutory enactments or other regulatory codes. Some of the thorough 
decisions pertaining to documentary credit include cases such as Philips and 
Another v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd and Others1028
 
 where the court 
dealt with the principles pertaining to documentary credit thoroughly. It is a 
wonder that South African courts have had exposure to dealing with issues of 
documentary credit as more recently as 1985 when this practice has been in 
international trade for over a century.  
The lack of legislative attention on documentary credit suggests that it is a 
finance method that supports international trade efficiently with little need to 
regulate; it may be that it is appropriately self regulated through private rules of 
business practices, norms and rules.1029
 
  
The whole subject of commercial law is one where the global system has aspired 
towards uniformity of rules, albeit without the need of an international code or 
treaty. South African commercial law resembles English law and indeed most of 
its commercial statutes were almost verbatim to that of English statues.1030  
Relevant principles are inherited from English courts and therefore it is worth 
considering English judgments in various instances1031
                                                 
1028 1985 (3) SA 301 (W). 
 for the purposes of 
analyzing the application of these rules. Further, the analysis of judicial 
1029 This submission is based on the premise that even the South African courts primarily rely on secondary 
sources of law and other persuasive international law when hearing a matter that involves documentary 
credits. 
1030 Malan F R et al Malan on Bills of Exchange, Cheques and Promissory Note  4 ed Lexis Nexis 
Butterworths (2002) 6. 
1031 See for instance, Power Curber International Ltd v National Bank of Kuwait SAK [1981] 3 All ER 607 
(CA), Gian Singh and Company Ltd v Banque de l’Indochine [1974] 2 All ER 754, Owen (Edward) 
Engineering Ltd v Barclays Bank International Ltd [1978] 1 All ER 976, this case dealt with performance 
of a bank with obligations very similar to those assumed by a confirming bank in documentary credit. See 
also Sztejn v Henry Schroder Banking Corporation 31 NYS 2d 631 (1941), a decision referred to with 
approval in English judgments pertaining to documentary credit. 
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precedent on this practice provides essential academic insight on the South 
African legal trends pertaining to law on documentary credit. The understanding 
of the application of legal principles can be applied directly to diamond trade. 
 
The issue of fraudulent documents as a threat to efficient documentary credit 
practices was also considered in the case of Loomcraft Fabrics CC v Nedbank 
and Another.1032 From an academic perspective, this decision has received 
substantial and justified attention.1033 This case does however clarify the legal 
stance pertaining to when a bank is allowed to escape liability in the exceptional 
case of fraud. It established that in order for the bank to escape liability on the 
basis of fraudulent conduct in presenting documents by the seller, such fraud will 
not be lightly inferred; to succeed on the grounds of fraud it must be shown that 
the seller for the purpose of drawing credit presented bills (transport documents) 
knowing that such bills contained material representations of fact upon which the 
bank would rely and which the seller knew to be untrue, mere error, 
misunderstanding or oversight, however, unreasonable will not suffice as a 
ground for proving fraud.1034
                                                 
1032 1996 (1) SA 812 (A). 
 
1033 Itzikowitz A.J. and Du Toit S.F. (original text by L.J. Gering) Banking and Currency: Business of 
Commercial Banking Documentary Credits Volume 2(1) Law of South Africa (2003) 384, De Beer C. 
Banking Law Index to the All South African and South African Law Reports (2009), Besproeiingsraad en 
Andere [2000] 2 All SA 8 (A) 16, Transcontinental Procurement Services CC v ZVL & ZKL International 
AS and Another [2000] JOL 7352 (W) 10, Koumantarakis Group CC v Mystic River Investment 45 (Pty) 
Ltd & Another [2008] JOL 19699 (D) 13. Schulze W.G. The UCP 600: A New Law Applicable to Letters of 
Credit South African Mercantile Law Journal Volume 21 (2009) 228. 
1034 See summary. This position proving to support the English heard in the House of lords in United City 
Merchants (Investments) Ltd and Others v Royal Bank of Canada and Others [1982] All ER 720. This case 
was a decision upholding the validity of the international trade agreement financed by documentary credit. 
Rather than treating such crucial agreements as a nullity, which would probably have the effect of working 
against merchants if decisions to nullify contracts of international trade nature are taken arbitrarily or 
interpreted too strictly. This On the other hand these cases and judicial decisions serve as warning to 
merchants to not prepare documents for such contracts in a lax manner. In Brimpton (Pvt) Ltd v 
Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe [2001] JOL 9111 (ZH) Brimpton (plaintiff in the civil action) was 
purchasing goods from an Indian supplier and obtained an irrevocable letter of credit from the Commercial 
Bank of Zimbabwe. It was the condition of the letter of credit that the goods dispatched would conform to 
the specifications agreed. The bank caused certain payments to be made even though the documents 
received by it did not conform with the conditions of the letter of credit. Brimpton knew of these 
discrepancies and waived them. However in respect of some of the goods, Brimpton did not accept the 
discrepancies. The bank however failed to notify the supplier of the discrepancies in time and the seller 
insisted on payment. Payment was made and Brimpton’s account was credited. The court held that the 
relationship between Brimpton and the bank was governed by the ordinary laws of contract. The bank had 
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On the question of whether any other type of financiering contract in South Africa 
may operate as documentary credit, the case of Rosen v Ekon1035 is very useful. 
In this case the Applicant and Respondent had agreed to enter into a sale 
agreement whereby the Respondent sold a residential property to the Applicant 
for an amount of R1, 400 000.00. A further sale agreement for furniture and 
equipment worth R350 000.00 was also concluded by the parties. The Applicant 
paid a deposit of R100 000.00 following an agreement that the balance of R1, 
300 000.00 would be paid against registration of transfer and secured by means 
of a bank guarantee in favour of the Respondent, payable on date of transfer. 




The Respondent sought to avoid the contract by citing two reasons. He stated 
firstly that the right reserved by ABSA bank to cancel the guarantees at any time 
prior to registration by giving notice to that effect rendered them worthless and 
therefore unacceptable to him.1037
                                                                                                                                                 
failed to observe the rules of documentary credit and debited Brimpton’s account in breach of contract. 
Brimpton had however received the goods and benefited from them and therefore when calculating the 
quantum for breach of contract in casu the benefit to Brimpton was taken into account. See editor’s 
summary of the case. This case also shows that where the commercial transaction is upheld in breach of 
some obligation, a civil remedy is much more appropriate than a cancellation of the whole transaction. 
 Further, the seller was raising complaints 
about the actual value of the house. The court in making a finding concerning the 
bank guarantee considered the core function thereof and stated that the property 
guarantee is a form of documentary credit because its function is to provide for 
payment and not to serve as security. Therefore as long as the buyer has 
provided for the delivery of the guarantees, he or she has sufficiently complied 
with his or her obligations. 
1035 [2000] 3 All SA 24 (W). 
1036 See editor’s summary of facts and law in this case. 
1037 On the face of it this revocable form of guarantee, from the seller’s perspective, seems in fact the 
contradictory as it seems unfathomable that credit can be ‘guaranteed’ and yet very possible to withdraw at 
any stage. However the court stated that these forms of revocable property guarantees were found to be 
common in property transactions to guard against a situation where parties have breached the sale contract. 
The purpose of such a guarantee is to provide payment and not function as security and therefore the 
Respondent could not repudiate the contract based on that point of contention. 
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In Schmidt and Another NNO v ABSA Bank Ltd1038 the court dealt with the issue 
of documentary credit in breach of section 341 of the Companies Act.1039 The 
facts of the case are that a certain Badenhorst, sole director of Vesime Washing 
Systems (Pty) Ltd (referred to herein after as “VWS”) in 1995 secured sole 
distribution rights in South Africa for VWS certain automated motor vehicle 
washing machines from Auto-Equip Lavaggi SPA, an Italian company. Once 
VWS had secured an order or orders in South Africa it would import the machine 
or machines depending on the order. For finance purposes VWS, before placing 
the order with the Italian company supplier, it would arrange that a bank such as 
Bankfin, a division of ABSA and the respondent in this matter, to agree to finance 
the import, usually by entering into a lease or a suspensive sale agreement with 
the end user meaning the person placing the order with VWS.1040
 
 
Payment for the imported equipment by VWS to the Italian supplying company 
would be made via irrevocable documentary letters of credit in favour of the 
Italian company issued by the Trust Bank, a division of ABSA bank, the 
respondent. A machine was ordered and secured by VWS for an entity referred 
to as Mike Pendock Properties CC. For finance, VWS applied for documentary 
credit which was duly issued by ABSA, the respondent on 23 January 1998 with 
the date of payment for value being reflected as 15 April 1998. The relevant 
invoice from the Italian company dated 26 February 1998 and the machine were 
shipped from Italy on about that date.1041
 
 
VWS subsequently brought an ex parte application for its own winding up in 
March 1998 on the basis that it was unable to pay its debts, a month before the 
date of honour and payment on documentary credit was due. A provisional 
winding up order was made on 24 March 1998 and the final order on 5 May 
                                                 
1038 2002 (6) SA 706 (W). 
1039 61 of 1973. 
1040 709 A. 
1041 709 D – F. 
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1998. The machine arrived in South Africa and the respondent, ABSA, paid the 
Italian company on 15 April as per agreement. The amount paid to the Italian 
company was R404 086,50 in respect of the documentary credit and the 
respondent was to recover this payment from VWS.1042
 
 
Bankfin, a branch of the respondent upon becoming aware of VWS’s liquidation, 
were no longer prepared to finance the acquisition of the machine and this would 
put them in a difficult position considering that VWS is not widely represented in 
South Africa, taking into account that they were a sole distribution agent. In order 
to salvage the situation the respondent via its Trust bank branch arranged itself 
to sell the machine to Mike Pendock CC by entering into an agreement with that 
entity to finance the acquisition, this salvage attempt had the effect that Mike 
Pendock CC acquired the machine and the respondent paid for it.1043
 
 
It was the result of this perceived ability to dispose of the machine that the credit 
being challenged by the appellants that payment for that credit was made out to 
VWS account on 26 June 1998. It was shown in the facts that the first appellant 
had sent a letter to ABSA, the respondent on 26 August ‘1999’1044 claiming the 
machine or proceeds derived from the sale of the machine. ABSA replied by 
explaining that the purchase price of R404 086,50 had been repaid by Mike 
Pendock CC and credited to VWS via the branches suspense account. The 
respondent admitted to sending this reply but stated that the contents of the letter 




The court stated the trite law pertaining to documentary credit and came to the 
conclusion that there is certain risk that a bank takes on when issuing 
                                                 
1042 709 G – H. 
1043 710 A – B. 
1044 A typing error in letter acknowledged by the court, it was intended to read 1998. 
1045 710 C – F. This explanation by ABSA was accepted by the court a quo which had found that crediting 
the company’s account on 26 June 1998 was a rectification of a series of administrative errors or entries 
and did not amount to a disposition within the meaning of section 341(2) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 
as challenged within the application. 
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documentary credit. The bank may protect itself from this risk by retaining the bill 
of lading, obtaining security from the purchaser (customer) or obtaining payment 
from the same. In this case whether or not the respondent bank acted properly in 
debiting VWS’s current account at its Trust bank branch after the launching of an 
application for provisional order of liquidation is irrelevant. Having paid in terms of 
the credit it is common cause that the respondent bank became a concurrent 
creditor of VWS which would have been the position whether or not it did debit or 
did not debit VWS account with the amount.1046
 
 
What was important in the matter was that in terms of section 342 of the 
Companies Act1047 the winding up arose on 19 March 1998 and therefore the 
respondent bank was at all times prior to the crediting of the account on 26 June 
1998 a concurrent creditor of VWS in the amount of R404 086.50. However, 
once the respondent bank credited this amount on 26 June 1998, for whatever 
reason, this action had the effect of removing the respondent’s claim from the 
concursus in order to settle this claim in full in favour of the respondent bank to 
the prejudice of the general body of creditors.1048
 
 For this reason the court held 
that the payment amounted to a prohibited disposition. Granted this judgment is 
more related to company law than documentary credit it nevertheless provides 
useful insight on determining the extent of an issuing bank’s creditor position in 
cases where such a bank is due to recover payment made by it under 
documentary credit. 
Further, this case illustrates a typical case where a banking institution must avoid 
granting credit to finance a ‘sinking ship,’ it is proposed that though the innocent 
seller was assisted in receiving payment through the use of documentary credit, 
banks should ensure the sufficient solvency of clients in documentary credit 
applications or ensure that at least the commodity being traded upon resale can 
                                                 
1046 711 G – H. The court also established that the respondent’s bank’s decision to release the bill of lading 
to Mike Pendock CC which allowed him to obtain the machine and the respondent’s decision to lend Mike 
Pendock CC the amount necessary to purchase the machine was also completely irrelevant. 
1047 61 of 1973. 
1048 712 B. 
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provide sufficient profits to close all gaps opened by a credit issue, this is where 
diamond value becomes a more certain cover in international trade financed by 
documentary credit. 
 
A question that may arise is whether the rights contained in a documentary credit 
represent a res capable of attachment for the purposes of enforcing an action in 
rem. This issue was dealt with by the South African court in Ex Parte Sapan 
Trading (Pty) Ltd1049 is a case dealing with the question as to whether rights 
embodied in the irrevocable documentary credit can be attached ad fundandam 
or ad confirmandam jurisdictionem. This case was an urgent appeal against the 
judgment dismissing an ex parte application for an order authorizing the 
attachment ad fundandam or alternatively ad confirmandam jurisdictionem of the 
claims of four letters of credit.1050
 
 
The appeal court, in a judgment delivered by Streicher J, to which the whole 
bench concurred, stated that the trial court’s decision had been an incorrect 
conclusion based on wrong reasoning. In coming to a decision on the attachment 
of documentary credit claims, the appeal court stated that each of the letters of 
credit formed irrevocable undertakings by the issuing bank to the beneficiary 
(Finetrade in this case) which gave rise to a contract between the issuing bank 
and the beneficiary. Since the agreement between the issuing bank and the 
beneficiary was the result of a contract between the applicant (Sapan Trading 
(Pty) Ltd) and the beneficiary in terms of which the credit had to be established 
and of a contract between the applicant and the issuing bank but separate from 
and independent of such underlying contracts.1051
 
 In this case both the applicant 
and beneficiary had contractual obligations with the issuing bank based on 
independent terms of agreement. 
                                                 
1049 1995 (1) SA 218 (W). 
1050 220 H – J. The court considered the allegations contained in the applicants founding affidavit and stated 
that some of the allegations were highly improbable but would be considered nonetheless, however this 
attitude reflected by the court creates doubt as to the soundness of the applicant’s claims in this case. 
1051 223 H – J. 224 A. 
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In light of these contractual relationships the court clarified that the beneficiary 
was advised in terms of the letter of credit and not of the terms of application to 
the issuing bank. It was therefore the documentary credit that embodied the 
agreement between the issuing bank and beneficiary. On this basis the appeal 
court highlighted the flaw in the court a quo judgment stating that contracts 
between the beneficiary and the issuing banks had to be determined according to 
the application for the establishment of letters of credit.1052
 
 
It was established that the rights that existed under the letters of credit were 
those between beneficiary and issuing bank. Parties are obligated to perform in 
terms of their undertakings on the letters of credit. Since these rights were assets 
it was a crucial question for the court to determine whether these rights could be 
attached. In answering this question the appeal court found that in matters of 
documentary credits the credit issued and confirmed by the bank must be paid if 
the documents are in order and therefore any dispute between buyer and seller 
must be settled between themselves.1053 The court held that the undertaking of 
credit must be respected and any implied terms must be in accordance with what 
was aimed by the purpose of the letter of credit. Further, in this case the court 
stated that it would be fruitless to enforce the order sought by the applicant since 
the undertaking was to pay in Germany and not South Africa.1054
 
 
In conclusion the court took the view that a term should be implied in law into the 
agreement between the applicant and beneficiary that the applicant would 
establish an irrevocable letter of credit and that the applicant would not attach the 
claims under the credit to found or confirm jurisdiction.1055
 
 
                                                 
1052 224 A – B. Strangely this reasoning by the court a quo would mean that the court would have to get 
into the banking practice and look at the application for credit before the relationships have even been 
defined. This is certainly a somewhat flawed process. 
1053 225 D. 
1054 226 H. 
1055 227 D – E. 
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This case shows the usual zeal of the South African courts to support 
international trade transactions to the best of what it deems the intention of the 
parties. This is the appropriate method of interpretation as it gives business 
efficacy to the contract as would have been originally intended by the parties. 
Though that is commendable this judgment somewhat leaves the question of 
attachment unanswered in principle though there is a substantial attempt to 
define the nature of the letter of credit in the judgment, it is not so clear on giving 
sufficient guidance to the main issue at hand, that being, to what extent can 
rights under a credit be attached. 
 
5.3 Some Core Principles Documentary Credit  
The documentary credit has evolved to be the main form of credit sale 
acceptable and well recognised in the diamond international trading sphere. 
Documentary credit is also known as a commercial letter of credit or simply 
credit. This means that there is ‘an independent undertaking by a bank, acting as 
mandatory for its customer (for example, a local buyer), to pay the beneficiary 
(for example a foreign seller) a stipulated sum of money against the presentation 
of stipulated documents (for example, bills of lading (used in shipping, for 
instance), commercial invoices and insurance documents).’1056
 
 
The UCP 600 definition of documentary credit or credit as appears in the 
definitions section is outlined as follows in Article 2: 
 
‘Credit means any arrangement, however named or 
described, that is irrevocable and thereby constitutes a 
                                                 
1056 Itzikowitz A.J. and Du Toit S.F. (original text by L.J. Gering) Banking and Currency: Business of 
Commercial Banking Documentary Credits Volume 2(1) Law of South Africa (2003) 379. See also Willis J 
Banking in South African Law Juta (1981). Schulze W.G. The UCP 600: A New Law Applicable to Letters 
of Credit South African Mercantile Law Journal Volume 21 (2009) 235. Schulze W.G. Strict Conformity of 
Documents Under A Performance Guarantee: Does A Signed Copy of A Document Qualify An Original? 
Stefanutti & Bressan (Pty) Ltd v Nedbank Ltd (Unreported Judgment Delivered 30 July 2008) Case 
Number 5311/2008 D&CLD Obiter (2009) 411. Schulze W.G. The UCP 600: A New Law Applicable to 
Letters of Credit South African Mercantile Law Journal Volume 21 (2009) 228. Fredericks E.A. and Neels 
J.L. The Proper Law of a Documentary Letter of Credit (Part I) South African Mercantile Law Journal 
Volume 15 (2003) 63.  
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definite undertaking of the issuing bank to honour a 
complying presentation.’ 
 
In practice documentary credit is therefore created as follows (a letter which 
comes into existence by formal written application by the applicant) is to facilitate 
dealings between merchants in different countries by guaranteeing payment to 
the seller whilst ensuring delivery to the buyer of the goods of contractual 
description. Four parties are involved in sale by documentary credit, namely the 
applicant (usually the importer or buyer), the issuing bank,1057 the notifying bank 
(which may bind itself as the confirming bank) and the beneficiary (usually the 
seller/exporter). There is a much involved paper trail in such transactions as the 
parties deal with documents and not with the goods; services or other 
performances under the transaction covered by the documents as credits are by 




It is important at this juncture to consider the detail of the specific requirements or 
characteristics of a valid letter of credit.1059 Three of the most important 
characteristics for a letter of credit are that will be discussed here are as follows. 
First when a letter of credit is opened there must be autonomy1060 of the letter of 
credit.1061 Secondly the letter operates through the doctrine of strict 
compliance.1062 Thirdly parties must be aware of the fraud exception.1063
                                                 
1057 Montrod Ltd v Grundkötter Fleischvertriebs GmbH and Another [2002] 3 All ER 697 para 37, banks 
deal with the documents and not the goods. 
 
1058 Ibid. The banks are not concerned or  bound by other contracts underlying the credit agreement even if 
such contracts are included in the credit. This was confirmed in the following decisions of the court: Ex 
Parte Sapan Trading (Pty) Ltd 1995 (1) SA 218 (W); Hamzeh Malas and Sons v British Imex Industries 
Ltd [1958] 2 QB 127; Discount Records Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1975] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 444; United City 
Merchants (Investments) Ltd and Others v Royal Bank of Canada and Others [1982] All ER 720. See also 
Sirus International Insurance Corp (Publ) v FAI General Insurance Co Ltd and Others [2004] 1 All ER 
308 p 309. 
1059 Carr I. International Trade Law 3 ed Cavendish Publishing Limited (2005) 471. 
1060 Schulze W.G. The UCP 600: A New Law Applicable to Letters of Credit South African Mercantile Law 
Journal Volume 21 (2009) 235. 
1061 Carr I. International Trade Law 3 ed Cavendish Publishing Limited (2005) 471. 
1062 Carr I. International Trade Law 3 ed Cavendish Publishing Limited (2005) 478. Montrod Ltd v 




According to the principle of autonomy, the undertaking of the issuing bank or 
confirming is bank to pay against the documents is the primary obligation.  This 
confirms the principle already stated above and well established in South African 
law and banking practice.1064 This means that any dispute between the seller and 
buyer over the contract of sale will not affect the credit.1065
 
 What is of importance 
is that the documents supporting the credit are tendered properly and in order. 
The principle of autonomy a core principle in documentary credit law1066
 
 is 
provided for in Article 5 of the UCP 600 where it is stated specifically that banks 
deal with documents and not with goods, services or performance to which the 
documents are related. 
5.3.2 Strict Compliance 
The principle of strict compliance or conformity of documents has been 
considered by South African author Schulze1067 who submits that for the South 
African context, a new case1068 dealing with principles that can be applicable to 
documentary credit is important to the understanding of the area of law. The 
author discussed a case which involves the presentation of a signed copy 
(marked ‘copy II’) for payment under a guarantee. The court found that 
signatures on copies did not elevate the documents to some sort of duplicate 
original.1069
                                                                                                                                                 
1063 Carr I. International Trade Law 3 ed Cavendish Publishing Limited (2005) 502. Connerty A. Fraud 
and Documentary Credits: The Approach of the English Courts antonyconnerty@lambchambers.com. 
 The author discusses sub-article 17(b), (c) and (d) which provide that 
1064 Ex Parte Sapan Trading (Pty) Ltd 1995 (1) SA 218 (W) 223 H – J. 224 A. 
1065 Carr I. International Trade Law 3 ed Cavendish Publishing Limited (2005) 478. 
1066 Montrod Ltd v Grundkötter Fleischvertriebs GmbH and Another [2002] 3 All ER 697 para 37. 
1067 Schulze W.G. Strict Conformity of Documents Under A Performance Guarantee: Does A Signed Copy 
of A Document Qualify An Original? Stefanutti & Bressan (Pty) Ltd v Nedbank Ltd (Unreported Judgment 
Delivered 30 July 2008) Case Number 5311/2008 D&CLD Obiter (2009) 411. See also Schulze W.G. The 
UCP 600: A New Law Applicable to Letters of Credit South African Mercantile Law Journal Volume 21 
(2009) 228. 
1068 Ibid. 
1069 Schulze W.G. Strict Conformity of Documents Under A Performance Guarantee: Does A Signed Copy 
of A Document Qualify An Original? Stefanutti & Bressan (Pty) Ltd v Nedbank Ltd (Unreported Judgment 
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a document will be treated as original under certain circumstances. However the 
author also cautions that with the modern technological advances that allow for 
easier duplication, a marked copy will not suffice as sufficient tender of original 
under sub-article 17(d).1070
 
 Strict compliance is an important protective measure 
in documentary credit. 
Under the doctrine of strict compliance the beneficiary will present the documents 
to the issuing, advising or confirming bank as required.1071 The acceptance or 
rejection of the tendered documents by the bank is dependant on whether the 
documents conform prima facie to the terms of credit. Therefore on the face of 
the documents there must be strict compliance with credit terms or the bank will 
be entitled to reject the documents. Since banks are not imputed with the 
knowledge of trade but are rather experts on finance this means that such 
documents must meet the specific requirements of credit no matter how trivial 




Articles 14, 15, 16 and 17 of the UCP 600 deal specifically with the standard of 
documents and the manner in which they may be presented. 
 
5.3.3 Fraud exception 
It has been submitted that the bank’s obligation to pay on documents that appear 
to conform on their face is curtailed in the event of fraud. The courts are however 
reluctant to set aside the credit agreement based on a mere allegation of fraud. 
Fraud must be proved as will be illustrated in the further deliberations of this 
chapter. The aim of preserving the trust in compliant documentation is essential 
                                                                                                                                                 
Delivered 30 July 2008) Case Number 5311/2008 D&CLD Obiter (2009) 413. This means that the bank 
favoured strict compliance. 
1070 Schulze W.G. Strict Conformity of Documents Under A Performance Guarantee: Does A Signed Copy 
of A Document Qualify An Original? Stefanutti & Bressan (Pty) Ltd v Nedbank Ltd (Unreported Judgment 
Delivered 30 July 2008) Case Number 5311/2008 D&CLD Obiter (2009) 418. 
1071 Forestal Mimosa Ltd v Oriental Credit Ltd [1986] 2 All ER 400 505 H.; Banque de l’Indochine et de 
Suez SA v J H Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd [1983] 1 All ER 1137 1145 – 1145. 
1072 Carr I. International Trade Law 3 ed Cavendish Publishing Limited (2005) 471, 481; 482. 
 281 
for the purposes of preserving the flourishing of commerce.1073
 
 It is submitted 
that the protection of commerce must be at the top of the agenda when methods 
of financing international trade are at issue. 
In United City merchants (Investments) Ltd and Others v Royal Bank of Canada 
and Others1074 the House of Lords in this case dealt with a presentation of 
fraudulent documents for purposes of enforcing documentary credit. In the 
judgment of Lord Diplock to which the entire bench concurred it was stated that 
this judgment is of general importance to all those engaged in the conduct and 
financing of international trade. The facts of the case were first discussed in the 
court a quo where the sellers and their own merchant bankers to whom they had 
transferred the credit as security for advances were the plaintiffs. The confirming 
bank was cited as defendant with the buyers and the issuing bank joined as 
further parties. There was a further appeal to the Court of Appeal (CA)1075 and 
finally an appeal to the House of Lords.1076
 
 
The issuing bank had initially admitted liability to indemnify the confirming bank 
for any sums for which it as defendant should have been held liable to the 
plaintiffs. However, the appeals in this matter were undertaken by counsel for the 
issuing bank. Lord Diplock subsequently pointed out however that the House of 
Lords was concerned with the contractual relationship between the buyers and 
the issuing bank or between the issuing bank and the confirming bank because 
‘the documentary credit point depends on the contractual relationship between 
                                                 
1073 Carr I. International Trade Law 3 ed Cavendish Publishing Limited (2005) 502; 503. 
1074 [1982] 2All ER 720. 
1075 Where the Court of Appeal had found that the letter of credit was unenforceable under the Bretton 
Woods Agreement (the sale agreement) in that it infringed exchange control regulations, this part of the 
finding was confirmed by the House of Lords. The Court of Appeal also found that the defendant 
(confirming bank) was entitled to refuse to pay under the letter of credit against the fraudulently completed 
shipping documents, the House of Lords rejected this finding and allowed the appeal. This case shows that 
the letter of credit and the ancillary sales contract underlying it are separate issues and it will be important 
to this chapter to analyze the rationale adopted by the House of Lords in making this finding. 
1076 722 – 723. 
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the sellers (or their transferee) and the confirming bank.’1077
 
 This is an important 
point because the sellers were contractual benefactors under the documentary 
credit and it would seem strange that they were unable to claim payment.  
The buyer, Vitrorefuerzos SA, a Peruvian company had agreed to buy from the 
seller goods in the form of plant for the manufacture of glass fibers at a price of $ 
662, 086 FOB1078 London for shipment to Callao. Payment was to be done in 
London by confirmed irrevocable transferable letter of credit as to 70 per cent of 
the invoice price and 100 per cent of the freight.1079
 
 
The letter of credit was made subject to the International Chamber of Commerce 
(ICC) Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP), 1974 
revision. The letter was to be available by sight drafts on the issuing bank against 
delivery with a full set of among other documents ‘on board’ bills of lading 
evidencing receipt for shipment of the goods from London to Callao on or before 
a date in October 1976 which was extended to 15 December 1976. The initial 
payment of 20 per cent of the invoice price was duly made by the confirming 
bank to the seller, after that the seller transferred to its own merchant bankers its 
interest under the credit as security for advances with the seller continuing as 
beneficiary of the confirmed credit.1080
 
 
The goods were not shipped timeously and when the bills of lading (shipping 
documents) were presented to the confirming bank on 17 December 1976, the 
bank refused to pay because the bills of lading did not have a dated ‘on board’ 
                                                 
1077 722. The House of Lords in this case also had to determine an ancillary issue in the matter concerning 
the certain special provisions in an agreement between the sellers and the buyers which was collateral or 
added confirmation to their sale contract and this was the ‘Bretton Woods Agreement point’ to be decided 
in the case. 
1078 An Incoterm which stands for ‘free on board’ as sponsored by the International Chamber of Commerce 
(ICC) which means stands for ‘free on board’ where the seller is said to have completed his or her 
obligations once he or she has delivered the goods over the ship’s rail at the port of shipment. The buyer 
from that point takes responsibility and risk in the goods. For further reading on this issue. See Ndlovu 
Portia, South Africa Law of Carriage of Goods by Sea: Common Obligations in Charterparties and Bills of 
Lading Under English and South African Law, Law Books Press (2008) 42. 
1079 723 par. 3 – 4. 
1080 723 par. 5. 
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notation. The bills were returned to the carrier’s freight brokers and they issued a 
fresh set of bills of lading reflecting an untrue notation stating that the goods were 
on board on 15 December 1976. The amended bills together with the other 
documents were presented to the confirming bank and it again refused to pay on 
the basis that it had information in its possession which suggested that shipment 
was not affected as reflected in the bills and therefore falsified.1081 It was 
established that the misleading conduct of the employee of the loading brokers to 
the carriers was fraudulent however neither the seller (nor its transferee) were 
parties to such fraud.1082
 
 
The House of Lords made reference to the principles as to the legal nature of 
contractual obligations assumed by various parties to a transaction consisting of 
an international sale of goods to be financed by means of a confirmed 
irrevocable documentary credit. It opined that it is trite law that there are four 
autonomous but interconnected contractual relationships of utmost importance 
and these are: 
 
1. The foundational sale of goods contract between buyer 
and seller. 
2. The contract between the buyer and the issuing bank. In 
this case the issuing bank agrees to issue credit, either 
through itself or a confirming bank to notify credit to the 
seller and to make payments to or to order of the seller, 
which may also include payment, acceptance or 
negotiation of bills of exchange drawn by the seller, 
against presentation of stipulated documents. The buyer 
                                                 
1081 724 par. 1. 
1082 724 par. 2. Therefore, it became important to consider whether it would be fair to punish the 
beneficiary or the transferee for conduct resulting in falsified shipping documents which they knew nothing 
of and which formed a separate aspect of the documentary credit in essence since banks do not deal with 
the goods but documentation. 
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agrees to reimburse the issuing bank for payments 
made under the credit.1083
3. If payment is to be made through a confirming bank, 
there is a contract between the issuing bank and the 
confirming bank authorizing and requiring the confirming 
bank to make such payments and to remit the stipulated 
documents to the issuing bank when they are received. 
The issuing bank then agrees to reimburse the 
confirming bank for payments made under the credit. 
 
4. The contract between the confirming bank and seller. 
The confirming bank in this case undertakes to pay the 
seller (or to accept or negotiate without recourse to 
drawer bills of exchange drawn by him or her) up to the 




With regard to the fourth contract the court further emphasized that it is trite law 
that the confirming bank deals with documents and not goods as provided in the 
UCP. Therefore it is expected that if the documents presented to the confirming 
bank prima facie conform to the requirements of credit, that bank is contractually 
bound to the seller to honour the credit.  
 
The whole commercial purpose of the irrevocable documentary credit system has 
been developed in international trade to give the seller an assured right to 
payment before he parts with control of the goods and that does not allow any 
dispute with the buyer as to the performance of the contract of sale being used 
as a ground for non-payment, reduction or deferment of payment.1085
 
  
                                                 
1083 725 par. 1. Note that if the stipulated document includes a bill of lading, because the bill of lading is a 
document of dignity representing the goods, it acts as security available to the issuing bank. 
1084 Ibid. 
1085 725 par. 2.  
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The above view suggests that the confirming bank must honour the credit based 
on the conforming documents notwithstanding that the bank has some 
knowledge that the seller at the time of presentation is alleged by the buyer to 
have or in fact already has committed a breach of his contract with the buyer of 
the sale of goods. This confirms the position that banks are merely concerned 
with the documents. 
 
The exception to this rule comes only in the case where the seller has been 
fraudulent in presenting documents for the purpose of obtaining credit and in the 
instant case the House of Lords found that there was no such fraud because the 
seller was not privy to the inaccuracy of the statement in the bills of lading 
concerning the date of shipment.1086
 
 
The House of Lords discussed the fraud issue a length and discussed English 
and American law on what would constitute documents that are fraudulent and 
the extent required for such false statements to make the documentary credit a 
nullity. The concluding view taken by the court in this case agreed with Judge 
Mocatta of the court a quo in that he had been correct in upholding the 
documentary credit and finding in favour of the sellers. The House of Lords on 
that basis did not agree with the finding that the documentary credit was a nullity 
as found by the Court of Appeals on this issue. 
 
This case forms an important basis for establishing trite law on documentary 
credit and illustrates that for commercial parties involved in international trade, 
documentary credits are used as vehicles to support sellers in receiving 
payments for goods that they have parted company with. But for this type of 
security it would be extremely difficult to enter into international trade contracts 
particularly ones involving diamonds. Further, this case favors the protection of 
the documentary credit, however, within the limits of ensuring that documents 
used are procured without forgery and material defects in law. 
                                                 
1086 725 par. 3 - 4.   
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In terms of the UCP 600 provisions concerning the fraud exception will be 
clarified to a greater extent in the subsequent paragraph. However it is important 
to note that the drafters of the UCP 600 did not elect to use the word fraud as 
such in the document however Article 16 (a) does make reference to the refusal 
by the bank to honour discrepant documents. 
 
5.3.1 International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Uniform Customs and 
Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP) 
Certain specific Articles of the recently updated ICC1087
 
 UCP 600 will now be 
examined. It is clear that the latest UCP seek to align banking practice with 
developments in banking, transport and insurance industries. Further, the UCP 
600 also sought to address the issue of the use of uniform language and style in 
the standard documents in order to remove wording that could lead to 
inconsistent application and interpretation. 
In South Africa these rules may apply within the choice of law branch for the 




The language of the UCP 600 rules is clear. However, it is submitted that it will 
be important to mention a few aspects of the rules in order to illustrate its 
alignment or contrast with foreign courts’ views and national law on the issue. In 
South Africa there is a rich source of precedent dealing with documentary letters 
of credit,1089
                                                 
1087 www.iccwbo.org/ 24 February 2008. 
 however, the rules are not captured in a specific statute dealing with 
this type of international trade tool. Since South Africa does not have a specific 
1088 Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act 105 of 1983 section 6(5). 
1089 Examples of such precedent include examples of cases such as Philips and Another v Standard Bank of 
South Africa Ltd and Others 1985 (3) SA 301 (W), Ex Parte Sapan Trading (Pty) Ltd 1995 (1) SA 218 
(W),  Loomcraft Fabrics CC v Nedbank and Another 1996 (1) SA 812 (A), Rosen v Ekon [2000] 3 All SA 
24 (W), Vereins-Und Wesbank AG v Veren Investments and Others 2000 (4) SA 238 (W), Transcontinental 
Procurement Services CC v ZVL & ZKL International AS and Another [2000] JOL 7352 (W), Vereins-Und 
Wesbank AG v Veren Investments and Others 2002 (4) SA 421 (SCA), Schmidt and Another NNO v ABSA 
Bank Ltd 2002 (6) SA 706 (W), OK Bazaars (1929) Ltd v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd [2002] JOL 
9460 (A). 
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national statute on documentary credit it may be best to consider the importance 
of the ICC UCP as they formulate an international code that provides harmony on 
this international finance tool for international trade as well as certainty on the 
rules to be adhered to by the international banking fraternity. 
 
In the case of Ex Parte Sapan Trading (Pty) Ltd1090 the appeal court seemed very 
critical of the court a quo’s assumption that the 1983 revised UCP as sponsored 
by the ICC was automatically applicable without question in that case. The 1983 
UCP and its provisions were heavily relied on by the judge a quo in making his 
decision to dismiss the application in issue before it.1091 The appeal court did not 
mention much else pertaining to the UCP after that criticism but it would stand to 
reason that the court was suggesting that a South African court when considering 
a matter pertaining to documentary credit, UCP as sponsored by the ICC do not 
form rules that are final and binding to determine matters of documentary credit 
and trade in a South African court. This means that as useful as it is to consider 
the UCP, the South African courts will rely mostly on its own judicial precedent 
rather than the UCP and the UCP is there as an international guide. So the UCP 




                                                 
1090 1995 (1) SA 218 (W). 
1091 222 I – J; 223 C – E. 
1092 It must be noted that the decision taken by the court in this case was in line with s 231 of the 
Constitution which provides as follows:    It must be noted that  ‘(1) The negotiating and signing of all 
international agreements is the responsibility of the national executive.  
(2) An international agreement binds the Republic only after it has been approved by resolution in both the 
National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces, unless it is an agreement referred to in 
subsection (3).  
 (3) An international agreement of a technical, administrative or executive nature, or an agreement which 
does not require either ratification or accession, entered into by the national executive, binds the Republic 
without approval by the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces, but must be tabled in 
the Assembly and the Council within a reasonable time.  
 (4) Any international agreement becomes law in the Republic when it is enacted into law by national 
legislation; but a self-executing provision of an agreement that has been approved by Parliament is law in 
the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament.  
 (5) The Republic is bound by international agreements which were binding on the Republic when this 
Constitution took effect.’ 
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It is proposed that the UCP can form a useful and unique guide to formulating a 
South African code or informing the court on the international practice in matters 
of trade and the use of documentary credit as a financing tool. The structure of 
the UCP 2007 revision contains 39 articles with an application note and 
definitions sections contained in the initial articles of the document. It is stated in 
Article 1 of the UCP that the rules contained therein are applicable to any 
documentary credit when the text of the credit expressly indicates that it is 
subject to these rules. It is also contained within the same article that all parties 
are bound by the rules in the same manner unless they have expressly modified 
this position by agreement or excluded by the credit. Therefore, a court or party 
seeking to enforce these rules must prove applicability thereof from the standard 
trading conditions of the documentary credit stating expressly that such rules are 
applicable. It cannot just be assumed. 
 
Article 2 provides for the definition of the parties involved and the meaning of 
credit. Article 3 deals with important language uses and expressly provides how 
these are to be interpreted. Article 4 is an important provision which by its nature 
confirms the law concerning the parallel role of documentary credit alongside the 
sale or commercial contract on which it is based The article provides that the 
credit is a separate transaction to the sale or other contract and banks are in no 
way concerned with or bound by such a contract even if reference to such a 
contract has been included in the credit. The article further states that an 
undertaking by a bank to honour, negotiate or fulfill any other obligation under the 
credit is not subject to claims or defences by the applicant resulting from its 
relationships with the issuing bank or the beneficiary. 
 
The article goes as far as to state clearly that the beneficiary cannot in any 
circumstances avail itself of the contractual relationships existing between banks 
or between the applicant and the issuing bank. In fact the article provides further 
in sub-section (b) of Article 4 that the issuing bank must discourage any attempt 
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by the applicant to include as an essential part of the credit copies of the 
underlying contract including proforma invoices and documents of that nature. 
 
Since diamonds are commonly carried by air, the provisions relating to air 
transport in UCP 600 Article 23 becomes particularly relevant to such 
transactions for consideration. Even though it is clearly stated in Article 5 of the 
UCP that banks deal with documents and not goods, services or performance to 
which the document may relate, it is essential that all documents comply with the 
banking practice techniques expected in order to effect a valid documentary 
credit transaction.  
 
Since Article 23 is important to diamond carriage because of general air transport 
use, there are certain technical aspects that must be contained in the air 
transport document. The air transport document must indicate the name of the 
carrier and be signed by such carrier or its agent while showing in the same 
document that such goods were in fact received and accepted for carriage, 
indicating the date of issue and that date will be the date deemed as date of 
shipment unless the air transport document contains a specific notation of the 
actual date of shipment. Other important information relating to the air transport 
(also referred to as ‘shipment’) can be determined by reference to this article. 
 
Other important articles pertaining to diamond shipments relate to Article 25 
which deals with use of courier receipt as diamonds are generally delivered by 
hand to hand type of service for extra caution although Article 25 also covers the 
use of the post. The documents used in this type of service must reflect post 
receipts or certificates of posting which must bear the necessary stamps or 
signatures in order to determine date of shipment. Article 28 deals with the 
insurance of the goods in question. All the necessary information pertaining to 
underwriters must appear clearly on the duly issued insurance certificate or a 
declaration under an open cover. This aspect of insurance is most crucial to 
diamond trade. The documents listed above are essential to enable the bank to 
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view the transaction as acceptable within banking hours and subject to 
exclusionary clauses pertaining to fortuitous events.1093
 
 
It is important to note that one of the concerns in documentary credit finance as 
raised in case law involves the liability of the bank in instances of forgery in 
documents. Article 34 deals with this issue very clearly under the heading 
‘disclaimer on effectiveness of documents’. In terms of this provision a bank does 
not assume responsibility for the form, sufficiency, accuracy, genuineness, 
falsification or legal effect of any document, or for the general or particular 
conditions stipulated in a document or superimposed thereon. The bank further 
does not assume liability or responsibility for the description, quantity, weight, 
quality, condition, packing, delivery, value or existence of the goods, services or 
other performance represented y any document, or for the good faith or acts of 
omission, solvency, performance or standing of the consignor, the carrier, the 
forwarder, the consignee or the insurer of the goods or any other person. 
 
Professor Levit commented that the UCP is a thick technical document which 
may prove too complicated to those who do not have trade-finance expertise.1094 
Professor Levit further argues that while the UCP is clear on the standards to be 
employed by banks when examining the documents in order to determine 
whether they are going to honour or dishonor them or waive their rights to 
dishonor the credit through the employment of the preclusion principle. The 
unpacking of all these provisions in the UCP, it is submitted, allows parties to the 
documentary credit to reference these rules in wholesale fashion and thereby 
making them to be the preferred law of the documentary contract.1095
                                                 
1093 Articles 33 and 36. 
 
1094 This is part of the reason for elucidating some core aspects of the UCP in this chapter. 
1095 Janet Koven Levit Bottom-Up Lawmaking Through a Pluralist Lens: The ICC Banking Commission 
and the Transnational Regulation of Letters of Credit Emory Law Journal 57 Emory L.J. (2008) 1147 p. 
1172. The submissions above are of value to parties who wish to be at harmony in terms of ensuring 
maximum compliance with uniform customs and banking practice in international trade documentary credit 
transactions and documents. It is submitted that if a particular law works well and has been tried and tested 
through time there ought to be nothing precluding such uniform rules becoming preferred law instead of 
local legislation or common law. 
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With regard to the debate on the law to be applied in light of documentary credit 
and the application of the ICC UCP in South Africa submissions by Professor 
Basedow provides some advice. He argues that uniform rules on international 
trade place the world in a mixed jurisdiction with legal pluralism.1096
 
  
Professor Basedow further submits that private law results from two competing 
sources, namely, organs of State and organizations of private parties. The State 
and non-State systems sometimes complement each other and sometimes 
compete. The competition occurs in the context generally observed in 
transnational economic regulation. Although State sovereignty might be 
presumed to dominate such competitions, experience or practice somehow 
illustrates that sometimes privately made laws will prevail.1097
 
 
Professor Basedow also comments that the ICC UCP rules are a fine example of 
privately made rules that are at times preferred. The documentary credit and 
other financial legal instruments have been governed by international customs 
and these customs have been codified by the ICC. Therefore while documentary 
credit might be governed by US law, such US law was revised to align it with the 
provisions of the UCP, particularly with issues pertaining to revocability and 
preclusion. These two systems publicly and privately made competing law and 
the privately made law prevailed.1098
 
 It is submitted countries are better served if 
they adopt such privately made laws in international trade for the sake of 
developing international compatibility in business and to avoid legal disharmony 
where it can easily be prevented. 
 
                                                 
1096 David V. Snyder Special Symposium Issue: “Beyond the State: Rethinking Private Law”: Article: 
Actors: Contract Regulation, With and Without the State: Ruminations on Rules and their Sources. A 
Comment on Jurgen Basedow The American Society of Comparative law, Inc. American Journal of 
comparative Law 56 Am. Comp. L. 723 (2008) 725 – 726. 
1097 Ibid. As can be noted by the clarity provided by ICC Uniform Rules on documentary credit. 
1098 Ibid. 
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5.4 Practical Aspects of Using the Letter of Credit in Diamond Deals 
The consideration of the use of documentary credit in the preceding paragraphs 
proves that it is a finance method that undoubtedly has stood the test of time in 
international trade. The use of credit is still a common practice that will continue 
to support the practical commercial diamond trade throughout the globe. In this 
portion of the chapter there will be a consideration some of the everyday banking 
practice aspects of documentary credit in relation to actual diamond deals. It is 
important to note that these credits are referred to as letters of credit or LCs in 
banking jargon by customers and bankers, thus making their trade specific jargon 
very common to merchants.1099
 
 
To illustrate practical aspects of the use of documentary credit in diamond trade, 
two entities will be selected and briefly discussed. The first entity will represent 
diamond banking practice and the other entity will be in a form of a diamond 
trading company. These examples can be used as a fair reflection of what occurs 
in these types of entities throughout the world where diamond trade transactions 
are likely to take place. It must be noted that due to the protection of client 
confidentiality the information on the practice of financing diamond sales by 
documentary credit is limited to very brief information which the banking fraternity 
and their clients, the diamond houses could reveal. Therefore, it is submitted that 
the information that appears in this study though limited by nature reveals some 
useful practical insight nonetheless. 
 
The two examples expressed below showing diamond banking practices are but 
those aspects of information that are made available to the public domain. The 
business models that are expressed by these entities may be applied generally 
to all other entities with regard to legal aspects with obvious differences being 
expressed by various differing in-house procedures of each company. 
 
 
                                                 
1099 See Schmidt and Another NNO v ABSA Bank Ltd 2002 (6) SA 706 (W). 
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5.4.1 Antwerp Diamond Bank (ADB) 
It has been a documented fact that 85 per cent of the Antwerp diamond 
companies have an account with the Antwerp Diamond Bank.1100 The core 
activity of ADB is to grant credit to the diamond industry, execution of 
international and domestic payments and collections, import and export 
merchandise handling services and advisory services to clients. The bank 
maintains an excellent reputation and accepts only diamond and jewellery 
companies as clients and new clients must be introduced by at least two already 
existing members. They maintain strong compliance with industry regulations 
and maintain a good understanding of clients’ cycles. The credit granting aspect 
of the ADB banking practice is based on the self-securing, self-liquidating 
individual transactions. ADB’s financial services include letters of credit and other 
services which are well supported by state of the art software to ensure efficient 
and expedient service.1101
 
The history of the bank post-World War II is explained 
as follows: 
‘With the development of the international trade, typical of 
the post-war period, ADB played an important role in the 
revival of the Belgian diamond industry and as such in the 
promotion of Belgian exports of which diamonds 
represented a considerable share. During that period of 
virtual ‘relocation’ of the diamond business from Amsterdam 
to Antwerp, the Bank also played a decisive role in the 
financing of rough diamonds at the sights organized by De 
                                                 
1100http://www.theage.com.au/business/another-lost-year-for-diamonds-20091026-hg9p.html 13 March 
2010.http://www.thediamond.com/press/businessam.html 13 March 2010. www.antwerpdiamondbank.com 
28 October 2009. It becomes evident from ADB’s public relations information that at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, diamond trade in Belgium was flourishing which led to the establishment of the 
Comptoir Diamantaire Anversois which was considered a real première in the world of finance, since for 
the first time a bank (now known to as ADB) decided to devote its activities entirely to the interests of 
diamond trade.  https://www.antwerpdiamondbank.com/index.php/ADB_en/profile/5 13 March 2010. 
1101 www.antwerpdiamondbank.com 28 October 2009. The ADB is constantly dealing with fluctuations in 
markets and will obviously be affected by the world-wide economic downturn, however, this does not 
mean that efficient services to clients in the form of documentary credit will die within their banking 
services to reliable customers.  
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Beers in London. In view of the increasing importance of 
Antwerp in the rough market and in the distribution of 
rough, the Bank was able to expand its activities 
considerably, first in Antwerp and at a later stage on an 
international level. In the early 80’s, both the Bank and the 
entire diamond banking community worldwide were faced 
with serious problems when the international diamond 
market came under pressure from inside its own industry as 
well as from the world economy in general. Supported by its 
shareholders and its customers, the ADB has been able to 




The activities of ADB and some of its operational structures in relation to 
diamond trade will be considered briefly as it sets out an important practical 
understanding of the contribution of made by an entity of this nature to diamond 
trade in the international context. The information explained below is taken from 




Between 19821104 and 2005 a wholly-owned subsidiary of ADB was established 
in Geneva, the Banque Diamantaire (Suisse) S.A. which was renamed later on in 
Diamond Bank (Switzerland) S.A. It is apparent from the information that the 
main activities of this subsidiary are focused on financing international diamond 
transactions and portfolio management.1105
                                                 
1102 https://www.antwerpdiamondbank.com/index.php/ADB_en/profile/5 13 March 2010. 
 In 1999 ADB opened a 
representative office in New York. In 2000 it opened another representative office 
in Hong Kong. In 2002 ADB opened a branch in India’s prime diamond centre, 
1103 Ibid. 
1104 At this stage diamond trade was particularly strong in South Africa with reference to its contribution to 
the national GDP. As stated by author Linda Ensor that at present diamond trade largely contributes to the 
South African GDP, although there has been a decline of this contribution in comparison with the early 
eighties. Linda Ensor Business Day (South Africa) October 13 2005. 
1105 https://www.antwerpdiamondbank.com/index.php/ADB_en/profile/5 13 March 2010. 
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Mumbai. In 2005 Diamond Bank (Switzerland) S.A., the wholly-owned subsidiary, 
opened a representative office in Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE).1106
 
 
It is stated that 85% of the Antwerp Diamond companies have an account with 
ADB and this includes a strong commercial link with KBC one of the largest 
banks in Belgium.1107 The core business of ADB is granting credit to the diamond 
industry.1108 This core function of ADB is proof that LCs and other forms of credit 
are necessary and will naturally follow diamond trade transactions. Further, the 
banks core functions also include the execution of international and domestic 
payments and collections, import and export merchandise handling services, 
advice to clients, account management credits and management of customer 
profile. Only diamond and jewellery companies are accepted as clients and all 
new clients must be introduced by at least two existing ADB clients and they 
must be members of one of the four diamond bourses in Antwerp.1109
 
 
ADB offer expedient import and export services to clients. Once the parcels are 
received by them for shipment, they are prepared, packaged and all the 
documentation required for the Diamond Office, Customs, Carriers, Consulate 
and acknowledgment of receipt are done. Physical presentation of the goods at 
Diamond Office for valuation and delivery to the carrier are also part of ADB’s 
mandate. This includes documents required for KPCS certification and where 
necessary storage in the bank’s highly secured vaults.1110
 
 It submitted that the 
understanding of the practical contribution of a bank to diamond trade as evident 
in ADB’s banking practices above serves as a useful example that creates clarity 
on how the law pertaining to diamond trade is practically applied by the parties 
involved in the transaction. 




1109 Ibid. Strict compliance with the Bank’s requirements is expected from every client and the bank 
ensures that it understands each customer’s production cycle. 
1110 Ibid. 
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5.4.2 Romance Diamond Company 
The selection of this company as an example of the business side of illustrating 
use of documentary credit in diamond sales is inspired by the fact that this 
company upholds as part of their business marketing strategy the use of 
documentary credit.1111
 
 They state in their public marketing documents provide 
as follows:  
‘Romance Diamonds may require the buyer to make 
payment by irrevocable letter of credit and may defer 
shipment or cancel any order if buyer does not promptly 
provide such letter of credit. Such letter of credit shall be 
issued for Romance Diamond’s benefit by a prime United 




The Romance Diamond Company is an example of a diamond and jewellery 
trading company with clients that are private people who seek to make their 
diamond purchases for private use hence the name of the company. The 
products which they focus on include engagement rings and other articles of 
jewellery intended for similar private wear.1113 Romance Diamond Company 
ensures the quality of its products by adhering to the standards of premier 





                                                 
1111 www.romance-diamonds.com/SalesOnline/ReturnsCreditPolicy.aspx 20 October 2009. 
1112 www.romance-diamonds.com/SalesOnline/ReturnsCreditPolicy.aspx 20 October 2009. In 2010 the 
documents related to purchases from Romance were closed to the general public and only the clients of 
Romance could have access to sales information via a special internet pass key. 
1113 http://www.thediamond.com/press/businessam.html 13 March 2010. 
1114 The Romance Diamond Company came from the Brosh family tradition of jewellery making. The 
Brosh family tradition began in Middletown, Ohio, where a young Charles Brosh got his start in the jewelry 
business. Through study and apprenticeships, he leaned the art of watch making, hand engraving, jewelry 
repair and stone setting. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
Notwithstanding the current global economic challenges that are impacting 
negatively on international trade and commerce, trade and business has to go on 
as usual though with caution particularly if that industry is involved in high value 
minerals that can be used as security at any stage of the transaction. Therefore if 
usual business includes the granting of credit by banks to buyers to finance such 
business transactions in diamond trade, the nature of such credit, the impact of 
its use in diamond trade and the importance of maintaining such an effective 
international financiering method should be known and learnt.  
 
It is submitted that documentary credit specifically appropriate for international 
diamond trading as some form of risk is necessary in supporting international 
trade. The use of credit in diamond trading does not create gaps in domestic 
economies as the whole processes were generally secured by a valued 
commodity. To discard this method of finance would impact negatively on 
international diamond trade and also on trade of commodities based on credit.  
The use of credit based trading systems has proven to be the best option 
especially in the financing of global diamond trade. Further, since there are 
sound international principles that promote the use of documentary credit, such a 
practice should be upheld and retained as it will contribute positively to South 
Africa as a diamond producing country. 
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Having discussed some of the practical aspects of the purchase and sale of 
diamonds, it is essential that the transportation of such diamonds be discussed in 
order to determine how delivery of the diamond as a highly sensitive product is 
achieved. Since the removal of apartheid laws in South Africa, air carriage has 
since been enhanced and global trade through air carriage has become the norm 
in South African international trade. It is the removal of apartheid1115 which has 
allowed South Africa to participate freely with the world1116 in trade and other 




The purpose of this chapter is to highlight some of the practicalities of diamond 
trade insofar as it relates to the carriage and insurance of the stones that are 
                                                 
1115 This was achieved with the efforts of the Government of National Unity which saw to the development 
of the Interim Constitution, 1993 and the Final Constutition, 1996. 
1116 See Cochran S.E.  The Pivotal State: Post-Apartheid South Africa Parameters, Volume 30  (2000) 
available on http://www.questia.com/googleScholar.qst?docId=5002379437 25 March 2010, \ in his paper 
he states that ‘Since the end of apartheid South Africa has made significant progress toward overcoming 
the legacy of this politically and economically fragile race-based system which denied full rights to the 
majority of its people. Six years after Mandela's election, South Africa is by far the most advanced 
democracy in Africa. The end of apartheid also has allowed South Africa to end its previous international 
isolation. The country's new government aspires to both a position of regional political leadership and one 
of influence in international organizations. South Africa also has emerged as one of Africa's leading trading 
nations and a key center of foreign, including US, investment in the region. South Africa's economy alone 
accounts for 40 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa's total gross domestic product (GDP). Excluding oil imports, 
South Africa accounts for 60 percent of US trade with Africa and one-quarter of US capital investment in 
the region.’ Para 1. 
1117 Pirie G.H. Aviation, apartheid and sanctions: Air Transport To and From South Africa, 1945 – 1989 
(1990) 231. The author argues that that the past geography of air transport to and from South Africa has 
been shaped by the world map of anti-apartheid.’ This position has been altered by the removal of such 
embargoes. 
1118 The development of South Africa’s Aviation standards is partly owed to the Constitutional 
dispensation, particularly in light of the regrettable past of South African flying. It is documented in history 
that because of apartheid South African planes were prohibited from flying over certain African and Indian 
countries. See www.southafrica.to/history/history.html 25 March 2010. ‘Due to international condemnation 
of the apartheid regime during the 1980s…South African's planes were able to fly for the first time over 
Egypt and Sudan.’ www.airliners.net/aviation-forums/general_aviation/.../1177779/ 25 March 2010. South 
Africa was nicknamed ‘slow around Africa’ because of anti-apartheid activism by members of other 
countries. 
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being traded. For the most part, it is the persons directly involved in international 
diamond trade who are aware of the assessment of risks of diamond insurance 
or the lawful and standard packaging methods of diamonds for carriage. 
 
This chapter is not designed to be a consideration of the general law of 
insurance. It is intended to be a study of the methods of carriage and insurance 
of diamonds which were alluded to in the chapter dealing with documentary 
credit. Therefore some international standard practices will be elucidated in light 
of some legal principles that pertain to the sensitive and risky nature of the 
business of trading in diamonds. What will emerge from this study is that the 
Constitutional1119
 
 mandate of looking into foreign law to develop South African 
law further has caused air carriage law in South Africa to show world class 
standards in application. This means that South African transport systems are 
sophisticated enough to attract the best trading partners in the global context. 
Since the study is concerned about Constitutionally sound methods of trade that 
are being experienced in the diamond trade in modern South Africa, this study 
will investigate how applicable international law and national law is also created 
and applied in such a way that it supports the equity considerations in the day to 
day practices of the diamond trade industry, particularly in the transportation of 
diamonds. 
 
South Africa having repealed its discriminatory laws has been accepted by the 
aviation bodies or associations such as the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO).1120
                                                 
1119 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996 section 39 and section 233. 
 ICAO is important to the international development of 
1120 Aviation Act 74 of 1962 second schedule of the Act as amended by the Aviation Amendment Act 12 of 
1965, Expropriation Act 55 of 1965, Aviation Amendment Act 83 of 1969, Civil Aviation Offences Act 10 
of 1972, General Law, Amendment Act 62 of 1973, Expropriation Act 63 of 1975, Aviation Amendment 
Act 63 of 1981,  
Aviation Amendment Act 4 of 1982, Aviation Amendment Act 1 of 1984, Transfer of Powers and Duties 
of the State President Act 97 of 1986, Transport Advisory Council Act 58 of 1987, Air Services Licensing 
Act 115 of 1990, Aviation Amendment Act 16 of 1992, Airports Company Act 44 of 1993  
Air Traffic and Navigation Services Company Act 45 of 1993, General Law Sixth Amendment Act 204 of 
1993, Transport General Amendment Act 16 of 1995, Aviation Laws Amendment Act 98 of 1996  
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the highest standards of aviation. It has primary aims of ensuring development 
principles and techniques of international air navigation and to foster the planning 
and development of international air transport so as to ensure safe and orderly 
growth of international civil aviation throughout the world.1121
 
 
South Africa became a member in 1947, after ratifying the Chicago Convention 
on 1 March 1947 however there was a suspension in participation because of 
apartheid laws. On 10 June 1994 South Africa once again became a fully 
participating ICAO member after an executive decision to remove all restrictions 
on South Africa. On 31 March 2003 during an Assembly of ICAO, South Africa 
was elected to the ICAO Council. A permanent representative from South Africa 
has been appointed by the Minister of Transport to sit on the ICAO on behalf of 
South Africa and to establish a South African Office at the ICAO headquarters in 
Montreal, Canada.1122
 
 It is submitted that the Constitutional democracy has 
brought much benefit to South Africa.  
The courts have also heard and decided matters pertaining to the aims of the 
ICAO as established in legislation. This serves to provide a useful body of 
precedent and valuable interpretation of the provisions of aviation laws. In ZS-
SVN Syndicate v 43 Air School (Pty) Ltd and Another1123
                                                                                                                                                 
Aviation Laws Amendment 
 the court found that the 
ICAO standards are helpful in matters of aviation because their requirements are 
geared to the such purposes, in this case, the ICAO standards were helpful to 
Act 82 of 1997, South African Civil Aviation Authority Act 40 of 1998  
South African Maritime and Aeronautical Search and Rescue Act 44 of 2002. See further repealed South 
African Civil Aviation Authority Act 40 of 1998 section 4, as amended by the Prevention and Combating 
of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004 and the Transport Agencies General Laws Amendment Act 42 of 
2007. This Act is wholly repealed by s 166(2) of the Civil Aviation Act 13 of 2009 which is not yet 
promulgated and therefore the Civil Aviation Act 40 of 1998 stays in force until the commencement of the 
Civil Aviation Act 13 of 2009. Civil Aviation Act 13 of 2009 preamble and sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 soon to 
be promulgated. 
1121 Ibid. www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/inter/icoa.htm 12 June 2009. 
1122 Ibid. 
1123 2007 (6) SA 389 (E).  
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In Welkom Municipality v Masureik and Herman T/A Lotus Corporation and 
Another,1125 the court heard a matter pertaining to the application of a regulation 
where it pertains to the issue of the duty of licensee of aerodrome to maintain an 
aerodrome in safe condition for flying. The court a quo relied on the 
recommendations in annexure 14 to the Chicago Convention in respect of 
aerodromes issued by ICAO. It was held on appeal that while the Convention 
itself is part of domestic law in terms of the Aviation Amendment Act1126 and 
annexure 14 setting out the international aviation standard contained therein was 
acceptable, it was also required by s 22A of Aviation Act1127 that such an 
annexure had to first be incorporated in regulations by ministerial notice in 
Government Gazette in order to be deemed a binding regulation. In the case 
above there was no evidence given before the court to show that the annexure 
was so incorporated therefore it was held that the court a quo had misdirected 
itself by relying on annexure 14.1128
 
 
6.2 Carriage of Diamonds for International Trade Purposes 
For obvious security concerns it is not always easy for researchers to be given 
access to information as to the exact movements of diamonds. This is particularly 
true for companies that transport rough diamonds and jewels etc. Therefore 
when studying the law or regulations for diamond carriage one has to be content 
with the general consideration of publicly available trade customs of carriage of 
diamonds. In India for example, they have a public domain policy prepared in 
                                                 
1124 397 H – J. 
1125 1997 (3) SA 363 (SCA). 
1126 42 of 1947 section 1 repealed. 
1127 74 of 1962. 
1128 1997 (3) SA 363 (SCA) 636 D - F. This is also in line with the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 section 231. 
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2002 on carriage of diamonds and precious stones.1129 The policy does not 
mention particulars for actual transport carriage but it encourages trade by 
making reference to certain incentives with reference to the values of import and 
export duties on precious stones being carried by sea. It must be noted however 
that carriage of precious stones by sea is a dying practice even in India where 
such carriage has been traditionally used for the carriage of precious stones.1130
 
 
Since diamonds are often carried by air, it is important to consider the 
international legal framework that has been established to ensure that carriage of 
goods by air meets certain international standards. The instrument to look to for 
the relevant legal provisions is the Carriage of Goods by Air: A Guide to the 
International Legal Framework United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD).1131
 
 This guide is of importance to South Africa since it 
is a contracting party to many of the treaties on carriage of goods by air. 
The UNCTAD Secretariat has prepared a comprehensive document outlining the 
purpose of the creation of the legal framework for the carriage of goods by air. 
This document makes reference to treaties and other protocols (for example, 
Warsaw Convention, 1929) that pertain to carriage by air. These are important 
international contributions and particularly relevant to international diamond 
trade. 
 
It is important to note that the international framework for the creation of rules 
pertaining to the carriage of goods was motivated by the growing proportion of 
high value, time sensitive products traversing national boundaries by air. This 
created an area for vast economic development. It was established that air 
transport improves the ability to participate in the global economy especially for 
                                                 
1129 Carriage of Diamonds and Precious Stones in Indian Policy, Circular No. 37/2002-Cus, 28 June 2002, 
F.NO. 305/22/2002-FTT, Government of India, Ministry of Finance Department of Revenue Central Board 
of Excise & Customs. 
1130 Ibid. 
1131 Report by UNCTAD Secretariat Distr. General UNCTAD/SDTE/TLB/2006/1 27 June 2006. 
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With regard to the actual international rules and standards for carriage South 
Africa may look to these Conventions. As trade in diamonds is supported by air 
transport, Africa is desirable diamond trading destination. At present South Africa 
is a party to the Warsaw Convention, 1929, The Hague Protocol and the 
Guadalajara Convention 1961. The waybills used to evidence carriage will follow 
a format generally recognized in these treaties as briefly examined below. 
 
6.2.1 The Warsaw Convention 
The Warsaw Convention or Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules 
Relating to International Carriage by Air (Warsaw Convention: 1929) is relevant 
to South Africa as a contracting State.  
 
There are other important instruments such as the Convention on International 
Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention, 1944),1133
                                                 
1132 Report by UNCTAD Secretariat Distr. General UNCTAD/SDTE/TLB/2006/1 27 June (2006) 5. 
 International Air Services Transit 
Agreement (1944), International Air Transport Agreement (1944), Convention on 
the International Recognition of Rights in Aircraft (Geneva Convention: 1948), 
Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the 
Surface (Rome Convention: 1952), Convention, supplementary to the Warsaw 
Convention, Performed by a person other than the Contracting Carrier 
(Guadalajara Convention: 1961), Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts 
Committed on Board Aircraft (Tokyo Convention: 1970), Convention for the 
Suspension of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hague Convention: 1970), 
Convention for the Suspension of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil 
Aviation (Montreal Convention: 1971), Convention on the Marking of Plastic 
Explosives for the Purposes of Detection (MEX Convention: 1991) and 
1133 Aviation Act 74 of 1962. Civil Aviation Act 13 of 2009 preamble and sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 soon to be 
promulgated 
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Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, 
signed at Montreal on 28 May 1999.1134
 
  
This chapter will limit its more in depth consideration to the Warsaw Convention 
as the Convention that has showed the most uniform international applicability to 
the international trade transport by air. There will also be a discussion of the 
Convention for the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for 
International Carriage by Air, 1999 (The Montreal Convention).1135
 
 
The Warsaw Convention is a clearly written technical document. In terms of 
Article 1(1) the Convention applies to international carriage of persons, luggage 
or goods performed by aircraft for reward. It also applies in circumstances where 
such carriage is done gratuitously by aircraft performed by an air transport 
undertaking.  
 
It must be noted that in terms of Article 2(2) the Convention does not apply to 
carriage performed under the terms of any postal Convention. Therefore a 
diamond trade transaction that requires that the parcel of diamonds be carried by 
postal service and covered by a postal Convention, there can be no question of 
international carriage in such a case as envisaged by the Warsaw Convention. 
Therefore parties who opt for that service are excluding from such a contract all 
internationally recognized protections afforded by the Warsaw Convention. This 
may have the implication of increasing the insurance premium for a diamonds 
being transported by general post, in reality such diamonds are exposed to 
higher risks of getting lost or stolen. 
 
Article 5 of the Convention is of particular relevance to diamond trade as it 
provides for the requirements of a valid air consignment note for the carriage of 
                                                 
1134 Ibid. www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/inter/icoa.htm 12 June 2009. Carriage by Air Act 17 of 1946 
see preamble as amended by the Carriage by Air Amendment Act 5 of 1964, Carriage by Air Amendment 
Act 81 of 1979 and Carriage by Air Amendment Act 15 of 2006.  
1135 Carriage by Air Act 17 of 1946 see preamble.  
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goods. It is provided in Article 5(1);(2) that every carrier has the right to require 
from the consignor of the goods a document referred to as a consignment note. 
The consignor has the right to expect the carrier to accept such a note however 
any irregularities on the note or the absence or loss of such a consignment note 
does not invalidate the contract of carriage. There is a general desire within the 
language of the Convention in this article to uphold the carriage contract rather 
than invalidate it. The rationale is that equity demands that if a carrier has 
performed its part of the contract by carrying the goods, such a carrier must be 
compensated accordingly. An irregular consignment note does not render that 
service void. Therefore in air carriage the contract of carriage is the actual 
contract and not the consignment note. 
 
Articles 6 and 8 prescribe format of the consignment note and Article 7 provides 
that the carrier has the right to require the consignor to make separate 
consignment notes in an event that there is more than one package to deliver. 
Article 8 lists the particulars that ought to appear in the consignment note and 
these details include the weight, marks, description, size, packaging, colour of 
the goods, if payment is against delivery, the price of the goods, the expected 
time for the completion of carriage and a paramount statement stating that the 
carriage of such goods is subject to the Warsaw Convention.  
 
Where diamonds are carried in manner described above, it is obvious that the 
carrier would have highly ethical employees who will not be tempted to steal 
when they notice the contents of a transported package. However, it is common 
practice for the diamonds to be accompanied by a person in order to ensure that 
there is hand to hand delivery for the purposes of reducing risk. The nature of a 
consignment note is very similar to that of the bill of lading in carriage of goods 
by sea. In terms of Article 11 the consignment note serves as prima facie 
evidence of receipt of goods being received on board the aircraft for carriage. 
Notwithstanding carriage of goods without requesting a consignment note is also 
acceptable in terms of Article 9, however the carrier in this instance will not be 
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able to avail himself to the provisions of the Convention that limit or exclude his 
or her liability. Therefore it benefits the carrier at all times to insist on a 
consignment note. 
 
Article 16 of the Convention is of particular importance to diamond trade 
particularly in view of the fact that there is an international understanding for 
compliance with the KPCS that the diamonds, if rough would have complied with 
certain legal requirements. Article 16 provides that it is the consignor’s duty to 
meet the formalities of customs or police before the goods can be delivered to 
the consignee. The consignor who has supplied insufficient information is liable 
to the carrier for any damages suffered unless it can be proved that the damage 
was caused by the carrier or his agents. However, as a rule it is not the concern 
of the carrier to check that the consignor’s documents are correct or compliant. 
 
In terms of Article 19 of the Convention, the carrier is liable for damage caused 
by delay in the carriage of goods unless the carrier can prove, in terms of Article 
20 that it took all necessary steps to avoid resultant damage or that such damage 
was unavoidable due to impossibility in taking preventative measures. If the 
goods are damaged and the carrier is found to e liable, the carrier’s liability will 
be limited in terms of Article 22(2) to a sum of 250 francs per kilogram.  
 
The calculation based on kilograms course will lead to an absurdity when applied 
to diamond losses. Therefore the provision in the same article providing an 
exception to the calculation is applicable to special value items. The exception to 
the 250 francs per kilogram rule applies if at the time when the package was 
handed over to the carrier, a special declaration of the value was made. In that 
case the carrier will be liable to pay the sum not exceeding the declared sum 
unless he or she proves that the sum is greater that the actual value to the 
consignor at delivery. 
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The provisions of the Warsaw Convention are exceptional particularly when 
considering that they provide simple rules that are precise and internationally 
uniform which means they represent the standard of what the contracting States 
view as fair law to regulate international carriage by air. Article 23 is important in 
ensuring that the rules are respected by providing that any attempt to relieve the 
carrier of liability or to fix a limitation that is lower than that provided in the 
Convention is a nullity. Further, Article 25 ensures the utmost good faith or best 
effort standards on the part of the carrier by making an express provision that a 
carrier who has committed willful misconduct or default will not be able to use the 
Convention to exclude or limit his or her liability. 
 
6.2.2 Convention for the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for 
International Carriage by Air, 1999 (The Montreal Convention) 
The Convention for the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for 
International Carriage by Air, 1999 is applicable in terms of the South African 
Carriage by Air Act.1136 The Montreal Convention contains a preamble that 
acknowledges the contribution of the Warsaw Convention. Further, in an effort to 
create uniformity and equitable international trade practices in the aviation sector, 
the Montreal Convention provides that it is created for the purpose of seeking 
orderly development of international air transport operations and the smooth flow 
of cargo (as the focus of this chapter), passengers and baggage in accordance 
with principles and objectives of the Montreal Convention on International Civil 
Aviation.1137 And most importantly the preamble provides specifically for 
internationally uniform and harmonious laws that will achieve an equitable 
balance of interests for those concerned.1138
 
 
                                                 
1136 17 of 1946 preamble ‘to give effect to a Convention (meaning section 1 “the Convention for the 
Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, signed at Montreal on 28 May 1999, as set 
out in the Schedule”) for the unification of certain rules relating to international carriage by air; to make 
provision for applying the rules contained in the said Convention, subject to exceptions, adaptations and 
modifications, to carriage by air which is not international carriage within the meaning of the Convention; 
and for matters incidental thereto.’ 
1137 Ibid. 
1138 See schedule to Carriage by Air Act 17 of 1946. 
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The scope of the application as provided for in terms of Article 1(1);(2) of the 
Montreal Convention in relation to international carriage is very similar to that 
provided for in the Warsaw Convention. Article 4 of the Montreal Convention 
provides for the use of the word waybill which will act as a receipt with 
information pertaining to carriage particulars in relation to cargo. There is 
prescribed information1139 that must be contained in the waybill however similar 




Article 18 provides for the carrier’s liability in respect of the cargo and states that 
the carrier is liable for damage sustained in the event of destruction or loss of the 
cargo but subject to the damaging condition having taken place during the 
carriage by air. However if loss or damage to cargo falls within one of the 
exceptions listed in Article 18(2)(a), (b), (c) and (d), for example, defectively 
packed cargo, inherent vice in that cargo or an act of war or armed conflict, then 
the carrier will not be held liable for resultant loss. 
 
The provision relating to delay in Article 19 illustrates the same position as that of 
the Warsaw Convention. With regards to limitation of liability, Article 22(4) 
provides that the general calculation for the limitation of the carrier’s liability shall 
only be the total weight of the package or packages concerned. This is a clear 
modernization of the Warsaw Convention which takes into account issues of 
limitation of liability while in Article 22(6) allowing a national court freedom to 
award costs and expenses incurred by a plaintiff in litigation in enforcing his or 
her rights in terms of the Convention.  
 
Article 27 of the Montreal Convention provides for parties freedom of contract 
within the acceptable standards of the Convention. Further the Convention 
provides in Article 34 that parties may seek to resolve matters concerning the 
                                                 
1139 Articles 5 – 7. 
1140 Article 9. 
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Convention by way of arbitration, however this must be expressly provided for in 
writing. It is submitted that this is an important tool in ensuring that carriage by air 
matters are dealt with in a forum that will provide for expedient resolution to party 
claims and complaints.  
 
Article 50 of the Montreal Convention provides expressly for a form of public 
liability insurance on behalf of carriers in pursuance to their obligations under the 
Convention. This is an equitable requirement that will ensure that if the 
undesirable happens and liability is incurred by the carrier, at least such a carrier 
will be adequately prepared to deal with liability. The Convention is a crucial 
update of the Warsaw Convention and will ensure that South Africa is seen as a 
worthy international trading partner by adhering to international rules that support 
best aviation practices and rules for carriage of goods. 
 
6.2.3 South African Law on Carriage of Goods by Air  
In South Africa the relevant national law pertaining to the regulation of carriage of 
goods by air comes in the form of the Carriage by Air Act,1141 as amended and 
previously discussed under the provisions of the Montreal Convention. The 
schedule to the Carriage by Air Act1142 contains the Montreal Convention or the 
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, 
19991143 which forms the basis of South African law on Carriage of Goods by Air. 
The schedule of the Carriage by Air Act1144
 
 expressly provides as follows: 
‘Schedule  
CONVENTION FOR THE UNIFICATION OF CERTAIN 
RULES FOR INTERNATIONAL CARRIAGE BY AIR  
 
The States Parties to this Convention  
                                                 
1141 17 of 1946. 
1142 17 of 1946. 
1143 The schedule is duly amended by Proclamation R294 of 1967 and substituted by section 
8 of Carriage by Air Amendment Act 15 of 2006. 
1144 17 of 1946. 
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RECOGNISING the significant contribution of the 
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to 
International Carriage by Air signed in Warsaw on 12 
October 1929, hereinafter referred to as the 'Warsaw 
Convention', and other related instruments to the 
harmonization of private international air law;  
RECOGNISING the need to modernise and consolidate the 
Warsaw Convention and related instruments;  
RECOGNISING the importance of ensuring protection of 
the interests of consumers in international carriage by air 
and the need for equitable compensation based on the 
principle of restitution;  
REAFFIRMING the desirability of an orderly development of 
international air transport operations and the smooth flow of 
passengers, baggage and cargo in accordance with the 
principles and objectives of the Convention on International 
Civil Aviation, done at Chicago on 7 December 1944;  
CONVINCED that collective State action for further 
harmonisation and codification of certain rules governing 
international carriage by air through a new Convention is 
the most adequate means of achieving an equitable 
balance of interests’  
 
The principles contained in the air carriage Conventions (the Warsaw Convention 
and the Montreal Convention) have been judicially considered by the South 
African court. An example of such precedent is contained in the decision of 
Impala Platinum Ltd v Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij NV and Another,1145
                                                 
1145 2008 (6) SA 606 (SCA). 
 
the court considered the application of the Warsaw Convention and the liability 
for loss of goods carried by air. This case contributes to the knowledge of the 
principles and the rationale adopted by the court in its application of the 
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Convention. The principles established in this case can be suitably used to apply 
to international carriage of diamonds by air.  
 
The facts of the case show that Impala Platinum Ltd (Impala) being a consignor 
of cargo that was lost during air carriage between South Africa and the US had 
claimed damages for the loss. Impala was duly indemnified by its insurer for the 
loss of the goods however Impala continued with an action for loss in the court a 
quo against the airline. The airline excepted Impala’s claim on the basis that in 
terms of air carriage law, if the loss of the consignor is made good by its insurer 
then Impala had suffered no loss. The court a quo accepted this objection by the 
airline and dismissed the action.1146
 
 
On appeal to the Supreme Court it was held that the approach to the 
interpretation of the Convention on air carriage must be done with relevant 
consideration of foreign decisions as they are very useful in guiding the courts. 
This also contributed to the modern day international carriage exigencies which 
are conducive to the promotion of comity and uniformity among nations. The 
court held that Impala platinum had a right to sue in terms of the Convention as it 
would offend the need for uniformity to exclude his right to sue which is provided 
for expressly in Article 30 of the Convention.1147
 
 This decision illustrates that 
principles of carriage of goods by air are dealt with in South Africa in an 
internationally uniform manner that will ensure the most equitable form of redress 
for parties involved in litigation with the ultimate purpose of upholding comity 
among nations. 
In KLM Royal Dutch Airlines v Hamman1148
                                                 
1146 608 – 610. 
 the court had specifically stated that 
the dispute in this case occurred between 17 and 19 January 1999 and therefore 
the Montreal Convention was not applicable in this case because it was only 
1147 619E – F. 
1148 2002 (3) SA 818 (W). 
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signed on 28 May 1999.1149 While this case does not give much insight into the 
interpretation of the Montreal Convention, it does in principle establish a timeline 
in which the Convention can be considered and applied as part of South African 
law. With regards to the modern application of the Montreal Convention, there 
are developments that are proposed in legislation in the form of the Carriage by 
Air Amendment Bill, 2006.1150
 
These developments seem to show a further 
legislative step in facilitating the application of the Convention. 
6.3 Diamond Insurance 
International trade transactions, particularly in the carriage of goods by air involve 
various risks. To alleviate this situation parties will often enter into insurance 
contracts to protect themselves.  
 
This chapter is not going to deliberate on insurance laws as a special focus but it 
will examine some of the intricacies that are involved in diamond trade. Due to 
client confidentiality protection, this chapter will not dwell on specific in-house 
diamond insurance processes of various diamond traders but it is submitted that 
through the understanding of the law and the importance of trade insurance 
cover some insight will be gained from the study of some specific aspects of 
diamond insurance as they illustrate the sensitive nature of the business. 
 
It is established that for most business agents whose main vocation is carrying 
goods by air, their standard trading conditions (STCs) make reference to the 
applicability of the Warsaw Convention and also provide that insurance is 
obtainable by purchasing private insurance. A clause to the effect of ‘the names 
                                                 
1149 823 C. 
1150 ‘1.2 The purpose of the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by 
Air, 1999 ('the ‘Montreal Convention’), is to modernise the Warsaw System of liability for the international 
carriage of passengers, baggage and cargo. A major feature of the new legal instrument is the concept of 
unlimited liability. Whereas the Warsaw Convention set a limit of 125 000 Gold Francs (approximately US 
$8 300) in case of death or injury to passengers, the Montreal Convention introduces a two-tier system. The 
first tier includes strict liability up to 100 000 Special Drawing Rights (SDR) (approximately US $135 
000), irrespective of a carrier's fault. The second tier is based on presumption of fault of a carrier and has 
no limit of liability. The Carriage by Air Amendment Bill, 2006, seeks to give effect to the Montreal 
Convention.’ 
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of Carriers (meaning those involved in the transportation of goods by air) to such 
special carriage contracts are available at all ticket offices of such carriers and 
may be examined on request…insurance obtained is not affected by any 
limitation of the Carrier’s liability under the Warsaw Convention.’1151
 
 This clause 
in the Carrier’s business practice shows the relationship between the Warsaw 
Convention and the role of private insurance. 
In South Africa, the sources of insurance law are legislation, case law, Roman-
Dutch law and English law.1152 In South African insurance law the Short-Term 
Insurance Act,1153 as amended, may be consulted for general guidance relating 
to assurance matters. See for example, Short-Term Insurance Act,1154
 
 deals with 
misrepresentation, provides that a representation made to the insurer which is 
not true will not invalidate a policy unless that representation is such as to be 
likely to have materially affected the assessment of the risk under the policy 
concerned at the time of its issue or at the time of any renewal or variation 
thereof. What is clear from South African insurance law is that it is a protected 
and upheld policy provided that the underwriter or insurer is aware of all the 
material risks that will affect the assessment of a particular premium when 
entering into an insurance contract. 
With regard to diamonds as subjects of insurance, the case of Lapperman 
Diamond Cutting Works (Pty) Ltd v MIB Group (Pty) Ltd1155
 
 will be studied in this 
section as it serves as a very useful judgment for understanding the intricacies of 
the diamond industry and the insurance aspects applicable to it though the main 
issue in this case revolved around the specialist insurance broker’s duty to inform 
his or her client any onerous terms that may be contained in an insurance policy. 
                                                 
1151 See www.fedair.com 15 September 2009. 
1152 Dillon Clare & JP Van Niekerk South African Maritime Law and Marine Insurance (1983) 103. 
1153 23 of 1998 as amended by the Insurance Amendment Act 17 of 2003, National Credit Act 34 of 2005, 
Financial Services Laws General Amendment Act 22 of 2008, Insurance Laws Amendment Act 27 of 2008.  
1154 53 of 1998. 
1155 [2003] JOL 11680 (SCA); [2003] 4 All SA 317 (SCA). 
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The facts of the case show that Lapperman Diamond Cutting Works (Pty) Ltd 
(‘Lapperman,’ the appellant) was carrying on the business of diamond cutting 
and polishing in Gauteng. MIB Group (Pty) Ltd (‘MIB’ and the underwriter, the 
respondents) were the insurance brokers and insurer respectively1156 in this 
case. The litigation commenced with an action against the underwriter and MIB 
for payment of a claim to the appellant for the loss of diamonds, during the 
course of the proceedings however the claim against MIB was withdrawn and the 
action against the underwriter was dismissed.1157
 
 
The appellant then instituted a subsequent action against MIB for the payment of 
US$ 2 751 936,00 and US$ 9 51 467,00 being the amounts claimed initially from 
the underwriter.1158 It was alleged by the appellant that these sums were 
damages sustained by it as a result of MIB’s breach of contract or in the alternate 
damages caused by negligent performance of duty.1159
 
 The facts of this case 
reveal two significant factors about diamond insurance. First it is a type of 
insurance that involves significant amounts of insurance cover, particularly when 
the insured is running an entity such as a cutting and polishing facility. Secondly, 
the specialized type of insurance has necessitated the industry to use specialist 
brokers for the purpose of procuring diamond insurance as was the case of MIB 
on behalf of the appellant. 
It was stated in the agreement between MIB and the appellant that ‘MIB would 
act with reasonable care and skill such as could be expected of a professional 
insurance broker.’ Of particular importance to this matter, are the provisions of 
the brokerage agreement provided further that ‘MIB would familiarize themselves 
with the nature and scope of the appellant’s business which included 
ascertaining whether the appellant was able to fulfill the requirements of an 
                                                 
1156 For the purposes of this action, the underwriters and the broker assumed joint and several liability. 
1157 2 para. 2 – 3; 3 para. 3. 
1158 )[2003] 4 All SA 317 (SCA) 319 C. 
1159 3 para. 3. 
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underwriter in terms of a policy…and draw the attention of the appellant to any 
promissory warranties applying to the policies.’1160
 
 
The policy also had a critical provision which provided that it would be 
understood and agreed that the insured shall keep detailed records of all sales, 
purchases and other transactions and that such records shall be made available 
for inspection by the underwriters or their representatives in case of a claim being 
made under the insurance policy. It was common cause that the underwriters 
sought to avoid the claims by the appellant by relying on the provisions of the 
policy requiring that records be kept by the appellant.1161
 
 
It must be noted that though it may seem strange and even negligent to an 
outsider that the appellant was engaged in such a sensitive and rigorously 
regulated industry1162
 
 without keeping such records as described above, it was 
argued by the appellant that the diamond industry by nature is based on a 
practice of confidentiality. The appellant argued that MIB being specialist 
diamond insurers should have been aware of the confidential dealings that were 
not on record. However be that as it may the point that the appellant was arguing 
was that this provision was not drawn to his attention by the broker MIB and 
therefore the appellant felt that that was a breach of duty in terms of the 
brokerage agreement the parties had entered into. 
The court investigated the parties’ arguments carefully and on this point the court 
came to the conclusion that the appellant’s claims had to fail. This is because, it 
was held, a specialist broker is not the assured’s keeper and thus cannot control 
the business of the assured. In this case it was sufficient that the brokers had 
advised the appellant of the obligations within the policy and this was sufficient 
compliance with the brokerage agreement. The court held that MIB had not 
                                                 
1160 4 para. 6. 
1161 5 para. 7. 
1162 Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 section 57 and 61 together with regulations under GN R680 in GG 10684 of 
1 April 1987) illustrate the importance of keeping records when one is engaged in the business of diamond 
trading. 
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breached any duty toward the appellant.1163
 
 In fact the whole problem in this 
case was that the letters from the insurer illustrated that the appellant had not 
been able to prove loss in any case and this is possible since there were no 
formal records kept. This case serves as a warning for business to keep accurate 
records and inventories as they are important in proving losses to which the 
insurance is applicable. 
In a further useful diamond insurance related English judgment of CZ Cohen SC 
and IP Green instructed by Webber, Wentzel Bowens, Johannesburg Euro-Diam 
Ltd v Bathhurst1164 there are some further lessons that can be extracted 
concerning diamond underwriting activities. The facts of the case show that the 
plaintiffs Euro-Diam Ltd (‘ED’) were diamond merchants carrying on business in 
London. They had insurance cover in the form of a Lloyd’s slip which had an 




In a diamond sale agreement certain diamonds were sent to Germany by the 
plaintiffs with an invoice that understated the value of the diamonds in an effort to 
avoid German customs duty. The diamonds were stolen in Germany and the 
plaintiffs claimed under the insurance agreement. The insurers rejected the claim 
on the basis that the insured ‘adventure’ in terms of the English Marine Insurance 
Act,1166 was not carried out in a lawful manner and therefore the sale agreement 




The court held that the diamond insurance policy was not a marine policy 
intended to insure any ‘adventure.’ The policy was simply a policy on goods and 
thus no implication of a warranty in terms of section 41 would arise either in 
                                                 
1163 26 par. 44. 
1164 [1988] 2 All ER 23. 
1165 22. 
1166 1906 section 41. 
1167 23; 33. 
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statute or common law. On this basis the insurer’s appeal had to fail.1168
 
 This 
case clearly settles the nature of the insurance policy on diamonds and precious 
stones. It appears that in international trade such goods are simply insured as 
goods and do not have to be attached to a type of marine policy which is 
governed by the English marine insurance statute. 
6.4 Conclusion 
It is clear that due to the high risk nature of the diamond industry, carriage 
(through international law and standards) and insurance methods involved in the 
context of international trade is rigidly guided by trade custom and usage. This is 
certainly supported by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 
1996.1169 Some of these trade usages and customs clearly show that in the 
diamond industry it is the safety of the goods and the keeping of contractual 
conditions first that is of main concern to the underwriter. However, it is also the 
duty of the underwriter to bring to the attention of the potential insured any 
contractual terms that may affect his or insurance cover in a negative way.1170
 
  
This is because a genuine loss of such a valuable commodity causes serious 
effects on the cash flow of a particular underwriter. Therefore, if it is shown that 
the diamonds were not kept in safe order at all times such an underwriter may 
seek to escape liability and rightfully so however this point can be argued before 
court according to the merits of each case.1171
 
 
On the other hand it is generally acceptable that insurers do not engage in 
diamond underwriting with cash flow problems therefore it is expected that they 
                                                 
1168 Ibid. 
1169 Section 39(1)(c), section 231. 
1170 This is in line with regulations under the Short-Term Insurance Act 53 of 1998, GN R1128 in GG 
26853 of 30 September 2004 which deals with Part VII statutory notice to short-term insurance policy, 
section 18. Although it is stated in the regulations that this notice does not form part of the insurance 
contract or any other document it is provided in the regulation that,  a short-term insurance policyholder, or 
prospective policyholder, has the right to specific information which the insurer must inform the insured 
about. 
1171 See Starfire Diamond Rings Ltd. v Angel [1962] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 217; Price and Another v Incorporated 
General Insurance 1983 (1) SA 311. 
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will be of great assistance to clients who have kept the terms of the insurance 
contract in an appropriate manner. It is submitted that this chapter has been a 
useful consideration to the industry or practical aspects of diamond trade as 
viewed by the courts or contained in international law. It is proposed that though 
knowledge of these aspects may be expanded by direct interaction with the 
industry, this study provides a launching pad from which all other information 
may be built. Further, it is submitted that a study on diamond regulations would 
not be complete without these considerations. 
 
What has emerged from this chapter most importantly is that when carriage of 
goods by air and other insurance practices that are relevant to international 
diamond trade including all the practices show a desire by South Africa to 
participate in the international laws that promote comity and international 
uniformity with other nations. This adds to the hypothesis of this study which 
proves that truly in the Constitutional era diamond laws have been significantly 
impacted by more equitable systems of law. The most important aspect of this 
equity is that it reflects both domestic law as well as international law. 
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Chapter 7: Uniformity of International Sale Laws and South African 
International Diamond Trade under the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for International Sale of Goods, 1980 (The CISG Convention) 
 
7.1 Introduction 
As part of this study, the next three chapters, in the form of chapters 7, 8 and 9 
will consider certain Conventions which are applicable to the national and 
international regulation of the diamond industry. It is submitted that through these 
Conventions the Constitutional ideal of developing South African laws will be 
achieved.1172 The first Convention to be examined on in this chapter is the United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for International Sale of Goods, 1980 (The 
CISG Convention) also known as the Vienna Sales Convention.1173 The 
provisions and effect of this Convention will be studied in order to have a clear 




Currently South Africa has not yet ratified or acceded1175 to the CISG 
Convention. However South Africa takes cognizance of and respects the aims 
and objectives of the CISG Convention. This respect for the CISG Convention in 
South African law is evident in the provisions of other related international law 
applicable in South Africa which calls for the CISG Convention aims to be borne 
in mind1176
                                                 
1172 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996 sections 39 and 231. 
  when a court is dealing with such international trade law. It will be 
1173 Sarcevic Petar and Volken Paul International Sale of Goods Dubrovnik Lectures Oceana Publications 
(1986) 1. www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/CISG.pdf 17 March 2010. 
1174 Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 sections 44 – 76 deal with trade and international trade in diamonds and 
therefore it is essential that international instruments that may affect these transactions are considered in 
this study. 
1175 Or assented to the CISG Convention, which means to become a party (as to an agreement), to express 
approval or give consent give in to a request or demand. http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/acceded 16 March 2010. See, Convention on Agency in the International Sale of 
Goods Act 4 of 1986 where the schedule of the Act provides that the aims of the CISG Convention should 
be borne in mind in South African law. See Wethmar-Lemmar, M. ‘When could a South African court be 
expected to apply the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
(CISG)?’ 2008 De Jure Volume 2 (2008) 419. 
1176 The South African Legislature has stated in the Convention on Agency in the International Sale of 
Goods Act 4 of 1986 that the aims of the CISG Convention should be borne in mind, see the Schedule of 
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argued in this chapter that the adoption of the CISG Convention can only 
enhance the Constitutional goals, the provisions of the MPRDA1177 and the 
Diamonds Act1178
 
 as it will encourage more trade in diamonds and economically 
benefit the country. 
Extensive analyses have been made on the role, significance and relevance of 
the CISG Convention in modern international trade and commerce. However few 
of them have specifically examined the relationship between the CISG 
Convention and diamond trade. Therefore this chapter seeks to provide an 
analysis of the impact of the CISG Convention on international diamond sales as 
particular to South Africa. The fact that South Africa has not ratified the CISG 
Convention has meant that fewer legal commentaries1179
 
 have been made 
pertaining to the CISG Convention and the South African legal framework. It 
seems South Africa may in the foreseeable future consider the adoption of the 
CISG Convention. This on account of the expressions of the legislature.  
Some of South Africa’s major trading partners for example China have ratified 
the CISG Convention. Therefore it is obvious that South Africa has to sign the 
CISG Convention if it deems it fit and necessary to do so for the sake of its own 
exports industry. It is submitted with respect that South Africa should not blindly 
follow England which has also not yet ratified the CISG Convention particularly in 
                                                                                                                                                 
the Agency Act 1986 an instrument which can be said is related to the CISG Convention. It has also been 
submitted that a further sister Act to the CISG Convention is the Convention on the Limitation Period in 
the International Sale of Goods (New York, 1974). See Sarcevic Petar and Volken Paul International Sale 
of Goods Dubrovnik Lectures Oceana Publications (1986) 2. 
www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/CISG.pdf 17 March 2010. 
1177 28 of 2002. 
1178 56 of 1986. 
1179 Wethmar-Lemmar, M. ‘When could a South African court be expected to apply the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG)?’ Naudé T. and Lubbe G. 
Cancellation for ‘Material’ or ‘Fundamental’ Breach: A Comparative Analysis of South African Law, The 
UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) and the Unidroit Principles of 
International Contracts (2001) 12 Stellenbosch Law Review 371. 
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view of the fact that England1180
 
 can no longer be regarded as South Africa’s 
biggest trading partner.  
The ratification of the CISG Convention will assist diamond exports in South 
Africa, by attracting more CISG Convention contracting merchants. It is important 
now to focus on a discussion of the provisions of the CISG Convention in light of 
South Africa’s diamond trade. If the implications of ratifying the CISG Convention 
are positive then a strong recommendation will be made toward encouraging the 
acceptance of the CISG Convention. 
 
When considering the relationship between the CISG Convention and the South 
African diamond industry, first an understanding of the socio economic and 
financial concerns that are unique to South Africa should be addressed. 
 
It needs to be acknowledged that South Africa is a developing State with unique 
economic needs such as a need to make itself internationally competitive. South 
Africa is also faced with the challenge of addressing empowerment issues in 
various sectors including the diamond industry sector.1181
                                                 
1180 It is submitted that it is the EU rather than the UK generally that is the biggest trading partner of South 
Africa. See http://www.southafrica.info/business/trade/relations/trade_europe.htm 16 March 2010. 
 If it can be showed that 
‘Europe is South Africa's biggest source of investment, accounting for almost half of South Africa's total 
foreign trade. The recently concluded trade agreement between the European Unionand South Africa - the 
Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement (TDCA) - removes 90% of all trade barriers over the 
next decade. The TDCA has been ratified by all fifteen EU members. Since the provisional application of 
the TDCA in January 2000, South African exports to the EU have gone up by 46%. EU exports to South 
Africa, after growing by almost 20% in the year 2000 and again in the year 2001, remained at the same 
level over 2002. South Africa's trade relations and development co-operation with the EU are governed by 
the TDCA, which was signed in 1999. The TDCA's ratification is still ongoing and the agreement is being 
provisionally applied. The main objective of the TDCA is to create a free-trade area between South Africa 
and the EU over a 12-year period. The EU and South Africa will, in terms of the agreement, open their 
markets to each other at a different pace. The EU remains South Africa's most important economic trading 
partner, accounting for over 40% of its imports and exports, as well as 70% of foreign direct investment. 
South Africa's trade surplus with the bloc rose from R6-billion in 1999 to R30-billion at the end of 2001. 
Against a backdrop of a slowing global economy in 2001, which resulted in a 0.3% drop in EU imports 
from the rest of the world, South African exports to the EU grew by a further 11%. In May 2002 South 
Africa had overtaken Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia and Singapore in overall trade with the EU.’ 
1181 MPRDA 28 of 2002 section 100 of the Act makes specific reference to the transformation goals of the 
industry, which must be in accordance with the socio-economic empowerment Charter. The section 
provides as follows: ‘1) The Minister must, within five years from the date on which this Act took effect-  
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the CISG Convention somewhat contributes to the ideals of policy such as 
fairness of trade, international uniformity, broad-based socio-economic 
empowerment, then such an international instrument must be made fully 
applicable in South African law. 
 
The major themes that are unique to the South African diamond industry include 
the support of local beneficiation and broad based black economic 
empowerment. One has to question whether or not the contribution of the CISG 
Convention on existing diamond law is adding any value to the South African 
diamond markets in light of those special needs. 
 
One of the obvious concerns about the CISG Convention is that it assumes an 
economy based on equality or a model that is not tainted by unfair market 
competition.  It is therefore an instrument that apart from a small reference to 
broad abstract moral terms of good faith and fairness, it seems impervious to 
issues of poverty, imbalance of power on the basis of race and economic inequity 
which takes center stage in South African law. This is because it is not an 
instrument that is concerned with consumers but merchants. The empowerment 
composition of those merchants in contracting States is not a concern that should 
naturally be addressed by technical contractual instrument. 
 
The CISG Convention is an international instrument based on the assumption 
that there is fair economic competition, fair trading frameworks and fair economic 
                                                                                                                                                 
        (a)     and after consultation with the Minister for Housing, develop a housing and living conditions 
standard for the minerals industry; and  
       (b)     develop a code of good practice for the minerals industry in the Republic.  
(2) (a) To ensure the attainment of Government's objectives of redressing historical, social and economic 
inequalities as stated in the Constitution, the Minister must within six months from the date on which this 
Act takes effect develop a broad-based socio-economic empowerment Charter that will set the framework, 
targets and time-table for effecting the entry of historically disadvantaged South Africans into the mining 
industry, and allow such South Africans to benefit from the exploitation of mining and mineral resources.’ 
www.dme.gov.za/pdfs/minerals/scorecard.pdf 16 March 2010. 
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opportunities in contracting States.1182
 
 This neutrality is most significant part of 
the CISG Convention in South Africa because it is a race neutral law that allows 
a contracting State to focus on enhancing its economy as a united and diverse 
society not obsessed with skin colour.  
South Africa should also adopt the CISG Convention as it is somewhat broadly 
sympathetic to the international trade plight of developing countries. This is 
based on the New International Economic Order (NIEO)1183 ideals which, like the 
South African Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act1184 are concerned 
with equity, fairness in trade and State Sovereignty. In practice however, South 
Africa is moving at snail’s pace in the ratification of the CISG Convention. There 
is doubt that South African merchants are going to jump at the chance of 
applying the provisions of the CISG Convention. A clear example of this doubt is 
in Precedent 6 of the Butterworths Forms and Precedents where there is a Form 




Clause 25 of that memorandum provides for the governing law. It is provided in 
the sample form under this clause that ‘for avoidance of doubt, the Parties agree 
to hereby exclude the operation of the United Nations Convention on Contracts 
for International Sale of Goods, 1980 should South Africa accede to the CISG 
Convention during the continuance of this agreement.’1186
                                                 
1182 Preamble of the CISG Convention. 
 It is proposed that 
www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/CISG.pdf 17 March 
2010. 
1183 Preamble of the CISG Convention which provides that, the Contracting States are adopting the CISG 
Convention by bearing in mind the broad objectives in the resolutions adopted by the sixth special session 
of the General Assembly of the United Nations on the establishment of a New International Economic 
Order. This is done by considering that the development of international trade on the basis of equality and 
mutual benefit is an important element in promoting friendly relations among States. This is based on the 
opinion that  the adoption of uniform rules which govern contracts for the international sale of goods and 
take into account the different social, economic and legal systems would contribute to the removal of legal 
barriers in international trade and promote the development of international trade. (Preamble paraphrased) 
www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/CISG.pdf 17 March 2010. 
1184 108 of 1996. 
1185 Van Der Merve M.J., De Wet H. and Meiring R. Forms & Precedents, Intellectual Property 1: 
Computer Contracts Butterworths Lexis Nexis (2005) Precedent 6.  
1186 Ibid. 
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clauses of this nature in South African trade contracts reflect that the ratification 
and accession to the CISG Convention is almost assured although some other 
entities can still exclude operation of its provisions although the attitude of this 
particular precedent seems to be one that expresses a ‘thanks but no thanks’ 
attitude to the CISG Convention. 
 
Insofar as trading partnerships with England is concerned, traditionally England 
was one of South Africa’s biggest trading partners1187
 
 however by 2009 that 
position has been altered somewhat in that England is no longer South Africa’s 
biggest trading partner. The legacy of the traditional relationship between South 
Africa and England can be seen in the adoption of English commercial law. It 
would seem like England is that old friend that South Africa wishes to mimic, 
however, in the best interests of trade, the sovereignty of each State must prevail 
with the effect that the international laws which best represent State interests 
must be ratified. 
Insofar as England is concerned it has been submitted that the attitude of the 
English government concerning the CISG Convention has been lukewarm until 
fairly recently, around the year 1999 to 2000 or so where it was discovered that 
the English Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) was giving a positive 
acceptance of the CISG Convention as many of England’s trading partners were 
ratifying the Convention. It was stated in the English DTI documents that the 
failure of England to adopt the CISG Convention would lead it to becoming 
increasingly isolated within the international trading community.1188
                                                 
1187 This is evident in the commercial and legal heritage of South Africa. The Admiralty Jurisdiction 
Regulation Act 105 of 1983 section 6(1)(a) for example shows how English shipping law and practice are 
inherited and applicable to an extent in South Africa. It is submitted that it is this colonial history of South 
Africa and England among other historical factors a strong traditional trading partnership between the two 
countries. This traditional and historical trade relationship between South Africa and England is also 
captured in various case law in the form of cases such as Anderson and Coltman Ltd v Universal Trading 
Co. 1948 (1) SA 1277 as an example. 
 
1188 Bridge Michael The International Sale of Goods Law and Practice, Oxford University Press (1999) 39. 
It seems currently that this concern has not pressured the ratification of the CISG Convention into English 
law. This could largely be due to the fact that by virtue of the rules of private international law English 
jurisdictions have had to apply the CISG Convention or have had to entertain its applicability as a result of 
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7.2 The History of the CISG Convention 
The CISG Convention is a product of the efforts of the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). The origins of CISG 
Convention can be gleaned from the preamble of the Convention itself. The 
CISG Convention was developed because of the resolutions adopted by the sixth 
special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on the 
establishment of a New International Economic Order. Therefore the CISG 
Convention is an example of international law that embodies ideals of trade 
based on equity, fairness and the respect of each State’s sovereignty. 
 
The CISG Convention was formulated with the intention to support and develop 
international trade on the basis of equality and mutual benefit and the need to 
promote international cooperation and commercial relations among States.1189 
This co-operation among States is still the object of Conventions in international 
trade and even more so in modern times through the formulation of a global 
village which has a global economy. It is important to note that the history of 
global co-operation in international trade still continues in the form of other UN 
efforts and structures that continue with the representation of States at 
international level for the purposes of encouraging friendly relations.1190
 
 It is 
submitted that it is these friendly relations among States will be essential to 
steering countries out of the global economic challenges. 
The international economic policy considerations as determined by UNCITRAL 
behind the creation of the CISG Convention also allows for the adoption of 
                                                                                                                                                 
choice of law clauses by contracting parties. For example, in arbitration proceedings it is open to parties to 
make the rules of the CISG Convention applicable. 
1189 Preamble. www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/CISG.pdf 17 March 2010. 
1190 This was further emphasized in a live broadcast address, 2 April 2009, by American President, Barak 
Obama in a recent G20, a body representing the richest States of the world. This Summit was concerned 
with the international economic policy and assistance that would be provided by the US in co-operation 
with the rest of the world’s States during the current world-wide recession. This illustrates that the 
achievement of economic co-operation in history and the history of the creation of the CISG demonstrates 
that UN efforts to unite the world in a global economy have been fruitful and sustainable even in modern 
times. 
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uniform rules which govern contracts for the international sale of goods as part of 
an effort to unify the private law of global trading partners. These uniform rules 
uniquely took into account the different social, economic and legal systems which 
would contribute to the removal of legal barriers in international trade and 
promote the development of international trade.1191 Having established that the 
main aim of the CISG Convention is to achieve legal uniformity and fairness in 
sales agreements it goes without saying that there is a reciprocal duty on 
contracting States to take appropriate actions1192
 
 to achieve the aims of the CISG 
Convention. 
The CISG Convention allows parties to have reasonably predictable legal 
consequences in international sales. For instance, to a dispute over diamond 
sales contract performed in various States as long as the CISG Convention is 
applied to that dispute the end result will be uniform in any particular CISG 
Convention forum. 
 
Prior to the formulation of the CISG Convention, two Hague Conventions 
adopted in the 1960s formed the basis of international sales and contracts 
regulation. These prior instruments were the Convention Relating to a Uniform 
Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods done at 
The Hague on 1 July 1964 (1964 ULF Hague Convention) and the Convention 
Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods done at The Hague 
on 1 July 1964 (The Hague Sales ULIS Convention).1193
                                                 
1191 Preamble. Note that this is an instrument concerned with merchant sales. 
 Although the 
Convention may be read together with the explanatory note as prepared by the 
Secretariat of the UNCITRAL it has been stated that such a commentary, though 
1192 The obvious first action is for the contracting State to ratify the Convention and ensure that trade 
practices and other structural bodies that are involved in international trade are able to take cognizance of 
the newly adopted Convention. Further, the interpretation of the CISG Convention in national law must be 
done with these considerations in mind. 
1193 Article 99. 
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providing some useful insight on the international policy and structure of the 
CISG Convention, it is not an official commentary on the CISG Convention.1194
 
 
The initial international efforts preparation of a uniform law for international sale 
of goods had commenced as early as 1930 at the instance of the International 
Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) in Rome. This effort was 
interrupted by the eruption of the Second World War, continuing when a draft 
was submitted to a diplomatic conference in The Hague in 1964 and this 
subsequently led to the earlier 1964 Conventions mentioned above. The 1964 
instruments were widely criticized1195 for reflecting legal traditions and economic 
practice of continental Western Europe. When UNCITRAL undertook the task of 
unifying the law relating to international sales in 1968 an enquiry was made to 
States on whether or not they intended to adhere to the 1964 instruments.1196
 
 
After various submissions by several States, UNCITRAL studied the 1964 ULF 
and ULIS Hague Conventions to determine what modifications were needed in 
the instruments to make them more capable of wider acceptance by countries of 
different legal, social and economic systems. This endeavor resulted in the 
adoption of the CISG Convention which is essentially a combination of the 
subject matter of the two prior 1964 Conventions.1197
 
 This understanding of the 
development of the CISG Convention is essential to the understanding of some 
of the additional provisions of the CISG Convention relating to accession, 
ratification and adoption (these terms have arguably come to mean the same 
process). Article 99(3) for instance provides that a State which accepts the CISG 
Convention shall at the same time denounce the previously adopted 1964 
Conventions. 
                                                 
1194 UNCITRAL Secretariat. 
1195 Item 3. UNCITRAL Secretariat commentary. The primary reflection of Western Europe’s economic 
trends in the 1964 instruments was largely due to the fact that it was the region that most actively 




The participants in the uniformity process who worked together at reaching a 
consensus on the appropriate international instrument worked diligently to 
reconcile differences between common law and civil law traditions. This role was 
largely played by contributions of countries such as the US and by developing 
nations. It has been stated that while the CISG Convention represented nothing 
new it did in fact reflect the concerns of developing and socialist nations alike 




The CISG Convention then came into force in 1988 after securing the necessary 
number of ratifications. To date it has been adopted in many countries including 
countries of the European Union with the exception of other powerful traders 
such as the United Kingdom. The North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) 
along with some South American countries have also welcomed the CISG 
Convention.1199
 
 The status of adoption of the CISG Convention is made freely 
available to the international community via the United Nations or UNCITRAL 
website information and other applicable resources. 
7.3 The Nature of the International Legal Regulatory Framework  
As highlighted above, the regulatory framework for the international sale of goods 
is dominated by the CISG Convention as well as other regional and multilateral 
agreements. It is important to note that modern international trade is dominated 
by the rules of the WTO1200
                                                 
1198 Bridge Michael The International Sale of Goods Law and Practice, Oxford University Press (1999) 41; 
42. 
 which has assumed huge significance in regulating 
1199 Ibid. 
1200 See Eisenberg G.S. The GATT and the WTO Agreements: Comments on their Legal Applicability to the 
Republic of South Africa South African Yearbook of International Law (1993) 127. 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ursum_e.htm#Agreement 25 March 2010. ‘The agreement 
establishing the WTO calls for a single institutional framework encompassing the GATT, as modified by 
the Uruguay Round, all agreements and arrangements concluded under its auspices and the complete results 
of the Uruguay Round. Its structure is headed by a Ministerial Conference meeting at least once every two 
years. A General Council oversees the operation of the agreement and ministerial decisions on a regular 
basis. This General Council acts as a Dispute Settlement Body and a Trade Policy Review Mechanism, 
which concern themselves with the full range of trade issues covered by the WTO, and has also established 
subsidiary bodies such as a Goods Council, a Services Council and a TRIPs Council.’ 
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global trade. However the WTO regulates international trade and not strictly 
international sale of goods and for this reason, it is of limited significance in the 
regulating international sales contracts. The CISG Convention is therefore the 
main instrument on the regulation of international sales contracts. The CISG 
Convention is useful in the international trade of diamonds which involves various 
contractual agreements between different State and non State entities. 
 
The CISG Convention applies to contracts of sale of goods between parties 
whose places of business are in different States parties.1201  The CISG 
Convention also applies in terms of the rules of private international law in that 
the law.1202 This is significant in that if one party is from a contracting State, but 
both parties have places of business in other countries not party to the CISG 
Convention, the CISG Convention may apply.1203
 
 This is common in import and 
exports regulations where international law becomes inwardly or outwardly 
applicable as a result of the trading relationship and the commercial agreements 
between parties from different States. 
One may take the view that asks the question ‘if the CISG will apply anyway 
because I, the non-CISG Convention merchant am contracting with a CISG 
Convention merchant in another country, what is the use of ratifying such a 
Convention in my own country?’ The answer to this question is simply that by 
ratifying the Convention you as the non-CISG Convention merchant are going to 
make the foreign CISG Convention merchant feel more comfortable in 
international trade relations to select your business above others because they 
feel that in law there is no separation which has to be negotiated every time a 
new trade contract is entered into and the question of choice of law will no longer 
be an issue thus supporting smoother international trade between countries. 
 
                                                 
1201 Article 1(a). 
1202 Article 1 (b). 
1203 Weizuo Chen The Conflict of Laws in the Context of the CISG: A Chinese Perspective 20 Pace 
International Law Review (2008) 115, 118. 
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In terms of the scope of application the CISG Convention does not apply to sales 
involving particular goods for instance, personal or household goods, goods 
being sold by auction or sales in execution, sale of securities, shares or stocks, 
ships, vessels and aircraft as well as electricity. This means that the CISG 
Convention contemplates commodities which have been, or have emerged to be 
subject of international trade1204
 
 such as diamonds but probably in their 
unpolished form because most beneficiated diamond products or jewellery fall 
into the category of goods used for personal reasons. 
In structure essentially the CISG Convention is divided into four parts, each part 
regulating a particular aspect of international contract law. The first part is 
devoted mainly to general principles of contract that would apply to international 
contracts. This part is basically a codification of the common law principles of the 
law of contract. The CISG Convention in this regard does not seek to amend, 
override or preclude the common law principles and rules governing the law of 
contract. Instead, the CISG Convention codifies them and makes provision for 
how these would be applied in the international sale of goods context.  
 
The rules demonstrated above are not distinct from South African law of general 
application which is applicable to contracts. These rules are also not strange to 
South Africa’s commercial legal system and their application and interpretation 
by South African courts is not likely to cause problems. Therefore it can be stated 
firmly that South African contractual principles and rules fit in directly with the 
international regulatory framework for the sale of goods. 
 
The CISG Convention provisions accordingly make provision for parties to the 
contract,1205 formation of the contracts,1206 formalities,1207
                                                 
1204 Article 2. 
 and issues of offer, 
intention of the parties and acceptance and communication of the 
1205 Article 1. 
1206 Article 14. 




 It is reiterated that the principles underlying the CISG Convention 
provisions reflect the common law position, which position informs modern South 
African law of contract. The CISG Convention has therefore not altered the 
common law, making it less difficult for South African courts to interpret and 
apply the law. 
The second part of the CISG Convention is devoted to rules for the sale of 
goods. Again these rules reflect the common law position on the law of sale. 
Provision is made for obligations of the seller1209 and the purchaser,1210 delivery 
of the goods,1211 liability for lack of conformity,1212 breach of the contract and 
remedies by the seller1213 and the purchaser.1214 Provision is also made for the 
passing of risk and ownership.1215
 
 In interpreting these rules and principles in the 
international context, South African courts are free to refer to its own common 
law background as this provides the source for most of the rules in the CISG 
Convention. Further, South African traders who would be affected by the CISG 
Convention would not find it difficult to know what the international legal position 
will be since the domestic law is not fundamentally different with international law 
regarding international contracts. 
Another branch of law contemplated by the CISG Convention is private 
international law. The CISG Convention does not amend, alter or change 
universally accepted choice of law rules and conflict of law principles. 
Accordingly, if a party has more than one place of business, the official place of 
business is that which has the closest relationship to the contract and its 
performance.1216
                                                 
1208 Article 18. 
 If a party does not have a place of business, reference is made 
1209 Chapter II. 
1210 Chapter III. Articles 53 – 60. 
1211 Chapter II. Section 1. Articles 31 - 34. 
1212 Chapter II. Section  II. Articles 35 – 44. 
1213 Chapter II. Section III. Articles 45 – 52. 
1214  Chapter III. Section III. Articles 61 – 65. 
1215 Article 66. 
1216 Article 10(a). 
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to its habitual residence.1217
 
 These rules are primarily found in private 
international law. The CISG Convention therefore adopts the current South 
African and most jurisdictions legal positions in relation to private international 
law. 
The whole tenor of the CISG Convention is advantageous to local diamond 
companies involved in the import and export of rough diamonds where issues of 
harmonious and uniform application of sales law is brought into question 
between South Africa and its international trading partners. It is submitted that 
the sophistication of modern trade and commerce requires an understanding of 
the regulatory framework by those involved in the activity and the CISG 
Convention serves to provide that understanding. It is highly risky to carry on 
international transactions without understanding the regulatory framework that 
governs those transactions. Private and state entities that contract would greatly 
benefit if the regulatory framework is fundamentally similar to their own legal 
system. This tends to promote and facilitate trading since the playing field will not 
be full of uncertainties or surprises for local commercial entities. 
 
7.4 The Structure and Law of the CISG Convention 
The CISG Convention can be described as generally a comprehensive, and in 
some instances   technical document that is divided into various articles. A brief 
discussion of the main divisions of the Convention has already been made 
above. Only certain salient parts and provisions that are directly relevant to the 
sale of goods in the form of rough diamonds will be reviewed and how they are 
applicable in diamond trade. 
 
In terms of the actual legal structure of the CISG Convention it has been 
described as consisting of statutory rules on the international sale of goods which 
as a formal source of law are contained in an international treaty. Thus it caters 
for two different types of legal rules on contract law, the first one being the 
                                                 
1217 Article 10(b). 
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traditional rules of contract law and the second one the public international rules 
on the law of treaties. It has been said that one must be aware of the classic 
distinction between law making treaties and contractual treaties. The CISG 
belongs to the category of law-making treaties which also have a further 
distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties.1218
 
 
Treaties that are non-self-executing create rights and obligations for the 
Contracting States only. Individuals living in the Contracting States cannot assert 
any rights arising directly from the treaty itself. In order to become effective 
towards individuals, a non-self executing treaty must be transformed into 
domestic statutory law, therefore by ratifying or acceding to a non-self-executing 
treaty, a Contracting State accepts the international duty to provide for the 
appropriate domestic legislation. As long as such implementing national 




In the case of a self-executing treaty the legal rules arising from such a treaty are 
open for immediate application by a national judge. In such a case all persons 
living in the contracting State are entitled to assert their rights or demand the 
fulfillment of another person’s duty by referring directly to the legal rules of the 
treaty itself. On the other hand it is quite possible to have a treaty that is partly 
self-executing and non-self-executing. The CISG Convention is a classic 
example of a self-executing treaty.1220
 
 
It seems that the South African legislature’s intention in the Convention on 
Agency in the International Sale of Goods Act,1221
                                                 
1218 Sarcevic Petar and Volken Paul International Sale of Goods Dubrovnik Lectures Oceana Publications 
(1986) 20.  
 in an attempt to assent to the 
CISG Convention, provides that the aims of the CISG Convention should be 
1219 Sarcevic Petar and Volken Paul International Sale of Goods Dubrovnik Lectures Oceana Publications 
(1986) 21. 
1220 Ibid. 
1221 4 of 1986. 
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borne in mind when applying the international agency Convention. This provision 
while it illustrates a serious commitment to the objectives of the CISG Convention 
in South Africa, it does not serve much purpose as long as the CISG Convention 
remains un-ratified. On the other hand because of the self-executing nature of 
the CISG Convention it allows in appropriate circumstances a South African court 
to apply its provisions. 
 
Accordingly, the treaty nature of the CISG Convention must always be borne in 
mind. It has been submitted that even where parties have their places of 
business in different States will be immaterial if this does not appear in the 
contract, this where necessary may be inferred from the facts of each case. 
Further, the nationality or commercial character of the parties to the contract will 
also be immaterial when determining the application of the CISG Convention.1222
 
 
This suspension of legal debates concerning applicability in light of individual 
parties’ location and local law allows for matters pertaining to the sale of goods to 
be dealt with swiftly under the CISG Convention, particularly essential to 
diamond trade where location of a party’s business premises and performance of 
the contract may substantially vary. 
Article 31223 of the CISG Convention is important for the purposes of the diamond 
industry in that it provides that contracts for the supply of goods to be 
manufactured or produced, for example, rough diamonds for the purposes of 
cutting and polishing, or cut and polished diamonds for the purposes of 
beneficiation are to be considered sales1224
                                                 
1222 Article I (2); (3). This Article must be read together with Article 10 which deals with party having more 
than one place of business for the purposes of the Convention. 
 unless the party who orders the 
goods undertakes to supply a substantial part of the materials necessary for such 
manufacture and production. This would be a technicality that may exclude many 
1223 Article 3 provides as follows: ‘(1) Contracts for the supply of goods to be manufactured or produced 
are to be considered sales unless the party who orders the goods undertakes to supply a substantial part of 
the materials necessary for such manufacture or production. (2) This Convention does not apply to 
contracts in which the preponderant part of the obligations of the party who furnishes the goods consists in 
the supply of labour or other services.’ 
1224 This is the intention of the CISG Convention. 
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of the diamond trade contracts from the ambit of the CISG Convention as it is 
very common for the party ordering the supply of diamonds as goods has to 
substantially provide for the manufacturing and beneficiation of such diamonds. 
Further, Article 3(2) provides clearly that the Convention does not apply to 
contracts where the main aspect of the obligations of the party who furnishes the 
goods consists in the supply of labour and other services. 
 
Article 3 provides ‘(1) Contracts for the supply of goods to be manufactured or 
produced are to be considered international sales unless the party who orders 
the goods undertakes to supply a substantial part of the materials necessary for 
such manufacture or production. (2) This Convention does not apply to contracts 
in which the preponderant part of the obligations of the party who furnishes the 
goods consists in the supply of labour or other services.’ It is clear that the first 
part of Article 3 deals with an exception to the application of the CISG Convention 
in a case where the buyer has to supply much more services and other items for 
the product to be created while part 2 of Article 3 makes an exception to the 
application of the CISG Convention where the seller is required to supply certain 
services that will result in the creation of that final product. In such cases one is 
not dealing with pure sales but ‘other services’ contracts which would be 
excluded from the ambit of the CISG Convention. 
 
It is clearly established then that exceptions to the CISG Convention sales 
involve the following circumstances: 
1. Buyer cannot be expected to supply materials to create product to be sold. 
2. Seller cannot be expected to supply labour and other services. 
 
 Rough diamonds sales will always fit into the CISG Convention ambit unless the 
buyer supplies materials for producing such diamonds or if the seller offers to cut 
and polish the diamonds as part of ‘other services’ that accompany that sale. In 
light of this, it is submitted that South Africa should seek to have a realistic 
portion of diamond sales covered under the CISG Convention so that all such 
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sales do not require skills and materials input from outside so that all the revenue 
that can be generated from trade in national products comes to South Africa, this 
will build its economy and develop its own skills in producing final products 
beneficiated within South Africa by its own workforce. This is also in line with 
South African State policy in enhancing local beneficiation.1225
 
 
Practically this means that if A, in China is a Sightholder1226 and orders a 
consignment of rough diamonds from a South African Party B, for the purposes 
of producing engagement rings for the Chinese market and the latter undertakes 
to supply all the materials necessary for the production of such engagement rings 
through the use of South African labour, skill and beneficiation, this transaction 
by definition falls outside of the CISG Convention.1227
 
  
Although such a contract forms part of international trade, technically in terms of 
the CISG Convention, such a contract would be excluded from the application of 
the CISG Convention.1228 Only where A, in China undertakes to purchase such 
rough diamonds for whatever other international trade purpose including 
stockpiling other than requiring B, the South African seller to supply a substantial 
part of the materials necessary for the production of such engagement rings will 
the CISG Convention be applicable to  such a contract.1229
 
 
Further, the illustration above shows the ‘preponderant part test’1230
                                                 
1225 Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 section 5 and 15 as amended by the Diamonds Amendment Act 29 of 2005 
read together with section 2 and 26 of the MPRDA 28 of 2002. 
 in terms of 
Article 3(2) of the CISG Convention which provides that the CISG Convention will 
not apply in the case where the preponderant part for the supply agreement 
between the Chinese Sightholder and the South African diamond producer 
requires that the South African supplier as a furnisher of the goods in addition to 
1226 In diamond trade, diamond merchants or clients and buyers are commonly referred to as Sight holders. 
1227 Article 3(1) of the CISG Convention. 
1228 Ibid. 
1229 Article 3(1) and (2). 
1230 Philip L. Bruner and Patrick J. O’Connor, Jr. Risk Management: Identifying, Allocating and Mitigating 
Construction Risks Bruner and O’Connor Construction Law BOCL, May (2008) 7:38, 7. 
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supplying diamonds further supplies labour, in the form of diamond cutting skill 
and other services connected to that supply. 
 
The provisions of the CISG Convention in Article 3 are crucial in the context of the 
diamond industry because not every international sale of diamonds necessarily 
forms a sale within the ambit of the CISG Convention and in such instances 
applicable law must be considered according to ordinary rules of private 
international law. The disadvantage of these exclusionary provisions of the CISG 
Convention is that it still leaves lacuna in certain international sales contracts with 
services such as labour and skill attached to them therefore interpretation will be 
required to determine application of the CISG Convention if it is not clear enough. 
 
It has been submitted that because the CISG Convention does not define goods 
but simply provides for excluded goods, it is thus uncertain whether the CISG 
Convention applies to items such as body parts and software.1231 It has been 
accepted that the provision for goods in the CISG Convention is broad enough so 
that it embraces all tangible corporeal things and where there is doubt it is 
proposed that the CISG Convention will provide a wide berth to domestic case law 
dealing with the difference between contracts for the sale of minerals and 
contracts for the sale of natural produce.  It is proposed that since the CISG 
Convention applied to goods that are produced as contained in Article 3 then it 
applies to the extraction of minerals (diamonds) and the growth of crops.1232
 
 This 
submission clearly illustrates the CISG Convention applicability to rough diamond 
international sales however the supply of services to produce the sold product 
debate is still subject to interpretation when dealing with international diamond 
trade. 
While the CISG Convention provides a relatively verbatim code resembling South 
African law of contract it is important to international diamond trade on a 
                                                 
1231 Bridge Michael The International Sale of Goods Law and Practice, Oxford University Press (1999) 47; 
48. 
1232 Bridge Michael The International Sale of Goods Law and Practice, Oxford University Press (1999) 48. 
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merchant to merchant type of commercial relationship. With regard to carriage of 
goods sold, the provisions of Articles 31 and 32 of the CISG Convention are of 
particular importance to international diamond trade for instance which deals with 
the delivery of the goods sold it often a very important aspect of international 
diamond trade. Article 32(2) provides that if1233 the seller is bound to arrange he 
must conclude such contracts as are necessary for the carriage to the place fixed 
by means of transportation appropriate in the circumstances, for instance, 
carriage by air in the case of diamonds as the case may be and according to the 
usual terms for such transportation, for instance, arranging an insurance 
certificate covering carriage of diamonds by air.1234
 
 
Article 35 deals with the conformity of the goods sold. When dealing with 
diamond sales, expert knowledge of valuators is essential in determining the 
conformity of the diamonds as goods sold. In terms of the provision a seller must 
deliver goods which are of the quality, quantity and description required by the 
contract and which are contained or packaged in the manner required by the 
contract. To balance this the seller’s obligations as required by this provision of 
the Convention, it must be read together with Article 38 which provides that the 
buyer must examine the goods, or cause them to be examined within a short 
period as is practicable in the circumstances and if goods are subject to carriage 
examination by the buyer may be deferred until after the goods have arrived at 
their destination.1235
 
 It is open to a buyer of the diamonds in such circumstances 
to employ their own valuator for the purpose of examining the goods. 
Article 46(2) provides that in instances where goods do not conform with the 
contract, it is open to the buyer to require delivery of substitute goods however 
only if lack of conformity constitutes a fundamental breach of contract and a 
                                                 
1233 The use of the wording ‘if’ in this instance forms an express acknowledgment of the possible 
alternative carriage obligations that may arise in the context of international trade. In light of the fact that 
there are many INCOTERMS as sponsored by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) ‘if’ suggests 
accurately that it is not always expected in international trade that the seller will be responsible for 
arranging the carriage of the goods sold.  
1234 Article 32(3) allows the seller to make necessary arrangements for insurance of goods being carried. 
1235 Article 38(2).  
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request for substitute goods is made subject to the notice of lack of conformity as 
contained in Article 39 or within reasonable time. In the case of diamond sales it 
would be open to a buyer to prove lack of conformity and this would also be 
determined by expert knowledge as they are able to guide the court as to when 
quality of carats in diamonds can be said to be so compromised that it is deemed 
a fundamental breach of contract. 
 
The risk provisions of the CISG Convention that relate to fitting diamond sales 
must also be mentioned. In terms of Article 66 which provides that loss or 
damage to the goods after the risk has passed to the purchaser does not absolve 
him or her from his or her obligation to pay the price unless the loss or damage is 
due to an act or omission of the seller. This provision is of particular importance 
to international diamond sales as loss of diamonds as the subject matter of the 
contract through theft1236 is a very serious and age old concern1237
                                                 
1236 S v Gauss v Mukete; S v Petrus; S v Teodor 1980 ( 3 ) SA 770 (SWA) 771, 772.  In this case the four 
appellants had, in separate cases, been convicted by a magistrate of theft of diamonds in contravention of s 
30 (1) of Proclamation 17 of 1939 (SWA) and each had been sentenced to a fine of R600 or six months' 
imprisonment plus six months' imprisonment. The value of the diamonds involved in the offences varied 
from R53 to R357. The appellants were all first offenders and each had dependants. Several warnings had 
in the past been issued by the courts to diamond offenders that heavier sentences would be imposed in the 
future. In an appeal against the sentences, it was held that there was sufficient money to pay the fines, that 
imprisonment was indicated if the offence was to be combated, that the imprisonment had to be firm and 
appropriate in order to deter would-be offenders who were aware of the gravity of the offence and who 
ignored warnings and that the magistrate had exercised his discretion properly and that the appeals against 
the sentences should be dismissed. National Union of Mineworkers v De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd 
(1997) 18 ILJ 1442 (CCMA) 1455 F. It was stated in this case that diamond theft the mine threatens its 
profitability and ultimately its existence. A mine often has to operate in an extremely strict security 
environment which is backed up with severe disciplinary penalties for breaches of that security. Of the 
numerous witnesses who were asked about mine policy in this regard it is clear that the mine's policy 
allows no room for any tolerance. 
 or threat 
1237 See an example of a very early South African case dealing with diamond theft. Queen v Klaas (1893-
1895) 7 HCG 245, 246. In this very early case, the court dealt with a matter involving an alleged theft of a 
diamond and the facts clearly illustrate the threat of diamond theft that will always be of concern to the 
diamond industry. In this case ‘a labourer named Klaas, was charged before the Special Justice of the Peace 
at Windsorton, with contravening sect. 2 of Act 18 of 1873 by unlawfully absenting himself from the place 
appointed for his work. It appears that Klaas was working for a licensed digger at Klipdam, and was absent 
from duty at a time when he should have been working in the claims. A search was made for him, and he 
was found in a disused claim apparently concealing something, and his movements, both then and 
subsequently, were of a somewhat suspicious character, leading to the surmise that he had swallowed a 
diamond. The Special Justice convicted him of the offence charged, and sentenced him to pay a fine of ten 
shillings or undergo eight days' hard labour. At the complainant's request, he made the further order, "in the 
event of the fine being paid, to be detained for four days in order to see if he should pass a diamond during 
that time.”’ 
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faced by diamond merchants. These threats will be considered in an in depth in 
chapter 10 of this study which deals with the prevention of corruption in diamond 
trade. 
 
In light of the CISG Convention provisions for passing of risk,1238 a diamond 
purchaser who has purchased diamonds that have subsequently become lost 
due to theft or some other cause, such a purchaser shall have to pay for the lost 
or stolen diamonds unless he or she can show that such loss can be attributed to 
the conduct of the seller.1239 What constitutes wrongful conduct in such sale 
cases is a question of fact therefore the court will have to consider normal 






 is also crucial to passing of risk in the case where a carrier is used. 
It is provided under this provision of the CISG Convention that if the contract of 
sale involves carriage as is common in diamond sales, if the seller is not bound 
to hand the goods over at a particular place, the risk will pass to the buyer when 
the goods are handed over to the first carrier for transmission to the buyer in 
accordance with the sale agreement. 
Article 67(2) provides provides specifically that risk will not pass to the purchaser 
until the goods are clearly identified to the contract whether by markings on the 
goods, by shipping documents, which includes documents used for carriage by 
                                                 
1238 Chapter IV of the CISG Convention provisions contained in Articles 66, 67, 68, 69 and 70. 
1239 Article 66 provides for a qualification based on the passage of risk in this situation. The Article 
provides that ‘loss of or damage to the goods after the risk has passed to the buyer does not discharge him 
from his obligation to pay the price, unless the loss or damage is due to an act or omission of the seller.’ 
1240 Commissioner for SARS and Another v TFN Diamond Cutting Works (Pty) Ltd 2005] 2 All SA 455 
(SCA) where the court found that the diamonds were stolen while in State custody. 
1241 The CISG provides specifically that ‘(1) If the contract of sale involves carriage of the goods and the 
seller is not bound to hand them over at a particular place, the risk passes to the buyer when the goods are 
handed over to the first carrier for transmission to the buyer in accordance with the contract of sale. If the 
seller is bound to hand the goods over to a carrier at a particular place, the risk does not pass to the buyer 
until the goods are handed over to the carrier at that place. The fact that the seller is authorized to retain 
documents controlling the disposition of the goods does not affect the passage of the risk.(2) Nevertheless, 
the risk does not pass to the buyer until the goods are clearly identified to the contract, whether by 
markings on the goods, by shipping documents, by notice given to the buyer or otherwise.’ 
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air  or by notice to the buyer or otherwise. Clearly in diamond sales it would be 
logical to make the required identification of the goods by clear notice to the 
buyer in order to secure such goods and thwart potential attempts to steal 
diamonds sold. Obviously each diamond merchant organization also has its own 
safety measures and intelligence in such diamond carriage for sale purposes. 
 
Chapter 51242 of the CISG Convention deals with the general obligations of the 
seller and buyer in an international sales contract and these are cogent 
provisions. They cover legal issues pertaining to inter alia anticipatory breach, 
damages, interest, and exemptions based on impossibility, the effects of 
avoidance of the contract by both parties and the preservation of the goods. In 
diamond sales preservation of the goods is a provision that has less meaning to 
diamond sales than any other perishable or consumable as diamonds are by 
their nature enduring items. However, a seller who has incurred expenses such 
as safety deposit or storage expenses as a result of the buyer’s failure to take 
delivery of diamonds sold can retain the diamonds until he or she has been 
reimbursed for his reasonable expenses.1243
 
 
7.4.1 Good Faith and the CISG Convention 
It is important to give due regard to the essence of good faith in the interpretation 
of the provisions of the CISG Convention as contained in Article 71244
                                                 
1242 Articles 71 – 88 of the CISG Convention. 
 of the 
Convention. It is submitted that good faith essentially holds together the all 
practical aspects of international trade. Insofar as it relates to diamond sales 
international merchants must exercise good faith when supplying the correct 
quantity and quality of diamonds being traded and ensure that risks in such trade 
are minimized. Without good faith and ‘above board’ business practices in the 
interpretation of the CISG Convention the provisions under it will simply be 
rendered inoperative or be turned into a mockery. Proper interpretation of the 
1243 Article 85. 
1244 Article 7(1) of the CISG Convention provides that when interpreting the Convention, regard must be 
had to its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance 
of good faith in international trade. 
 342 
CISG Convention, it is submitted, will curb much undesirable and endless 
litigation which would truly create harmony for parties when entering into 
international sales contracts. 
 
It has been proposed that using good faith in the CISG Convention as a guide for 
interpretation is less sweeping that the general good faith requirements of some 
legal systems. Some jurisdictions even have varying degrees of good faith1245 
which may it is submitted be a cause for concern or mirth when one tries to apply 
such varying degrees of good faith, for example, utmost good faith and good 
faith. Be that as it may it is proposed that the interpretation of good faith under 
the CISG Convention may avoid stultification or circumvention of specific 
provisions of the CISG Convention.1246 Further, the CISG Convention is unique in 
that it attempts to legislate a moral value this is in line with the spirit and purport 
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act.1247
 
 
7.5 The South African Perspective on the CISG Convention 
Since the CISG Convention has not been ratified by South Africa it remains an 
area that has not received local judicial interpretation and attention. This is in 
stark contrast to certain foreign jurisdictions that have acceded to the CISG 
Convention and have widely interpreted it in the context of their domestic laws.  It 
is not clear why South Africa has seemingly delayed ratification of the CISG 
Convention since it seems to have been assented to in South Africa.  
 
It would seem that the reception of the CISG Convention in South Africa can be 
likened to a newly appointed Chief Executive Officer (CEO) who is received with 
much applause and parading however gets totally ignored in the daily running of 
that particular company. This could be because such an officer is totally 
redundant or his or her methods are considered unnecessary for the organization 
                                                 
1245 For example the legal concepts of utmost good faith as opposed to good faith. Is good faith not just 
good faith, further in what circumstances must good faith not be utmost one may ask? 
1246 Honnold John Uniform Law for International Sales Under the 1980 United Nations Convention Kluwer 
(1982) 20. 
1247 108 of 1996. 
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in question. It is nevertheless important to consider the likely impact of acceding 
to the CISG Convention insofar as it represents a body with universally 
applicable and uniform international rules governing the sale of goods and for the 
purposes of this study in international diamond trade.  
 
In 1995 the South African Law Commission was considering the CISG 
Convention for ratification and accession and this effort was seen as a positive 
development which South Africa needed in the interests of its international trade 
law and policy.1248 It had been proposed that the adoption of the CISG 
Convention would stimulate confidence in the trade relations between South 
Africa and its international trading partners and that there was no reason why 
South Africa should lag behind in such international legal developments.1249
 
  
This recommendation by a South African legal scholar illustrates a positive 
acceptance that UNCITRAL efforts are welcome developments insofar as they 
seek to reform existing South African international trade law. One must only 
caution that this work does not propose an accession by South Africa to the 
CISG Convention for the sake of acceding or for the reasons that other nations 
have done so. The recommendation is for South Africa to ratify and accede to the 
CISG Convention, and other well intentioned international instruments if it is clear 
that this is in South Africa’s best commercial and international trade interests.  
 
The local legal profession would best be served by understanding the CISG 
Convention application in various instances and scenarios especially since it is 
clear that the CISG Convention in international trade contracts is an instrument 
                                                 
1248 Coutsoudis Basil UNCITRAL Instruments in Southern Africa De Rebus, November (1999) SA 
Attorneys Journal 30. In his article, Basil Coutsoudis proposes a reformation of certain aspects of South 
Africa’s law on international trade through various instruments created by UNCITRAL; this includes not 
only the CISG but other instruments pertaining to international trade such as the UNCITRAL Model Law 
on International Commercial Arbitration and the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, 
which at present forms part of South African law. See article also on  http://www.law-
online.co.za/IntTradeLaw/ 23 March 2010. 
UNCITRAL%20Instruments.htm 21 March 2010. 
1249 Ibid. 
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that may be applicable to such contracts in terms of private international law and 
Article 1 of the Convention.1250
 
 This is a cogent submission in light of the fact that 
the CISG Convention is adopted by many of South Africa’s trading partners, the 
only strange aspect of this submission is that it was made in 1999 and it is now 
ten years and the CISG Convention is yet to be ratified by South Africa. This 
raises practical questions about urgent need for its adoption for purposes of 
substantiating South African law on international trade. 
7.6 The CISG Convention and Foreign Law 
It is prudent to now consider how the CISG Convention has been applied by 
other jurisdictions whose legal decisions and commercial practices are similar to 
South Africa’s. This analysis will consider these foreign decisions in order to 
illustrate whether or not ratification of the CISG Convention stimulates or 
enhances international trade.  Further, this analysis will assess the successes 
and challenges identifiable in foreign international trade law that will 
consequently encourage South Africa not to vacillate in adopting measures that 
will enhance and improve its international trade status particularly international 
diamond trade. The foreign law illustrated below will also confirm that the law as 
provided by the CISG Convention shows principles of equity and comity all of 
which are going to contribute to sound international trade in diamonds and thus 
are justifiable in terms of the Constitutional dispensation of South African 
diamond law. 
 
The US has ratified the CISG Convention and the treaty is a self-executing treaty 
with preemptive force of law in that country. This is notwithstanding the fact that 
key trading partners of the US such as the United Kingdom, Japan and Ireland 
are not parties to the Convention. In the US the debate as to when a contract can 
be covered by the CISG Convention, and thus a pure international sale of goods 
contract, has not been resolved yet. For example, construction contracts are 
                                                 
1250 Ibid. In 2005 South Africa was still termed in academic writings as a future party to the CISG, See 
Malunga Kevin International Civil Matters De Rebus, April (2005) SA Attorneys Journal 27. The question 
is whether or not another ten years will pass before South Africa actually ratifies the CISG. 
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generally not covered by the CISG Convention but when determining whether a 
contract is one for construction or sale of goods, this can be a difficult matter to 
determine.1251
 
 This is an issue that is also important in diamond trade as each 
contract must be determined on its merits when seeking to identify whether or not 
it falls into the ambit of being a pure international sale of goods contract covered 
by the CISG Convention. 
Bruner & O’Connor submit that there are contracts that are contracts for the sale 
of goods and thus governed by the CISG Convention although such goods are 
associated with construction. These include, for example, the supply and 
installation of anti-pollution devices, the supply and installation of producing, 
delivering and installing machinery. One of the legal concerns pertaining to such 
contracts is what factors are to be taken into account when determining whether 
a mixed contract should be characterized as one for construction services or as 
one for the sale of goods.1252
 
 
It is proposed by the writers above that when seeking guidance on interpreting 
the true nature of the contract the CISG Convention concept of the “preponderant 
part” in Article 3(2) should be the test used. The meaning of preponderant part is 
not defined in the CISG Convention therefore it has been suggested that one 
must look at both the monetary values of the services and goods portion of the 
contract as well as the overall purpose of the contract.1253
                                                 
1251 Philip L. Bruner and Patrick J. O’Connor, Jr. Risk Management: Identifying, Allocating and Mitigating 
Construction Risks Bruner and O’Connor Construction Law BOCL, May (2008) 7:38, 1. 
 Thus a contract is an 
international sale if it is clear from the facts that that was the intended purpose of 
the contract. It is also respectfully submitted that preponderant should be 
interpreted to mean the overwhelming or significant portion of the contract, if that 
portion of the contract is a sale then such a contract should be covered by the 
CISG Convention. 
1252 Philip L. Bruner and Patrick J. O’Connor, Jr. Risk Management: Identifying, Allocating and Mitigating 
Construction Risks Bruner and O’Connor Construction Law BOCL, May (2008) 7:38, 6. 
1253 Philip L. Bruner and Patrick J. O’Connor, Jr. Risk Management: Identifying, Allocating and Mitigating 
Construction Risks Bruner and O’Connor Construction Law BOCL, May (2008) 7:38, 7. 
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A further challenge faced by parties determining which transactions are governed 
by the CISG Convention and which are not can be further impaired by different 
countries subscribing to different portions of the CISG Convention. This is 
illustrated, for example, by the US and other States that have elected not to be 
bound by Article 1(1)(b) which provides ‘when the rules of private international 
law lead to the application of the law of a contracting State.’ The effect of this 
election is that the CISG Convention is only applicable to domestic contracts only 
if the seller and buyer have their places of business in different countries and 
both countries have ratified or accepted the Convention.1254
 
 The election by the 
US to exclude the application of Article 1(1)(b) may be a useful tool in ensuring 
that only States that have ratified the CISG are faced with having to endure the 
effects of the application of the CISG Convention. South Africa may adopt this 
route to avoid complications when applying the CISG Convention in the future 
ratification thereof. 
In Delchi Carrier S.p.A. v Rotorex Corp1255 the US court heard a matter involving 
the application of the CISG Convention to a contract between a US seller and 
Italian buyer. The facts of the case are such that in 1988 the seller agreed to sell 
10, 800 compressors to the buyer for use in the buyers portable room air 
conditioners. The air conditioners were scheduled to go on sale in the spring and 
summer of 1988 and were due to be delivered in three shipments before 15 May 
1988. The first shipment1256
                                                 
1254 Ibid. 
 was sent by sea on 26 March, the second shipment 
on about 9 May. While the second shipment was en route the buyer discovered 
that the first shipment of compressors did not conform to the sample model that 
accompanied the required specifications. On 13 May, the buyer informed the 
seller that 93 per cent of the compressors were rejected in the quality control 
1255 US Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit) 6 December 1995. 
1256 Note that in international trade carriage by air is also referred to as shipment and thus it becomes 
important to note mode of transport specifically when using the words shipment. 
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checks because they had lower cooling capacity and consumed more power than 
the same model specifications.1257
 
 
After several attempts to cure the defects in the compressors the buyer asked 
the seller to supply new compressors conforming to the original sample and 
specifications and the seller refused to comply. On 23 May 1988 the buyer 
cancelled the contract, declared the contract voided with suitable arrangements 
to attempt to mitigate his losses. The court of first instance, the District Court held 
the seller liable for breach of contract and the Circuit Court of Appeals 
considering the effects of the provisions of the CISG Convention confirmed the 
ruling.  It was stated by the appellate court that the CISG Convention governs 
sales contracts between parties from different signatory countries; however, the 
CISG Convention makes it clear that the parties may choose to be bound 
contractually by a source of law other than the CISG Convention such as the 
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC),1258
 
 for example. 
Article 61259
 
 of the CISG Convention makes it clear that parties may exclude 
application of the Convention regardless of the signatory status of the State they 
are in and the parties may not seek to alter that agreement just because they 
suddenly wish to be protected under some provision of the CISG Convention or 
seek to escape liability through technical arguments under the CISG Convention. 
South African parties who find the CISG Convention onerous and are in a greater 
position to influence choice of law in a sales agreement may exclude the 
application of the CISG Convention. Ordinary remedies for breach of contract will 
then be determined in terms of that choice of law. Therefore parties to a diamond 
deal would be in the same manner free to agree to choice of law whose effect 
would be the exclusion of the CISG Convention. 
                                                 
1257 See facts. 
1258 US State code harmonizing sales law 1952. 
1259 Article 6 provived that parties may exclude the application of this Convention or, subject to article 12, 
derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions. 
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In Forest Guarani, S.A. v Daros International Inc.1260 the matter involved an 
Argentinean corporation, Forestal, whose principal place of business was 
Argentina. Forestal’s business involved the manufacturing, repairs, finishing and 
sales of lumber products including wooden finger joints and Daros a New Jersey 
based import-export Corporation whose principal place of business is New 
Jersey. In 1999 the two corporations entered into a verbal agreement in terms of 
which Daros undertook to sell Forestal’s wooden finger joints to third party 
buyers in the US. Pursuant to this agreement Forestal shipped USD$ 1, 857, 
766.06 worth of finger joints to Daros and in turn Daros remitted USD$ 1, 458, 
212.35 in payments for the finger joints, however, there was still a question of 
payment of the outstanding amount of USD$ 419, 553.71 which included 
additional charges related to the transaction.1261
 
 
On 12 April 2002 a complaint for breach of contract was filed by the Plaintiff, 
Forestal in the New Jersey, Superior Court but the action was stayed at the 
instance of Daros and moved to the federal court on the point of jurisdiction 
pursuant to the application of the CISG Convention. It was argued by the 
Defendant that proper exercise of jurisdiction over every civil action that rises 
under a treaty of the United States, as in the case of the CISG Convention, which 
is ratified by the US senate creates a private right of action in federal court.1262
 
 
On 5 June 2005 Daros moved for summary judgment on the grounds that as a 
matter of law Forestal’s claims are barred under the CISG Convention, as 
amended by Argentina, which requires that all sales agreements be made in 
writing, further, Forestal failed to produce any credible evidence to substantiate a 
claim for breach of contract.1263
                                                 
1260 US District Court For the District of New Jersey, Civil Action No. 03-4821 (JAG). 2008 US Dist. 
LEXIS 79734; 67 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 18. 
 It seems that the Argentinean amendment of the 
CISG Convention in this case had the effect of nullifying the effects of Article 
1261 Para. 2. 
1262 Ibid. 




 of the CISG Convention which provides that a contract of sale need not be 
in writing and is not subject to any other requirement as to form. Further Article 
11 provides that a sales contract may be proved by any means, including a 
witness. Clearly in this case Forestal had shot themselves in the foot by not 
reducing the contract into writing and it was no wonder they could not make 
proper discovery using any documents, there simply were no documents to prove 
the sale. Forestal could not have strengthened their case by focusing on 
producing oral evidence to prove the sales contract because by not reducing the 
contract to writing, they had acted outside the protections of Argentinean 
international trade law.  
The federal court was not quick to accept the arguments given by the Defendants 
and requested parties to file papers addressing the applicability of the CISG 
Convention to this matter and to give the Plaintiffs an opportunity to argue their 
case properly. The federal court came to the conclusion that the CISG 
Convention was applicable to this matter particularly in light of the fact that the 
parties had not elected to exclude its application. The court considered Article 11 
of the Convention and took the view that Argentina, like China had exercised 




Article 96 provides that a contracting State whose law requires sales contracts to 
be reduced to writing may at any time make a declaration in accordance with 
Article 12 that any provision of Article 11, Article 291266
                                                 
1264 Article 11 provides that ‘a contract of sale need not be concluded in or evidenced by writing and is not 
subject to any other requirement as to form. It may be proved by any means, including witnesses.’ 
 or part II of this 
Convention, that allows a contract of sale or its modification or termination by 
agreement or any offer, acceptance, or any other indication of intention to be 
1265 Para. 12. 
1266 Article 29(1) provides that a contract may be modified or terminate by the mere agreement of parties, 
Article 29(2) provides that a contract in writing which contains a provision requiring any modification or 
termination by agreement to be made in writing may not be otherwise modified or terminated by 
agreement. However, a party may be precluded by his or her conduct from asserting such a provision to the 
extent that the other party has relied on that conduct. 
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made in any form other than in writing, does not apply where any party has his or 
her place of business in that State. In light of this provision if the place of 
business in China or Argentina, contracts must be in writing. 
 
In the federal court Forestal argued that the plain language of the CISG 
Convention in Argentina’s declaration under Article 96 should be disregarded. 
The court did not accept that contention and explained that it was intended by the 
drafters of the CISG Convention to remove impediments to international 
commerce and contracting by allowing a more liberal enforcement of oral 
agreements. However the same drafters did not wish to dictate conduct of each 
State in such matters and in Argentina sales contracts are expected to be in 




An important lesson that can be drawn from this case to assist South African 
lawmakers is that when ratifying the CISG Convention, there is no need to 
exercise the option under Article 96. All sale contracts may be brought before the 
court for consideration without fearing that they may not have been in writing. 
This submission is of course subject to trade customs and trade usage 
practicalities. Further, in diamond sales, it is simply prudent for evidentiary 
purposes to reduce all international trade agreements to writing. However, if this 
practice offends ordinary trust relationships often expressed among diamond 
merchants, then the contracts should remain oral agreements but also 
enforceable in terms of Article 11 of the CISG Convention. 
 
In Cedar Petrochemicals Inc. v Chemical Co. Ltd.1268
                                                 
1267 Para. 13. See also Zhejiang Shaoxing Yongli Printig and Dyeing Co. Ltd v Microflock Textile Group 
Corporation Case No. 06-22608-CIV-O’ Sullivan US District Court for the Southern District of Florida 
2008 US Dist. LEXIS 40418; 66 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 716. 
 the American court decided 
a matter pertaining to breach of contract under the provisions of the CISG 
Convention. In this case a New York based corporation, Cedar had entered into 
1268 06 Civ. 3972 (LTS) (JCF) US Court for the Southern District of New York 2007 US Dist. LEXIS 
51802. 
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a sales agreement with Ertisa, a Spanish corporation in April 2005 in terms of 
which Cedar would sell Ertisa 4,000 metric tons of liquid phenol for delivery 
CFR1269 Rotterdam May. The phenol was to meet certain specifications for 
colour. Cedar sought to purchase the liquid phenol from third party Dongbu a 
Korean corporation. The phenol purchased from Dongbu was to be delivered 
according to contractual specifications FOB Ulsan Anchorage, Korea. It was 
provided in the contract that inspection would be conducted by an independent 
surveyor whose findings as to quality and quantity as per shore tank figures at 
loading port would be final and binding on both parties.1270
 
 
The phenol was loaded on board Cedar’s designated vessel at Ulsan Anchorage 
where samples of it were drawn and some samples removed for immediate 
testing by SGS Korea Co. Ltd. SGS affirmed that the phenol had met the 
specifications for colour and payment was made to Dongbu by Cedar under this 
contract. When the phenol arrived in Rotterdam, more samples were taken for 
testing and it was found that the colour specifications were not met1271 in that test 
therefore Ertisa rejected delivery. Cedar managed to mitigate its losses by 
repurchasing the phenol and sold it to an Indian undertaking then proceeded in 
an action for recovery of damages in the US federal court.1272
 
 
This matter had commenced before the court on claims against Dongbu for 
negligence and fraud, which allegations were deleted and removed from the 
papers by consent from all parties and confirmed by the court. Cedar also 
attempted to join Ertisa to the action as an additional Plaintiff who has suffered 
loss as third party. The court rejected this argument stating that there is no basis 
for linking Ertisa as additional Plaintiff. The loss that Ertisa had suffered had no 
juridical link with the loss suffered by Cedar even if those losses occurred 
                                                 
1269 See International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) INCOTERMS for this shipping term and obligations 
that arise under it. 
1270 Para 2. 
1271 When the Korean samples were also checked they were also subsequently confirmed as being off 
colour. 
1272 Para. 3 – 4. 
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simultaneously, they form separate claims. The court held that although it 
granted that the allegations of fraud and negligence be removed there was still a 
claim based on the breach of contract in direct violation of the seller’s obligations 
under the CISG Convention. It was confirmed by the court that the provisions of 
the CISG Convention were applicable in light of the fact that both parties were 
conducting business in States that are signatories to the CISG Convention.1273
 
 
This case forms a useful guide to illustrating the limits of the aggrieved party’s 
claim under the CISG Convention in a case of a breach of contract. However, 
any additional legal questions which may arise out of the same action such as 
fraud or other criminal charges are subject to alternative application of relevant 
law. This means that when considering diamond sales only those aspects that 
the CISG Convention is applicable will be used to resolve contractual matters 
and those aspects that may relate to other conduct of parties in the contract not 
related to the CISG Convention will form alternative causes of action arising out 
of the same contract. Therefore, parties must be aware that the CISG 
Convention is not all encompassing law in such international trade matters and 
therefore choosing to be bound by it alone does not mean other applicable 
domestic law must be ignored particularly where the CISG Convention is silent 
on those issues. 
 
It must be noted that UNCITRAL keeps a useful account and record of judicial 
precedent pertaining to the CISG Convention.1274
 
 This record of decisions 
provided can be analysed as a measure to determine whether the rules 
pertaining to the CISG Convention are in fact being uniformly applied by the 
courts enforcing the treaty. This is an important precedent record considering 
that the one of the main purposes of the CISG Convention is to unite the global 
economy’s private law in the sale of goods. 
                                                 
1273 Para. 11 – 12. 
1274 See UNCITRAL, Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts (CLOUT). See 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/case_law.html 16 March 2010.  
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What one learns about the Case Law on UNCITRAL texts is that they are 
recorded as a compilation of abstracts marked with unique user guide numbers. 
These abstracts are prepared by National Correspondents designated by their 
States.1275
 
 Therefore it can be said that it is a method by which the contracting 
States account for their proper application and interpretation of the CISG 
Convention. Therefore, there is a co-operative international trade law 
accountability system that is set in place by the UN for governments to account 
for their CISG Convention interpretation and application. Therefore any party that 
is trading with a CISG Convention partner can be assured that any potential 
dispute that may arise will be dealt with in a predictable or certain manner as new 
matters are highly unlikely to deviate from established precedent. This is one of 
the incentives for South Africa to expediently complete the process of ratification 
of the CISG Convention. 
In Canada it has been submitted in a legal opinion that Article 351276
                                                 
1275 See Introduction to CLOUT. These cases are normally published in the language of the contracting 
State, however, for the purposes of CLOUT the cases are translated into English or other language abstracts 
to enable access to any interested parties and users. Obviously the abstracts in themselves may not be 
sufficient to the understanding of the cases and the rationale applied by the courts therefore the full 
citations of the cases together with the information of the courts in which those matters are heard are 
provided for further reading. 
 is practically 
the most important provision of the CISG Convention. Article 35 is a provision 
found in Part 3, Section II of the Convention and provides for conformity of the 
goods and third party claims. It is submitted that the CISG Convention is silent on 
remedies for non-contractual misrepresentations, because Article 35(1) requires 
1276 Which provides that ‘(1) the seller must deliver goods which are of the quantity, quality and description 
required by the contract and which are contained or packaged in the manner required by the contract. 
(2) Except where the parties have agreed otherwise, the goods do not conform with the contract unless 
they:  
(a) are fit for the purposes for which goods of the same description would ordinarily be used;  
(b) are fit for any particular purpose expressly or impliedly made known to the seller at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract, except where the circumstances show that the buyer did not rely, or that it was 
unreasonable for him to rely, on the seller's skill and judgement;  
(c) possess the qualities of goods which the seller has held out to the buyer as a sample or model;  
(d) are contained or packaged in the manner usual for such goods or, where there is no such manner, in a 
manner adequate to preserve and protect the goods.  
(3) The seller is not liable under subparagraphs (a) to (d) of the preceding paragraph for any lack of 
conformity of the goods if at the time of the conclusion of the contract the buyer knew or could not have 
been unaware of such lack of conformity.’ 
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that the seller delivers goods as required by the contract. It has been stated that 
this leads to the conclusion that the buyer will be remitted to the applicable 
national law for his remedies. This is seen as a weakness in the provisions of the 
CISG Convention particularly in the sense that contractual and non-contractual 
remedies in the sales area should be viewed as part of a single action.1277
 
 This is 
a classic practical example where a court would have to consult common law and 
the CISG Convention to apply to the same contract, perhaps this undesirable 
effect is one of the reasons ratification of the CISG Convention has delayed in 
South Africa. 
Further, Professor Ziegel submits that Article 35 of the CISG Convention does 
not distinguish between merchant and non-merchant sellers1278 and this has 
been found to be problematic under Canadian law since statutory warranties of 
merchantability and fitness only apply to a seller who deals with goods of that 
description where it is within the course of that seller’s business to supply such 
goods.1279
 
 It is submitted, with respect, that perhaps the answer to this dilemma 
can be generally assumed that since the CISG Convention is applicable to sales 
that pertain to international trade in a true sense, then it may be assumed on the 
whole that it is a CISG Convention applicable to merchants and therefore there is 
no need to look to common law to distinguish between merchant and non-
merchant sales. This would also settle the debate on which diamond sales 
agreements this Convention would cover in the South African context. 
In the case cited as Oberlandesgericht Hamm1280
                                                 
1277 Professor Jacob S. Ziegel Report to the Uniform Law Conference of Canada on CISG July, University 
of Toronto (1981). 
 the German buyer (defendant) 
offered to buy ten lots of ‘wrapped’ bacon from an Italian seller (plaintiff). The 
1278 It is submitted that this is a cogent view of the CISG Convention in that while it excludes goods 
purchased outside of the realm of traditional international trade purposes, see Article 2 foe excluded goods, 
it does not exclude certain sellers therefore a non-merchant seller simply needs to sell CISG Convention 
compliant goods and that is sufficient to cover him in terms of the Convention even though he is engaging 
in such a sale as a casual act as opposed to a merchant.  
1279 Ibid. 
1280 Case 227 CLOUT CISG: A/CN.9/SER.C/ABSTRACTS/20 (1992); 19U 97/91. 
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seller replied to the buyer’s offer but made reference to ‘unwrapped’ bacon.1281 In 
its reply the buyer did not object to the change in terms but after four ‘unwrapped’ 
bacon deliveries the buyer refused further deliveries. The seller declared the sale 
voided and sold the remaining bacon at a loss and claimed damages in the form 
of the outstanding purchase price and interest.1282
 
 
Although the facts illustrate that there was a counter offer, the most pertinent 
question that arose in this case deals with the issue of the buyer’s silence to the 
counter offer. In applying the CISG Convention the court held that the seller’s 
reply to the buyer’s offer was a counter offer in terms of Article 19(1) and not a 
true acceptance in terms of Article 18(1). The buyer’s reply to the counter offer 
because it did not show any objections to the change in terms, the court held, 
should be treated as an unconditional acceptance in terms of Article 8(2) and 
because the buyer had refused to take delivery of more than half the goods, this 




Damages were assessed in terms of the priority provision Article 751284 which 
took into account the seller’s attempt to mitigate its loss in terms of Article 771285 
however since the goods had been sold at a loss in casu the method of 
calculating damages adopted was that provided for in Article 76.1286
                                                 
1281 It is trite South African contract law that this is a counter offer which nullifies the original offer. 
 The court 
1282 Case 227 CLOUT CISG: A/CN.9/SER.C/ABSTRACTS/20 (1992); 19U 97/91. 
1283 Case 227 CLOUT CISG: A/CN.9/SER.C/ABSTRACTS/20 (1992); 19U 97/91. 
1284 Article 75 provides that ‘if the contract is avoided (a term used in case reporting language of the CISG 
Convention) and if, in a reasonable manner and within a reasonable time after avoidance, the buyer has 
bought goods in replacement or the seller has resold the goods, the party claiming damages may recover the 
difference between the contract price and the price in the substitute transaction as well as any further 
damages recoverable under article 74.’ 
1285 Article 77 provides that ‘party who relies on a breach of contract must take such measures as are 
reasonable in the circumstances to mitigate the loss, including loss of profit, resulting from the breach. If he 
fails to take such measures, the party in breach may claim a reduction in the damages in the amount by 
which the loss should have been mitigated.’ 
1286 Article 76 provides that ‘(1) If the contract is avoided and there is a current price for the goods, the 
party claiming damages may, if he has not made a purchase or resale under article 75, recover the 
difference between the price fixed by the contract and the current price at the time of avoidance as well as 
any further damages recoverable under article 74. If, however, the party claiming damages has avoided the 
contract after taking over the goods, the current price at the time of such taking over shall be applied 
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also granted the outstanding purchase price in terms of Article 55 and interest in 
terms of Article 78 of the CISG Convention.1287
 
 There is no doubt that the whole 
dispute would have been avoided if the buyer had objected to the counter offer 
but since that was water under the bridge in this case the CISG Convention 
provisions prevailed to protect the aggrieved party. It is submitted that this 
probably would have been the same stance taken by the South African court 
however the CISG Convention is crucial as it uniformly synthesized private law 
on assessment and calculation of damages. 
In a further decision cited as Oberlandesgericht Münshen1288 a German buyer 
(defendant) had ordered cashmere sweaters from an Italian seller (plaintiff). The 
buyer sought a set-off1289 on the basis that it had notified the seller that the 
sweaters were defective. The court held that in terms of the applicable CISG 
Convention, the seller was entitled to the purchase price in terms of Article 
1(1)(a) and Article 53 of the CISG Convention. The claim for set-off was 
prohibited under the Standard Conditions of the German Textile and Clothing 
Industry which the parties had made applicable to their contract in terms of 
Article 18 therefore the issue of set-off had to be determined in terms of German 
law as provided for in Article 4(a) of the CISG Convention.1290
 
 
With regard to the validity of the contract, the court held that the buyer could not 
declare the contract voided or reduce the purchase price in terms of Article 50 of 
the CISG Convention. This is due to the fact that the buyer had lost its ability to 
rely on the lack of conformity as it should have examined the goods within a short 
                                                                                                                                                 
instead of the current price at the time of avoidance. (2) For the purposes of the preceding paragraph, the 
current price is the price prevailing at the place where delivery of the goods should have been made or, if 
there is no current price at that place, the price at such other place as serves as a reasonable substitute, 
making due allowance for differences in the cost of transporting the goods.’ 
1287 Case 227 CLOUT CISG: A/CN.9/SER.C/ABSTRACTS/20 (1992); 19U 97/91. 
1288 Case 232 CLOUT CISG: A/CN.9/SER.C/ABSTRACTS/20 (1998); 7 U 4427/97. 
1289 See Michael Greenhalgh Bridge A Premier on English Law of Set-Off 24 Journal of Malaysian and 
Comparative Law (1997) 97. Set off has been accepted as an equitable defence for the cancellation of 
mutual debts between the parties in question. This principle may also be applied in insolvency where 
mutual debts cancel one another. 
1290 Ibid. 
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period as the circumstances required in terms of Article 38(1) and 39(1) and as 
agreed between parties in terms of the incorporated Standard Conditions which 
the buyer had failed to comply with.1291
 
  
The court held further that there could not be an exclusion of Article 39(1) of the 
CISG Convention by operation of Article 40 which would have been applicable 
had the seller overlooked obvious and serious defects in the goods which could 
have been detected through the exercise of ordinary care. In casu the buyer had 
distributed the goods to its very own customers and it was evident that the goods 
were neither unsuitable nor unsaleable. The general disputes considered herein 
illustrate that the application of the CISG Convention is generally to favour the 
upholding of the international sale contract having had regard to the rules and 
what is equitable in the circumstances. 
 
7.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter the CISG Convention has been considered carefully and it is 
submitted that it is a crucial in the international sales, particularly diamond sales. 
Although this Convention has not been ratified by South Africa, it is clear the 
ratification of the CISG Convention is welcome in South Africa. In this chapter the 
implications of ratifying the CISG Convention particularly on the diamond industry 
have also been elucidated. 
 
It is submitted that a clearer understanding of these implications will promote its 
much awaited ratification. Comparatives from foreign jurisdictions have been 
used to demonstrate the extent of these implications. Further elucidated in this 
chapter are some of the benefits and difficulties that are inherent in the 
application of the CISG Convention and would manifest upon ratification of the 
CISG Convention. Having considered these implications, the conclusions 
expressed below can be drawn.  
 
                                                 
1291 Ibid. 
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The CISG Convention is useful in harmonizing international law on sales 
contracts which are particularly prevalent in international diamond trade, bearing 
in mind that Africa has some strong diamond producing countries such as South 
Africa, Botswana and the DRC, who would benefit in aligning their diamond sales 
with the objectives of the CISG Convention. Interestingly the three diamond 
producing States named herein have not yet ratified the CISG Convention. 
 
One of the issues raised by the CISG Convention in its provisions is the question 
as to whether it is relevant to international diamond trade, since diamond sales 
usually have a character of being mixed sales.1292 This defining of sales 
contracts is even more important in the context of international trade diamonds. 
This means that while the CISG Convention clearly applies to sale of rough 
diamonds as a ‘produced’ product. What happens in the case where further 
labour and skills have been applied to such diamonds to the point that the final 
sold product seems to fit with excluded goods in terms of the CISG Convention? 
This would make that diamond a mixed sale therefore if diamonds are mixed 
sales then it has to be clarified in law in terms of the CISG Convention whether or 
not the provisions of the CISG Convention are even relevant to international 
diamond trade in such a context in the first place. In such cases it is submitted 
that the preponderant test1293
 
 can be used on a case by case basis to determine 
whether an international diamond sales contract is one covered by the CISG 
Convention or not. 
On the whole the application of the CISG Convention is desirable in international 
trade as it promotes the attainment of international legal harmony in sales 
contracts on a global scale. On the other hand however if state parties take 
advantage of Article 96, which is the ‘opt out’ or reservation clause on 
                                                 
1292 This is because often diamonds require labour and skills such as cutting, polishing and beneficiation to 
prepare them for sale. 
1293 Article 3(2) of the CISG Convention will not apply in the case where the preponderant part of the 
supply agreement between buyer and seller requires that the supplier, as a furnisher of the goods, in 




enforcement of oral agreements this could prove to be a set back to international 
uniformity of sales rules as it alters the position on the domestic requirements on 
form of the contract. Some countries have actually used the escape gap provided 
by this Article to escape enforcement of contracts that are not reduced to writing; 
this may be seen as an injustice or a punitive measure to merchants who have 
not adhered to local requirements for contracts to be in written form.  
 
Nevertheless, it can be safely assumed that the CISG Convention provides more 
solutions than problems in the context of international sale of commodities such 
as diamonds and South Africa should expeditiously move to ratify the CISG 
Convention. It is an example of international law that upholds principles of equity, 
fairness and promotes comity. All these principles are fundamentally reflective of 
Constitutional principles in South African law. It is therefore submitted that South 
African international trade would benefit from the formal adoption of the CISG 
Convention and this will particularly enhance diamond law. 
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Diamond trade plays a significant role in sustaining domestic economies of 
diamond rich countries such as South Africa. This makes such countries 
important contributors to the global economy and therefore it is important to 
understand the international trade instruments that control these trade activities 
at international level.1294 The regulation of diamond trade in these economies 
tends to reflect international trends in an attempt to achieve the most equitable 
commercial participation through uniform international regulatory frameworks. 
Once again principles of equity in economic activity are crucial to the 
development of laws in the Constitutional dispensation.1295 The Convention on 
Agency in the International Sale of Goods adopted by the International Institute 
of the United Nations Organization for the Unification of Private Law 
(UNIDROIT), in Geneva on 17 February 1983 (The Convention on Agency)1296
 
 
which is part of South African law will be considered in this chapter to illustrate 
the broad development nature of diamond regulations in the current 
dispensation. 
 The trade regulatory frameworks are inevitably ensconced with various 
international trade principles and norms commonly found in the commercial and 
business laws of various modern States.1297
                                                 
1294 South African Diamond and Precious Metals Regulator Annual Report (2008) 14 – 17. 
 Most of these principles have been 
codified by the global community into international instruments regulating the 
www.sadpmr.co.za 27 October 2009. 
1295 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996 section 39 and 231. 
1296 Convention on Agency in the International Sale of Goods Act 4 of 1986 set out in the schedule of the 
Act section 1 definition of the Agency Convention. 
1297 See endeavours by the International Chamber of Commerce as a world business organization which is 
instrumental in shaping modern business practices in the global community. http://www.iccwbo.org/ 17 
March 2010. The ICC is instrumental in shaping business practices by making policy in anti-corruption, 
arbitration, banking technique & practice, Commercial Law and practice, competition, corporate 
responsibility, customs and trade regulations, e-business, IT and telecommunications, environment and 
energy, financial services and insurance, intellectual property, marketing and advertising, taxation, trade 
and investment policy and transport and logistics. 
 361 




The need to harmonize the regulatory framework for international agency 
eventually culminated into the Convention on Agency in the International Sale of 
Goods.1299 The international rules on agency in commercial arrangements and 
trade in South Africa has been made necessary or perhaps naturally applicable 
as a result of the adoption of other international rules on the sale of goods,1300
 
 
international contracts, arbitration and other commercial rules which South Africa 
has adopted or considered adopting as a global economic player with a number 
of industries and an exporter of diamonds in particular.  
In South African law the general principles on the law of agency1301 are clearly 
well developed and accord with most of the principles, norms and provisions of 
the Agency Convention.  It is however fortunate that there has not been a 
considerable application and interpretation of the Convention principles on the 
international scale by South African courts as this illustrates that there is 
harmony and litigation is minimal. Having said that though it is submitted that the 
Agency Convention at present seems like an important reform1302
 
 to South 
African law, more particularly in international trade matters however currently the 
Convention really seems dormant in application. 
                                                 
1298 See www.unidroit.org/ 17 March 2010 endeavours by UNIDROIT. 
1299 This Agency Convention forms part of South African International Law and is contained in the 
Convention on Agency in the International Sale of Goods Act 4 of 1986. 
1300 Though admittedly the Agency Convention is capable of being applicable in cases where the CISG 
Convention is not applicable, for example, in a case where parties have an agreement under the Agency 
Convention but have elected not to be governed by the CISG Convention. 
www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/CISG.pdf 17 March 2010. 
1301 Turkstra v Kaplan 1953 (2) SA 300 (T) 301 C.The South African law of agency is a combination of the 
Roman-Dutch Law of the contract of mandate and the modern principles of commercial agency. Schachat 
Cullum (Pty) Ltd and another v McLearie [1998] JOL 1727 (W) 13, Francis v East London Board of 
Executors 1935 EDL 405 p 427. 
1302 Ailola D.A. and Eiselen G.T.S. (Original Text by Horn J.P.) Trade and Industry: Agency in 
International Sale of Goods Law of South Africa Volume 28 (2002) 824. Edwards A.B. (updated by 
Ellison Khahn) Conflict of Laws Law of South Africa Volume 2(2) 2 ed (2003) 283. 
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The fact that South African International Law of Agency has not been the subject 
of legal testing1303 before the courts leaves some concern about its actual 
contribution to the development of national law.1304 This means that although it is 
a thorough law that may be accepted as having prevented disputes concerning 
the conduct of agents in international sales, it may also have simply fallen into 
inactivity at the election of parties.1305 In spite of this seemingly inactive state of 
the Convention, it is still very crucial and developmental to diamond trade 
regulations even if untested it is useful in providing a legislative code to create 
certainty in the international law on agency.1306
 
 
Even in the global context, it has emerged from UNCITRAL case law reports 
(CLOUT)1307
 
 that the Convention on International Agency in the sale of goods 
has hardly been a cause of legal disputes. By the same token whether or not 
there are disputes the true test of an effective law is found in the substantive 
rules it provides and the clarity of conduct expected in terms of that law. It is 
submitted that the Agency Convention has those qualities of a law that brings 
about international clarity in rules of agency and therefore is crucial to 
international sales particularly diamond sales should agents be employed to 
complete such contracts. 
                                                 
1303 This is in spite of the fact that the jurisdiction of the South African courts is clearly provided for in 
section 4 of the Convention on Agency in the International Sale of Goods Act 4 of 1986. This section 
provides that ‘any offence contemplated in section 3 (2) shall, for purposes in relation to jurisdiction of a 
court to try the offence, be deemed also to have been committed at any place where the accused happens to 
be.’ 
1304 To date it appears that in South African precedent the Convention on Agency in the International Sale 
of Goods Act 4 of 1986 has not been considered. However there are some useful secondary sources of law 
on the subject and its impact on South African law. These author’s contributions are cited as follows: 
Ailola D.A. and Eiselen G.T.S. (Original Text by Horn J.P.) Trade and Industry: Agency in International 
Sale of Goods Law of South Africa Volume 28 (2002) 824. Edwards A.B. (updated by Ellison Khahn) 
Conflict of Laws Law of South Africa Volume 2(2) 2 ed (2003) 283. 
1305 Article 5 of the Agency Convention provides that ‘the principal, or an agent acting in accordance with 
the express or implied instructions of the principal, may agree with the third party to exclude the 
application of this Convention or, subject to Article 11, to derogate from or vary the effects of any of its 
provisions.’ 
1306 This is in line with the preamble of the Agency Convention. 
1307 See UNCITRAL, Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts (CLOUT). 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/case_law.html 16 March 2010. 
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This chapter will discuss and analyze to an extent the important reform to 
international trade law as contained in the Agency Convention. Further in this 
analysis an inclusion of the consideration of the New International Economic 
Order (NIEO)1308 which has brought about the Agency Convention’s creation will 
be studied in light of the South African Constitutional1309
 
 dispensation. Further, 
this chapter will discuss the relevance of both the Convention and the domestic 
legislation that domesticated the Convention and its impact on diamond trade as 
a briefly considered sample industry. 
The efforts at formulating the Agency Convention efforts commenced as early as 
1935.1310 The exact date account of this period is unclear however it is recorded 
that the Agency Convention unification project was initiated by UNIDROIT in 
1935. These efforts were interrupted during World War II and resumed in 
1946.1311 The draft initial draft documents showing efforts to unify the law on 
agency were presented in the periods ranging from 1961 to 1964 where they 




The Convention finally came about in 1983 and South Africa ratified it in 
1986.This means that by the time the Agency Convention was adopted, the 
phrase ‘new economic order’ was already in use and was also a relevant 
consideration in international trade.  That the order was new distinguished it from 
the international economic order developed after World War II which was mainly 
inspired by the economic theory of the comparative advantage. The new 
                                                 
1308 See preamble of the Agency Convention.  Schedule to the Convention on Agency in the International 
Sale of Goods Act 4 of 1986. www.unidroit.org/.../conventions/1983agency/1983agency-e.htm 17 March 
2010. 
1309 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996 sections 22, 39 and 231. It is submitted that the 
incorporation and effect of Conventions such as the Agency Convention support the right, through 
international instruments, contained in section 22 of the Constitution which provides for the freedom of 
trade, occupation and profession. 
1310 Sarcevic Petar and Volken Paul International Sale of Goods Dubrovnik Lectures Oceana Publications 
(1986) 447. 
1311 Ibid. 
1312 Ibid.  
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economic order was providing a more equitable advantage which allowed 




8.2 The Relevance of Agency in International Diamond Trade 
The need for agency in international diamond sales comes as a natural 
consequence of the industry needs and nature of modern world trade and 
commerce. These involve various aspects ranging from formulation of necessary 
contracts, sale negotiations, the transportation and insurance thereof as well as 
delivery. A web of relationships that result naturally makes agency necessary 
and indispensable to facilitate international diamond trade and commerce.  
These relationships created by contracts of mandate are anticipated in the 
Agency Convention. 
 
There are various dealings and arrangements in diamond trade that makes 
agency necessary in the facilitation of negotiations and formation and execution 
of contracts. An example would be the conduct of ‘sighting’ in the sale and 
purchase of rough diamonds.1314 Since most diamond trade takes place through 
brokerage, for example in the New York Diamond Dealer’s Club (DDC) it has 
been stated that in America’s commercial traffic in diamonds has most members 
acting as middlemen between the diamond producers who mine the stones (Most 




In the practice of diamond sales, the diamond purchasing method involves a 
process whereby a diamond producer offers their diamonds to a select group of 
diamond buyers. These buyers would have had to prior to the sighting have filed 
a shopping list with the diamond producer where the buyer or Sightholder as 
                                                 
1313 Ioannis Lianos The Contribution of the United Nations to the Emergence of Global Antitrust Law 
Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 15 Tul. Int’l & Comp. L. (2007) 415 a 422. 
1314 Choi Kwan Monopoly and Market Demand (2001) Monopoly Par B. 8. 
1315 Richman D. Barak The Antitrust of Reputation Mechanisms: Institutional Economics and Concerted 
Refusals to Deal Virginia Law Review 95 Va. L. Rev. 325 (2009) 332. 
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commonly known in diamond sales would indicate on the shopping list the 
amount of diamonds to be purchased and the quality required. The diamond 
producer then selects the diamonds for the buyer puts them in the relevant 
buyer’s box and attaches a price tag which generally is up to USD$ 500,000.00. 
It is open to the buyer to either accept or reject the price of the producer. Sight 
holders who do not buy often are usually not invited to the diamond sights. 
 
There is a wide scope for the use of intermediaries and a typical contract of 
mandate may be for the agent to inspect the diamonds and one to but engage 
the producer in negotiating the best possible price to suit the principal. It is of 
course open to the principal to ratify such actions of the agents which bring about 
the agreement. It is perfectly clear that agency in diamond sales is the oil that 
lubricates commercial arrangements and keeps the whole trading system in.1316
 
  
8.3 Convention on Agency in the International Sale of Goods Act 4 of 1986 
South Africa has ratified the United Nations Convention on Agency as appears in 
the Convention on Agency in the International Sale of Goods Act.1317 Most of the 
substance of this Act appears in this schedule as previously mentioned. The 
ratification process is provided for in the Convention on Agency in the 
International Sale of Goods Act1318
                                                 
1316 One of the Sight holders of De Beers, for example, is Henri Polak Diamond Corporation who are 
wholesale distributors of natural industrial diamonds including dressers, shapes, elongates, flat elongates, 
diestones, maccles, sawables and drilling. The company has been operating through a series of agents and 
is currently in the process of expanding its network of agents and clients covering areas such as the US, 
Europe, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, People’s Republic of China, Mexico and Brazil 
 which also provides for the ratification of 
subsequent amendments to the Agency Convention.  The adoption of this 
Convention is an important step towards the harmonization of the South African 
1317 4 of 1986. 
1318 4 of 1986 section 2 in line with section 231 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 
1996. Section 2 of the Convention on Agency in the International Sale of Goods Act 4 of 1986 which 
provides as follows: ‘(1) The Convention shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, apply in the Republic. 
(2)The State President may do all things necessary to ratify or cause to be ratified on behalf of the Republic 
any amendments of or additions to the Convention which may be made from time to time, and may by 
proclamation in the Gazette amend the Schedule to give effect to any amendment or addition so ratified. (3) 
The Minister shall lay a copy of every proclamation issued under subsection (2) upon the Table in the 
respective Houses of Parliament within 14 days after the date of the publication of the proclamation in the 
Gazette, if Parliament is then in ordinary session, or, if Parliament is not then in ordinary session, within 14 
days after the commencement of its next ensuing ordinary session.’ 
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legal system with that of the rest of the modern world. The Convention on 
Agency in the International Sale of Goods Act1319
 
 was assented to on 4 March 
1986 and its commencement date is 1 May 1987. 
The State president is entitled to ratify or cause to be ratified amendments and 
additions to the Convention. The Minister of Trade and Industry will have the 
responsibility of tabling proclamations as contained in the Government Gazzete 
reflecting additions or amendments to the Convention in the respective Houses 
of Parliament.1320
 
 This statutory acceptance of the Convention into South African 
trade regulations clearly expresses much confidence in the UNIDROIT’s efforts in 
creating international trade rules that enhances South African law of agency in 
the international sale of goods whether such rules are presently reflected in 
existing law or to be created in future. 
Interestingly the Convention on Agency in the International Sale of Goods Act1321 
makes provision for the criminal sanction under Convention on Agency in the 
International Sale of Goods Act.1322 The responsible Minister is empowered to 
make regulations in accordance with Parliamentary processes that will give effect 
to the Convention in a manner that is appropriate and unique to South Africa, as 
well as prescribe tariffs and recovery of expenditure incurred while applying the 
Convention. The contravention of the regulations under this Convention on 




                                                 
1319 4 of 1986. 
1320 Section 2. 
1321 4 of 1986. 
1322 4 of 1986 section 3. 
1323 4 of 1986. 
1324 Convention on Agency in the International Sale of Goods Act 4 of 1986 section 3(2) prescribes a fine 
not exceeding R 1000, 00 and imprisonment for up to 12 months or both. 
1325 Section 3(1), (2), (3) and (4) to repeal the disapproved regulation, this will be achieved in terms of 
section 12(2) of the Interpretation Act 33 of 1957.  
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Although this statutory sanction illustrates the extent of enforcement of the 
regulations such regulations are subject to heavy testing and debate by the 
Houses of Parliament and may be disapproved and treated as repealed.1326 It is 
not clear from the face of the Convention on Agency in the International Sale of 
Goods Act1327how the importation of purely criminal sanctions will enhance 
adherence to a law designed to facilitate purely commercial matters and this is 
probably there have not been any reported convictions based on the Convention 
on Agency in the International Sale of Goods Act1328
 
to date.  
Perhaps this might be particularly more relevant to diamond trade as the age old 
problem of illicit diamond trading may lead to a contravention of the Convention 
on Agency in the International Sale of Goods Act1329by potentially overzealous 
traders who sadly seek to avoid legal diamond trade at all costs. While the 
international agency law in South Africa seems to have been received with 
sufficient zeal as illustrated by deterrent criminal sanctions for breaches of the 
Convention on Agency in the International Sale of Goods Act,1330
 
the Agency 
Convention currently remains dormant as there has not been much activity 
requiring its application from the basis of litigation. This lack of legal testing is not 
to suggest that it is an unimportant legislative mechanism in international trade. 
8.3.1 Understanding the Provisions of the Convention 
It is submitted that conducting business in foreign countries through agents has 
become a common practice that has necessitated the creation of the Agency 
Convention. This is because agency though present in the systems of all modern 
States has generally tended to follow two distinct systems of law either in the 
form of common law or a civil law system. The main differences in these systems 
is that in common law agency has been defined as the relationship that exists 
between two people, principal and agent, one of whom expresses implicitly or 
                                                 
1326 Ibid. 
1327 4 of 1986. 
1328 4 of 1986. 
1329 4 of 1986. 
1330 4 of 1986. 
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impliedly that the other should represent him or her. The civil law countries have 
tended to make a distinction between direct and indirect agency. Direct agency 
refers to a legal situation where the agent not only acts on behalf of the principal 
but in the name of the principal.1331 Indirect agency refers to a commission agent 
who concludes a contract1332 in his own name but on account of the principal.1333
 
  
Both common law and civil elements1334
 
 of agency have been noted in internal 
South African agency law however such internal agency rules are not the focus 
of this chapter. What is being considered in this chapter is the impact of the 
legislative endeavor to have a uniform stance in the sale of goods or international 
trade in South Africa. It is submitted that having due regard to the dualistic 
elements of internal national agency law South Africa has done well to adopt the 
Agency Convention and it is therefore important to consider the harmonizing 
provisions that are contained therein and their impact on diamond trade and 
other international sales generally. 
The Convention on Agency in the International Sale of Goods Act1335 explicitly 
sets out in the preamble that its primary purpose is to establish common 
provisions concerning agency in the sale of goods bearing in mind the United 
Nations (UN objectives and desire to enhance the development of international 
trade. The UN objectives include the need to develop international trade on the 
basis of equality and mutual benefit and a desire to promote friendly relations 
among States in the New International Economic Order.1336
 
  
This international trade theme directly relates to the philosophy underlying of the 
CISG, denoting that the two Conventions can be read together. South Africa has 
                                                 
1331 In this case a contract is concluded between the principal and the third party through an agent. 
1332 A contractual relationship in this case is formed between the agent and third party. 
1333 Sarcevic Petar and Volken Paul International Sale of Goods Dubrovnik Lectures Oceana Publications 
(1986) 443; 444. 
1334 This can be evidenced by the long standing practice and recognition of commissioned agents. 
1335 4 of 1986. 
1336 See elaboration on the NIEO contained in the latter part of this chapter as part of an analysis of the 
driving common international purpose behind the creation of the Agency Convention. 
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however not ratified the Sale of Goods Convention yet and it is proposed that it 
will not be difficult to conceive of how the two Conventions would be applied in 
unison and enhance each other. The two Conventions together will serve to 
homogenize international sales rules while taking into account the diversity of 
economic and socio-legal aspects of different States in order to remove barriers 
in international trade in order to promote and enhance international trade. 
 
The Convention on Agency in the International Sale of Goods Act1337basically 
makes provision in cases where one person (the agent) has authority1338 or 
purports1339 to have authority on behalf of another person (the principal) to 
conclude a contract of sale of goods with a third party. The Act also governs not 
only the conclusion of a contract by an agent but any other act undertaken by 
him to for the purposes of concluding that contract in relation to its performance. 
It also governs the relationship between the principal or agent and the third party. 
Further, it should be noted that it applies irrespective of whether the agent acts in 
his own name or that of the principal.1340
 
 
In the context of diamond sales the agency can be concluded where the 
Sightholder (a diamond buying merchant) appoints an agent to act on his or her 
behalf in purchasing the said diamonds. There may be other agency contracts 
such as the appointment of a valuator who is not independent in order to advise 
the diamond merchants on the fair price of the diamonds. Further, with regard to 
carriage of the said purchased diamonds the carrier is also the agent of the 
diamond merchant and all the obligations arising from those agreements will be 
                                                 
1337 4 of 1986. 
1338 This principle has always formed part of South African law in that an agent must have authority to act 
on behalf of the principal. An agent is a person who creates, varies or discharges contractual obligations on 
behalf of another, known as principal. For the purposes of the Convention, agency is limited to the sale of 
goods in the context of international trade. 
1339 Purports to have authority applies in the context where the agent has led parties to believe that he has 
the authority to act on behalf of the principal, in such a case the authority is referred to ostensible authority 
or agency by estoppel. Coetzer v Mosenthals Ltd. 1963 (4) SA 22 (A). 
1340 Article 1. 
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determined within the context of the Convention on Agency in the International 
Sale of Goods Act1341
 
where it applies directly or is necessarily inferred. 
On the international scale the Convention applies only where the principal and 
the third party have their place of business in different countries. This is subject 
to the agent and its place of business being in a Contracting State or the rules 
pertaining to private international law leading to the application of the law of the 
Contracting State. The Convention also applies where at the time of contracting, 
the third party was not aware of the agency1342 and such third party’s place of 
business and the agent’s business are in different States and such a State is 




Diamond merchants particularly and other merchants often structure their 
business entities so that an umbrella company or entity contains representative 
organs, officers or partners spread across various and different States. Those 
representatives may enter into contracts on behalf of the parent or holding 
company and sometimes the constitutive documents of the controlling entity may 
often determine the power of the representative in such circumstances. The 
question of whether this scenario can be interpreted as an agency is anticipated 
by the Convention and can be resolved by reference to the provisions of the 
Convention.  
 
Article 3 of the Convention makes provision for circumstances where the 
Convention is specifically excluded. Article 3 provides expressly that the 
Convention does not apply to the agency of a dealer on a stock, commodity or 
other exchange, agency of an auctioneers, agency by operation in family law, for 
                                                 
1341 4 of 1986. 
1342 This would be the case where the agent outwardly presents itself as principal. 
1343 Article 2 (1)(2). Article 2 (3) further provides that neither the nationality of the parties nor the civil or 
commercial character of the parties or of the sales contract is to be taken into consideration in determining 
the application of the Convention. This Article must be read together with Article 5 which provides that 
parties may by agreement exclude the application of this Convention. 
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instance, succession and or matrimonial law, agency arising out of a statutory or 
judicial authorization to act for a person without capacity to act, for instance, a 
curator bonis and an agency that has arisen by virtue of a judicial decision or 
quasi-judicial authority or subject to control of such authority.1344
 
 
The Convention also makes provision for entities represented by other organs, 
officers or partners in other jurisdictions within itself or other States for the 
purposes of concluding contracts. Article 4 provides that, such a representative 
organ, officer or partnering entity1345
 
 shall not be regarded as the agent of that 
entity in so far as in the exercise of his or her functions as such, he or she acts 
by virtue of an authority conferred by law or by the constitutive documents of that 
entity. This is an important distinction in the law of agency as it is important to 
differentiate in all circumstances the legal obligations of a principal acting for its 
own interests and using certain organs or officers to meet those obligations and 
those of agent acting within the given mandate. 
Most importantly the Convention clearly provides in Article 4 (b) that a trustee is 
not to be regarded as an agent of a trust, of the person who has created the trust 
or of the beneficiaries. The exclusionary provisions of the Convention assist in 
clarifying the fact the main purpose of the Convention is to regulate international 
commercial sales agency. All other sales of similar nature are excluded from the 
ambit of the Convention must be decided according to each country’s domestic 
rules or applicable law according to the rules of private international law. This is 




                                                 
1344 Article 3(1)(a), (b), (c), (d) and  (e). 
1345 For the purposes of the Convention, whether the entity is an organ, officer or partner of a corporation, 
association, partnership or any other entity, whether or not possessing legal personality.  
1346 Article 6. 
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Further, Article 7 provides that regard must be had to trade usages and other 
widely known trade customs.1347 This was the case in Santam Insurance Co. Ltd. 
v SA Stevedores Ltd 1989 (1) SA 183 (D). In this case South African law of 
contract was applicable in terms of section 6(2) of the Admiralty Jurisdiction 
Regulation Act,1348
 
 however, a widely accepted maritime practice of the insertion 
of the Himalaya clause in a shipping document resulted in the contradiction of the 
contractual rule of South African law, that being, privity of contract. The court 
held that in applying contract law to shipping contracts, such application must be 
done with due regard to established maritime practices such as the insertion of 
the Himalaya clause. 
The Himalaya clause has its origin in the decision of the court in Alder v 
Dickson1349In this case the defendants were the master and boatswain1350 of the 
P&O passenger liner Himalaya. The plaintiff was injured when an insecure 
gangway1351 slipped and he fell 16ft to the wharf. The plaintiff had a contract with 
P&O which excluded liability1352
                                                 
1347 Article 7 provides that ‘(1) The principal or the agent on the one hand and the third party on the other 
are bound by any usage to which they have agreed and by any practices which they have established 
between themselves.  
 for such an injury. The defendants relied on that 
  (2) They are considered, unless otherwise agreed, to have impliedly made applicable to their relations any 
usage of which they knew or ought to have known and which in international trade is widely known to, and 
regularly observed by, parties to agency relations of the type involved in the particular trade concerned.’ 
1348 105 of 1983. 
1349 [1955] 1 QB 158. 
1350 This term is used to describe a warrant officer on a warship, or a petty officer on a merchant vessel, in 
charge of rigging, anchors, cables, etc. See http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/boatswain7102 25 
March 2010. 
1351 This term refers to an opening in the railing or bulwark of a ship, as that into which a gangplank fits, 
see http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/boatswain7102 25 March 2010. 
1352 See paragraph 18 and 19, where the exclusion of liability was contained in the clause providing that 
‘The contract between the Company and the Plaintiff, as evidenced by the ticket issued to her by the 
Company, included the following provisions. Printed on the ticket itself were the words: 
"Your attention is specially directed to the conditions of transportation on the covers containing this ticket. 
Passengers and their baggage are carried at passengers entire risk". Printed on the inside front cover were 
certain conditions which (so far as material for the present purpose) ran thus:"Conditions and Regulations. 
This ticket is issued by the Company and accepted by the passenger subject to the 
following conditions and regulations. The Company will not be responsible for and shall be exempt from 
all liability in respect of any....... injury whatsoever of or to the person of any passenger......whether such 
injury of or to the person of any passenger.......shall occur on land, on shipboard or elsewhere......and 
whether the same shall arise from or be occasioned by the negligence of the Company's servants on board 
the ship or on land in the discharge of their duties, or while the passenger is embarking or disembarking, 
or whether by the negligence of other persons directly or 
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clause. The court found the defendants liable on the basis that they owed the 
plaintiff a duty of care in tort.1353
 
 
This means that the Agency Convention will regulate diamond sales agency 
conduct however all other diamond trade peculiarities and trade usages will not 
be covered in terms of the Convention. Further, where the Agency Convention is 
not to be governing law, a forum court may have to decide what law is to be 
applied even if that alternative law is in a form of other model laws,1354 uniform 
customs or trade usages. However, these provisions are subject to agreement by 
the parties and the standard business practices1355
 
 of the particular trading 
parties.  
Chapter II of the Convention deals with the establishment and scope of the 
agent’s authority. It is established as fully accepted in South African law that the 
authority of an agent may be express or implied. An example of express authority 
of an agent to act on behalf of a principle includes a case where a mandate is 
signed in terms of law. An instance would be the appointment of estate agents in 
terms of the Estate Agency Affairs Act.1356
 
  
This statute provides that an estate agent holds himself or herself out to the 
public that he or she on the instruction of or on behalf of another person sells or 
purchases publicly immovable property or hires and lets or publicly exhibits for 
                                                                                                                                                 
indirectly in the employment or service of the Company, or otherwise, or by the Act of God......dangers of 
the seas......or by accidents......or any acts, defaults or negligence of the....... Master, 
Mariners.......Company's agents or servants of any kind under any circumstances whatsoever.....". 
The above-quoted provisions of the contract admittedly precluded.’.10 
1353 Para. 34. 
1354 Bridge Michael The International Sale of Goods Law and Practice, Oxford University Press (1999) 37. 
It is important to note here that uniform substantive law is different from model laws of the kind usually 
sponsored by international organizations such as UNCITRAL and UNDROIT. Model laws are proffered 
for enactment to States without becoming contractually bound to do so. See UNCITRAL Secretariat Guide 
to Enactment, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-Second Session, Supplement No. 17 
(A/52/17) (1997) (III)(11) A model law is legislative text that is recommended to States or incorporation 
into their national law and does not require the enacting State to notify the United Nations (UN) or other 
States that may have also enacted such model law. 
1355 Sarcevic Petar and Volken Paul International Sale of Goods Dubrovnik Lectures Oceana Publications 
(1986) 459. 
1356 112 of 1976. 
 374 
hire immovable property. This type of agency clearly does not fall within the 
realm of the Convention but is an illustration of a business agency that is 
rigorously regulated in South African law1357
 
 to provide for all the essential 
elements of an agency agreement and thus the authority of an estate agent is 
clear by express authority. 
With regard to implied authority, the issues become technical and sophisticated 
since more often than not parties may already be in a dispute and wish to have a 
court determine whether  an agency agreement was concluded or not. The court 
stated in the case of O’Connell, Manthe, Cragg and Partners v Charles1358
 
 that 
the agent in this case had implied authority to act because the principal was at all 
times aware of the actions of the agent and had not questioned such actions as 
they were in any case required to reasonably allow the agent to execute his 
mandate. The question of the agent’s authority to act affects the liability to third 
parties and thus becomes important in law to determine the scope of such 
authority and whether actions of agents do not exceed such authority. 
Article 9(2) is a wide and all encompassing provision designed to protect agents 
in international trade. It provides that the agent has authority to perform all acts 
necessary in the circumstances to achieve the purposes for which the 
authorization was given. This provision allows each agent to be able to freely 
enter into contracts which will be incidental and natural in the completion of the 
principal’s mandate. This allows for a fair degree of freedom and ‘commercial 
decision making leeway’. An agent in such cases is free to make such decisions 
in the international trade context for instance that would allow the agent to 
negotiate other incidental contracts and arrangements to mitigate losses and 
protect the interests of the principal and third parties.1359
                                                 
1357 See Taljaard v TL Botha Properties 2008 (6) SA 207 (SCA). In this case the court upheld the validity 
of an agency agreement and stated that the contract of mandate cannot be invalidated by lack of fidelity 
fund certificate required in terms of the Estate Agency Affairs Act 112 of 1976. 
 
1358 1970 (1) SA 7 (E). 
1359 Article 9(2) provides that the agent has authority to perform all acts necessary in the circumstances to 
achieve the purposes for which the authorization was given. 
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The Convention does not prescribe formalities for the agency contract. 
Accordingly, oral contracts are enforceable and binding by virtue of Article 10. 
This provision is also present in the CISG Convention1360 which requirements no 
formalities in drawing up international sales contracts. It is submitted that the 
move to enforce oral contracts in international trade is practical and realistic. The 
prevalence of modern devices that allow communication and formation of 
contracts makes it difficult to prescribe a particular form of contract. Oral 
contracts however pose a risk from an evidentiary perspective as clearly 
demonstrated in the case of Flint v Flemyng.1361 To overcome the oral contract 
dilemma for evidentiary purposes the Convention provides that parties may 
require that all agency contracts be concluded in writing by opting out of oral 
contract provision in Article 10.1362
 
 
In Flint v Flemyng1363
 
 the vessel Hope was insured by the plaintiff with the 
defendant insurers for a voyage at and from Madras to London. The cargo 
carried comprised of 25 tons of redwood, which the master had purchased on 
behalf of his owner, 122 tons of saltpeter (KNO3), which the ship was contracted 
to carry and a further 90 tons of light goods for which there was no written 
contract of carriage, only a verbal agreement. Before the cargo was loaded, the 
vessel was lost by a peril insured against and the plaintiff sought to enforce his 
claim in terms of the policy. The question before the court was: ‘on which items of 
cargo could the policy on freight be held to have attached?’  
The court found that the insurers were liable for the freight on the redwood and 
saltpeter, but were only liable for the freight on the light goods if the contract of 
carriage could be found. What was interesting about this case is that the court 
stated that in order for an insured to recover on a policy on freight, that insured 
                                                 
1360 http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/CISG.pdf 17 March 2010. 
1361 (1830) 1 B & Ad 45, English case. 
1362 Article 11. 
1363 (1830) 1 B & Ad 45, English case.  
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must prove that but for the intervention of some perils insured against, some 
freight would have been earned. The insured must show that either goods were 
loaded on a vessel or there was some contract for doing so. Therefore, the 
contract for the carriage of light goods, which was a verbal one, had to be proved 
before the insured could recover under the policy on freight. The irony of this 
case is that while it was acknowledged in a sense that there was a verbal 
contract of carriage in respect of the light goods, there was no recovery in terms 
of the insurance policy because such contract could not be proved.1364
 
 
It was apparent in the case of Gardner & Another v Margo1365
 
 that it is more apt 
to have all aspects of the agent’s mandate recorded in written form, including any 
subsequent oral agreements as failure to do so may cause uncertainty and 
create room for disputes. In the above case, the court had to interpret an agency 
agreement where the agent was mandated to sell shares however it was alleged 
by the agent that part of the mandate included an incorporation of a subsequent 
oral agreement which would result in the agent being a higher amount for the 
sale of shares than that reflected in the written contract.  
One of the arguments that were made before the court in this case was that the 
written contract of mandate was not a correct reflection of the intentions of the 
parties1366 and it was pleaded that the oral agreement had to be taken as the 
correctly intended effect of the contract.1367
 
 This line of argument in a contract of 
mandate is unacceptable on two grounds. Firstly, there is the obvious fact that 
the oral contract alleged by one party is usually beneficial to the party alleging it 
and secondly the courts have to interpret the contract and determine for the 
parties what they intended, it has always been undesirable that courts should 
formulate contracts on behalf of parties. 
                                                 
1364 Ibid. 
1365 2006 (6) SA 33 (SCA). 
1366 38 A. 
1367 39 H. 
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In this case the court interpreted the contract of mandate with regard to the 
alleged oral contract by examining the actual effect of the alleged oral terms. The 
court determined the probability of having adopted subsequent oral terms by 
testing them against what was contained in the written agreement and held that 
the written terms themselves were unclear as to the actual sale price of the 
shares to which the mandate to sell related or the fate of the proceeds sold in 
excess of what was provided in the written agreement.1368 In light of these 
uncertainties created in the written contract alone, the court had to use the rules 
of interpretation established in South African law to determine the intention of the 
parties by considering the terms that follow naturally from the surrounding 
circumstances of the contract.1369
 
  
The court held that from the evidence provided in the case particularly in light of 
the uncertainties created by the written mandate, it followed that parties probably 
did orally agree to additional terms that would address the gaps of the written 
contract. The court also held that the evidence of the witness proving a 
subsequent oral agreement was not successfully challenged and thus it was 




The case above illustrates the classic conundrum that can be potentially created 
by lack of clarity of terms contained in the contracts of agency. This can easily be 
prevented by requiring contracts to be in writing. It is submitted however that a 
state such as South Africa should generally seek to respect oral contracts as 
much as written ones. This is because often agency agreements in international 
trade need to occur quickly and efficiently without being hindered by the 
requirement of form. From the reading of the ratified Agency Convention in South 
Africa it is clear that a declaration in terms of Article 27 has not be taken in South 
                                                 
1368 41 A. 
1369 41 G. 
1370 46  E. 
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Africa and therefore there is no prescription for form for agency in the 
international trade context. 
 
Chapter III of the Convention provides for important legal implications of the 
actions of the agent and this section of the provisions can be termed the 
backbone or core of the Convention as that is where the uniformity of private law 
is achieved by parties to the Convention. This chapter sets out the basic 
international law on agency and clearly outlines the extent of liability, if any, of 
the agent under the mandate and this is linked to the manner in which the agent 
has presented himself or herself to third parties.  
 
Article 12 sets out general principles of agency one of which provides that an 
agent who acts within the scope of authority granted to him or her by contracting 
with a third party who knows or ought to have known that the agent was acting as 
an agent, such acts of the agent shall bind the principal directly. However, 
depending on the circumstances of the agreement, the agent is free to bind 
himself directly to third parties and this is acknowledged in the Convention for 
cases, for example, that involve commission1371
 
 for the agent. There is an a 
further exclusion of liability for the principal contained in Article 12(1)(a) which 
provides that an agent acting within the scope of authority shall be personally 
liable if the third party did not know or reasonably have known that the agent was 
acting as an agent. 
The Convention also gives the principal a contractual safety net in circumstances 
where the agent has bound him to obligations to a third party, though such a third 
party may not have been aware that the agent is acting as such. This is provided 
for in Article 13(2)(a) which states that if the contract of mandate is breached by 
some failure on the part of the third party or any other reason, the principal may 
exercise the rights acquired on his or her behalf by the agent and this is naturally 
                                                 
1371 This is recognized in South African law that an agent must be an effective cause of sale in order to be 
entitled to agent’s commission. See Mano Et Mano Ltd vNationwide Airlines (Pty) Ltd & Others 2007 (2) 
512 (SCA). 
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One of the main concerns in agency and the nature of the protection afforded by 
agency contracts in international trade and other domestic contracts in general 
revolves around the concern as to what ought to take place if the parties would 
not have contracted with the undisclosed principal had they known of his or her 
identity. The Convention deals with this question in Article 13(6) where it is 
provided that a principal may not exercise against the party the rights acquired 
on his or her behalf if it appears from the circumstances of the case that the third 
party, had he known of the principal’s identity would not have entered into the 
contract. 
 
This Article is commendable as it seeks to uphold freedom of contract by 
ensuring that the identity of parties in international sales contracts is somewhat 
disclosed. This may be necessary in the context of international sales in that 
some goods sold may be produced by parties who do not observe or adhere to 
some internationally acceptable standards or practices such as human rights or 
environmental standards. Further, this may guard against products of 
questionable quality. The courts or drafters of the Convention may need to 
pronounce on the circumstances that would justify a third party wishing to be 
exonerated from an agency contract as a result of the identity of the principal. It 
is submitted that such circumstances in diamond trade may involve parties not 
wishing to contract with a principal that is not part of the KPCS1373
 
 for instance. 
Article 13(6) also acknowledges the fact that parties may seek to induce or forge 
international sales contracts by remaining in obscurity but the ability to escape 
such a contract of mandate creates a loophole that will enable aggrieved or 
                                                 
1372 In the same manner, it is also open to the third party to exercise rights created by the contract of 
mandate against the principal, where the agent has failed or unable to fulfill his or her obligations, to the 
third party subject to the applicable defences that may be raised by the parties in such contracts. 
1373 An international effort to keep conflict diamonds out of legitimate diamond markets. See Diamonds Act 
56 of 1986. 
 380 
repudiating third parties from escaping contracts of mandate and sales. Further, 
courts will have to determine and establish the meaning of ‘circumstances’ that 
would enable the third party to argue that had he or she known of the principal’s 
true identity he or she would not have contracted. 
 
In South African law, the doctrine of undisclosed principals is very clear1374  in 
that where there is an undisclosed principal, outwardly the agent is the principal. 
In such a case the third party has a right to elect to sue either the principal or 
agent on the contract. The third party can not object to being sued by the agent 
in the agent’s name, further, the undisclosed principal may emerge from 
obscurity and claim on the contract concluded by the agent, but that principal has 
no greater rights than the agent would have had.1375
 
  
It has been stated that the application of the doctrine does not vary the 
agreement between the agent and the third party. This principle in the 
Convention can be challenged by virtue of Article 13(6).1376 It is important to 
understand the courts’ interpretation of this doctrine in terms of South African 
common law. The issue of an undisclosed principal was been dealt with in Sasfin 
Bank Ltd v Soho Unit1377
                                                 
1374 Sasfin Bank Ltd v Soho Unit 14 CC t/a Aventura Eiland and Others 2006 (4) SA 513 (T), Springfield 
Omnibus Service Durban CC v Peter Maskell Auction CC and Another 2006 (4) SA 186 (N), Talacchi and 
Another v The Master and Others 1997 (1) SA 702 (T), Cullinan v Noordkaaplandse 
Aartappelkernmoerkwekers Koöperasie Beperk 1972 (1) SA 761 (A) 761 B. The doctrine of the 
'undisclosed principal', as it exists in English law, is incorporated into our law, has been applied for a long 
time and must be regarded as accepted law, but it is not extended to more than one undisclosed principal; 
i.e. the doctrine has not been so extended that an agent can lawfully contract with a third party on behalf of 
more than one undisclosed principal who on the strength of such contract can obtain rights and incur 
obligations. See Nagel C.J. Undisclosed principal-locus standi of agent to sue in his own name-remedies 
for breach of contract, Botha v Giyose t/a Paragon Fisheries [2007] SCA 73 (RSA) 
http://www.up.ac.za/dspace/bitstream/2263/5570/1/Nagel_Undisclosed(2007).pdf 17 March 2010. 
 albeit not in the context if international trade law. The 
court made important statements pertaining to a scenario where third party 
wishes to be released from an agency agreement because had he or she known 
1375 Ibid. 
1376 Article 13(6) provides that ‘the principal may not exercise against the third party the rights acquired on 
his behalf by the agent if it appears from the circumstances of the case that the third party, had he known 
the principal's identity, would not have entered into the contract.’ 
1377 2006 (4) SA 513 (T). 
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of the principal’s identity, he or she would not have entered the contract of 
mandate. 
 
The facts of the case are that the plaintiff in its capacity as undisclosed principal 
claimed payment for arrear rentals from the lessee as first defendant and 
sureties as second, third and fourth defendants as per agreement of lease. The 
sureties excepted the claim as lacking averments to sustain a valid cause of 
action on the basis that by relying on the doctrine of undisclosed principal the 
plaintiff was attempting to alter the terms of the lease which prevented the 
altering of the parties to the lease as contained in the non-variation clause of the 
lease agreement. In response the plaintiff argued that the lease agreement 
allowed the agent of the plaintiff as lessor to transfer its rights in terms of the 
agreement to a third party.1378
 
 
In the cogent judgment of Van den Heever AJ the doctrine of undisclosed 
principal was considered with reference to established precedent1379 that was 
used by counsel to support their arguments. Having heard counsels’ arguments, 
pertaining to the doctrine of undisclosed principal the court stated that although 
the doctrine of the undisclosed principal has been accepted as part of South 
African law, its true dogmatic basis and operation has never been certain.1380
 
 
The court explained that the doctrine of the undisclosed principal means that the 
undisclosed principal can claim that he or she and not the intermediary or agent 
with whom the third party contracted, is the real creditor of the third party. This 
application of law has been described as being ‘an untrue’ in reality because the 
third party did not contract with the undisclosed principal but with the 
intermediary who is his or her real creditor. The doctrine is borne out by the 
recognition of the third party’s right to set off against the undisclosed principal’s 
                                                 
1378 See summary of facts in headnote. 
1379 See Cullinan v Noordkaaplandse Aartappelkernmoerkwekers Kooperasie Bpk 1972 (1) SA 761 (A), 
Karstein v Moribe 1982 (2) SA 282 (T). 
1380 518 C – E. 
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claim any debt owed to him or her by the intermediary. By the same token the 
undisclosed principal will have no claims against the third party if the latter pays 
the debt or performs his obligations to the intermediary before the undisclosed 
principal intervenes. Therefore in can be concluded that in terms of this doctrine 




The court held that in principle the doctrine of undisclosed principal is not to be 
regarded as a variation or an amendment of the contract of mandate, the 
respective rights and duties that flow from the contract of mandate remain 
unchanged therefore the third party can sue the agent or alternatively the 
principal who has emerged from obscurity. The principal and agent become liable 
to the third party at his or her choice. This was confirmed by the court to also be 
the position in English law.1382
 
 
This principle in South African law is quite clear. It does not deal with the 
question of the third party not wishing to contract with the undisclosed principal 
upon gaining subsequent knowledge of his or her true identity as provided in 
Article 13(6) of the Convention. In fact it provides for little room for the third party 
to escape the contract of mandate. It is submitted with respect that this is the 
general position that should be followed in international agency law in 
commercial agency agreements in order to ensure that trade is strengthened 
unless there is evidence that the undisclosed principal is involved in activity that 
promotes trading in illicit goods that have violated certain human rights. 
 
This provision creates uncertainty in that it does not seem to accord with the 
general ethos or spirit of the Convention which seeks to uphold the protection of 
a contract of agency in international trade because suddenly it makes the identity 
of a party a main issue in seeking to withdraw from such a respectable and 
                                                 
1381 518 F – G. 
1382 519 F – J. 
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crucial contract in international trade. It also creates an impression that parties in 
international trade contracts have commercial foes that they need to avoid. This 
is clearly not desirable when attempting to increase cooperation among States.  
 
Article 141383 clearly provides that the actions of an agent who goes beyond the 
authority and scope of his or her mandate will not bind the principal. However, 
this rule is qualified by the conduct of the principal. If the principal causes the 
third party reasonably and in good faith to believe that the agent has authority to 
bind the principal, such a principal is bound in those circumstances.1384 Further, 
where an agent acts outside the scope of his or her authority, it is open to the 
principal to ratify such an act to make it have a binding effect as if it was in the 





 deals with the implications of ratification or refusal of ratification by 
the principal and the rights of the third party in such circumstances as it is 
undesirable that a third party should be prejudiced by an over-zealous agent who 
has procured a deficient agency contract. Chapter IV deals with the law 
regulating the termination of the authority of an agent and it is desirable in an 
ideal situation that the typical scenario for such termination is as a result of 
successful completion of the mandate. Chapter V of the Agency Convention 
deals with the final provisions relating to the signatory of the Convention. It is 
submitted that this Convention serves as a succinct document of simple 
unification of private law for contracts of agency in the sale of goods. It is not an 
overly technical document and that is probably the reason it has not attracted 
much national or international debate. It can on that basis be argued that the 
aims behind the creation of this Convention have been sufficiently realized. 
                                                 
1383 Article 14(1). 
1384 This is in line with South African law, O’Connell, Manthe, Cragg and Partners v Charles 1970 (1) SA 
7 (E). 
1385 Article 15. 
1386 Article 15(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7) and (8). 
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It as been questioned whether or not a third party is obliged to accept ratification 
in the circumstances where an agent has acted beyond his or her scope of 
authority. It has been argued that the answer to this question generally speaking 
will depend on whether or not the third party in question entered into the contract 
of agency in good faith.1387 In other words did the third party believe that the 
agent was acting within the bounds of his or her given authority and if he or she 
was not can the third party avoid the subsequently ratified act of the agent?1388
 
  
To answer this question it has been proposed that if the third party neither knew 
nor ought to have known of the lack of authority at the time of the agent’s act, he 
or she may refuse to accept the ratification but this must be done within 
reasonable time by notice to the principal before the principal ratifies the acts of 
the agent.1389
 
 This is arguably a weak technicality that may be used by a third 
party to avoid the contract and it is very acceptable in the case where there is no 
ratification, however, where there is ratification it is submitted that that should not 
really make any difference to a third party who in good faith has entered a 
contract of mandate believing that the agent has the authority required. 
Generally the whole Convention is based on the principle that the contracts of 
agency should be honored and the freedom of the parties has to be respected in 
entering into such contracts. This principle is evident in the provisions of the 
Convention that allow for party autonomy as contained in the Convention clause 
referred to as ‘opting-out’ clause, which generally permits parties may select the 
law which the contract is to be governed. Further, parties are also permitted to 
modify the provisions of the Convention by agreement.1390
                                                 
1387 This good faith rationale is in line with Article 14(2) which provides that ‘…the conduct of the 
principal causes the third party reasonably and in good faith to believe that the agent has authority to act on 
behalf of the principal and that the agent is acting within the scope of that authority, the principal may not 
invoke against the third party the lack of authority of the agent.’ Therefore an agency agreement is easirer 
to justify when good faith is shown. 
 
1388 Sarcevic Petar and Volken Paul International Sale of Goods Dubrovnik Lectures Oceana Publications 
(1986) 470. 
1389 Ibid. 
1390 Article 5; Sarcevic Petar and Volken Paul International Sale of Goods Dubrovnik Lectures Oceana 
Publications (1986) 456. 
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8.3.2 The New International Economic Order 
The Agency Convention states that one of the primary purposes for its creation 
relates to the existence of the NIEO. This term is also present in the CISG 
Convention.1391
 
 The term is not explicitly defined in the body of the Convention 
because it is a very wide terms based on many philosophical and jurisprudential 
principles. Therefore its meaning has to be necessarily considered as it is one of 
the motivations of the international community when creating uniform private law 
rules transnational.  
It is essential at this juncture to study this economic driving ideology that is based 
on the NIEO as a force behind the creation of the Conventions pertaining to the 
international sale of goods. One of the important aspects of international law 
ideologies such as the NIEO is that they may be adopted in South Africa in so far 
as they reflect the spirit and purport of the South African Constitution. The ideals 
in the creation of the CISG under the auspices of the NIEO are no doubt 
connected to Constitutional values.  
 
It is submitted that such NIEO have a direct link to other important trade 
objectives such as those found in the development objectives such as the United 
Nations 2015 Millennium Development Goals (MDG). Most relevant to this study 
it has been shown as discussed in the earlier parts of this study that fair 
economic practices in diamond trade and can assist developing countries to 
meet their 2015 MDGs. The MDGs are specifically listed as the eradication of 
extreme poverty and hunger, achievement of universal primary education, 
promotion of gender equality and empowerment of women, reduction of child 
mortality, improvement of maternal health, combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and 
other diseases, ensuring environmental sustainability and the development of 
                                                 
1391 http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/CISG.pdf 17 March 2010. See preamble of CISG 
Convention and Agency Convention. 
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global partnership for development.1392
 
 Since development under the NIEO is 
linked to the achievement of these goals, it is important to have due regard to its 
principles and mandate in the plight of improving the state of developing States. 
One of the motivations behind the establishment of fair trade and the NIEO is 
based on the notion, as argued, of unjust enrichment. It is submitted that 
contemporary international law recognizes the right of every State to have 
permanent sovereignty over its wealth, natural resources and economic activities 
as contained in the UN General Assembly resolutions in particular the Charter of 
economic Rights and Duties of States.1393
 
 In other words just because on State is 
rich in certain resources it is unjust for another State to overtake those resources 
and deprive the citizens of the resource rich State any benefit from its own 
resources. Therefore it is cogent to accept the Agency Convention as it is based 
on an economic ideal that respects the sovereignty of South Africa in managing 
its resources. 
This NIEO as referred to in light of the Convention represents and at the 
inception of the Agency Convention represented an acknowledgment of a world-
wide awareness of the importance of international co-operation in international 
trade, particularly in the creation of uniform law that would allow developing 
countries to thrive without being bullied by developed States. In summary the 
new international economic order can be defined as a set of submissions relating 
to increased developed country assistance by tariff reduction and other means as 
put forward by developing countries through the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD).1394
 
 
The main core terms and submissions of the new international economic order 
provided that developing countries must be able to regulate and control the 
                                                 
1392 www.un.org 29 October 2009. www.ddiglobal.org  29 October 2009. 
1393 Hossain Kamal Legal Aspects of the New International Economic Order (1980) 222. 
1394 See Declaration for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, 1974 as adopted by the 
United Nations General Assembly, 1 May 1974 A/RES/S-6/3201.  
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activities of multi-national corporations within their own countries, they must be 
able to control by nationalization, they must also be free to set up structures 
similar to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)1395
 
  and all 
other States must refrain from taking economic, military and political measures to 
restrict a developing country’s right to development. Finally the submissions also 
provided that international trade should be based on the need to ensure stable, 
equitable remunerative prices for raw materials while ensuring fair trade tariffs 
and transfer of technology and technical assistance. 
One of the major industries that would be affected by the submissions as 
provided for in the NIEO is the South African diamond industry. The South 
African diamond industry is substantially controlled by multi-national companies, 
Anglo-American,1396 for example, which is based in the United Kingdom.1397 
South Africa’s diamond industry has benefited from the recognition of the NIEO 
submissions as it is an industry that forms an integral portion of international 
trade and the multi-national companies that have controlled a significant portion 




The core principles of the NIEO uphold human rights through international law 
and these rights are upheld in order to promote fair trade and assist in 
eradicating the scourge of blood diamonds, for example, and other illicit diamond 
trade.1399 This is because the principals of the NIEO are based on the universally 
accepted notions of equity, fairness, justice and the respect of human rights,1400
                                                 
1395 This body was established by intergovernmental organizations on 20 September 1960.  
 
1396 http://www.angloamerican.co.za/aa/ 17 March 2010. 
1397 It must be noted that Anglo American has a South African branch which is currently active in the 
development of South Africa in various social responsibility projects. See Anglo American South Africa. 
http://www.angloamerican.co.za/aa/media/releases/2008pr/2008-11-11/?t=print 17 March 2010. 
1398 Ibid. 
1399 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996 the Bill of Rights which contains the rights of 
human beings including dignity and bodily integrity among other rights, see sections 7 to 39. 
1400 Johnson H.G. The New International Economic Order, Graduate School of Business University of 
Chicago Selected Papers No. 49 (1976) 1; 2. 
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which are fundamental to the Constitutional values of the South African Bill of 
Rights. 
 
Generally the new economic order has been hailed as being based on morally 
positive principles and standards. However, it has been criticized in that most of 
the arguments concerning the NIEO tend to down play its negative side that 
seeks to advance capitalism at all costs whilst ignoring its ills to society. It has 
been argued that the justifications for the arguments in favour of the new 
economic order are not new at all; they represent ideas that have been in 
existence from time immemorial.1401
 
  
It has been further argued that while it may actually be correct to state that the 
new economic order represents on the surface a need to address the grievances 
of less developed countries against developed countries by increasing the 
developmental aid. This is difficult to achieve and the extreme dependency of 
developing countries on the developed world is exacerbated. This dependence 
does not reduce the gap between the rich countries and the poor at all or in any 
way.1402
 
 The critical writer who has expressed these views should not it is 
proposed be seen as a critic of the NIEO but he is simply offering a warning not 
to take these abstract moral values of the NIEO at face value as in practice they 
may result in a situation where developing countries become overly dependent 
on developed countries and this may result in a situation where developing 
countries never learn to walk as it were for fear of standing on their own two feet. 
It is clear that the NIEO has had some positive as well as negative implications to 
the conduct of trade in developing countries. As highlighted earlier on, the new 
economic order encourages formation of regional economic blocs such as OPEC 
in the interests of some countries in a particular region. However, the developed 
world community has not particularly encouraged policies and developmental 
                                                 
1401 Johnson H.G. The New International Economic Order, Graduate School of Business University of 
Chicago Selected Papers No. 49 (1976) 3. 
1402 Ibid. 
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objectives of these regional blocs in developing states.1403
 
  Ultimately at the end 
of the day countries to counteract negatives in applying the intentions of the 
NIEO need to create and codify more instruments that reflect the sentiments of 
the Agency Convention, for instance to make sure that trade remains humane 
and fair without resorting to negative actions that will conflict with the moral aims 
of the NIEO. 
The determination and regulation of tariffs in international trade was also an 
important aspect of the inception of the NIEO. The debate surrounding trade 
tariffs began in the 1950s when it became clear that the existing General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)1404 was unsuitable for developing 
countries and amendments were necessary to it to meet the expectations of 
developing countries. The developing world, for example, made a compromise in 
that it did not expect reciprocity for their commitments to remove or reduce tariffs 
and other trade barriers.1405
 
 
This resulted in the amendments of the GATT to incorporate some of the 
expectations of the developing world. The effects of this were many but one 
important one was the permission granted to developing countries to exchange 
tariff preferences among themselves. These changes or waivers as it were, were 
permanently included in the 1979 GATT provisions as enabling clauses. These 
provisions are meant to create a more balanced economic order1406
                                                 
1403 As recently as 2007, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was celebrating its 47 
years of existence however it was reported as having been assailed with hostility by members of the 
Washington Policy Community to the point that it should be declared an illegal body particularly in view of 
the oil embargoes and rising oil prices and allegations that it was the body responsible for the 
impoverishment of many of the non-oil producing countries in the third world. Reported in Africa News 
Daily Champion Newsletter of 28 September Nigeria: OPEC at 47 (2007). 
 that would 
1404 30 October 1947, entered into force 1 January 1948. 
1405 Justice Chimugwuanya Nwobike The WTO Compatible ACP-EU Trade Partnership: Interpreting the 
Reciprocity Requirement to Further Development Review of International Business and Trade Law 8 Asper 
Rev. Int’l Bus. & Trade L. (2008) 90. 
1406 Justice Chimugwuanya Nwobike The WTO Compatible ACP-EU Trade Partnership: Interpreting the 
Reciprocity Requirement to Further Development Review of International Business and Trade Law 8 Asper 
Rev. Int’l Bus. & Trade L. (2008) 91. 
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accommodate the special needs of least developed countries thus allowing for a 
more democratic international trade. 
 
Generally the NIEO was deemed desirable as it promoted and still promotes a 
form of international trade that is based on equity, sovereign equality, 
interdependence, common interest and co-operation among all States. It also 
promoted the elimination of existing unfairness and inequalities in modern 
international trade and enabled the reduction of the gap between economies of 
developing and developed countries. Finally it should ensure accelerated 
economic and social development, peace and justice for present and future 
generations.1407 If these themes can be identified in many of the international 
trade conventions and model laws, then it would be desirable to ratify such 
instruments as formulated within the context of the new economic order as they 
are in line with the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act1408
 
 in spirit. 
It was argued in the initial phases of the NIEO that such NIEO cannot be 
established on a foundation of the old international legal system and a new 
proposed foundation was rather a gradual substantive evolution and adjustment 
to new realities of the global trade context. This gradual movement was said to 
be contained in documents such as the UN principle of the Atlantic Charter which 
makes a mention of the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all 
peoples. Advancement as contained in the UN charter included aims to promote 
a higher standard of living all people.1409
 
  
The Atlantic Charter is an important document to South Africa and the world 
alike. The Atlantic Charter was initially accepted by the allied powers during the 
Second World War. African leaders drafted a monograph entitled, ‘The African 
Charter’ which was followed by an early ‘Bill of Rights’ which formed the basis for 
                                                 
1407 Ioannis Lianos The Contribution of the United Nations to the Emergence of Global Antitrust Law 
Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 15 (2007) 415 a 421. 
1408 108 of 1996. 
1409 Hossain Kamal Legal Aspects of the New International Economic Order (1980) 45; 46. 
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the Freedom Charter.1410 The Atlantic Charter1411 also served as a precursor to 
the creation of the UN and GATT.1412
 
 
Once again these ideals agree with the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa Act1413
 
 however, this is subject to available resources and achieving these 
goals is a gradual process that can only be achieved when each person in a 
particular country is somehow empowered and willing together with his or her 
government to contribute to the realization of this ideal otherwise these ideals will 
remain abstract at least for the excluded and marginalized of societies. However, 
having said that it is proposed that the codification of international trade rules 
such as the CISG and the Agency Convention as discussed in this chapter 
illustrate that due regard has been given to the sentiments of the NIEO and 
further these international instruments demonstrate practical steps that the 
international community, developed countries partnering with developing 
countries have taken to achieve the goals expressed under the NIEO. 
8.3.3 The Liberal International Economic Order 
It is worth mentioning albeit very briefly in this chapter that there is also a Liberal 
International Economic Order (LIEO). This is defined as a global free trade 
establishment and has been generally understood to be a creation of the United 
States. The WTO1414
                                                 
1410 Devenish G.E. (Original Text by Goldblatt R.E.) Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights Law of South 
Africa Volume 5(3) (2004) 23. 
 creates and implements free trade agreements while the 
1411 By Douglas Brinkley, David Richard Facey-Crowther The Atlantic Charter, Library Congress 
Cataloging (1994) x. In 1941 a meeting between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston 
Churchhill gave rise to the Atlantic Charter. This was a seminal moment in the history of creating global 
cooperation. 
1412 See Eisenberg G.S. The Gatt and the WTO Agreements: Comments on their Legal Applicability to the 
Republic of South Africa South African Yearbook of International Law (1993) 127. It is submitted by the 
author in his paper that GATT is a premier multinational treaty regulating global trade relations. 
1413 108 of 1996 sections 25(5), 26(2) and 27(2). These sections of the Constitution deal with different and 
related rights under the Bill of Rights but each of the rights can only be given effect to subject to available 
resources. 
1414 See http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf 25 March 2010. ‘AGREEMENT 
ESTABLISHING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 
The Parties to this Agreement, 
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted 
with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing 
 392 
                                                                                                                                                 
volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and 
services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the objective 
of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the 
means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels 
of economic development, 
Recognizing further that there is need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing 
countries, and especially the least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international 
trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development, 
Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering into reciprocal and mutually 
advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade 
and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations, 
Resolved, therefore, to develop an integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading system 
encompassing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the results of past trade liberalization efforts, 
and all of the results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 
Determined to preserve the basic principles and to further the objectives underlying this 
multilateral trading system, 
Agree as follows: 
Article I 
Establishment of the Organization 
The World Trade Organization (hereinafter referred to as "the WTO") is hereby established. 
Article II 
Scope of the WTO 
1. The WTO shall provide the common institutional framework for the conduct of trade relations 
among its Members in matters related to the agreements and associated legal instruments included in 
the Annexes to this Agreement. 
2. The agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annexes 1, 2 and 3 (hereinafter 
referred to as "Multilateral Trade Agreements") are integral parts of this Agreement, binding on all 
Members. 
3. The agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annex 4 (hereinafter referred 
to as "Plurilateral Trade Agreements") are also part of this Agreement for those Members that have 
Page 10 
accepted them, and are binding on those Members. The Plurilateral Trade Agreements do not create 
either obligations or rights for Members that have not accepted them. 
4. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 as specified in Annex 1A (hereinafter referred 
to as "GATT 1994") is legally distinct from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, dated 
30 October 1947, annexed to the Final Act Adopted at the Conclusion of the Second Session of the 
Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, as subsequently 
rectified, amended or modified (hereinafter referred to as "GATT 1947"). 
Article III 
Functions of the WTO 
1. The WTO shall facilitate the implementation, administration and operation, and further the 
objectives, of this Agreement and of the Multilateral Trade Agreements, and shall also provide the 
framework for the implementation, administration and operation of the Plurilateral Trade Agreements. 
2. The WTO shall provide the forum for negotiations among its Members concerning their 
multilateral trade relations in matters dealt with under the agreements in the Annexes to this Agreement. 
The WTO may also provide a forum for further negotiations among its Members concerning their 
multilateral trade relations, and a framework for the implementation of the results of such negotiations, 
as may be decided by the Ministerial Conference. 
3. The WTO shall administer the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement 
of Disputes (hereinafter referred to as the "Dispute Settlement Understanding" or "DSU") in Annex 2 
to this Agreement. 
4. The WTO shall administer the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (hereinafter referred to as the 
"TPRM") provided for in Annex 3 to this Agreement. 
5. With a view to achieving greater coherence in global economic policy-making, the WTO shall 
cooperate, as appropriate, with the International Monetary Fund and with the International Bank for 
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World Bank issues structural adjustment loans to developing countries and these 
conditions may encourage the opening up of markets to Western business.  It is 
believed that as long as markets are free and global trade is liberal, there is hope 
for a sustainable and stable global economy. 
 
This view of global trade expressed above is in line with Adam Smith’s 
philosophy1415
 
 of the invisible hand regulating a healthy economy ensuring that 
all of society’s needs are automatically met in a successful economy. This theory 
would work well in a society where all individuals were contributing on a relatively 
balanced scale but this is more difficult in certain societies because there is no 
invisible force that would regulate greed levels in individuals and therefore the 
economy becomes automatically unbalanced particularly where unregulated 
diamond trade is involved. 
8.4 A Brief Note on the Contribution of the UNIDROIT  
UNIDROIT is a body which is exceptionally active through various working 
groups in order to create model laws and uniform rules in the international 
context. Some of the UNIDROIT efforts relevant to trade include pioneering the 
Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA). It is 
submitted that these efforts are crucial to international trade and must always be 
borne in mind when a State seeks to develop its private law or participate 
meaningfully in the international sale of goods. 
 
The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts and other 
Conventions such as the CISG and the Agency Convention were formulated by 
the UNIDROIT. It tailored these instruments to fit with international sales law 
which at the same time was intended to be consistent with the general 
philosophies of all legal systems. As a whole it is submitted that the UNIDROIT 
                                                                                                                                                 
Reconstruction and Development and its affiliated agencies.’ 
1415 Adam Smith (1723-1790), moral philosopher and economist, wrote two great books, the well-known 
Wealth of Nations (1776) and Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759). See 
http://www.quebecoislibre.org/05/050415-16.htm 17 March 2010. 
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principles generally do not openly conflict with the respective domestic laws of 
various countries. The international instruments in the commercial world 
complement the provisions in legal systems of various countries such as South 
Africa as demonstrated above. 
 
8.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has considered the impact of the ratification of the UN Convention 
on Agency, formally referred to as the Convention on Agency in the International 
Sale of Goods, 1983 and contained within the Convention on Agency in the 
International Sale of Goods Act.1416 South Africa is a diamond producer and 
contributes substantially to the international diamond trade. This necessarily 
brings it into contact with the rest of the world. The domestic legal system is 
influenced by this contact with the global community and this is evident in its laws 
such as the Convention on Agency in the International Sale of Goods Act.1417
 
  
This analysis has demonstrated the nature, scope and relevance of the 
international law of agency in the context of diamond trading while investigating 
the core international themes that have driven working groups of the United 
Nations to create uniform international sales rules ad instruments that would 
seriously impact international trade in a positive and human rights conscious 
manner with respect to State Sovereignty whether a country is developed or not. 
 
It is clear that the law concerning a State’s sovereignty with an ability to act as 
custodian over its own mineral and petroleum resources is drawn from the New 
Economic Order principles that drive international trade law. These themes are 
captured in local legislation such as the MPRDA1418
                                                 
1416 4 of 1986. 
 which makes the State 
custodian of its own mineral resources for the benefit of its people. Clearly this 
demonstrates a shift both nationally and internationally into a system where 
developing countries can stand on their own and control and utilize their nation’s 
1417 4 of 1986. 
1418 28 of 2002. 
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resources free from outside interference but also respecting principles that 
promote comity among nations. 
 
The themes that can be gleaned from this chapter are various but the most 
important one is that the contact between South African law and that of the 
international community enriches its own legal system. This may be through 
ratifying various conventions and incorporating them into South Africa’s own 
domestic law, or participating in the formulation of international standards to 
regulate commercial arrangements of an international nature. It is through the 
adoption of the international instruments that the post apartheid Constitutional 
dispensation can be enhanced and strengthened. 
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Chapter 9: Insolvency and International Diamond Trade: South African 
Legislation On Cross-Border Insolvency 
 
9.1 Introduction 
It is important in this study of international trade and diamond regulations to 
mention the area of cross-border insolvency or transnational insolvency law as it 
affects the manner in which business is conducted across national borders in 
testing times.1419 Having regard to the fact that a GFC1420 in 2008 and 2009 was 
a factor that exacerbated insolvency, this part of the study proves significant.1421 
Therefore this area of international trade becomes important to consider as it is 
relevant to the diamond trade industry in times where insolvency becomes an 
influential factor.1422
                                                 
1419 PM Meskin; B Galgut; PAM Magid; JA Kunst; A Boraine; DA Burdette Insolvency Law Butterworths, 
Lexis Nexis (2008) Chapter 17. See Bekink B. and Botha C. The Role of a Modern Central Ban in 
Managing Consumer Bankrupsies and Corporate Failures: A South African Public-Law Angle of Incidence 
South African Mercantile Law Journal Volume 21 (2009) 74. The authors submit that the global economy 
is showing clear signs of stress as was illustrated during the 2008, 2009 GFC. 
 Since South Africa is an active trading country within the 
context of the global economy the international law aimed at regulating the 
effects of insolvency are relevant to all its international markets. What will 
emerge from this chapter is the Constitutionally influenced set of laws dealing 
1420 Ibid. 
1421 United Nations Intergraded Regional Information Networks, Job Losses as Diamonds Lose Their 
Lustre, Africa News 11 February (2009) www.afrika.no/Detailed/17940.html 16 July 2009. 
1422As a general rule a diamond trading entity seeks to always establish itself as being solvent at all times of 
active trading and diamond production. This is due to the fact that to be involved in diamond trade at the 
highest level, for instance, when trading as a client of ADB Bank, such a bank requires that all their clients 
be solvent because as a bank ADB is self-securing and self-liquidating, see 
https://www.antwerpdiamondbank.com/index.php/ADB_en/profile/5 13 March 2010. In any case, any 
business entity desires to aspire confidence in their clients by showing that they are able to meet their debts. 
In AFGEM v Rex Mining Corporation Ltd [2007] JOL 19337 (W) 7 par. 11 the court dealt with an urgent 
application to wind up the respondent company, Rex Mining Corporation Ltd. The court held that ‘that the 
court has inherent jurisdiction to refuse to entertain proceedings which amount to an abuse of court process. 
The court had been coerced into hearing the matter on an urgent basis, which was not necessary in the 
circumstances. Because of the haste it was not possible to adjudicate on the matter. The confusing case 
presented to the court involved an inordinate amount of reading time in order to try and "plumb 
unnecessary opaqueness and contradiction". The application was dismissed with punitive costs.’ This case 
did not dwell on the insolvency issue but that the papers alleging such insolvency were contradictory and 
inadequately drafted. The case does however illustrate that there is a strong desire by this diamond trading 
entity to show itself as being solvent. See a report dated 14 June 2007 on the alleged insolvency of AFGEM 
in http://www.miningmx.com/diamonds/967809.htm 18 March 2010 posted by McKay David Thursday 14 
Jun 2007, where an AFGEM representative makes the following statement: ‘Afgem will remain as a cash 
shell. All debts will be paid off and all legal issues will be resolved. It will be a totally clean company as 
will be the one we sell.’ 
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with Cross-Border insolvency. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
Act1423
 
 is evidenced in insolvency law in areas of attempting to salvage 
businesses while dealing with matters in an equitable manner with due regard to 
human dignity. 
This study is being conducted at a time when the world is experiencing a 
grievous economic down turn or global financial crisis (GFC) and the courts in 
many States are faced with having to deal with many bankruptcy matters. 
Governments, for example, the US sought to achieve the aims of the 
international model laws on insolvency by creating rescue packages for suffering 
businesses, for example, the motor industry (in the form of Daimler Chrysler and 
GM Motors) in the US has been reported in global news as one of the industries 
that will gain governments rescue packages that will save those businesses and 
mitigate the effects of the job losses taking place during the current economic 
crisis.1424
 
 This is in line with the South African Constitutional ideals explained 
above and the law related to cross-border insolvency. The US has stated the 
following principles in providing aid to various businesses during the GFC: 
                                                 
1423 108 of 1996 section 22 which provides for the right to freedom of trade. It is submitted that the 
Constitutional principle in this case is to protect business where there are viable methods of doing so with 
the assistance of the State. This is in line with sections 39 and 231 of the Constitution as well which seek to 
encourage international cooperation in supporting trade and business and laws related to insolvency on this 
issue. The Cross-Border Insolvency Act 42 of 2000 preamble provides that ‘Whereas the General 
Assembly of the United Nations on 15 December 1997 adopted a resolution, co-sponsored by the Republic 
of South Africa, recommending that States review their legislation on cross-border insolvency and, in that 
review, give favourable consideration to the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency of the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law; And whereas the Republic of South Africa acknowledges the 
need to create effective mechanisms for dealing with cases of cross-border insolvency in accordance with 
the provisions of the Model Law, bearing in mind the need for internationally harmonised legislation 
governing instances of cross-border insolvency.’ 
1424 These principles can clearly be expanded to other potentially suffering businesses such as the diamond 
industry which like all markets has been affected by the world wide recession. See also, ABI Event Round 
Up: Debt Conference, New York CLE Program and Litigation Skills Training Highlight Busy May 
American Bankruptcy Institute 27-5 ABIJ 1 (2008). The ABI Debt Symposium brought together 
international scholars from a variety of disciplines to examine the escalating problem of the debt 
phenomenon that influences much of today’s economy and culture. See 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/30/44601046.pdf 18 March 2010 an unclassified document by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development cited as DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2010) 67 Global 
Forum on Competition, State Aids and Subsides Contribution from the U.S. Federal Trade Commission - 
Session I 12 Feb (2010) 67.  
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‘The United States does not have a system for the direct 
regulation of government financial aid to firms. In some 
extraordinary instances, the U.S. Government has provided 
assistance to industries and firms to address specific 
exigencies, for example, to protect critical infrastructure, 
employment, national defence, and the integrity of the 
banking and financial system.1 In its recent rescue 
measures, the U.S. Government has taken steps to limit the 
possible negative effects of such interventions by restricting 
the duration and depth of its intervention. U.S. states may 
provide certain assistance to firms but, under the “dormant 
Commerce Clause” of the U.S. Constitution, their actions 
may not discriminate against other states or hinder 
interstate commerce.  
2. State and Local Level Aids and Subsidies  
The United States does not have a regulatory regime 
governing state and local aids and subsidies. However, 
courts have found certain state assistance to violate the 
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.2 The Supreme 
Court has held that there is a “dormant” or “negative” 
aspect of the Commerce Clause that implicitly limits the 
states‟ right to tax or otherwise regulate interstate 
commerce:  
It has been long accepted that the Commerce Clause not 
only grants Congress the authority to regulate commerce 
among the States, but also directly limits the power of the 
States to discriminate against interstate commerce. … This 
‘negative’ aspect of the Commerce Clause prohibits 
economic protectionism – that is, regulatory measures 
designed to benefit in-state economic interests by 
burdening out-of-state competition.… Thus, State statutes 
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that clearly discriminate against interstate commerce are 
routinely struck down, […] unless the discrimination is 
demonstrably justified by a valid factor unrelated to 
economic protectionism’ 
 
While insolvency is a crucial consideration when dealing with commercial 
considerations, this chapter will not be a re-iteration of national law on the subject 
of insolvency in general. This has been sufficiently investigated in South African 
law and is therefore not necessary in this study. What this part of the study aims 
to achieve is to analyze and consider how cross-border insolvency law in South 
Africa affects international trade with reference being made to trade in diamonds 
though admittedly this legal subject is wide enough to cover other industries in 
areas of international trade. 
 
It has been explained that cross-border insolvency arises when a bankruptcy 
procedure is initiated in one jurisdiction relating to the estate of a debtor, usually 
in his or her country of domicile, who own and has interests in at least one other 
jurisdiction. In such circumstances the insolvency representative whether in the 
form of a liquidator or trustee appointed to administer the debtor’s estate will 
have to consider the legal steps he or she may have to take in order to in order to 
take possession of the debtor’s foreign property or interests for the benefit of 
local creditors. In this case such a representative would have to abide by the law 
of the foreign court in which the property or interest in question lies within its 
borders. In the absence of a treaty this situation may create uncertainty as the 




                                                 
1425PM Meskin; B Galgut; PAM Magid; JA Kunst; A Boraine; DA Burdette Insolvency Law Butterworths, 
Lexis Nexis (2008) Chapter 17 p 1.  
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It has been explained by the authors1426
 
 that uncertainty can be created when 
there is a clash between the universality and territoriality model of the treatment 
of cross-border insolvency. The universality model (if absolute it allows for a 
singular bankruptcy process) calls for the treatment of such insolvency as a 
single matter so as to make sure that creditors from different jurisdictions are 
treated equally whereas the territoriality model (which entertains plural 
bankruptcy processes) seeks to protect the interests of the local creditors first 
before allowing foreign creditors to use the debtor’s local assets. 
This chapter will consider the international trade specific international regulatory 
framework in the form of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency 
(MLCBI) by deliberating on the practical participation of South Africa as a 
participating and sponsoring State to the Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency.1427 This analysis will be formulated by a thorough study and 
consideration of the legislation and precedent as applied in South Africa and 
other international jurisdictions while also consulting some useful academic 
guidance from various learned authors1428
 
 on the very important subject of cross-
border insolvency. The aim of this study is to illustrate that only through 
international uniform regulatory rules of cross-border insolvency can international 
trade be regulated in the most equitable manner that is satisfactory to national as 
well as international entities that may find themselves in insolvent situations. 
It must be noted that the question of insolvency is so important to the global 
context hence South African law has provided for its implications in law through 
various legislative instruments. This includes inter alia statutory law such as the 
                                                 
1426 Ibid. 
1427 Cross-Border Insolvency Act 42 of 2000. 
1428 See Wessels Bob Current Topics of International Insolvency Law, Kluwer (2004); Smith A.D. and 
Aliola D.A. Cross-Border Insolvencies: An Overview of Some Recent Legal Developments 11 SA Merc LJ 
192 (1999), Ailola David Recognition of Foreign Proceedings, Orders and Officials in Insolvency in 
Southern Africa: A Call for a Regional Convention 31/1 Comparative and International Law Journal of 
Southern Africa (1999) 54,  Ailola David The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency: Its 
Efficacy and Suitability as a Basis for a SADC Convention Stellenbosch Law Review (2000) 215, PM 
Meskin; B Galgut; PAM Magid; JA Kunst; A Boraine; DA Burdette Insolvency Law Butterworths, Lexis 
Nexis (2008) Chapter 17 for example. 
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Judicial Matters Second Amendment Act.1429 This law together with the 
regulations applicable under it is a relatively recent statute that was promulgated 
to provide for the consolidation and amendment of law relating to insolvent 
persons and their estates. The Judicial Matters Second Amendment Act1430 
provides for the repeal of various insolvency laws1431 and widens the jurisdiction 
of the court to provide specifically for matters relating to insolvency. Further, the 
Judicial Matters Second Amendment Act1432 provides that preferences must be 




The Judicial Matters Second Amendment Act1434 provides that the South African 
court, the High Court, shall have jurisdiction over every debtor and in regard to 
any estate of every debtor who on the date on which a petition for the 
acceptance of the surrender or for the sequestration of his or her estate is lodged 
with the registrar of the court, is domiciled or owns property that is situated within 
the jurisdiction of the court or at any time within twelve months immediately 
before the lodging of the petition normally resided or carried on business within 
the jurisdiction of the court.1435
 
 
The jurisdiction of the court is uniquely provided for in this statute as pertaining to 
cross-border insolvency matters by making reference to the court’s discretion 
based on equity and convenience to refuse or postpone the acceptance of 
surrender or sequestration of a person domiciled in a State not designated1436
                                                 
1429 55 of 2003. Also relevant to cross-border insolvency is the Judicial Matters Amendment Act 42 of 
2001. 
 in 
1430 55 of 2003. 
1431 Insolvency Act 32 of 1916; Insolvency Amendment Act 29 of 1926 (except the title and preamble 
thereof and sections 1, 71, 72 and 74 thereof); section 24 of the Land Bank Amendment Act 58 of 1934. 
1432 55 of 2003. 
1433 Judicial Matters Second Amendment Act 55 of 2003 introduces section 98A to the Insolvency Act 24 
of 1936 which provides for the preference of employees. This is clearly a social justice issue. 
1434 55 of 2003. 
1435 Judicial Matters Second Amendment Act 55 of 2003 section 1(a)(b). 
1436 It is common cause that there has not been any designation of the States in terms of section 2 by the 
Minister of Justice in any case and this has caused the Act to remain dormant. 
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terms of the Cross-Border Act.1437 This pertains to a person who should be 
sequestrated by a court outside of South Africa or the estate of a person over 
whom it has jurisdiction be sequestrated by another court within the Republic.1438
 
  
Further, the laws such as the Securities Service Act1439 and the National Credit 
Act,1440 inter alia, must be read together with all the South African law relating to 
insolvency as these specific statutes appear to operate in such a way as to 
systematically lead persons away from situations where they are insolvent by 
ensuring and curbing the over-dependency on credit1441
 
 as a means to structure 
day to day business dealings while legally ensuring that persons are living or 
managing their commercial activities within their means. 
Barry Herman in his paper on dealing with developing country sovereign debt 
makes certain proposals for reform in the international treatment of sovereign 
debt via ethical analysis. The proposals made by the learned author are 
important to international insolvency laws because generally insolvency does not 
only concern commercial entities but entire States themselves particularly 
developing States. It is stated in Herman’s submissions that there is a trend of 
over-indebtedness and insolvencies that have occurred and re-occurred many 
times in developing countries.1442 Having regard to the systems that have the 
potential of leading individuals, businesses and States into insolvency,1443
                                                 
1437 42 of 2000 section 2. 
 it is 
1438 Ibid. 
1439 36 of 2004. 
1440 34 of 2005 section 3 of which provides that the purpose of the Act is to ‘The purposes of this Act are to 
promote and advance the social and economic welfare of South Africans, promote a fair, transparent, 
competitive, sustainable, responsible, efficient, effective and accessible credit market and industry, and to 
protect consumers, by-  
        (a)promoting the development of a credit market that is accessible to all South Africans, and in particular to 
those who have historically been unable to access credit under sustainable market conditions.’ 
1441 See National Credit Act 34 of 2005 section 7 together with regulations thereunder which deals with the 
determination of thresholds and credit limit facilities to avoid over-indebtedness.  
1442 Herman Barry Doing the Right Thing: Dealing With Developing Country Sovereign Debt North 
Carolina Journal of International Law & Commercial Regulation 32 N.C.J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. (2007) 
773. 
1443 By virtue of a culture of over-indebtedness or other uncontrollable influences that may lead to market 
failure, for example, product failure due to climate changes or other vis major. 
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prudent that some international uniform regulation be adopted to deal with this 
situation. 
 
It is therefore relevant in this study to highlight and test these issues of 
insolvency in the context of international trade and determine whether these laws 
are effective and achieving their purpose particularly when dealing with cross-
border insolvency which becomes a global concern that originates from each 
country’s financial and market driven systems. Further, when relating these 
issues to the diamond industry if one is not discussing the industrial diamond 
which is an economic necessity; it generally induces mirth to find that persons 
who are insolvent are concerning themselves with luxury items such as diamond 
jewellery.1444
 
 Having said that though a commercial entity which deals in luxury 
diamond items may find itself insolvent of that business is not obtaining support 
from the market and thus unable to meet its overheads thus making cross-border 
insolvency law applicable for international trade purposes. 
9.2 Background of UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency 
It is important at this stage to consider the origins or motivations behind the 
creation of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency as identified 
by the UNCITRAL Secretariat.1445
                                                 
1444 Granted the situation is distinguishable if such insolvent persons are looking to luxury items as a means 
of resolving their debt problems.  
 This will be done in order to create an 
opportunity for a more careful study of the influences that led to the 
establishment of this international model law particularly considering that 
embraces such a wide and universalistic scope for the protection of creditors and 
debtors alike in the global economy. It will not be necessary in this section to 
once again flesh out the substantive provisions of the model law, what will be 
considered are the actual endeavors and economic thoughts that led to the final 
shape of the instrument. 
1445 See UNCITRAL Secretariat Guide to Enactment, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-
Second Session, Supplement No. 17 (A/52/17) (1997). 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/insolvency-e.pdf 19 March 2010; 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model.html 19 March 2010. 
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One of the motivations behind the Model Law was centered on the need to curb 
fraudulent conduct by insolvent debtors. In the context of cross-border insolvency 
debtors may behave fraudulently by concealing assets or transferring them to 
foreign jurisdictions. This problem is one that was becoming a serious concern in 
frequency and magnitude in the global context and therefore mechanisms had to 
be developed at an international level to deal with this issue. Further, with the 
modern global interdependence carrying out such fraud was becoming easier 
therefore the international community had to react.1446
 
 
The Model Law was not developed in a vacuum. This is evident in the references 
to the Convention on Insolvency Proceedings of the European Union, the 
European Convention on Certain Aspects of Bankruptcy (1990), the Montevideo 
treaties on international commercial law (1889 and 1940), the Convention 
regarding Bankruptcy between Nordic States (1933) and the Convention on 
Private International law (Bustamante Code) (1928). Further, proposals from 
non-governmental organizations were also taken into account including the 
Model International Insolvency Cooperation Act and the Cross-Border Insolvency 
Concordat, both developed by the Committee J of the Section on Business Law 
of the International Bar Association.1447
 
 
One of the concerns that were raised leading to the creation of the Model Law 
involved a widespread limitation on cooperation and coordination between 
judges1448
                                                 
1446 UNCITRAL Secretariat Guide to Enactment, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-Second 
Session, Supplement No. 17 (A/52/17) (1997) Part IV Main Features of the Model Law, Background 
section 14. http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/insolvency-e.pdf 19 March 2010. 
 from different jurisdictions in cases of cross-border insolvency. This 
1447 Ibid. Section 18. 
1448 Ibid. Part Two I section 5 ‘Prior to the decision by UNCITRAL to undertake work on cross-border 
insolvency, the Commission and International Association of Insolvency Practitioners (INSOL) held two 
international colloquiums for insolvency practitioners, judges, government officials 
and representatives of other interested sectors. The suggestion arising from those colloquiums was that 
work by UNCITRAL should have the limited but useful goal of facilitating judicial cooperation, court 
access for foreign insolvency administrators and recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings.’ See 
www.insol.org/ 19 March 2010. 
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challenge was attributed to the lack of legislative framework or uncertainty 
regarding the scope of the existing legislative authority for pursuing cooperation 
with foreign courts.1449 It is submitted that this was the very complaint raise by 
Mullins J in the court a quo judgment in Moolman v Builders & Developers (Pty) 
Ltd (In Provisional Liquidation) Jooste Intervening.1450
 
 
It is acknowledged in the Secretariat’s commentary that the Model Law had to be 
created to resolve this issue since it was learnt from experience that no matter 
how much discretion a court may enjoy, as very evident in South African 
common law on cross-border insolvency law, the passage of a specific legislative 
framework is useful for promoting internal cooperation in cross-border cases. 
Further for the same reasons it is submitted that the Model law includes 




Further, the Model Law lists possible forms of cooperation and leaves the 
lawmakers to list other cooperative measures in order to adopt relevant 
cooperative measures into law so as to fit with the specific circumstances that 
may arise.1452
 
 A specific circumstance may for instance be a peculiarity to the 
diamond industry, where hypothetically a law may be adopted to include 
intergovernmental cooperation in instances that require for example decisions on 
what to do with physical location of an insolvent mine or other furniture, 
equipment and stockpiled diamonds. This will naturally occur if there are no other 
prevailing general laws that may provide for these circumstances.  
                                                 
1449 UNCITRAL Secretariat Guide to Enactment, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-Second 
Session, Supplement No. 17 (A/52/17) (1997) Part IV Main Features of the Model Law, Background 
section 14. http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/insolvency-e.pdf 19 March 2010. Section 38. 
1450 [1990] All SA 77 (A). 
1451 See Article 26. 
1452 UNCITRAL Secretariat Guide to Enactment, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-Second 
Session, Supplement No. 17 (A/52/17) (1997) Part IV Main Features of the Model Law, Background 
section 38 - 41. http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/insolvency-e.pdf 19 March 2010. 
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Some of the concerns which were also debated by the working group involved in 
the development of the Model Law pertain to the regulation of the coordination 
and cooperation with regard to concurrent proceedings. This is dealt with in 
Article 32 of the Model Law and this particular provision is referred to as the 
‘hotchpotch’ rule. The rule regulates coordination and cooperation in concurrent 
proceedings by preventing situations where a creditor might obtain a more 
favorable treatment than other creditors of the same class by obtaining payment 
for the same claim in different jurisdictions.1453
 
 
Without being repetitive the core motivational issues behind the creation of the 
Model Law are clearly stated above. What strongly emerges from the UN 
Secretariat’s commentary in the actual principles of the Model Law is the strong 
desire to create ‘harmony’ and ‘uniformity’ in the global economy to address the 
challenges that are peculiar to cross-border insolvency. 
 
9.3 Deliberations Prior to the Adoption of International Cross-Border 
Insolvency Law 
The South African perspective on the United Nations Cross-Border Model Law 
has generally invited some insightful academic debate however it seems that the 
common view on the legislation that has made such an instrument part of South 
African Law is that it would have significant impact on South African relations 
with the outside world.1454 It has also been suggested that such law make a 
cogent basis for developing a regional block in the form of the SADC 
Convention.1455
                                                 
1453 UNCITRAL Secretariat Guide to Enactment, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-Second 
Session, Supplement No. 17 (A/52/17) (1997) Part IV Main Features of the Model Law, Background 
section 198. In such cases a creditor will only receive payment in the enacting State that is limited to the 
total payments that the creditor has already received. 
 
1454 Dugard John and Abraham Garth International Law and Foreign Relations Public International Law 
2000 Annual Survey 103; 109. 
1455 http://www.sadc.int/ 19 March 2010. The members of the SADC are Angola, Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe. Ailola David Recognition of Foreign Proceedings, Orders and Officials in 
Insolvency in Southern Africa: A Call for a Regional Convention 31/1 Comparative and International Law 
Journal of Southern Africa (1999) 54; Ailola David The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border 
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Some of the South African views on the cross-border expressed above in law 
make it logical to infer that the Cross-Border Model Law of the United Nations 
was considered to be positive developmental law in South African relations on 
insolvency with other States. Further, the call for a development of a Convention 
suggests that this law intends to further encourage international relations in 
matters of insolvency. In South African legislation it allows the court to be 




In 1999 a conference was held on UNCITRAL instruments in Southern Africa at 
the formerly named Rand Afrikaans University.1458 The purpose of the 
conference was to determine the future reform of South African trade or 
international trade law. It was noted at this conference that South Africa was 
slowly shifting from its Eurocentric stance to become part of the community of 
States represented by the United Nations which would be important for South 
Africa as a developing State.1459
 
 
It emerged from the deliberations of the conference mentioned above that the 
purpose of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency was to 
                                                                                                                                                 
Insolvency: Its Efficacy and Suitability as a Basis for a SADC Convention Stellenbosch Law Review (2000) 
215. See also Coutsoudis Basil UNCITRAL Instruments in Southern Africa De Rebus, November (1999) 
SA Attorneys Journal 30. See article also on http://www.law-online.co.za/IntTradeLaw/ 21 March 2010. 
UNCITRAL%20Instruments.htm) (06/12/2006); Rothbart S. Mars: The Law of Insolvency in South Africa: 
Mars ‘A Welcome Return’ De Rebus, 1 December 9 ed (2008) 47. 
1456 Cross-Border Insolvency Act 32 of 2000 section 9 which states that ‘a foreign representative may apply 
directly to a court in the Republic for relief.’ Section 10 provides that ‘the sole fact that an application 
pursuant to this Act is made to a court in the Republic by a foreign representative does not subject the 
foreign representative or the foreign assets and affairs of the debtor to the jurisdiction of the courts of the 
Republic for any purpose other than the application.’ 
1457 Cross-Border Insolvency Act 32 of 2000 section 3 which provides for the application of law subject to 
international obligations of the Republic of South Africa in terms of any applicable treaty. Section 5 
provides that ‘a trustee, liquidator, judicial manager, curator of an institution, or receiver is authorised to 
act in a foreign State in respect of proceedings under the laws of the Republic relating to insolvency, as 
permitted by the applicable foreign law.’ 
1458 See www.jstor.org/stable/40176531 19 March 2010. 
1459 Coutsoudis Basil UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (1999). http://www.law-
online.co.za/IntTradeLaw/UNCITRAL%20Instruments.htm 19 March 2010. 
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encourage States to review their legislation on cross-border insolvency and 
determine whether existing legislation met the objectives of the modern and 
efficient insolvency system. One of the main observations that came out of the 
conference is that South Africa was a part of a global economy with a fast 
growing international trade role and therefore international borders were 
becoming diminished. It was proposed at the conference that the model law 
would support free trade in developing economies or at times of recession by 
removing the threat of injustice in instances of cross-border insolvency.1460
 
 
What emerged from the conference was that the insolvency legislation that South 
Africa prior to the adoption of the model law was inadequate. This is particularly 
because the common law position for dealing with cross-border situations in 
South Africa as expressed in Ex Parte Steyn1461 provided that a court has the 
power to recognize a foreign trustee but this was coupled with a practice that the 
courts had unfettered discretion to accept or allow a foreign trustee thus leading 
to uncertainty as to when a foreign trustee would be accepted.1462
 
 However it 
must be noted that the common law would still be crucial for the courts to have 
due regard to when dealing with States that are not to be dealt with according to 
the model law. 
Clearly the findings of law at the conference on UNCITRAL Instruments in South 
Africa adopted the view that the model law would address the lacunae in South 
African insolvency law which needed urgent reformation therefore a proposal for 
the adoption of the model law was made to the Law Commission. When the 
                                                 
1460 Ibid. Para. 17. 
1461 1979 (2) SA 709 (O). There are other cases of similar cross-border uncertainty that were presented 
before the court with contrasting decisions as expressed by writer Ailola David The UNCITRAL Model Law 
on Cross-Border Insolvency: Its Efficacy and Suitability as a Basis for a SADC Convention Stellenbosch 
Law Review (2000). These cases included Moolman v Builders and Developers (Pty) Ltd (In provisional 
Liquidation): Jooste Intervening 1990 (1) SA 954; In re Gurr v Zambia Airways Corporation Ltd [1998] 
All SA 479 (A); Clegg v Priestly 1985 (3) SA 950 (W); Ex Parte Palmer NO v In re Hahn 1993 (3) SA 359 
(CPD); Bekker NO v Kotze and Others 1996 (4) SA 1293. 
1462 South African writer, Ailola David The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency: Its 
Efficacy and Suitability as a Basis for a SADC Convention Stellenbosch Law Review (2000) 215 also 
proposed the same reforms. 
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Cross-Border Insolvency Bill was tabled in parliament in the year 2000 certain 
amendments were made to it to make it into a law that would be more reflective 
of the South African insolvency context, for example structure of the law and the 
courts which would administer the law were fully canvassed in the bill. It has 
been submitted that the memorandum of the objects of the model law were fully 
debated in the bill and now form part of South African law while promoting the 
aims of the model law.1463
 
 
The prior deliberations on the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency illustrate 
that it was a well received instrument in South Africa and hence its promulgation 
as a South African statute was accelerated.1464
 
 Such adoption of the model law 
has indeed led to a reform of South African trade law. Further South African 
trading partners and other States that are party to this law can be viewed as 
having a common process for resolving insolvency matters regardless of the 
location of the court dealing with the matter. 
In Sackstein NO v Proudfoot SA (Pty) Ltd1465 the court dealt with the issue of 
cross-border insolvency in this case although it was not entirely a matter based 
solely on the cross-border insolvency issue as contemplated in the Cross-Border 
Insolvency Act1466 or the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. This case was 
decided prior to the promulgation1467 of the model law into South Africa. The facts 
of the case however serve a useful purpose for the practical scenario that is 
envisaged by the South African Cross-Border Insolvency Act.1468
 
 
                                                 
1463 Stretch R.; Silke J. Cross-Border Insolvency A New Bill Income Tax Taxgram Issue 10 Butterworths, 
Lexis Nexis (2000) par. 1.7. 
1464 Ibid. The Cross-Border Insolvency Act 42 of 2000 was assented to on 8 December 2000 and the date of 
commencement was 28 November 2003. 
1465 2003 (4) SA 348 (SCA). 
1466 42 of 2000. 
1467 The South African Cross-Border Insolvency Act 42 of 2000 has a commencement date of 28 November 
2003. 
1468 42 of 2000. 
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The facts demonstrate a typical scenario as to firstly, how a cross-border 
situation may present itself, secondly the facts show what is meant by concurrent 
insolvency proceedings and thirdly, the facts demonstrate the legal rights or 
position of foreign representatives in relation to a South African court if or should 
they wish to enforce a liquidation of an order given by another court. With this 
understanding of the practical aspects as illustrated by this case it is important 
then to study the facts of the case. 
 
The matter revolved around a Namibian based company1469 having a body 
corporate in South Africa. The company’s name was Tsumeb Corporation Ltd 
(Tsumeb SA) and incorporated in Namibia but having its offices in Johannesburg, 
South Africa and subject to the provisions of the South African Companies Act 61 
of 1973. The defendant company, Proudfoot SA (Pty) Ltd (Proudfoot) was also 
company registered in South Africa carrying on business as industrial consultants 
in Johannesburg South Africa. In 1997 Tsumeb SA concluded a contract with 
Proudfoot in terms of which Proudfoot undertook to provide certain consulting 
services to Tsumeb in Namibia. In return for those services Tsumeb was to pay a 
total amount on R10 million in fixed weekly installments however the total amount 
that was paid amounted only to R5 708 957.00 much less than agreed.1470
 
  
It was an established fact that Tsumeb was placed under provisional liquidation 
by an order of the High Court of Namibia after the conclusion of the contract with 
Proudfoot, on 29 April 1998. A final winding-up order was granted by the same 
Namibian court the subsequent year, on 12 March 1999, with the liquidators 
being appointed on 26 May 1999. On 29 July 1998 Tsumeb was simultaneously 
placed in provisional liquidation by an order of the South African court and final 
winding up was granted on 16 March 1999.1471
                                                 
1469 The foreign company was registered in South Africa in terms of section 323 of the Companies Act 61 
of 1973. 
 The decision of the court in this 
case forms an important example of cross border insolvency where it became 
1470 354 D – H. 
1471 354 H – J; 355A. 
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apparent that there were concurrent liquidation orders involving the same entity. 
The court referred to them as the South African liquidation order and the 
Namibian liquidation order in order to distinguish the concurrent proceedings. 
 
In this case, however, the Namibian liquidators did not apply for an order for their 
recognition in a South African court in order to enable them to wind up the affairs 
of Tsumeb. Further, in terms of the South African liquidation order, a Mr. Leslie 
Sackstein was appointed as liquidator on 17 May 1999. On 3 November 1999 the 
Proudfoot, the defendant, proved a claim at a meeting of creditors of Tsumeb in 
Namibia in terms of Namibian law. The claim was based on the balance owed to 
Proudfoot by Tsumeb under the consultancy contract between the parties. It is 
this balance of payments that were the subject of the proceedings in the South 
African court in casu.1472
 
 
The issue of concurrent proceedings came to an end in this case, however, when 
an offer by Ongopolo Mining Processing Ltd made a scheme arrangement in 
terms of section 311 of the Companies Act of Namibia, though it was clearly 
stated by the court that the Namibian proceedings did not affect the South 
African process.1473
                                                 
1472 355 B – D.  
 This scheme was sanctioned by the Namibian High Court on 
10 March 2000 with the effect that the Namibian Court discharged the liquidation 
order pertaining to this case. Upon the cancellation of the Namibian liquidation 
order, Mr. Sackstein acting as liquidator in terms of the South African liquidation 
order instituted an action against Proudfoot for the recovery of moneys paid to it 
in pursuance of the consulting contract between the two parties. The liquidator’s 
main contention was that the payments made to Proudfoot were made at a lime 
when the liabilities of Tsumeb were exceeding its assets and therefore paying 
1473 357 E. 
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The Supreme Court of appeals in this case clearly established that in South 
African law an external company may be wound up by the court like any other 
domestic company by virtue of the Companies Act1475 which includes an external 
company. Such an external company can be liquidated as an independent entity 
regardless of the fact that the company to which it relates is a foreign country has 
not been liquidated.1476 This means that a Namibian diamond trading company 
with South African representation as an external company, for example, may be 
liquidated in South Africa while the Namibian commercial activities are continuing 
or vice versa, all that is required is to prove insolvency for a company to be 
wound up not just that it is related to a certain foreign thriving or failing 
company.1477 However, this does not create two legal personalities, it is still one 
company registered in two different countries.1478
 
 
The court stated that the law pertaining to the demarcation of territory for 
liquidators in such a situation must still be developed.1479 It is submitted that the 
purpose of the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency has brought about such 
development.1480
                                                 
1474 355 D – H. The liquidator’s claim was based on sub-section 29(1) and 30 of the South African 
Insolvency act 24 of 1936 which read in conjunction with section 340 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 
Proudfoot was obliged to repay the amounts paid to it to the liquidator in his capacity as such. 
 However, for the purposes of this case the court’s guidance on 
the law regarding separating the responsibilities of liquidators according to the 
1475 61 of 1973 section 337 which provides that ‘in this Chapter, unless the context otherwise indicates- 
'company' includes a company, external company and any other body corporate.’  
1476 357 A – B. 
1477 357 C. The court emphasized this point further by stating that in a situation where there are concurrent 
liquidations taking place in respect of a company with a foreign country of origin and is also represented in 
South Africa as an external company, in such cases the liquidators of such companies are independent and 
may deal with assets and liabilities of the respective companies separately according to the requirements of 
each company. 
1478 357 F. 
1479 357 I. 
1480 Cross-Border Insolvency Act 42 of 2000 where the preamble of the Act provides that the purpose of the 
Act is to provide effective mechanisms for dealing with cases of cross-border insolvency; and to amend the 
Insolvency Act 24 of 1936, so as to further regulate the jurisdiction of the High Courts; and to provide for 
matters connected therewith. 
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entity for which they were appointed to manage is a guide in law particularly 
because it seems to respect the intentions of the Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency by in a way respecting the findings concerning insolvency of the 
foreign court although this was not the issue in this matter. 
 
With regard to the liquidator’s contention that the payments to Proudfoot were 
unlawful dispositions in terms of the Insolvency Act,1481 the court held that if the 
disposition of property occurred outside the Republic, a South African liquidator 
has no power to impeach such a disposition,1482 however, where section 391 of 
the Companies Act1483 is also applicable the court held that the limitation of the 
recovery of property to property only situated in the Republic in terms of the 
Insolvency Act1484 must be ignored1485 with the result that the South African 
liquidator of an external company is entitled to carry out impeachment 
procedures for that disposition and may proceed in South Africa in terms of 
section 391 of the Companies Act1486 or take action recognized by the courts of 
the foreign country concerned, therefore the appeal was allowed.1487
 
 
This case law truly illustrates the position and spirit of the Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency prior to its promulgation into South African law which resulted 
in the most equitable protection of interests of all parties in an insolvency 
situation. Arguably this view might not have been one shared by Proudfoot in the 
matter however the point is that Proudfoot was not having any rights taken away 
as creditor but simply being placed on an equal footing with all the other creditors 
as if to respect the pari passu1488
                                                 
1481 24 of 1936. 
 principle in this case. 
1482 358 J. 
1483 61 of 1973. 
1484 24 of 1936. 
1485 359 B. 
1486 61 of 1973. 
1487 360 E – F. 
1488 The application of the pari passu principle was considered by the court in the following cases,  MV 
Olympic Countess: Fortis Bank (Nederland) NV v Orient Denizcilik Turizm Sanayi Ve Tricaret AS 2008 (1) 
SA 376 (SCA) 380 A - F, Koumantarakis Group CC v Mystic River Investment 45 (Pty) Ltd and Another 
2008 (5) SA 159 (SCA) 165 C. 
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9.4 The Cross-Border Insolvency Act 42 of 2000 
It is important as a first port of call to consider the relevant law on cross-border 
insolvency in South African law as related to international trade matters. The 
statute to look to in this instance is the Cross-Border Insolvency Act1489 as 
amended1490 which is effectively an acceptance of international law in the form of 
a Model Law for the purposes of providing effective mechanisms for dealing with 
cases of cross-border insolvency, to amend the Insolvency Act.1491
 
 As a starting 
point the law makers must be commended for the recognition of the need to 
create certain rules on cross-border insolvency. Without stating that the law-
makers acted with commendable foresight, they were also able to create rules 
that could prevent bankruptcy anarchy especially in times of the world wide 
recession. 
It has been submitted by Professor David Ailola, a prolific writer in matters of 
insolvency, that when considering the South African Constitution and the Bill of 
Rights contained therein it is essential to study what its impact is on cross-border 
insolvency. Professor Ailola submits that in light of cross-border insolvency laws 
of South Africa it is clear that one group that could be adversely affected by 
insolvency is that group of foreign-based creditors of a local debtor. This adverse 
                                                 
1489 42 of 2000. 
1490 The Cross-Border Insolvency Act 42 of 2000, as amended by the Judicial Matters Amendment Act 42 
of 2001 and must be read together with the following statutes, The Administration Amendment Act 9 of 
1929; The Maintenance Act 99 of 1998; The Sheriffs Act 90 of 1986; Extradition Act 67 of 1962; 
Insolvency Act 24 of 1936; Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977; Judicial Matters Second Amendment Act 
55 of 2003; Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998; General Law Fourth Amendment Act 
132 of 1993; Judicial Matters Amendment Act 42 of 201; General law Sixth Amendment Act 204 of 1993; 
General Law Third Amendment Act 129 of 2001; Rules Board For Courts of Law Act 107 of 1985; 
National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998; South African Law Reform Commission Act 19 of 1973; 
Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000; Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000; 
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction Act 72 of 1996; Judges’ 
Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act 47 of 2001; Judicial Officers (Amendment of Conditions 
of Service) Act 28 of 2003; Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act 24 of 1987; Prevention of 
Counterfeiting of Currency Act 16 of 1965; Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000; Promotion 
of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000. 
1491 24 of 1936. See introductory note on Cross-Border Insolvency Act 42 of 2000. To make the application 
of this legislation more effective this Act also provides for further regulation of the jurisdiction of High 
Courts who are tasked with matters relating to insolvent persons. 
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prejudice that may be potentially suffered by foreign creditors clearly conflicts 
with Constitutional values which provide that all forms of discrimination on the 
basis of origin or citizenship are unconstitutional. Therefore it was required in law 
that a process be established to equalize the interests of foreign based creditors 
and creditors based in South Africa.1492 It is submitted by Professor Ailola that 
while the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency is helpful it does 
not guarantee equity in all States as the various States are free to adopt those 
parts of the Model law that suit their liking.1493
 
 
While the submissions above provide an excellent understanding of the 
Constitutional dimension of cross-border insolvency law and educates us on 
some equity challenges that may be posed in the application of the Mode Law, it 
is also important to note that the UNCITRAL Model law as adopted into South 
African law clearly shows that it will be a contribution to equity and fairness in 
South African law when applied. This is because it is a law that reflects important 
Constitutional values such as equality of all who approach the South African 
courts for cross-border insolvency justice regardless of where such persons 
originate. This is important for the protection of debtors and creditors alike in 
cross-border insolvency. 
 
It is stated in the preamble of the Cross-Border Insolvency Act1494
                                                 
1492 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996 section 9 which provides for the right to 
equality and equal protection for all before the law. The Cross-Border Insolvency Act 42 of 2000 section 7 
provides for additional legal remedies in terms of other law in the Republic to be made available to foreign 
creditors in appropriate circumstances. 
 that as a result 
of the 15 December 1997 UN General Assembly resolution as co-sponsored by 
the Republic of South Africa recommending that States must review their 
legislation on cross-border insolvency and give favorable consideration to the 
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency as developed by UNCITRAL. One of the 
key objectives in adopting this model law was to create a uniform body of rules in 
the international community providing for such matters. This is the main theme 
1493 David A. The Law of Insolvency and the Bill of Rights Bill of Rights Compendium, Commercial Law, 
Butterworths, Lexis Nexis (2000) SI 8. 
1494 42 of 2000. 
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The Cross-Border Insolvency Act,1496 apart from creating a uniform global 
approach to insolvency this law serves to enhance certainty in international trade 
by providing for a solid regulatory framework for trade and investment that will 
also provide for a fair and efficient administration of cross-border insolvencies 
that protects the interests of all creditors, other interested persons and the debtor 
alike.1497 As if anticipating possible effects of recession and market failure type of 
situations, the instrument uniquely also provides for the protection and 
maximization of the value of the debtor’s assets while creating mechanisms for 
the financial rescue of troubled businesses for a humane objective of protecting 
investment and preserving employment.1498
 
 
It must be noted that protection of employment and ensuring the continuance of a 
business is particularly important to the diamond industry as illustrated in the 
unreported case of De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v Anglovaal Mining 
Limited.1499
                                                 
1495 4 of 1986. 
 In this case the Competition Tribunal was considering a merger 
concerning a diamond interest which as far as the court was concerned in this 
case was already successfully competing and controlling this particular diamond 
market in a non-abusive manner. One of the major reasons for the tribunal’s 
endorsement of the merger was that the merger did not cause any job losses. 
These themes are very important in light of the South African Bill of Rights 
therefore the international Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency reflects 
Constitutional values to the utmost. 
1496 42 of 2000. 
1497 Cross-Border Insolvency Act 42 of 2000 where the preamble proves ‘for fair and efficient 
administration of cross-border insolvencies that protects the interests of all creditors and other interested 
persons, including the debtor.’ 
1498 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996, Bill of Rights. Cross-Border Insolvency Act 42 
of 2000 where the preamble. 
1499 Case No: 36/LM/Mar00, Competition Tribunal of the Republic of South Africa. The clearance was 
given by the court on 15 may 2000 prior to some of the amendments expressed in the Diamonds Act 56 of 
1986 that have altered the methods of diamond trade in South Africa. 
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In a similar scenario as illustrated in National Union of Mineworkers v De Beers 
Consolidated Mines (Pty) Ltd1500 where the Koffiefontein mine under the 
management of De Beers was in trouble as a result of consistent under 
performance in production. The mine had to be shut down and the court looked 
into the issue of potential job losses that would be consequent. The De Beers 
Industry report however illustrated that the mine was sold to Petra diamonds and 
thus the required business rescue was underway.1501
 
 
The structure of the South African law, the Cross-Border Insolvency Act1502 
illustrates that it is a technical and yet clearly structured statute with an 
interpretation section1503 using the relevant terms of reference that are specific to 
the area of law. The Cross-Border Insolvency Act1504 also has a section dealing 
with access of foreign representatives and creditors to courts in the Republic,1505 
the recognition of foreign proceedings and relief provisions,1506 cooperation with 
foreign courts and foreign representatives as provided1507
                                                 
1500 (2006) 27 ILJ 1909 (LC). 
 and consequently 
1501 Petra Diamonds Ltd (Petra) in July 2007 bought the Koffiefontein mine for US$ 12 million. See De 
Beers Living Up to Diamonds from Natural Resources to Shared National Wealth: Operating and Financial 
Review (2007) 9. www.debeersgroup.com 14 January 2007. 
1502 42 of 2000. 
1503 Chapter 1, which encapsulates certain fundamental principles of the law such as the definitions, scope 
of application and the public policy exception among other provisions. 
1504 42 of 2000. 
1505 Cross-Border Insolvency Act 42 of 2000, chapter 2 section 9 which provides that ‘a foreign 
representative may apply directly to a court in the Republic for relief.’ 
1506Cross-Border Insolvency Act 42 of 2000, chapter 3 section 15 which states that ‘(1) A foreign 
representative may apply to the court for recognition of the foreign proceedings in which the foreign 
representative has been appointed.  
(2) An application for recognition must be accompanied by-  
        (a)     a certified copy of the decision commencing the foreign proceedings and appointing the foreign 
representative; or  
        (b)     a certificate from the foreign court affirming the existence of the foreign proceedings and of the 
appointment of the foreign representative; or  
        (c)     in the absence of evidence referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) , any other evidence acceptable to the 
court of the existence of the foreign proceedings and of the appointment of the foreign representative.  
(3) An application for recognition must also be accompanied by a statement identifying all foreign 
proceedings in respect of the debtor that are known to the foreign representative.  
(4) The court may require a translation of documents supplied in support of the application for recognition 
into an official language of the Republic.’  
1507Cross-Border Insolvency Act 42 of 2000, chapter 4 sections 25, 26 and 27. 
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provisions for dealing with circumstances where concurrent proceedings1508 are 
taking place. A few of these provisions will be made reference to in order to 
analyze and study the mechanisms provided in the Cross-Border Insolvency 
Act1509
 
 for dealing with cross-border insolvency. 
The location of a business and the jurisdiction of the court in cross-border 
insolvency are crucial. Therefore the Cross-Border Insolvency Act1510 clearly 
defines the potential situation where an insolvency matter is being dealt with in 
more than one court and makes reference to the term ‘foreign main proceedings’ 
which means foreign proceedings taking place in the State where the debtor has 
the centre of his or her main interests, while the terms ‘foreign non-main 
proceedings’ pertain to foreign proceedings that do not fall within the main 
category where the debtor has an place of operations and carries out a non-
transitory1511 economic activity with human means and goods or services.1512
 
 
In the definitions section of the Cross-Border Insolvency Act1513 foreign 
proceedings as a whole are clarified as meaning collective judicial or 
administrative proceedings in a foreign State, including interim proceedings 
pursuant to insolvency law where the debtors assets and affairs have are made 
subject to the control or supervision of a foreign court with the aim of 
restructuring or liquidation. When reading the Cross-Border Insolvency Act1514
                                                 
1508 Cross-Border Insolvency Act 42 of 2000, chapter 5 sections 28, 29, 30 and 31. With regard to the 
payment rule in concurrent proceedings, section 32 is very clear in that it provides that, ‘ without prejudice 
to secured claims or rights in rem , a creditor who has received part payment in respect of his or her or its 
claim in proceedings pursuant to a law relating to insolvency in a foreign State may not receive a payment 
for the same claim in proceedings under the laws of the Republic relating to insolvency regarding the same 
debtor, so long as the payment to the other creditors of the same class is proportionately less than the 
payment the creditor has already received.’ 
 it 
1509 42 of 2000. 
1510 42 of 2000. 
1511 See Wessels Bob Current Topics of International Insolvency Law, Kluwer (2004) 287 where he 
suggests that the provision of the model law in this case is not referring to a fleeting economic activity of 
the debtor but envisages a more established kind of presence in that place. 
1512 Section 1(c), (e) and (f). 
1513 42 of 2000 section 1(g). 
1514 42 of 2000. 
 419 
is important to note the distinct references to all these types of ‘foreign 
proceedings’ as each has distinct implications attached to it.1515
 
 
It is submitted that the definition that should be given to the meaning on non-
transitory economic activity has to do with structural organization of the debtor’s 
business in order to realize the objectives of the debtor’s respective economic 
activity. Examples have been made to suggest that a debtor’s construction site 
and a warehouse abroad would constitute establishments. Human means relates 
to the ability of human input as agents or employees of the establishment and 
their ability to form contractual relationships between creditor and debtor. Goods 
pertain to the relative economic activity whether it is processing raw materials, 
semi-raw materials packing etc. and creating final products.1516
 
 This means that 
in the diamond industry a diamond mine and other diamond processing venues 
belonging to the debtor would be establishments. 
The Cross-Border Insolvency Act1517 is one that is mainly based on inter-State 
cooperation. This is due to the scope of the Act as it applies to matters where a 
foreign court1518 or foreign representative,1519
                                                 
1515 Cross-Border Insolvency Act 42 of 2000 section 1(e), (f) and (g) describe foreign proceedings as 
follows: ‘(e)     'foreign main proceedings' means foreign proceedings taking place in the State where the 
debtor has the centre of his or her or its main interests;  
 a body or person authorized by a 
foreign court to administer the re-organization or liquidation of the debtor’s 
assets, seeks assistance from the High Court of South Africa in connection with 
foreign proceedings. This also includes a situation where a foreign representative 
seeks assistance from the South African court with other insolvency matters of a 
similar nature, where there are concurrent proceedings under South African and 
(f)     'foreign non-main proceedings' means foreign proceedings, other than foreign main proceedings, 
taking place in a State where the debtor has an establishment within the meaning of paragraph (c) of this 
section;  
(g)     'foreign proceedings' means collective judicial or administrative proceedings in a foreign State, 
including interim proceedings, pursuant to a law relating to insolvency in which proceedings the assets and 
affairs of the debtor are subject to control or supervision by a foreign court, for the purpose of 
reorganization or liquidation’  
1516 Wessels Bob Current Topics of International Insolvency Law, Kluwer (2004) 287. 
1517 42 of 2000. 
1518 Section 1(d). 
1519 Section 1(h). 
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foreign insolvency laws or where interested foreign parties wish to intervene in an 




In one of the most comprehensive legal works on cross-border insolvency law in 
South Africa, as written by PM Meskin and others1523 it is stated that the Cross-
Border Insolvency Act1524 has an inbuilt reciprocity requirement as a result of its 
section 2. It is submitted that practically this means that the Act is of application 
to both inward-bound (where local representatives seek help abroad) and 
outward-bound requests pertaining to cross-border insolvency matters. By virtue 
of the requirement of reciprocity in relation to the designated foreign States to 
which the Act will apply in future, the Act is more limited in its application than the 
actual UNCITRAL Model Law.1525
 
 
It is submitted that while the UNCITRAL Model law is made a part of South 
African law in terms of the Cross-Border Insolvency Act,1526 if it conflicts with a 
treaty that forms part of South African law in terms of the Constitution1527 such a 
treaty will take precedent. Further, the UNCITRAL Model Law excludes in its 
application specialized institutions such as banks and insurance companies,1528
                                                 
1520 Section 2(1)(a), (b), (c) and (d). 
 
1521 42 of 2000. 
1522 Section 2 of the Act. The Minister of Justice has the authority to designate such States although it has 
been submitted that one of the challenges of the cross-border legislation in South Africa is that no States 
have been designated by the Minister and thus the Act lacks practical applicability. It is submitted that 
perhaps the solution to this delay in State designation be read into the law by the courts by the courts’ 
assumption that the contracting States are designated States for the purposes of this law. See De Witt Ian 
Challenges of Cross-Border Insolvencies. A talk presented to the 16th Commonwealth Law Conference in 
Hong Kong by Ian De Witt. (2009). 
1523 PM Meskin; B Galgut; PAM Magid; JA Kunst; A Boraine; DA Burdette Insolvency Law Butterworths, 
Lexis Nexis (2008) Chapter 17 para. 17.4.3. 
1524 42 of 2000. 
1525 Ibid. See also, UNCITRAL Secretariat Guide to Enactment, Official Records of the General Assembly, 
Fifty-Second Session, Supplement No. 17 (A/52/17) (1997) Part IV Main Features of the Model Law, 
Background section 22. 
1526 42 of 2000. 
1527 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996 section 231. 
1528 Ibid. Section 25. See In re Tri-Continental Exchange Ltd US Bankruptcy Court for the District of 
California No. 06-22652-C-15, 06-22655-C-15 and 06-22657-C-15 where the debtors in the case were 
insurance companies where the US court held that in terms of the US law (Bankruptcy code) which 
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when compared to the Cross-Border Insolvency Act,1529 it becomes clear that the 
South African Cross-Border Insolvency Act1530 is more concerned with the entire 




This is a very important factor to South African law particularly in light of the fact 
that once the Act becomes active, a foreign representative may seek to enforce a 
debt against a specifically excluded type of debtor1532 in terms of the UNCITRAL 
Model law which is not mentioned in the South African Cross-Border Insolvency 
Act,1533
Currently the States that are a party to the Model Law are Eritrea (1998), Japan 
(2000), Mexico (2000), South Africa (2000), Montenegro (2002), Poland (2003), 
Romania (2003), Serbia (2004), British Virgin Islands, overseas territory of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (2005), US of America 
(2005) Colombia (2006), Great Britain (2006), New Zealand (2006), Republic of 
Korea (2006); and Australia (2008).
 in such cases the court will have to make it clear whether such an 
application can be opposed on the grounds of the specific type of debtor being 
excluded in terms of the UNCITRAL Model Law. On the other hand this will likely 
not take place if the UNCITRAL Model Law is adhered to exclude certain types of 
debtors in that particular foreign representative’s internal law.  
1534
The Cross-Border Insolvency Act
 
1535
                                                                                                                                                 
corresponds with the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, the insurance company debtors 
were ineligible to file insolvency proceedings however foreign insurance companies were eligible for such 
relief in terms of the US Bankruptcy code. 
 uniquely provides for broad humanitarian 
jurisprudential concepts in addition to technicalities for dealing a debtor within 
1529 42 of 2000. 
1530 42 of 2000. 
1531 PM Meskin; B Galgut; PAM Magid; JA Kunst; A Boraine; DA Burdette Insolvency Law Butterworths, 
Lexis Nexis (2008) Chapter 17 para. 17.4.3. 
1532 This is highly possible as banks and insurance companies are also highly affected in times of recession. 
A foreign representative may be desperate to attach the assets of such an organization in South Africa. 
1533 42 of 2000. 
1534 http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model_status.html 16 July 2008. 
1535 42 of 2000. 
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this Act. Such concepts are captured in the boni mores1536 provision of the act 
and the interpretation clause which promotes unity among States while observing 
good faith.1537 This means that laws that are taken under this Act are not to be 
read as punitive to defaulting and struggling commercial entities and therefore 
the decisions taken and enforced by the court in each unique situating must have 
due regard to a holistic approach to the prevailing debtor and other interested 
parties1538
 
 as well. Where the court in South Africa is of the view that an action 
against the debtor is offensive to that rather chameleon concept of public 
morality, the court may refuse to take action. 
The Cross-Border Insolvency Act1539 provides clearly the right of access to the 
High Court for relief1540 however the court’s jurisdiction does not extend to any 
other matter outside of the application in terms of the Cross-Border Insolvency 
Act.1541 With regard to the access of foreign creditors to proceedings in terms of 
South African law, the Cross-Border Insolvency Act1542 provides that subject to 
the provisions of the Act foreign creditors have the same rights as South African 
creditors1543 and this will not affect the rankings of the claims under South African 
insolvency law, however, subject to foreign claims not being ranked lower than 
non-preferent claims.1544 Further, the Cross-Border Insolvency Act1545 makes 
provision for the recognition of foreign proceedings1546
                                                 
1536 Section 6, public policy exception. See also ABSA Bank Ltd v Chopdat 2000 (2) SA 1088 (W) 1092 H. 
where the court held that as a matter of public policy an act of insolvency should not be kept as privileged 
information as contained in the common law  of privilege particularly in settlement negotiations. 
 subject to a foreign 
1537 Section 8. 
1538 Section 22 which provides for the protection of creditors and other interested persons even if that 
means granting or denying the relief which may be granted by the courts in terms of the Act. Section 23 
provides for the general avoidance of acts that may be detrimental to creditors. 
1539 42 of 2000. 
1540 Section 9. 
1541 42 of 2000 sections 10 and 11. 
1542 42 of 2000. 
1543 Section 13(1). 
1544 Section 13(2). 
1545 42 of 2000. 
1546 Section 15. 
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representative producing certified1547 documentation1548
 
 to make an application 
for such recognition before the court.  
The Cross-Border Insolvency Act1549 clearly makes it facile for the foreign 
representatives and the South African courts to resolve insolvency matters 
expeditiously while also making clear provisions that permit for the courts to take 
a decision to recognize foreign proceedings.1550 Having clarified the rights of 
parties to insolvency proceedings it becomes crucial to consider the types of 
relief that a court may grant. The Cross-Border Insolvency Act1551
 
 provides for 
relief that may be granted by a court upon application for recognition of foreign 
proceedings and relief upon recognition of foreign proceedings. 
This relief includes an order by the court, inter alia, to order a stay in the 
execution against the debtor’s assets, entrusting administration or realization of 
the debtor’s assets to a foreign representative in order to protect the value of 
such assets or in the case of the Cross-Border Insolvency Act1552
 
 the court may 
stay other individual legal actions or suspend the disposal of debtor’s assets. It is 
submitted that once this model law becomes effective, it will contribute to legal 
testing and consequently achieve justice in cross-border insolvency matters. 
Further, in current financial crisis it is submitted that it has become imperative 
that such a law is made practically applicable. 
9.5 Some Debates around South African Cross-Border Insolvency Law 
It must be noted that though South Africa became a party to the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency in 2000, the Cross-Border Insolvency 
                                                 
1547 Section 16, which contains an in-built presumption of the authenticity of the foreign documents. See 
UNCITRAL Secretariat Guide to Enactment, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-Second 
Session, Supplement No. 17 (A/52/17) (1997) 113. The UN guide to ‘legalization’ or guidelines on proof of 
documents as authentic.  
1548 Section 15(2). 
1549 42 of 2000. 
1550 Section 17. 
1551 42 of 2000 sections 19 and 21. 




 was only promulgated on 28 November 2003 and many of the reported 
decisions on cross-border insolvency were taken by the court without reliance on 
this Act as it is not applicable at present. It is submitted that in spite of the 
decisions not being based on the model law, there are cases will also be 
considered carefully as a starting point on the courts interpretation and 
application of South African law on cross-border insolvency. The cases referred 
to herein will be considered in order to highlight some of the debates around the 
reforms that have taken place in as far as South African cross-border insolvency 
law is concerned. 
9.6 The Current Application of Cross-Border Insolvency Law in South 
Africa 
The current law on cross border insolvency is contained in The Cross-Border 
Insolvency Act1554 although to date there have no reported judgments on South 
African case law pertaining to the application of this Act as it operation is 
dependent upon the designation by the Minister of Justice as to the States to 
which the Act will apply.1555
 
 
With these circumstances in mind it is essential to consider some of the legal 
opinion on the subject as it will form a basis through which courts may be able to 
obtain guidance from when approached to make a decision as to the reliefs 
contained in the Cross-Border Act.1556 It seems clear that at present South Africa 
has simply made the halfway progress in the adoption of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency1557 therefore it cannot be said stricti sensu that 
South African current law on cross-border insolvency reflects that of the 
UNCITRAL Mode Law since the Cross-Border Insolvency Act1558
                                                 
1553 42 of 2000. 
 remains 
1554 42 of 2000. 
1555 PM Meskin; B Galgut; PAM Magid; JA Kunst; A Boraine; DA Burdette Insolvency Law Butterworths, 
Lexis Nexis (2008) Chapter 17. 
1556 42 of  2000. 
1557 See www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/.../insolvency/1997Model.html 19 March 2010. 
1558 42 of 2000. 
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inoperative at present. Therefore South Africa has to look to common law and 
other statutory law on cross-border insolvency matters. 
 
It is proposed on the other hand however because of the many financial 
challenges facing commercial entities throughout the world that it is only a matter 
of time before the South African courts are called to, with the help of lawmakers 
to look to the Cross-Border Insolvency Act.1559 Clearly the Minister is under 
pressure to be expediently designate the States in terms of section 2 of the 
Cross-Border Insolvency Act1560 and allow the for the full application of the Act. 
Further, international trade transactions form a constant concern for South Africa 
even through a world wide recession or GFC which was at its highest level of 
impact in 2008 and 2009.1561
 
  Therefore it is important that all aspects of 
international trade law in this case matters relating to cross-border insolvency in 
South Africa become fully reformed and functioning. As a country affected by the 
recession there seems to be no justification for half-bake statute that is essential 
to trade in times of recession. 
According to the writings of Professor Lee Steyn it is submitted that apart from 
looking to the Cross-Border Insolvency Act1562 it is possible to also have due 
regard to decisions such as Gendor Holdings Ltd v City Fishing Holdings (Pty) 
Ltd; Breemond Trust (Intervening Party)1563 on issues of cross-border insolvency. 
It is submitted that in cross-border insolvency, as reflected in casu, are 
superseded by provisions of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act.1564
                                                 
1559 42 of 2000. 
 The 
matter involved an application for the winding up of a company in terms of the 
1560 42 of 2000. 
1561 Bekink B. and Botha C. The Role of a Modern Central Ban in Managing Consumer Bankrupsies and 
Corporate Failures: A South African Public-Law Angle of Incidence South African Mercantile Law Journal 
Volume 21 (2009) 74. The authors submit that the global economy is showing clear signs of stress as was 
illustrated during the 2008, 2009 GFC. 
1562 42 of 2000. 
1563 [2007] 3 All SA 400 (C). See Steyn L Insolvency Review Juta’s Quaterly Review Insolvency Juta 
(2007) (3). 
1564 105 of 1983. 
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Companies Act1565 on the grounds that it was unable to pay its debts as 
envisaged within the provisions of the Act. The respondent opposed the 
application on the basis that this application constituted an abuse of the court 
process and that the winding up of the respondent would provide no tangible 
benefit to the applicant.1566
 
  
The cross-border aspect of this case was evident in the fact that the applicant 
and respondent were both Namibian companies although the respondent had 
established a place of business in Cape Town. One of the respondent’s 
arguments in the matter was that the application for winding up should be stayed 
in terms of section 10A(2)(a) of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act1567 as 
the Cape High Court had previously granted an order authorizing the same 
applicant to sell the respondent’s only asset, which was a shipping vessel. In 
terms of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act1568 the proceeds of the sale of 
the ship would establish a fund which would be administered by an appointed 
referee whose responsibility involves the examination and reporting to the fund 
on the validity and ranking of the claims against the fund.1569
 
 
The court’s ruling in this case was that in the circumstances the application to 
have the respondent’s company wound up was not an abuse of process further; 
there would be benefit for the applicant in having the company wound up. 
However, the effect of section 10A(2)(a)1570 of the Admiralty Jurisdiction 
Regulation Act1571
                                                 
1565 61 of 1973 section 346. 
 in this case was that it would stay the application for the 
winding up of the respondent company. It is proposed by Professor Steyn that 
when considering cross-border insolvency it is essential to consider the 
1566 Steyn L Insolvency Review Juta’s Quaterly Review Insolvency Juta (2007) (3) par 2.1. 
1567 105 of 1983. 
1568 105 of 1983 section 9(2) dealing with proceeds. 
1569 Steyn L Insolvency Review Juta’s Quaterly Review Insolvency Juta (2007) (3) par 2.1. 
1570 Ibid. Section 10A (2)(a) of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act 105 of 1983 provides that ‘all 
proceedings in respect of claims which are capable of proof for participation in the distribution of the fund 
shall be stayed and an such claims shall be proved only in accordance with such order.’ The court took the 
view that ‘all proceedings’ includes liquidation orders. 
1571 105 of 1983. 
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provisions of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act.1572 This is a very 
important point to consider as effectively the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation 
Act1573
 
 covers several international trade issues that may be directly linked to 
cross-border insolvency. 
It has been correctly submitted that in South Africa the Cross-Border Insolvency 
Act1574 is not concerned with substantive issues of insolvency but procedural 
issues.1575 This is evident in the statute’s pre-occupation of court process, court 
procedure and access to courts. It is also clearly evident that the reliefs that may 
also be granted in pursuance of the Cross-Border Insolvency Act1576
 
 are in their 
nature concerned with procedural issues. 
It is important to note that the presence of the Cross-Border Insolvency Act1577 
does not overtake the common law cross-border approach because the common 
law approach will continue to be applicable to non-designated States in terms of 
the Cross-Border Insolvency Act1578 and the Judicial Matters Second 
Amendment Act1579 which gives the South African court discretion to apply the 
territorial approach to insolvency matters when dealing with a foreign 
representative from a non-designated State.1580
 
 
9.6.1 Common Law Principles 
The common law principles on cross-border insolvency in South Africa are easily 
accessible. These principles have been sufficiently tested and applied by the 
                                                 
1572 105 of 1983. 
1573 105 of 1983. 
1574 42 of 2000. 
1575 PM Meskin; B Galgut; PAM Magid; JA Kunst; A Boraine; DA Burdette Insolvency Law Butterworths, 
Lexis Nexis (2008) Chapter 17. 
1576 42 of 2000. 
1577 42 of 2000. 
1578 42 of 2000 section 2. 
1579 55 of 2003. 
1580 See Ex Parte Steyn 1979 (2) SA 709 (O); Moolman v Builders and Developers (Pty) Ltd (In provisional 
Liquidation): Jooste Intervening 1990 (1) SA 954; [1990] All SA 77 (A); In re Gurr v Zambia Airways 
Corporation Ltd [1998] All SA 479 (A); Clegg v Priestly 1985 (3) SA 950 (W); Ex Parte Palmer NO v In 
re Hahn 1993 (3) SA 359 (CPD);  Bekker NO v Kotze and Others 1996 (4) SA 1293. 
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courts in order to provide guidance on such matters. In Moolman v Builders & 
Developers (Pty) Ltd (In Provisional Liquidation) Jooste Intervening1581 the court 
considered a cross-border insolvency situation. The facts of the case illustrate 
that the respondents, Builders & Developers (Pty) Ltd a company incorporated in 
the then Republic of Transkei was placed under provisional liquidation by order 




The liquidator subsequently obtained an order from the same court in terms of 
the Transkeian Companies Act authorizing an examination in terms of section 
417 of the Companies Act and an appointment of a commissioner. The 
examination commenced in Transkei and then convened in Port Elizabeth for the 
purposes of interrogating certain parties in that city. In Port Elizabeth were three 
persons to be interrogated. These were one Mr. Jooste a major shareholder and 
sole director of the company, one Mr. Visser and one Mrs. Scott. It was common 
cause that Mr. Jooste had paid large sums of money to one Mrs. Scott prior to 
the provisional liquidation1583 of the company. Jooste and Visser objected to the 
interrogation on the grounds that the Commissioner had no jurisdiction in South 




The objection came about as a result of an ex parte application in the court a quo 
by the appellant, Moolman the provisional liquidator in terms of the Transkei 
Supreme court order. In the application the appellant had applied for an order 
recognizing his appointment as provisional liquidator and the appointment of a 
commissioner,1585
                                                 
1581 [1990] All SA 77 (A). 
 in terms of the foreign Transkei court order. One of the crucial 
1582 See judgment by Hefer JA. 
1583 Already the facts clearly hint an establishment of a case of unlawful dispositions in light of the 
Companies Act 61 of 1973 therefore a prima facie cause for interrogation was sufficiently justified in the 
facts. 
1584 See judgment by Hefer JA.  
1585 Though the recognition of the appointment of a commissioner was neither canvassed in the rule nisi nor 
was there a respondent cited in the rule papers. 
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prayers in the appellant’s papers pertaining to cross-border insolvency was that 
he was seeking an order:  
 
‘declaring that thereafter the applicant shall by virtue of this 
recognition be empowered to administer the said estate in 
respect of all assets of the said estate which are situated 
within the Republic of South Africa.’1586
 
 
 The court a quo refused the order in terms of the rule nisi stating according to 
Mullins J who stated the following:  
 
‘As I understand the position therefore, while comity 
extends to affording a foreign trustee or liquidator the 
opportunity of recovering assets within our 
jurisdiction, there is no basis for affording him or her 
other powers or functions which he or she may have 
within the area of jurisdiction of the country in which 
he or she was appointed. There may be sound 
arguments in favour of granting an application such 
as this one but there must be authority therefore. 
Such authority is not to be found either in our statute 
law, or in our common law either directly or as an 
extension of recognition orders which have been 
granted in the past.’1587
 
 
 In arriving at a decision in the appeal in this case, the appellate court established 
that in cross-border cases there is a practical frustration that is immediately 
brought about and this must be balanced with a well recognized common law 
principle. This principle provides that ‘where a foreign representative, such as 
                                                 
1586 Ibid. See judgment. 
1587 Moolman v Builders and Developers (Pty) Ltd (In provisional Liquidation): Jooste Intervening 1990 
(1) SA 954; [1990] All SA 77 (A) 77. 
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executor, liquidator, or receiver (as couched in the language of the Cross-Border 
Model Law)1588 wishes to deal with assets in this country in his or her 
representative capacity and by virtue of his foreign authorization he or she must 
be first recognized in his or her appointment by a court of law or person of 
competent jurisdiction in South Africa before he or she is entitled to act.’1589
 
 
 The appellate court in this case continued to explain that in South African law 
recognition orders are sought and granted not only in respect of locally situated 
immovable property but also in respect of movables and in respect of incorporeal 
property, for example, a right of a foreign receiver to collect outstanding debts in 
South Africa. It was found in casu that the application while it was in order it was 
complicated by the company’s lack of property in South Africa. On the other hand 
recognition was crucial to allow the appointed commissioner to continue his 
enquiry in South Africa.1590
 
 
 The court recognized in the circumstances of this case the need for the 
commissioner to investigate the payments made to Mr. Visser and Mrs. Scott as 
these payments would be crucial to the recovery of the company’s assets, if any. 
Further, since the granting or refusal of the recognition of a foreign 
representative’s recognition is a matter for the court’s discretion1591
                                                 
1588 Cross-Border Insolvency Act 42 of 2000 section 1(h) which provides that a foreign representative 
‘means a person or body, including one appointed on an interim basis, authorised in foreign proceedings to 
administer the reorganization or the liquidation of the debtor's assets or affairs or to act as a representative 
of the foreign proceedings.’ 
 the court a 
quo had been in error to take the view that there existed no such discretion. 
Having stated this principle it became clear in casu that the court would exercise 
its discretion either in favour of or against the appellant. If the discretion is taken 
in favour of the appellant the court would further have to establish whether or not 
1589 See judgment. See also, Liquidator Rhodesian Plastics (Pvt) Ltd v Elvinco Plastics Products (Pty) Ltd 
1959 (1) SA 868 (C);  Zinn NO v Westminister Bank Ltd 1936 AD 89 where an English administrator was 
not permitted to issue summons for payment of moneys in a South African court without first obtaining 
recognition. 
1590 Ibid. 
1591 Ex Parte Stegmann 1902 TS 40. 
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in the circumstances, it would be appropriate to attach conditions to the 
recognition in order to prevent prejudice to local interested parties.1592
 
 
 In this case the court held that recognition is granted solely on the grounds of 
comity1593 and convenience. In this case the law of Transkei and South Africa 
was identical in the circumstances with the interdependence between the two 
countries it was clear that comity favored the recognition. Further, it was clear 
that there were matters1594 that were of such nature in this case that it was 
essential that these be investigated by the commissioner as per further relief 
sought by the appellant requesting the recognition of the commissioner. The 
court in conclusion granted the recognition of the foreign representative.1595
 
 
 This case above serves as a useful example to clarifying the common law 
principles on cross-border insolvency in South African law. Clearly common law 
is insufficient in light of ameliorating international trade relations. To leave it in the 
recognition of foreign representatives issue in the hands of the broad application 
of the court’s discretion creates uncertainty as already mentioned. Further, 
judging from this case if common law cross-border rules are applied as in the 
case above a foreign representative whose legal system in strange or unfamiliar 
in South African law, such a representative will likely not be recognized because 
of the doubtful comity and convenience in recognizing such a representative. 
This may lead to a cross-border situation that may operate as an injustice to the 
foreign representative and this may create all kinds of other negative implications 
when entering into international trade relationships with South Africa. 
 
 The principle of the universality of sequestration and the reciprocity and comity of 
nations is still respected in South African law and should be protected at all costs 
                                                 
1592 See judgment by Hefer JA. 
1593 See Zulman RH Insolvency Law (Including Winding up of Insolvent Companies) Annual Survey, Juta 
(2002) 681. See US v JA Jones Const. Group, LLC US District Court for the Eastern District of New York 
No. CV2003-1383 (SJF)(MDG). 
1594 In this case concerns about the payment of large sums of money to Mr. Visser and Mrs. Scott prior to 
the liquidation of the company had to be interrogated. 
1595 See judgment by Hefer JA. 
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as established in the case of Gardner & Another v Walters & Another NNO (In re 
Ex Parte Alters & Another NNO).1596
 
 This case dealt with the ‘letter of request’ 
which a local court asks a foreign court to recognize a locally appointed liquidator 
and to allow such liquidator to institute proceedings in the foreign court as may 
be necessary to enable a liquidator to carry out his or her duties of winding up a 
company. Such letter of request is well known and recognized in international 
law. All that the liquidator has to show in an application for a letter of request is a 
bona fide belief that proceedings should be initiated in a foreign country. The 
liquidator does not have to show reasonable prospects of success. The letter of 
request however must be followed by an appropriate legal process to address a 
cross-border insolvency situation. 
 The principle of recognition of foreign representatives according to the court’s 
discretion is a long standing principle which has been applied in South African 
law from the earliest reported judgments. It seems therefore that in law this 
principle was practical prior to the development of international model laws as the 
South African courts had to be trusted with making equitable decisions in cross-
border insolvency matters. This was illustrated in an earlier judgment of Re 
African Farms Ltd1597
 
 where the matter involved an English company in voluntary 
liquidation in England. The court recognized the English liquidator and held that  
‘In thus recognizing the appointment of a foreign liquidator, 
it should be clearly understood that it is a matter purely in 
the discretion of the Court, to be exercised in cases where it 
seems convenient and desirable and subject to conditions. 
Speaking generally with regard to these latter, the Court 
should, I think, provide that all local preferences validly 
acquired under the law of the colony should be given effect 
                                                 
1596 2002 (5) SA 796 (C). 
1597 1906 TS 373. 
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to, and should see that facilities are provided for local 
creditors proving their claims.’1598
 
 
This principle was also upheld in Mtd (Mangula) Ltd v Frost and Power, NO; Ex 
Parte Power, NO1599 where the court stated that even if the domicile of the debtor 
is Rhodesia, as was alleged in the papers before the court, there was nothing in 
law or on the facts before the court to preclude the granting of recognition to the 
curator appointed in the Transvaal. This case was a confirmation of the foreign 
representative recognition principle as stated in Re African Farms Ltd.1600
 
  
 In Ex Parte Steyn1601 the court dealt with an application brought about by a duly 
appointed trustee in the estate of one Augusto Moreira whose estate was 
sequestrated by an order of the High Court of the Kingdom of Lesotho. The 
applicant sought recognition of his appointment as trustee in the South African 
court in order to act in his capacity as trustee in regard to administering assets of 
the insolvent which were said to be situated in the Republic of South Africa. The 
applicant also submitted that the recognition was necessary in order that all 
assets of the insolvent estate be discovered and collected.1602
 
  
 The court re-iterated the common law principles pertaining to the court’s rationale 
when granting of recognition orders for the recognition of foreign representatives 
in cross-border insolvency matters. The court stated that these principles are 
based on the power of the court to exercise discretion and that such power is 
based on comity of nations. The court held that in these circumstances there was 
no bar to granting the recognition of the foreign trustee in this case.1603
                                                 
1598 392. 
 
1599 [1966] 2 All SA 510 (R) 514 and 515. 
1600 1906 TS 373. 
1601 [1979] All SA 773 (O). 
1602 See judgment by Flemming J. The court made a note that there was no support in the applicants 
contention for the ultimate ‘discovery and collection’ of insolvent estate assets. 
1603 Ibid. See also Ex Parte Francis, N.O. 1933 SWA 11 p 12, this matter dealt with the recognition in 
South West Africa of an assignee appointed by the Master of the Natal Provincial Division. The court 
stated the following principle ‘It is clear that the power is in the absolute discretion of the court. But for that 
reason this power should not be exercised in a way which may result in prejudice to interested persons. 
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 To further clarify the relevant principles the court made two important remarks in 
this case which cast important light to the knowledge of cross-border insolvency 
in South African law. First the court stated that the order should not be seen as a 
precedent for making special provision for local creditors. Secondly, the granting 
of recognition is thought adequate to protect all interested parties by extending 
practically all the rights created by South African insolvency laws.1604
  
 In essence 
common law although fairly uncertain seeks to enforce some of the main themes 
of the UNCITRAL Model Law such as the fair protection of all creditors and the 
desire to uphold comity. 
9.6.2 Insolvency Law and the Diamond Industry 
Insolvency in diamond trade can be a direct consequence of the diamond 
producing mine’s failure to provide sufficient revenue to sustain its commercial 
liquidity or a recession.1605
                                                                                                                                                 
Although the final order is usually made subject to conditions favourable to local creditors, it is not for the 
court to assume that conditions framed by itself, without giving persons interested an opportunity of being 
heard, will suffice to protect those interests in all contingencies.’ 
 It is crucial to mention briefly that in current reports 
during the course of this study in became apparent that the recession has 
undoubtedly affected the diamond industry with threats of insolvency looming 
1604 Ibid. Re African Farms Ltd [1979] All SA 773 (O) judgment. 
1605 Rafferty T. De Beers Executive Sees Signs of Diamond Market Revival 20 October (2009) 1. 
http://www.namakwadiamonds.co.za/nd/uploads/wysiwyg/documents/091020_IdexOnline.pdf 21 March 
2010. In the report by the author above, it becomes evident that the diamond industry was one that was 
worst affected by the recession. This is a typical example of market challenges that may give rise to 
concerns of insolvency in the diamond industry. The report provides as follows: ‘De Beers sees recovery in 
the global diamond market, and the company’s mines in Botswana are now running at 80 percent capacity. 
This is despite the fact that consumers are not yet buying polished diamonds in the amounts they were 
before the economic collapse.’ See http://www.busrep.co.za/index.php?fArticleId=5361707 21 March 
2010. In a business report powered by Independent Online dated 21 February (2010) it was reported that 
Botswana’s diamond industry was affected by the economic collapse. The report stated that ‘for years was 
hailed as an economic success story, but the collapse in demand for the country's diamonds has hit revenues 
hard and raised questions about an ambitious spending scheme. Botswana produces 22 percent of the 
world's diamonds, making it the top producer and accounting for half of government revenue. The country 
prides itself as a model of a successful African democracy. But in 2009, Botswana halved output and 
suspended much of its diamond activities as the global economic crisis hit its mine….Botswana produces 
22 percent of the world's diamonds, making it the top producer and accounting for half of government 
revenue. The country prides itself as a model of a successful African democracy. But in 2009, Botswana 
halved output and suspended much of its diamond activities as the global economic crisis hit its mines.’ 
This report is a further example of a mine’s failure to provide sufficient revenue to sustain commercial 
liquidity and as a result potentially create a gap for cross-border insolvency challenges. 
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over various diamond production entities in the Southern Africa region and some 
of the world’s mines; therefore the cross-border insolvency law is particularly 
relevant at this time. It was reported in the United Nations forum in 2009.1606
 
 
It became apparent earlier in 2009 that there were many job losses in Botswana 
as a result of sales dwindling and the companies retrenching in order to cut 
costs. It is difficult times for Debswana Diamond Company, which is a joint 
venture between the South African diamond company, De Beers and Botswana’s 
government. This is most unsettling since Botswana, like South Africa, is one of 




The New York Times also painted a grim picture in 2009 of the plunging diamond 
sales and prices. It was reported recently that the famed New York, Tiffany 
jewellery chain was struggling even after lowering prices. It was also further 
reported that many a diamond producer throughout the world were also suffering 
loss of business together with many other luxury businesses at this time. It has 
been estimated in the rather negative reports concerning the diamond industry 
that even with new discoveries of diamond deposits, it is estimated that the world 
will eventually run out of new diamonds within 20 years, this means that the 
industry must take steps to not only to maintain sales but to accommodate the 




It is submitted in this study that even if the estimate above concerning the drying 
out of natural diamond deposits is established to be true. It is proposed that this 
is insufficient to ignore the holistic impact of the diamond industry because the 
                                                 
1606 See United Nations Intergraded Regional Information Networks, Job Losses as Diamonds Lose Their 
Lustre, Africa News 11 February (2009) www.afrika.no/Detailed/17940.html 16 July 2009. 
1607 Ibid. http://www.namakwadiamonds.co.za/nd/uploads/wysiwyg/documents/091020_IdexOnline.pdf 21 
March 2010; http://www.busrep.co.za/index.php?fArticleId=5361707 21 March 2010. 
1608 Werdigier J. The New York Times: Diamond Sales, and Prices, Plunge 21 February, Late Edition-
Final (2009). 
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diamond industry can still be sustained by looking to stock piled diamonds. 
Diamonds kept by diamond companies as stockpiles will naturally become more 
valuable should the natural deposits run out as estimated. Further, it is submitted 
that the diamond industry may also look to scientific alternatives for stones of 
similar use or nature, for example, laboratory diamonds. Further, the diamond 
industry will always be viable as a business form designed to deal with poverty 
and create business opportunities by, for example, strengthening other aspects 
of the industry such as artisanal skills development and using previously mined 
diamond sights as tourist destinations.1609
 
 
The commercial failure of a mine was considered in the case of National Union of 
Mineworkers v De Beers Consolidated Mines (Pty) Ltd,1610 which involved the 
retrenchment of employees of DBCM at the Koffiefontein mine. This diamond 
mine was reported as having run at a consistent loss over its inconsistent 
operative years which culminated in a R75 million rand loss in the budget year of 
2005. In 2005 DBCM seriously contemplated closing the mine; however, instead 
of closing the mine cost-saving measures were implemented.1611
 
 Clearly the 
facts of this case illustrate a typical scenario where insolvency and the objectives 
of insolvency laws would have to be considered carefully to deal with the reality 
of these crippling effects of an economic challenge of a diamond mine. 
The strategy of implementing cost saving measures adopted by De Beers in this 
case and their attempts to retrench fewer employees or finding a buyer for the 
mine as a rescue package for this struggling business entity was in line with the 
objectives of the insolvency laws as contained in the now fully adopted United 
Nations Model Law of cross-border insolvency. However, the cross-border 
relevance of insolvency in this case would only have been raised and tested by 
the courts if it was found that the business had so failed as to be unable to meet 
its foreign debts or if foreign representatives such as liquidators or other 
                                                 
1609See example of such tourist sight in South Africa, www.goldreefcity.co.za/ 21 March 2010. 
1610 (2006) 27 ILJ 1909 (LC). 
1611 912 A.  
 437 
interested parties wished to be part of the proceedings in a South African court. 
This was not obviously the issue in this case however the example used shows 
the importance of having well developed cross-border insolvency laws in South 
Africa. 
 
A diamond entity that is faced with the difficult task of saving employment for the 
mine employees in spite of economic failure because the mine is unable to 
support itself is a very real concern. Further, if the raw material mined in that 
particular mine causes significant financial losses because it has become 
unfeasible to continue to do so must also be taken into consideration as required 
by the insolvency laws. Dealing with the diamond producers stockpiled 
diamonds, industrial machines and mine properties1612
 
 that have to be closed 
subsequently as assets must be clearly dealt with having taken into account 
holistically the interest of all parties involved. The main purpose of removing the 
injustice threat from insolvency is however the very first step that must be taken 
by a court dealing with the matter and this is now ensured through the application 
of current laws. 
The final effect of phenomena such as mine failure and recession, if left to 
chance1613
                                                 
1612 Mine properties may be upon ceasing mining operations be used as tourist attractions, educational 
facilities or other means of producing revenue. This approach is part of dealing with cross-border 
insolvency. If mining operations are no longer feasible proposals may be put forward to attempt to generate 
revenue in other ways. See www.goldreefcity.co.za/ 21 March 2010 an example of a South African tourist 
destination reborn out of previous mining activities. 
 is that diamond entities will not be able to sustain their usual 
commercial and mining activities. This would inevitably lead to an undesirable 
result of insolvency. However, with just and effective insolvency law in place 
potential for utmost protection of affected parties’ interests will be somewhat 
1613 In a document prepared by Gem Diamonds Limited Incorporated in the British Virgin Islands under 
the International Business Companies Ordinance Cap.291 of the British Virgin Islands with registered 
number 66975 Proposed acquisition of Kimberley Diamond Company NL and Notice of Extraordinary 
General Meeting 1 January (2007) it is clear that diamond companies are careful to have strategies in place 
to deal with market related problems that may threaten their diamond trading activities. See 
http://www.gemdiamonds.com/im/files/d/GEMD_circular_sep07.pdf 21 March 2010. Clearly no element 
of market influences is left to chance. This means that sufficient investigation often go into the research 




 and consequently prevent financial anarchy declining trade sectors. 
Further, the research and reports given at this stage will assist States to take 
measures to ensure sustainable trade and development of diamond markets. 
In order to have an example of preparation that a diamond entity may have to 
deal with threats to its diamond trade, this study will make reference to a 
document prepared by Gem Diamonds Limited.1615 Gem Diamonds Limited is a 
diamond trading company incorporated under the business laws of the British 
Islands. In the company’s document certain world diamond trade trends are 
investigated in order to allow this diamond trading entity to be able to cope with 
market forces that may lead to the company’s inability to function optimally. The 
information captured in this sample report also influences the business decisions 
to be taken by a company in the normal or extra-ordinary course of business. 
The information in the document covers important areas of a diamond company’s 




The market related influences discussed in the company’s report include inter 
alia information that relates to the internal structure of the company including its 
latest mergers and acquisitions, its role in the international diamond market, 
financial information and a mineral experts report. It becomes clear from this 
documented information that a thoughtful process of planning for a successful 
                                                 
1614 UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency seeking to create the most ideal and 
internationally acceptable manner of dealing with matters of cross-border insolvency. 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/insolvency-e.pdf 19 March 2010. 
1615 Gem Diamonds Limited Incorporated in the British Virgin Islands under the International Business 
Companies Ordinance Cap.291 of the British Virgin Islands with registered number 66975 Proposed 
acquisition of Kimberley Diamond Company NL and Notice of Extraordinary General Meeting 1 January 
(2007) it is clear that diamond companies are careful to have strategies in place to deal with market related 
problems that may threaten their diamond trading activities. See 
http://www.gemdiamonds.com/im/files/d/GEMD_circular_sep07.pdf 21 March 2010. 
1616 Ibid. 
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future of this diamond company.1617
 
With regard to preparations for the recession, 
the report provides as follows: 
‘The diamond industry is a highly specialized business and 
production and distribution is largely consolidated in the 
hands of a few key players. By far the majority, that is 70 
per cent by value of the diamonds, are mined in four 
countries namely Botswana, Russia, Canada and the DRC, 
and the marketing of these diamonds takes place in 
traditional diamond trading centers. The outlook for the 
diamond market remains good. A shortage in the supply of 
rough diamonds is expected in the ensuing ten years as 
global production is predicted to remain relatively constant 
whilst global demand continues to increase. 
This would result in continued price increases in the short to 
medium term. The market in 2006 was subdued and 
according to International Diamond Exchange (IDEX) 
research the global diamond demand is expected to cool in 
2007, reflecting the economic slowdown predicted by most 
forecasters. Volatility has been evident and price 
corrections have been necessary and will continue. 
However, apart from major economic meltdown, the global 
diamond market and the associated diamond prices are 
driven by the balance between the supply and demand. The 
supply volume is anticipated to be reasonably static whilst 
growing middle income markets in United States and Asia 
will continue to grow. In summary the supply/demand 
                                                 
1617 Gem Diamonds Limited Incorporated in the British Virgin Islands under the International Business 
Companies Ordinance Cap.291 of the British Virgin Islands with registered number 66975 Proposed 
acquisition of Kimberley Diamond Company NL and Notice of Extraordinary General Meeting 1 January 
(2007) it is clear that diamond companies are careful to have strategies in place to deal with market related 
problems that may threaten their diamond trading activities. See 
http://www.gemdiamonds.com/im/files/d/GEMD_circular_sep07.pdf 21 March 2010. p 4, 16, 24 and 116 
of the report. 
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scenario is positive. According to Royal Bank of Canada 
(RBC) Capital Markets (May 2007) diamond prices will 
remain firm for up to five years and are forecast to increase 
by 2– 5 per cent per annum. No major diamond mine is 
forecast to begin production and exploration spending will 
continue to run at a high level. The global exploration costs 
for diamonds in 2006 was US$7.5 billion, more than five 
times what it was five years ago. The market will be 
favourable for at least five years for any company bringing 
successful new projects on stream, and good projects will 
be valued by both trade buyers and the stock markets. 
 
5.1 Current and Forecast World Diamond Supply 
Global diamond production is dominated by Africa which 
contributed 61 per cent by carats in 2006, as shown in 
Figure 2.1618 The major producers within Africa are the DRC 
and Botswana which each produce approximately 20 per 
cent of Africa’s output. South Africa contributed 10 per cent 
to global production and Angola a further 5 per cent. 
Contributions by the Central African Republic are typically 1 
per cent of global production. Australia contributed 
approximately 19 per cent by carats in 2006.’1619
 
 
                                                 
1618 Gem Diamonds Limited Incorporated in the British Virgin Islands under the International Business 
Companies Ordinance Cap.291 of the British Virgin Islands with registered number 66975 Proposed 
acquisition of Kimberley Diamond Company NL and Notice of Extraordinary General Meeting 1 January 
(2007) it is clear that diamond companies are careful to have strategies in place to deal with market related 
problems that may threaten their diamond trading activities. See 
http://www.gemdiamonds.com/im/files/d/GEMD_circular_sep07.pdf 21 March 2010. p 129 of the report. 
1619 Gem Diamonds Limited Incorporated in the British Virgin Islands under the International Business 
Companies Ordinance Cap.291 of the British Virgin Islands with registered number 66975 Proposed 
acquisition of Kimberley Diamond Company NL and Notice of Extraordinary General Meeting 1 January 
(2007) it is clear that diamond companies are careful to have strategies in place to deal with market related 
problems that may threaten their diamond trading activities. See 
http://www.gemdiamonds.com/im/files/d/GEMD_circular_sep07.pdf 21 March 2010. p 128 of the report. 
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With regard to the availability of diamond resources as per Mineral Expert’s 
report the document provides that:  
 
‘The ability to realise the projected valuation of the 
Ellendale Diamond Mine is dependent on a number of 
industry factors and assumptions, some of which are 
outside the Group’s control. 
The diamond resources at the Ellendale Diamond Mine, as 
outlined in Part I “Letter from the Chairman of Gem 
Diamonds” and Part VII “Mineral Expert’s Report”, are 
predominantly in the indicated or inferred class. There is no 
guarantee, that as mining operations progress, the 
recovered grades will meet the predicted levels. 
Furthermore, the Ellendale Diamond Mine was evaluated 
using figures from historical production and forecast price 
increases. There can be no assurance that these estimates 
and forecasts are correct or that unforeseen events will not 
impact negatively on these elements; for example, a pit 
optimisation review will be undertaken at the Ellendale 
Diamond Mine following completion of the Acqusition, which 
might impact upon the expected rate of resource to reserve 
conversion (currently estimated at approximately 70 per 
cent in the Mineral Expert’s Report contained in Part VII 
“Mineral Expert’s Report”). In addition, the Directors 
anticipate that the modifications which are intended to be 
made to the plants at the Ellendale Diamond Mine will 
achieve the forecast increased throughput levels. Gem 
Diamonds has only been able to base these intended 
modifications on a limited number of inspections and no 
detailed designs or plans have been completed. As such, 
there can been no guarantees that the increases forecast 
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for production and throughput have been estimated 
correctly, which could therefore result in the Ellendale 




9.7 Foreign Law Perspective 
It must be noted that in foreign law, there exists other examples of an attempts to 
unify laws pertaining to cross-border insolvency. This is evident for example in 
the European Union’s EU Regulation as contained in (EC) 1346/2000 of 29 May 
20001621
 
 on Insolvency Proceedings. It has been said that this binding on all 
European Union member States, with the exception of Denmark. It is important 
for the law on cross-border insolvency to have due regard to the provisions of 
this regulation and perhaps some of the precedent that has emerged from its 
application as this may effectively be used as a guide if necessary to dealing with 
the interpretation of South African law.  
Obviously a single study is not able to capture all the perspectives of all foreign 
cross-border law therefore this chapter will concentrate on a few legal 
considerations of the US as a more economically palpable or developed country 
which has been influential in shaping the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency. It is proposed that it is essentially it is cogent to study the US and its 
perspective on cross-border insolvency law which will be helpful to consider at a 
time when the international community is studying the actions of the US during 
the times of a recession. 
 
                                                 
1620 Gem Diamonds Limited Incorporated in the British Virgin Islands under the International Business 
Companies Ordinance Cap.291 of the British Virgin Islands with registered number 66975 Proposed 
acquisition of Kimberley Diamond Company NL and Notice of Extraordinary General Meeting 1 January 
(2007) it is clear that diamond companies are careful to have strategies in place to deal with market related 
problems that may threaten their diamond trading activities. See 
http://www.gemdiamonds.com/im/files/d/GEMD_circular_sep07.pdf 21 March 2010. p 1o of the report. 
1621 Official Journal (OJ) L160 30/06/2000 p 1-13. See PM Meskin; B Galgut; PAM Magid; JA Kunst; A 
Boraine; DA Burdette Insolvency Law Butterworths, Lexis Nexis (2008) Chapter 17. See also, UNCITRAL 
Secretariat Guide to Enactment, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-Second Session, 
Supplement No. 17 (A/52/17) (1997) Part IV Main Features of the Model Law, Background section 18. 
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Having made a note about the EU Cross-Border Regulation it must be noted that 
in this study, the primary concern on cross-border insolvency law pertains to the 
UNCITRAL Model Law as contained in the South African Cross-Border Act1622
 
 as 
this is the law that seems to be more influential to South Africa and perhaps 
many more of its trading partners. Having said that it is important to note that the 
international community, whether it is represented by the United Nations or the 
European Union, has great concerns about the mechanisms for dealing with 
cross-border insolvency therefore it is important to keep abreast with other 
international jurisdictions on the legal implications of laws of cross-border 
insolvency. The foreign law perspective on the deliberations of this law will be 
succinctly analysed below. 
It has been submitted that international trade developments together with global 
market finance has been significantly altered in the last three decades. This has 
resulted in the direct international integration of economies. This integration of 
economies was marked by conflicts of law as a result of national bankruptcy laws 
that were distinct and thus uncertain. Therefore, the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Cross-Border Insolvency was created as a means of producing greater legal 
certainty for trade and investment.1623 It is submitted that bankruptcy is a serious 
issue in international commerce and it has been exacerbated by conditions such 
as the fragile nature of the financial sector, high inflation rates, poor banking 
supervision an excessive public debt.1624
 
 
According to Locatelli who focuses on US insolvency law his article  submits that 
the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency came about to solve the 
uncertainty that existed in the bankruptcy laws of economically interdependent 
countries by providing as one of its goals ‘an establishment of provision of 
                                                 
1622 42 of 2000. 
1623 Cross-Border Insolvency Act 42 of 2000, see preamble. 
1624 Locatelli Fernando International Trade and Insolvency Law: Is the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency an Answer for Brazil? (An Economic Analysis of its Benefits on International Trade) 
SMU Dedman School of Law and Business Review of the Americas 14 Law & Bus. Rev. Am. 313 (2008) 
316. 
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certainty to promote economic stability and growth.’ This provision is contained in 
the introductory sections of the model law and the South African Cross-Border 
Insolvency Act.1625 This is because it has been acknowledged in the international 
community that in practical economics credit availability is essential for the 
economy and so are optimal insolvency systems because the extension of credit 
by its nature involves risk.1626
 
 
It is further submitted that effective insolvency law, as clearly evident in the 
Model Law, must serve two objectives. The first one is to reduce the cost of 
financing by generating a manager’s incentives for liquidation in cases of 
financial failure so that further capital losses can be avoided whenever liquidation 
is the most favorable option. The second objective is to provide rules to avoid 
detrimental liquidation by creditors in economic circumstances where maintaining 
the business activity results in asset protection and higher valuation of the 
company. It is submitted that maximizing asset value and rehabilitation of a 
company are crucial elements of law that are used as a means to protect that 
business from individual creditor actions with the consequence that it will provide 
efficient rescue of distressed companies.1627
 
 
The UNCITRAL Model on Cross-Border Insolvency Law was received in US law 
as a positive universal framework. The Model Law was enacted in the US code 
which became effective in 2005 and takes the form of chapter 151628 of the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act1629 (BAPCPA).1630
                                                 
1625 42 of 2000. 
 It 
is submitted that historically the US approach to Multinational Corporation 
1626 Locatelli Fernando International Trade and Insolvency Law: Is the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency an Answer for Brazil? (An Economic Analysis of its Benefits on International Trade) 
SMU Dedman School of Law and Business Review of the Americas 14 Law & Bus. Rev. Am. 313 (2008) 
320. Therefore it is cogently submitted that one of the contributions of the Model Law is that it seeks to 
promote confidence in domestic and foreign creditors in order to attract investment. 
1627 Ibid. 321; 328. 
1628 Section 304 of the American Bankruptcy Code. 
1629 11 USC 1501 
1630 Proskurchenko Ksenia Chapter 15 Cross-Border Insolvency: Is it True to its Universalism Aspirations? 
The Rutgers Business Law Journal 5 Rutgers Bus. L.J. 96 (2008). 
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restructuring has always been flexible and successful with a pragmatic view of 
extensive jurisdiction to solve cross-border insolvency challenges. With the 
adoption of the Model Law, in the US Bankruptcy code it appears that it has 
served the purpose of improving procedural domestic regulation. 
 
In the same way as the Cross-Border Insolvency Act1631 of South Africa, the US 
chapter 15 of the BAPCPA makes reference to a ‘petition for recognition’ by a 
foreign representative which must be accompanied by a procedure proof of 
foreign insolvency proceedings which usually take a form of a certificate from a 
foreign court or other acceptable evidence. The US court will then decide 
whether or not to recognize foreign proceedings. Further, it is accepted as a 
general rule that the US courts have the power to refuse foreign proceedings if 
they are against US policy. If the debtor has its COMI in a foreign country the 
proceeding will be recognized as main proceeding but if the debtor only has 




It has been argued that the enactment of the US insolvency code in chapter 15 of 
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act has not changed 
the jurisdictional rules at all. Essentially it has been argued that the conflict of law 
on bankruptcy matters continues to be the same. On the other hand it has been 
acknowledged that the contribution of the Model Law on the US cross-border 
insolvency law is that it has allowed the US courts to have full respect and 
cooperation to the maximum extent possible with the foreign main proceeding 
                                                 
1631 42 of 2000. 
1632 Locatelli Fernando International Trade and Insolvency Law: Is the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency an Answer for Brazil? (An Economic Analysis of its Benefits on International Trade) 
SMU Dedman School of Law and Business Review of the Americas 14 Law & Bus. Rev. Am. 313 (2008) 
333; 334. The writer in his submissions makes a statement that countries such as Brazil continue to face 
substantive and procedural difficulties in resolving cross-border insolvency challenges because they have 
simply failed to embrace the international law that was created to deal with such matters. Therefore it can 
be inferred from submissions of this nature that the Model Law has been reformatory to international trade 
bankruptcy laws. 
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taking place in a foreign State thereby giving maximum protection to assets 
located in the United States.1633
 
 
One of the justified criticisms of the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency is 
that it provides an attractive option of universalism which appeals to the context 
of the global economy. While this seems acceptable, it has been submitted that 
this pure concept of universalism is a utopian concept which in reality cannot be 
expected to be adopted by every country. It has been argued in fact that to do so 
would serve to undermine State sovereignty.1634
 
 It is submitted that the utopian 
expectation is certainly not practical, it is however quite possible for a country to 
share its sovereignty simply by recognizing the rights of parties that are foreign to 
a national court as long as such rights are proven. 
9.8 Case Law on Cross-Border Insolvency 
The consideration of some UNCITRAL case law1635
 
 on cross-border insolvency 
serves to illustrate the manner which the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency is being applied in other countries including the US. Further, the case 
law provides a mechanism for legally testing the effectiveness of the provisions 
of the model law to resolve trans-national insolvency challenges. It is submitted 
that these legal tests and interpretations will serve to be useful persuasive 
guiding tools for guiding South African courts when applying cross-border law. 
                                                 
1633 Locatelli Fernando International Trade and Insolvency Law: Is the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency an Answer for Brazil? (An Economic Analysis of its Benefits on International Trade) 
SMU Dedman School of Law and Business Review of the Americas 14 Law & Bus. Rev. Am. 313 (2008) 
333. 
1634 Proskurchenko Ksenia Chapter 15 Cross-Border Insolvency: Is it True to its Universalism Aspirations? 
The Rutgers Business Law Journal 5 Rutgers Bus. L.J. 96 (2008) 112. On the other hand there are writers 
who maintain that comity is essential to cross-border challenges and should be maintained at all costs. See 
Timothy Brock, Satterlee Stephens Burke The Assault on Offshore Havens in Bear Stearns Undermines 
New Chapter 15 American Bankruptcy Institute Journal 27-1 ABIJ (2008) 24. 
1635 Some of which may be obtained from the UNCITRAL, Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts (CLOUT). 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/case_law.html 16 March 2010. 
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In the Mexico City Federal District Court in Smith (Foreign Trustee) v Xacur and 
Two Others1636
 
 the facts of the case illustrate that the defendants were brothers 
who were shareholders, directors and otherwise involved in the business of 
numerous Mexican grain and grain related companies. These businesses also 
had various places of operation in the US. Following many defaults in payments 
on their loans and guarantees to numerous Mexican and US banks, the banks as 
creditors commenced bankruptcy proceedings against the brothers.  
The brothers were declared bankrupt by the US Bankruptcy Court for the 
Southern District of Texas on 22 August 1997. This decision was unsuccessfully 
appealed by the brothers. The Mexican Court was approached by an official 
trustee of the co-defendants seeking an acknowledgment of the foreign 
bankruptcy proceedings, sentences and international cooperation. The Mexican 
court applied its Commercial Bankruptcy Law, title twelve of which is based on 
the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency.  The court 
acknowledged the foreign bankruptcy proceedings and granted the petition for 
cooperation and collaboration for the purposes of executing the sentences of the 
US court. Interestingly enough the defendants tried to raise the defence of res 
judicata however the court rejected this defence on the basis that the Mexican 
acknowledgment was not a new process but simply an acknowledgment of one 
that had already taken place.1637
 
 
In an English1638 case of In re Rajapakse1639
                                                 
1636 Proceedings No. 29/2001. 
 the debtors were a married couple 
and residents of the US who commenced a foreign insolvency proceeding, in the 
US. The US court appointed an insolvency representative over their estate. The 
foreign representative identified several assets of the debtors located outside the 
US and this included a residential property in England. The foreign 
1637 Ibid. 
1638 It must be noted that the United Kingdom is an enacting State of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency (MLCI) but when this case was heard reference to the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland was not made. It has however to date been shown that all these States have enacted 
the MLCI. 
1639 [2207] B.P.I.R. 99 23 November 2006, unreported judgment. 
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representative applied to the English court under Articles 15 and 21 of the Cross-
Border Insolvency Regulation 2006 which corresponds with Articles 15 and 21 of 
the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency by seeking recognition of 
the foreign proceeding, the foreign representative’s authority and recognition that 
the residential property in England formed part of the insolvency estate. The 
English court granted the application.1640
 
 
The US Bankruptcy courts in direct contrast to South African courts have had 
more decisions pertaining to the application and interpretation of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency.1641 It will not be necessary to consider a 
vast number of these judgments however it will be important for the purposes of 
this chapter to at least consider one of the cases that illustrates the US court’s 
approach to the meaning of ‘centre of main interests’ (COMI) which becomes 
relevant in insolvency proceedings. This issue was raised as a consideration in 
the case of In re Tradex Swiss AG.1642
 
 In this case the debtor was an exchange 
trading company registered in Switzerland using an internet based trading 
platform. It maintained offices in Switzerland and in the United States. The 
manager of the US office had the signing authority for the debtor’s bank 
accounts. Over the years the operations of the debtor were transferred to the US. 
In November 2007 the Swiss Federal banking Commission commenced a foreign 
insolvency proceeding against the debtor and appointed two insolvency 
representatives as foreign representatives. Shortly after the commencement of 
the foreign proceeding, an involuntary insolvency proceeding was initiated 
against the debtor in the United States. Three weeks later the foreign 
representative applied to the US court for the recognition of the foreign 
                                                 
1640 It is well worth noting that the application was supported with authentic documentation from the 
foreign court and therefore it was evident that the application complied with the requirements of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. 
1641 See for example CLOUT case law reports, In re Lloyd US Bankruptcy Court for the District of New 
York No. 05-60100 (BRL), In re Basis Yield Alpha Fund (Master) Lloyd US Bankruptcy Court for the 
District of New York No. 07-12762 (REG), In re Klytie’s Developments, Inc., Klytie’s Developments, LLC 
US Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado No. 07-22719 (MER) to name a few. 
1642 US Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts No. 07-17180 (JBR) and 07-17518 (JBR). 
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proceeding as a foreign ‘main’ proceeding under the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Cross-Border Insolvency of the US and the dismissal of the US proceeding. 
 
The creditors opposed the recognition application alleging that the foreign 
proceeding was not a foreign proceeding as identified in chapter 15 of the US 
Bankruptcy code which corresponds with the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency. They argued further that the COMI of the debtor was located 
in the US therefore foreign proceeding should be recognized, if at all, as a foreign 
non-main proceeding. The creditors further argued that it was in their best 
interests to continue with the US proceeding. In response the foreign 
representatives sought a consolidation of the pending involuntary proceeding 
with the foreign proceeding and argued that there was no need to continue with 
the US proceeding. 
 
The court in arriving at its decision gave strict interpretation of the US law which 
corresponds with the provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency. The court took the view that the lack of full translation of the foreign 
order was not enough to render the application invalid as argued by the creditors. 
This interpretation of the law pertaining to language difficulties illustrates the 
manner in which the US court was able to uphold the principle of comity and 
convenience as intended by the model law. 
 
Further, the court held that the foreign proceeding was an administrative one in a 
foreign country under a law relating to insolvency or adjustment of debt pursuant 
to the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. This is due to the fact 
that it remained unchallenged by the creditors that the Swiss Federal bank was 
an administrative agency with authority to regulate banks and brokers. In contract 
to the creditors the US court gave the same status of foreign court to the Swiss 
Federal banking agency as expressed in Article 2(e) of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency which includes a judicial officer or other 
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authority competent to regulate, control or supervise a foreign proceeding. 
Therefore, the foreign proceeding was such in terms of the model law. 
 
The court also dealt with the issue of the location of the debtor’s COMI because 
this would be critical in analyzing whether the foreign proceedings were main or 
non-main proceedings. The court noted that the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Cross-Border Insolvency did not provide a definition for the COMI therefore the 
interpretation of COMI was extracted from precedent and defined as a concept 
similar to a principal place of business. It was established in the case that the 
debtor’s principal place of business was in the US and consequently the foreign 
representatives had not proved that the Swiss proceeding was a main 
proceeding as alleged. 
 
In response to an application to dismiss the US proceeding, the court did not 
dismiss the US proceeding in that it was not barred in terms of chapter 15 of the 
US Bankruptcy code.  While it was recognized by the court that a foreign 
representative may seek a dismissal or suspension of an involuntary proceeding 
in terms of Article 15 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency 
such dismissal or suspension would only be granted if the application for 
recognition has been granted and the purposes of the bankruptcy code are best 
served in that manner. The court held that the US proceeding was justified in that 
it best served the purposes of the US bankruptcy code. Further, it appeared from 
the facts that the US representative appointed to administer the debtor’s estate 
had already begun collecting the debtor’s assets while the foreign proceeding 
remained in what the court referred to as a case ‘in limbo.’ 
 
The UNCITRAL case law provides invaluable academic insight to the 
practicalities of achieving insolvency justice in cross-border matters. It also 
reveals important procedural aspects of the application of the principles of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. It was confirmed in US v JA 
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Jones Const. Group, LLC1643 that in cross-border situations, it is not proper 
procedure to send only a letter to a foreign court where a debtor is being sued in 
order to stay those proceedings or to achieve other objectives of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. What is required is a proper application 
for recognition of a foreign proceeding.1644
 
 
With regard to practical court interpretation of what would constitute a violation of 
public policy in light of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, 
the US Court in In re Board of Directors of Telecom Argentina S.A. The Agro 
Fund Ltd v Board of Directors of Telecom Argentina S.A.1645
 
 stated an important 
principle. With reference to public policy in matters of cross-border insolvency the 
court held that an extension of comity to foreign proceedings will be affirmed so 
long as such comity is based on the finding that those proceedings did not violate 
US public policy considerations, the best interests of creditor test or the good-
faith requirement of the US Bankruptcy code which reflects principles of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. 
9.9 Conclusion 
It is clear from the deliberations on the provisions of South African law on cross-
border insolvency that the cross-border law in the form of the national statute as 
well as the UNCITRAL Model Law is essential to the development and continued 
reform of national international trade law. This reform has been made possible 
through much desired intergovernmental cooperation. It is proposed in this 
chapter that the national cross-border statute which embodies the Model Law 
should be given at this stage the required Ministerial support1646
 
 so that it may be 
operative in South Africa.  
                                                 
1643 US District Court for the Eastern District of New York No. CV2003-1383 (SJF)(MDG). 
1644 Letters of request are widely recognized in international law however proper legal procedure must still 
be followed to enforce the law in terms of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border insolvency. 
1645 US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 528 F. 3d; Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) P81, 248; 50. 
1646 Cross-Border Insolvency Act 42 of 2000 section 2. 
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The full operation of the cross-border international law will enhance the common 
law and continue to uphold values of equality before the courts in cross-border 
matters. It is submitted that there is overwhelming evidence of Constitutionally 
sound principles1647 of international trade law in South Africa and such laws 
insofar as they affect the diamond industry in order to represent the interests of 
debtors and creditors in the industry.1648
 
 
Further, in light of the current economic challenges that the global community is 
facing it is important that South Africa is seen to be participating in the global 
processes that deal with cross-border insolvency. This approach will enable 
South African courts to protect equity in matters of cross-border insolvency. 
Diamond trade, whether it involves luxury goods or goods necessary for 
industrial purposes is one of those industries that are most challenged by a 
recession1649
 
 therefore it is important that such industries be treated according to 
measures that will ensure insolvency equity as expressed in the UNCITRAL 
Model Law objectives. 
 
                                                 
1647 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996 section 9, 22, 39 and 231. 
1648 Cross-Border Insolvency Act 42 of 2000 preamble. 
1649 See example It was reported in the United Nations Intergraded Regional Information Networks, Job 
Losses as Diamonds Lose Their Lustre, Africa News 11 February (2009) 
www.afrika.no/Detailed/17940.html 16 July 2009 that there were many job losses in Botswana as a result 
of sales dwindling and the companies retrenching in order to cut costs. 
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Chapter 10: Anti-Corruption Laws and Diamond Trade 
 
10.1 Introduction 
Diamond trade has always been an industry that is plagued by issues of 
corruption because it involves trade in a valuable commodity that can be traded 
for vast amounts of revenue in illicit markets.1650 This point has been partly 
discussed in the first chapter of this study by looking at the earlier decisions of 
the South African courts pertaining to diamond theft1651 and unlawful possession 
of rough diamonds. 1652 This issue of corruption or crime in diamond dealings will 
be discussed in this dedicated chapter in light of South African law on this subject 
with reference to some useful input from other diamond dealing jurisdictions. This 
chapter is a chapter on the mandate of government agencies in the fight against 
diamond related crime as expressed in the South Africa Police Service 
Manual.1653 These agencies obtain their power from the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa Act1654
 
 which forms the highest law and therefore is 
constantly applicable in diamond crime prevention. 
Further and importantly to the issue of anti-corruption in diamond trade are the 
provisions of the Diamonds Act.1655 The Diamonds Act1656
                                                 
1650 National Director of Public Prosecutions v Naidoo and Others 2006 (2) SACR 403 (T) 415F, 416 G., S 
v Mkonto 2001 (1) SACR (C) 591 E, S v Hove S v Shumba 1979 (4) SA 648 (ZRA) 649 F where the court 
held that the law in question intended to deal with the mischief of illicit diamond trading. Incorporated Law 
Society v Harris 1932 OPD 20 p 23, Cape Law Society v Du Plessis 1932 CPD 119 p 120, S v Thomas and 
Another [1988] 4 All SA 220 (NC) see judgment where the court held that a fine for illicit diamond buying 
was appropriate in the circumstances. Nusca v Da Ponte and Others [1994] 4 All SA 417 (BG), par. A 
factual background. Income Tax Case NO 1683 62 SATC 406 p 408, 409 where the amount of money to be 
taxed was a reward for information leading to the arrest of one involved in illicit diamond trading. 
 contains other 
international diamond anti-corruption law in the form of United Nations 
1651 See additional examples of cases involving diamond theft, Queen v Klaas (1893-1895) 7 HCG 245, 
246. S v Gauss v Mukete; S v Petrus; S v Teodor 1980 ( 3 ) SA 770 (SWA) 771, 772,  National Union of 
Mineworkers v De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd (1997) 18 ILJ 1442 (CCMA) 1455 F where it was stated 
in the case that diamond theft the mine threatens its profitability and ultimately its existence. 
1652 See chapter 1 of this study Rex v Broodryk 1932 AD 131, Rex v Fourie and Another 1937 AD 31 p 38, 
Rex v Lipshitz 1921 AD 282. 
1653 Gazette No. 28500 17 February 2006. See Prevention of Organized Crime Act 121 of 1998, Prevention 
and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004. 
1654 108 of 1996. 
1655 56 of 1986. 
1656 56 of 1986. 
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Resolutions for adopting the KPCS which has been developed by the 
international community and adopted by South Africa to effectively remove 
conflict diamonds from legitimate diamond trade. This chapter will not be a focus 
on the KPCS as that has already been highlighted in other parts1657
 
 of this study. 
Instead this chapter will focus on additional legislation that deals with the 
protection of the integrity of the diamond industry in South Africa insofar as other 
criminal activities are concerned in diamond trade, for example, diamond theft or 
the buying of illicit diamonds. 
It is prudent for any diamond producing State to enact legislation that will protect 
all the relevant areas of a particular sector if necessary in order to protect its 
economy. This is done through various government agencies to protect the 
diamond industry, for example the Gold and Diamond branch of the South 
African Police Service,1658 in partnership with the corporate entities and other 
diamond producers uses legislative measures to curb corruption in diamond 
trade. Most diamond dealing corporate entities in partnership with the State also 
have various intelligence teams and in-house accountability structures that will 
protect employers and employees alike from the temptation of stealing the 
commodity for personal interests.1659
                                                 
1657 See chapter 1. 
 
1658 Gazette No. 28500 17 February 2006. 
1659 There have been many media reports that show that diamond corruption is rampant in the diamond 
industry. See The Namibian Namibia; No Production Bonuses for Namdeb Workers Monday, 21 January 
(2008). It was reported in this paper that Namdeb had failed to reach its targets and as a result employees 
could not be paid their bonuses. One of the ills blamed for the production bonus shortfall on mining targets 
is the number of diamond thefts that had been a factor in the year 2007. See also, Namibian Economist 
Namibia; Diamond Theft Affects Namdeb Production Friday, 25 January (2008). It was reported in this 
report that Namdeb’s carat production came short of its target for the year as a result of diamond theft. The 
company had budgeted a total of 2,248 million carats from its land and marine operations but only 
managed to produce 2,176 carats. The profits were realized in the marine operations but not in the land 
operations. There were many negative factors that had been attributed to poor production such as a fire that 
had broken out at one of the company’s plants in Oranjemund, increases is costs particularly fuel, incidents 
of flooding and rough sea conditions. However, the most crippling factor was the number of recorded 
diamond theft cases despite a campaign to educate employees about the negative effects of diamond theft 
on the Namibian economy. It was apparent that syndicates still continue to draw pockets of employees into 
diamond theft practices. In 2007 alone 21 cases of diamond thefts were investigated, 30 people were 
involved in these cases of which 20 were arrested by Nampol’s Protected Resources Unit. With regard to 
the 10 remaining people there was insufficient evidence to warrant criminal prosecutions. These remaining 
employees were however disciplined in terms of company policies and procedures. Stones which were 
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recovered through investigations were recorded measuring 23.1 carats in mass with an average size stone of 
1.56 carats and it became apparent that syndicates were targeting high quality goods. It was also reported in 
The Namibian (Africa News) Ex-Namdeb Worker Fined Over Diamond Theft Friday 21 November (2008) 
that a former Namdeb employee was sentenced in the Keetmanshoop Regional Court for stealing 
diamonds. He pleaded guilty to the charge of diamond theft and was sentenced to five years in prison or 
payment of a fine with a further two-year prison sentence wholly suspended for five years. The employee 
had been a multi-skilled labourer when he was arrested at the plant’s checkpoint for stealing three 
unpolished diamonds weighing 35.36 carats from his employer. The Regional Magistrate in his decision 
stated that the court is under an obligation to protect the diamond industry which is considered as the 
backbone of the country’s economy. It is submitted in light of this regional court’s finding that it may be 
important for employers to also investigate some of the reasons that may prompt employees to steal 
diamonds. Perhaps this type of investigation can inform producers of how to better curb the temptation to 
steal and perhaps even find other ways of further reducing the temptation of stealing stones which is 
ultimately against the interests of all involved in the long run. The problem of diamond thefts was also 
reported in Botswana see Mmengi/The Reporter (Africa News) Botswana; Police Arrest Diamond Theft 
Suspects Friday 14 November (2008). It was reported that the police had arrested three Botswana men in 
connection with a suspected diamond theft in Gaborone. A witness had testified that the men had many 
precious stones in their possession when they were arrested in a popular hotel in the city. Whether the 
stones were real or not in this case was a matter that still had to be proved, however the threat of diamond 
theft was sufficiently established in the diamond producing State of Botswana. In The Weekender (South 
Africa) Stealing Their Future 8 November (2008) Stephen Tim wrote a compelling article in the economy, 
business and finance section of this newspaper where he reports that while it has been difficult for diamond 
producers to state exactly what the negative effects of diamond smuggling were on the companies’ bottom 
line figures it has become apparent that it is the theft of larger diamonds which could significantly harm a 
mine’s bottom line. Over the years syndicates have thought of countless ways to smuggle diamonds from 
mines on the coast. For instance, arrows have been hollowed and employees have stamped stones into their 
boots while in Namibia smugglers have even used homing pigeons. Port Nolloth, a small town notorious as 
a diamond smuggler’s haven even though police have carried out a significant number of raids and stings 
which even led to the arrest of the town’s mayor. It is clear that corruption is further fuelled by corrupt 
leadership and a promise of vast revenue, it is said for example that a rough 50 carat diamond can fetch up 
to five million rand depending on its quality which means that even divers who pump stones into boats that 
work for offshore diamond producers, have to be searched when leaving the mine. Even though searches 
and closed-circuit cameras are used it is possible in a ton of diamond rich gravel to miss spot diamonds and 
therefore it can make it easy for thieves to help themselves to it. It has been said, for example, that a ton of 
gravel may contain n average of just three grams of diamonds. Unfortunately one of the biggest complaints 
by the divers themselves is that their share in legitimate revenue for diving for the stones is minimal. It is 
submitted that this unhappiness with payment for mining may be a cause for temptation to steal the 
diamonds, however, by the same token it is important that workers also learn to be content and try not to 
approach diamond mining as a ‘get rich quick’ scheme as that may lead to all kinds of temptations for 
corrupt activities. These reports of smuggling are not new to the diamond industry however they do add 
pressure to the already shaky market of diamond sales, particularly with the worldwide recession that is 
taking place at present. In Canada it was reported by writer Josh Wingrove in the crime section of the 
Toronto News (Canada) Suspect in one million Toronto diamond heist arrested in Saskatchewan Saturday, 
11 October (2008) that a suspect suspected of pulling off a million dollar diamond heist was arrested along 
the Trans-Canada Highway in Saskatchewan. This particular thief had stolen diamonds in the form of 
jewellery, it was unclear in this report where the diamonds had originated but it is very clear that diamond 
theft is a world-wide industry problem both threatening raw diamonds or processed diamond industries 
world-wide. All kinds of diamond thieves have been identified including reports that some thieves even use 
‘magic’ to steal diamonds as reported in the London Times ‘High magician’ linked to London diamond 
theft Edition 1 Saturday, 7 February (2009). This report gives the name of a Hatton Garden who is known 
as an international jewel thief who dresses as a wealthy Muslim woman and steals rings worth millions of 
pounds by either swapping gems for replicas or steals the rings as female assistants distract staff members. 
This known diamond thief has been identified across Europe as the ‘high magician’ of crime after jewels 
disappeared in Paris, Berlin and Frankfurt over a seven year period. These reports clearly show that 
diamond smuggling needs to be dealt with in a stringent manner in law in order to protect the economy. 
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Diamond theft and other connected corrupt activity is an age old problem that 
has inspired much academic, legal and social commentary. With these 
considerations in mind this chapter aims to provide academic insight into the 
legal framework and some of the industry reactions into methods that support the 
removal corrupt activities in diamond trade. South African law and industry 
regulations will be considered while making reference to the international trade 
context. It is submitted that by taking cognizance of some of the mechanisms 
adopted by foreign diamond traders as a comparator for the methods used in the 
South African industry to deal with the threat of corruption in diamond trade 
certain useful guidelines may be drawn.  
 
It has also been submitted by Professor Barak D. Richman that the problem with 
corrupt activities around diamond sales is that it is inspired by a particular feature 
of diamond transactions. He submits that this feature of diamond transactions is 
that, in America at least, there is an unreliability of State courts in enforcing 
executory contracts1660 because in typical diamond transactions the sale is 
generally a credit sale or a brokerage arrangement. In such situations a diamond 
or cache of diamonds is in the possession of someone who is not the owner.1661
 
 
Since diamonds are easily portable, virtually untraceable and command high 
prices throughout the world, a potential thief encounters few obstacles in hiding 
unpaid for or stolen diamonds from law enforcement officials. Such a thief can 
flee the American jurisdiction and sell such diamonds to black market buyers.1662
                                                 
1660 This is a type of contract where some obligations still need to be performed by one of the parties. 
 
Clearly the problem highlighted above by Professor Richman is not unfamiliar to 
South Africa as well therefore this chapter will investigate the legal strategies that 
have been adopted to discourage black market diamond dealings while also 
1661 Richman D. Barak The Antitrust of Reputation Mechanisms: Institutional Economics and Concerted 
Refusals to Deal Virginia Law Review 95 Va. L. Rev. 325 (2009) 330. 
1662 Ibid. S v Mkonto 2001 (1) SACR (C) 591 E where the court dealt with illicit diamond buying. 
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providing useful insight on strategies that have been adopted by the diamond 
industry itself to deal with the challenges of black market diamond sales. 
 
10.2 Understanding the Problem 
The problem of corrupt activities in diamond trade is fuelled by many factors most 
of which can be left for the criminologists to study however the main force behind 
such corruption is that diamonds produce quick and vast revenue in the black 
markets. It has been submitted that diamonds are often used as choice currency 
for fleeing fugitives. This was evident in the case of Martin Frankel a fugitive 
financier whose collapsed financial schemes prompted federal prosecution 
arranged by a shadowy purchase of over ten million dollars in diamonds just 
before his attempted escape from the US authorities.1663
 
 
Diamond theft continues to be a serious threat to the industry despite, it is 
submitted, the technological advances in security. In 2003 rough and polished 
diamonds worth approximately one million Euros were stolen from Antwerp 
vaults. In 2004 a diamond heist in London included earrings that had belonged to 
Marie Antoinette.1664
 
 It is important to consider some of the reported cases of 
corruption threats within the industry in order to enable one to understand the 
seriousness of the problem of corruption in diamond sales. One must also take 
into account that these criminal elements of diamond trade have a serious 
domino effect which will result in the impoverishment of the industry and 
ultimately the economy, not to mention the illicit activities that seriously lead to 
the impairment of human dignity for those whose illicit activities lead to other illicit 
activities such as murder and other possible corrupt activities. 
                                                 
1663 Richman D. Barak The Antitrust of Reputation Mechanisms: Institutional Economics and Concerted 
Refusals to Deal Virginia Law Review 95 Va. L. Rev. 325 (2009) n 13. 
1664 Ibid. 
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The problem of diamond corruption in diamond trade is a serious problem that 
has been the subject of many artistic works such as films1665 and exciting fiction 
novels. This is not the case in reality since diamond related crime serious 
cutthroat business. is a  While this can be dismissed as fanciful literary 
commentary on life, the fact is that diamond related crime is on the rise and is 
getting more serious as discussed by Brendan Ryan in the Crime, Law and 
Justice section of a South African corporate magazine. It is submitted in the 
writings of the author above that illegal diamond buying is attracting violent 
criminals in South Africa. This problem has been a long standing challenge faced 
by South African diamond miners, who have to find ways to prevent theft after 
finding diamonds in their mines.1666
 
 
It has been submitted that one of the areas that are notorious for illegal diamond 
mining in South Africa is the Northern Cape. At the time that Brendan’s article 
was written it seemed that more violent criminals were coming to trade or rob 
operators of their illegal diamonds in the area. These violent criminals would rob 
the illicit traders of their diamonds with AK 47 assault rifles and this would affect 
the smaller operators who cannot afford security.1667
 
 This is a serious and life 
threatening situation that illustrates how illegal diamond trade breeds more illegal 
activities thus exacerbating the problem on corruption in the diamond industry. 
In 2008 the Geological Society of South Africa organized a symposium known as 
‘Diamonds in Kimberley’ where presentations were made of various kinds of 
‘hands-off’ diamond recovery systems available together with associated 
technologically advanced surveillance systems. This is because diamond theft is 
a serious and constant threat in spite of security measures. In fact security to 
access a mine is exceptionally tight, such that cell phones carried on mining 
                                                 
1665 Jordan Mintzer Variety: Film Reviews 12 – 18 May 2008, France. See also The Washington Times a 
report by Christian Toto Flawless’ isn’t; Diamond Theft Adds Interest to Heist Genre Friday 28 March 
(2008). 
1666 Brendan Ryan Diamond Theft. A Thief’s Best Friend Crime, Law & Justice Financial Mail Edition 14 
September (2007) 88. http://secure.financialmail.co.za/07/0914/features/efeat.htm 12 August 2008. 
1667 Ibid. 
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premises have to be taken apart by security staff after visitors with cell phones 
have entered the mine therefore as a general rule De Beers Venetia mine for 
example does not permit visitors to take in cell phones, remote control devices, 
batteries, pastes, liquids or lip balm.1668
 
 
In the diamond industry the problem of corruption has been described as ‘a war 
in which the crime syndicates have more money than us, while their intelligence 
is as good as ours.’ Unfortunately criminals in diamond trade are always looking 
for weak links in the producers’ security systems. They usually achieve this by 
getting one of their criminal cohorts to join the producers’ work force or by picking 
on a worker who is in trouble for any reason and needs money. This urgent need 
for money may be driven by other factors such as a need to fuel a ‘tik-tik’ drug 
habit which is common in the Northern Cape towns near diamond mining areas 
such as Douglas and Barkly West.1669
 
 
It has been reported that diamond theft syndicates operating in the Kimberley 
area have a hierarchical structure. Some members are involved in stealing the 
actual diamonds while others act as agents. The agents transport the stolen 
diamonds to the organizers and dealers who legitimize these diamonds through 
cutting and polishing or exporting.1670
 
 This certainly is serious mischief which the 
general public is unaware of, however it is submitted that the problem does not 
lie with the innocent consumers but the producers who have elected to follow this 
illegal route of trading in illicit diamonds. 
 One of the well known techniques used by diamond crime syndicates involves 
‘swapping.’ What happens when a diamond is swapped is that a legitimate but 
low-value diamond is replaced in the system by a stolen higher quality stone of 
the same size. The persons involved in such activities are usually discovered but 
                                                 
1668 Brendan Ryan Diamond Theft. A Thief’s Best Friend Crime, Law & Justice Financial Mail Edition 14 




the problem is that nothing seems to happen to them, Bredan submits. The 
diamond producers do try to deal with the situation however successful 
prosecutions can only be achieved by the police officials.1671
 
 
Unfortunately if these problems are not dealt with they will eventually 
compromise the productivity of the mine. Insofar as security systems are 
concerned it has been established that a mine may use security systems which 
have a capital cost of five million to fifty million rand depending on the size of a 
particular producer. This estimate excludes running and operating costs for such 
systems. However, it has been established that a mine can pay for its own 
security equipment if it can prevent theft of large types of stones such as those 
frequently found in the Middle Orange alluvial deposits.1672
 
 
The fact that the diamond industry in South Africa has been forced to resort to 
technology in order to deal with diamond theft shows that most diamond theft 
seems to take place on producer sights where that human element of fault 
always a potential threat. It seems therefore that the diamond producer must 
adopt an approach which states that every worker is potentially susceptible to 
temptation in diamond production. This obviously creates a special type of work 
environment where camera surveillance and much prevention of industrial 
espionage in whatever form is avoided by the diamond producer at all costs. 
 
10.3 Anti-Corruption Law and Diamond Trade in South Africa 
It is important at this stage to mention the laws and regulations that have been 
promulgated as part of the State’s mandate to remove corrupt activities and other 
crimes from the diamond industry.1673
                                                 
1671 Brendan Ryan Diamond Theft. A Thief’s Best Friend Crime, Law & Justice Financial Mail Edition 14 
September (2007) 88. http://secure.financialmail.co.za/07/0914/features/efeat.htm 12 August 2008. 
 It is well known in South African law that 
1672 Ibid. 
1673 Examples of these laws include inter alia the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996 
section 205, Prevention of Organized Crime Act 121 of 1998, Prevention and Combating of Corrupt 
Activities Act 12 of 2004. 
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there are different State agencies1674 that are created to enforce the laws 
however for the purposes of understanding anti-corruption law in diamond trade 
this part of the study will limit its consideration to some of the policing efforts that 
are mandated by South African legislation.1675 At the same time it is 
acknowledged that fighting crime of any kind is a partnership between the 
citizens, the courts and the police.1676
 
 
The South Africa Police Service Manual1677 created in accordance with the 
Promotion of Access to Information Act1678
 
 is useful in understanding anti-
corruption law in South Africa. The manual sets out expressly the anti-corruption 
efforts that can be undertaken by the police to protect its citizens from general 
crime and these efforts have a direct effect on diamond related crime. This 
manual was created to give effect to the Constitutional right of access to any 
information held by the South African Police Service that is required in the 
protection of any rights. 
With reference to the protection of the integrity and economic viability of the 
diamond industry the manual provides as follows. Firstly it sets out the express 
objects of the police service as contained in of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa Act, 1996.1679
                                                 
1674 For example the South African Police Service www.saps.gov.za 19 March 2010 or the South African 
Revenue Service (SARS) www.sars.gov.za/ 19 March 2010. 
 It is provided that the objects of the police service are 
1675 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996 section 205. 
1676 The courts have recognized the partnership between the State and the people living in the Republic of 
South Africa. This is done through the protection of whistle blowers, for example, as was the case in 
Engineering Council of South Africa and Another v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality and 
Another 2008 ILJ 899 (T) 902 E – F. ‘The court was of the view that the present case was a good example 
of a bona fide whistleblower who deserved protection. The comparable protection afforded by the relevant 
sections in the EPA and OHSA had, no doubt, been enacted in the same spirit. Other examples included the 
'crime stop’ hotline and the practice of making use of police informers. Without these anonymous 
individuals, often working under extremely dangerous conditions, many crimes would otherwise remain 
unsolved. The court was according of the view that a court must be slow to condemn a whistleblower.’ 
1677 Gazette No. 28500 17 February 2006. 
1678 2 of 2000 which provides for transparency in the manner in which the State governs the Republic of 
South Africa. 
1679 108 of 1996 sections 205, 206, 207 and 208. Section 205 in particular provides that ‘(1) the national 
police service must be structured to function in the national, provincial and, where appropriate, local 
spheres of government.  
    (2) National legislation must establish the powers and functions of the police service and must enable the 
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to prevent, combat and investigate crime, to maintain public order,1680 to protect 




The police services are endowed with powers at all levels of government to 
engage in crime intelligence, crime prevention, keeping records and forensic 
science services, detective services, financial administration services, legal 
services, corporate services (management services), national evaluation 
services, operational response services, personnel services, protection and 
security services, supply chain management and training.1682
 
 
The investigation units or components include a special police anti-corruption unit 
which effectively curbs corruption within the police service itself so as to ensure 
that the police themselves are not a contributor to criminal activities. There is 
also a commercial branch that deals with fraud. This branch focuses on 
commercial related crime that includes fraud, syndicate-fraud and other 
commercial crime.1683
 
 Since syndicate crime is a significant contributor to 
diamond related crime, this provision of the manual is of particular importance to 
the diamond industry. 
There is also an additional provision specifically related to the diamond industry 
and this relates to the setting up of the ‘diamond and gold branch’ which 
effectively prevents and investigates crimes relating to the illegal dealing in 
                                                                                                                                                 
police service to discharge its responsibilities effectively, taking into account the requirements of the 
provinces.  
    (3) The objects of the police service are to prevent, combat and investigate crime, to maintain public 
order, to protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic and their property, and to uphold and enforce 
the law.’  
1680 This is particularly important in diamond trade as it has been clear throughout international law that 
without order in mining, chaos would reign as citizens use any kinds of methods to dig and prospect for 
diamonds hoping to get rich without regard to the environment or to sustainable development of the 
industry and the people. 
1681  Gazette No. 28500 17 February 2006. Section 2(3) of the manual, under the heading ‘functions.’ 
1682 Gazette No. 28500 17 February 2006. Of course each of these areas has vast responsibilities attached to 
each and the manual provides extensively for those aspects of crime fighting. 
1683 Gazette No. 28500 17 February 2006 part 2.4 (1); (3). 
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diamonds and precious metals nationally. This is achieved by means of the 
efficient gathering and utilization of relevant information in the interest of the 
country and the community.1684
 
 The manual is a significant document of 
prodigious size that provides elaborate information on crime fighting and this 
includes not only the law but the contact details of the police stations, all 
designed to protect citizens. The State must be commended for producing such a 
comprehensive and significant document particularly when living in a country 
where crime is of major concern. 
10.4 Reaction of the Diamond Industry to Diamond Theft in Sales 
The South African diamond industry was given an opportunity to elaborate on its 
reaction to crime, misconduct and other related corruption in diamond trade. This 
was done through a Commission of inquiry into the diamond industry as 
conducted in 1999. The topic to which these submissions were related in the 
report involved ‘the effectiveness or otherwise of illegal diamond buying (IDB) 
provisions and related matters.’ In dealing with this issue the Commission 
received both written and oral evidence and these submissions were duly 
recorded in the report. The submissions that came forth stated that it was the 
opinion of the industry that the South African Police Services themselves had 
become corrupt as they engage in setting up illegal diamond buying (IDB) stings 
in order to collect rewards and the problem with officials with the highest integrity 
is that they did not have sufficient, specialist training to handle IDB matters.1685
 
 
In another submission the diamond industry felt that the IDB laws should be kept 
in place in South Africa in order to protect the local industry from theft to ensure a 
stable and reliable future. However, it was proposed that the existing IDB law 
allowed for abuse and irregularities.1686
 
 
                                                 
1684 Ibid. Section 7. 
1685 Report of Task Team Appointed by the Minister of Minerals & Energy to Analyze the Memoranda and 
Evidence Laid Before The Commission of Inquiry into the South African Diamond Industry, 20 December 
(1999). Chapter 4. www.polity.org.za/polity/govdocs/reports/diamonds/chap5.html 20 October 2009. 
1686 Ibid. 
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The abuses complained of it was explained in the report, is that police could 
simply walk into registered premises and set up unjustified entrapments that lead 
to innocent people being charged and their business equipment being 
confiscated. The problem is that the confiscated items do not even get returned 
in good order even when innocence is proved on behalf of the parties. As a result 
there seemed to be a significant degree of discomfort in the industry about the 
then existing IDB laws. One of the proposals to strengthen IDB laws was that a 
police trap should be approved by a magistrate upon presentation of prima facie 
evidence that a crime was being committed first. This proposal was never 




In American diamond trade as mentioned in the writings of Professor Richman 
which are focused on the New York DDC, diamond theft can occur in a credit 
sale transaction if the person who is not the owner of the diamond or diamonds 
decides to steal such a diamond or diamonds for black market sales. This type of 
theft makes it difficult for the State courts to discipline parties or seize stolen 
assets that escape their jurisdictional reach. Even with sophisticated legal 
instruments such as liens or other devices used to secure assets as collateral, 
these cannot reliably prevent diamond theft. Therefore in reaction to this threat 
the diamond industry is said to have reacted by relying on an elaborate 
reputation mechanism.1688
 
 The submissions of Professor Richman serve as a 
useful study of the reaction of the diamond industry to illicit diamond trading as 
will be considered below. 
The way that the reputation mechanism works is that individuals charged with 
diamond sales activities enter into commercial relationships with others based on 
past actions of their potential partners. This means that in commercial contracts 
merchants refuse to enter into contracts with or will demand a premium from 
                                                 
1687 Ibid. 
1688 Richman D. Barak The Antitrust of Reputation Mechanisms: Institutional Economics and Concerted 
Refusals to Deal Virginia Law Review 95 Va. L. Rev. 325 (2009) 331. 
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individuals who have failed to fulfill their previous contractual obligations. It has 
been said that the payment of a premium and the prospect of losing future 
business has been proven successful in eradicating bad behavior in diamond 
sales.1689
 
 The very principle of ‘reputation’ suggests that there must be an 
industry word going around that a particular diamond dealer is a ‘trustworthy 
entity with a proven track-record’ otherwise threat of theft is almost imminent if 
the dealer is unknown. 
It has been suggested that the impediments to implementing the reputation 
mechanism include the availability of prompt and accurate information so that 
each merchant’s history is known to all potential exchange partners. Further, the 
imposition of a credible and sufficient punishment to deter misconduct can also 
be a serious impediment to implementing a reputation mechanism.1690 Therefore, 
to address these challenges the diamond industry itself has reacted by creating 
rules that meet these challenges. This is done by inducing contractual 




The diamond industry has a network of diamond bourses scattered throughout 
the world in various diamond centres. In South Africa there is the South African 
Diamond Exchange and Export Centre (DEEC). In New York there is the New 
York Diamond Dealer’s Club (DDC) located in Manhattan’s diamond district 
formed according to law with various by-laws and mandatory rules for its 
diamond merchant members. Most members in the club act as middle men 
between the diamond producers who mine the stones (most of which are 
arranged by De Beers) and the diamond retailers who turn them into jewellery. 
                                                 
1689 Ibid. 
1690 It is submitted that this could be due to the fact that even if punishment is imposed by virtue of a 
premium or a threat to be excluded from future diamond exchange, this alone is insufficient to stop a thief 
from vanishing with the diamond or diamonds. On the other hand punishment may mean a defaulting 
merchant may be threatened by foreclosure of his or her business because the other traders will not ‘touch’ 
him or her due to loss of good standing with the DDC. 
1691 Richman D. Barak The Antitrust of Reputation Mechanisms: Institutional Economics and Concerted 
Refusals to Deal Virginia Law Review 95 Va. L. Rev. 325 (2009) 330. 
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The most diamond sales are sold in the US and the DDC handles almost ninety-
five per cent of the diamonds imported into the country. Most diamonds are 
bought and sold several times before they are ultimately purchased by a 




The New York DDC protects itself by adhering to strict rules and by-laws, failure 
to comply with such rules leads to a member’s dismissal. The DDC rules also 
govern the members’ commercial activities including some technical aspects for 
validating contractual agreements.1693 There are also rigorous requirements for 
dealing with new partners, admission of new members and maintaining 
membership of good standing. The DDC also has a DDC Arbitration Panel which 
is formulated by persons who have gained the respect of their peers because of 
their vast industry experience. The panel handles matters such as complaints 
regarding payments or failure to deliver the diamonds promised. The DDC insists 
that the internal procedures for dispute resolution must be complied with by 




It has been submitted that the DDC Arbitration Panel is the guardian body of the 
industry’s reputation mechanism. Once the panel reaches a conclusion, it 
announces this judgment, the date which the decision was taken, the merchants 
involved and the amounts owed. A member, who fails to pay the judgment debt 
as decided by the panel, is dismissed from the DDC and such default is 
announced to all members. This information usually gets disseminated to other 
diamond bourses worldwide and this affects merchant reputation. The DDC’s 
procedures and procedure of other diamond bourses ensures that valuable 
                                                 
1692 Richman D. Barak The Antitrust of Reputation Mechanisms: Institutional Economics and Concerted 
Refusals to Deal Virginia Law Review 95 Va. L. Rev. 325 (2009) 332. 
1693 Ibid.. For example, an oral agreement only becomes binding when certain specific words are used to 
signify consensus. 
1694 Richman D. Barak The Antitrust of Reputation Mechanisms: Institutional Economics and Concerted 
Refusals to Deal Virginia Law Review 95 Va. L. Rev. 325 (2009) 333. 
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information concerning a merchant’s reputation is shared so that news may 
spread quickly to influence future trading relationships.1695
 
 
The diamond bourses efforts to protect the industry by adopting a reputation 
mechanism have been criticized as enforcing anti-competitive behavior through 
the protection of only certain cohesive family and business institutions that have 
a good reputation insofar as the DDC is concerned. The reputation mechanism in 
the diamond industry has also been criticized as contributing to the abuse of 
certain antitrust laws. These criticisms have been argued thoroughly in Professor 
Richman’s writings however they are not the focus in this chapter. What does 
emerge from the commentary concerning diamond bourse reputation 
mechanisms, relevant to this chapter, is that reputation mechanisms in the 
diamond industry supports the idea that to exclude the diamond thieves from 
legitimate diamond trade requires that the merchants that are dealt with are well 
known. This goes beyond just producing a few documents to prove the 
worthiness of the potential diamond dealer. 
 
In South Africa there were traditionally1696 four Diamond Exchanges that being 
divided into the Johannesburg Diamond Bourse and the Kimberley Diamond 
Bourse. Since the promulgation of the amendments to the Diamonds Act1697 the 
SADPMR determines the activities of trade in these centers and diamond trading 
houses in terms of the Diamonds Act1698
 
 must be registered and licensed as 
such accordingly. All these centres are associated with the international diamond 
trading bodies and have access to trade information from other diamond dealers’ 
clubs throughout the world. 
                                                 
1695 Richman D. Barak The Antitrust of Reputation Mechanisms: Institutional Economics and Concerted 
Refusals to Deal Virginia Law Review 95 Va. L. Rev. 325 (2009) 334. It is clear that reputation is a far 
more valuable trait for the diamond industry. 
1696 www.keyguide.net/bourses/ 12 August 2009. 
1697 56 of 1986. 
1698 56 of 1986. 
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The proposal for the submission that international diamond merchant bodies are 
associated is based on the existence of the international umbrella organization 
known as the World Federation of Diamond Bourses.1699 South African diamond 
merchants are also associated with this international body. The existence of this 
body while being criticized for its exclusivity contributes positively to the 
reputation mechanism which bars illicit diamond buying1700
 
 by ensuring that only 
‘reputable’ diamond merchants are actively trading in diamonds. 
In a similar fashion with all other international diamond merchants, diamond 
dealing centres in South Africa also face the serious threat of illicit diamond 
buying (IDB). This corruption is typically dealt with by the Gold and Diamond 
branch of the South African Police Service.1701
 
 This is why important information 
concerning undesirables in diamond trade must be circulated through bodies 
such as the World Federation of Diamond Bourses. This information can be used 
as part of criminal investigations. 
What is distinctive about the South African diamond industry however in 
comparison to the New York DDC is that the State and national courts are much 
more involved in South African diamond trade and dispute resolution whereas in 
the DDC the Arbitration Panel is used much more as an internal procedure for 
dispute resolution in diamond deals. However, both jurisdictions have the 
protection of the national law enforcement agencies when in comes to dealing 
with actual diamond related crime. It may also be difficult to uphold the reputation 
mechanism in South Africa particularly in light of the State’s Constitutional 
efforts1702
 
 to encourage new entrants into diamond trade and commerce in South 
Africa. 
                                                 
1699 Richman D. Barak The Antitrust of Reputation Mechanisms: Institutional Economics and Concerted 
Refusals to Deal Virginia Law Review 95 Va. L. Rev. 325 (2009) n 160. 
1700 See S v Mkonto 2001 (1) SACR (C) where the court dealt with the issue of illicit diamond buying as a 
threat to the industry. 
1701 Damarupurshad Ashok South African Diamond Handbook and Operating Diamond Mines Directory 
(2006) 17; 18. www.dme.gov.za 16 August 2009. 
1702 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996 sections 9(2) and 22. 
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10.5 Judicial Consideration of Diamond Related Crime 
10.5.1 The South African Position 
It is important at this juncture to study the manner in which the courts have dealt 
with the problem of corrupt activities surrounding diamond theft.1703
 
 To achieve 
this goal several reported judgments will be considered. These judgments will 
provide insight on the role played by the courts in protecting diamond trade from 
crime while also informing us of the factors that surround diamond crime and 
other civil misconduct cases. This will create a much needed broader 
understanding of the diamond laws insofar as the criminal law and civil law 
aspects relate to it.  
It is also possible that allegations of diamond theft in a particular case are not 
proved because all the elements of a crime1704
                                                 
1703 See additional cases as considered by the courts on this matter Queen v Klaas (1893-1895) 7 HCG 245, 
246. S v Gauss v Mukete; S v Petrus; S v Teodor 1980 ( 3 ) SA 770 (SWA) 771, 772 , National Union of 
Mineworkers v De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd (1997) 18 ILJ 1442 (CCMA) 1455 F. 
 cannot be established. This 
makes it difficult for the diamond producer who has an offending employee who 
cannot be criminally charged and as a result such an employer is forced to use 
other measures in law to discipline such an employee. This study of the judicial 
decisions on diamonds and crime will be very helpful to showing the manner in 
which the courts potentially deal with such alternative disciplinary measures in 
the diamond industry. 
1704 In certain diamond theft cases, the elements of a crime may be difficult to prove and reliance on 
statutory crime may be necessary for the State to prove its case. This may be in the case where diamonds 
are received as stolen property and the proof of their origin is insufficient to establish an one of the 
elements of the crime of theft, for example, as contained in section 265 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 
1977 which deals with the receiving stolen property knowing it to have been stolen. The section provides 
that ‘if the evidence on a charge of receiving stolen property knowing it to have been stolen does not prove 
that offence, but–  
     (a)  the offence of theft; or  
     (b)  an offence under section 37 of the General Law Amendment Act 62 of 1955 
the accused may be found guilty of the offence so proved.’ In terms  of section 265 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 51 of 1977 ‘the competent verdicts referred to in s 265 (a)–(b) are only permissible if the 
offence of receiving stolen property, knowing it to have been stolen, is not proved.’ This was confirmed 
dissenting judgment (on the facts) of Ogilvie Thompson JA in S v Bolus & another 1966 (4) SA 575 (A) 
578 G. This case has been identified as providing an example of where a court may resort to a conviction of 
theft in the absence of proof of guilty knowledge on the part of the accused at the time when he received 
the property, provided, of course, that all the elements of theft are proved. It should be noted that the 
reverse onus provision in s 37(1) of General Law Amendment Act 62 of 1955 is not unconstitutional, see 
appeal case S v Manamela and Others 2000 (1) SACR 414 (CC) 452 H. 
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Diamond theft has been a concern of the diamond industry from early days of the 
establishment of such an industry. This was evident in the case of R v Sam 
Ramothobi1705 where the accused was convicted and sentenced on a charge of 
theft of a rough diamond the property of De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd. The 
charge had arisen from the fact that the accused had neglected to deliver up to 
the detective department at Kimberley a rough and uncut diamond which he had 
found and picked up on certain ground not being the depositing floor or place 
worked by him under a prospecting licence. Alternatively, that the accused had 
stolen the rough diamond which was the property of De Beers.1706
 
 
In this case the court could not fully charge the accused for theft in the traditional 
sense and thus the case was remitted in order to take further evidence. This 
special circumstance had taken place because the accused had concealed the 
rough diamond at a place not belonging to him, that being a compound to which 
the Kimberley Floors belonged. What is clear in this case is that failure to deliver 
the rough diamond to the police would have been a more sound charge if it was 
found that the elements of the crime of theft were not established. The law on 
diamond theft has been more clarified since this earlier South African decision. 
 
In the decision of Ex Parte Rampi1707 an accused had been charged of theft of 
diamonds to the value of five thousand pounds. The issue in this case was not 
focused so much on the diamond theft as much as it was on the bail amount that 
had been set by the magistrate. The magistrate had set the bail amount at one 
thousand pounds in light of the crime and this was found to be excessive. The 
Attorney general left the matter in the court’s discretion and the amount was 
reduced accordingly to four hundred pounds.1708
 
  
                                                 
1705 (1899-1904) 9 HCG 380. 
1706 381. 
1707 1933 GWLD 27. 
1708 See case information. 
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This case is included in this study as an important starting point for diamond 
crime as it illustrates the attitude of the criminal courts in dealing with diamond 
related crime. It seems that by reducing bail and thereby making it easy for 
charged persons to obtain bail in such crimes, creates an impression that such 
theft is not so serious in that it does not threaten society as much as rape or 
murder, for example, therefore it is not necessary to make it difficult for persons 
charged with such crimes to interact with society while waiting for their trials.  
 
It is proposed that whether or not this attitude is correct, the danger that it may 
create is that it contributes to the lack of fear of the law in diamond related 
crimes. In such cases all a syndicate member needs to do is obtain easy bail1709
 
 
and engage in all kinds of activities to interrupt investigations which may 
eventually lead to a withdrawal of charges on the basis of lack of evidence 
particularly in the more difficult cases that the State must prove. This issue 
should be addressed particularly when considering the state of corruption that is 
trying to destroy a building block of the economy in the form of the diamond 
industry. It is submitted that the bail should not be used as a form of punishment 
indeed but it should be applied by the courts in the strictest manner so as to 
show the court’s commitment to the protection of the diamond industry. 
The issue of the release of a diamond theft suspect on bail and potentially 
hindering investigations was considered in John Rampi v The Attorney-
General.1710
                                                 
1709 Granted a syndicate member may engage in this obstructive manner even if his or her bail was high or 
low, however, it is submitted that a higher more stringent bail sends a message to the public in such 
matters. 
 The accused was refused bail on the sole ground put forward by the 
public prosecutor that investigations were still continuing and he feared that if the 
accused were at liberty he might interfere with the investigations and so defeat 
the ends of justice. The application to re-consider the granting of the bail was 
refused as it was shown that the charge related to the theft of diamonds a portion 
1710 1933 GWLD 11. 
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of which were found on the accused.1711
 
 This decision is justifiable in light of the 
submissions on the interference with investigations however it appears that there 
were other co-accused persons (some ‘Europeans’) in this case who had been 
granted bail so this decision is not the most exemplary one for bail applications in 
diamond related crime. 
In Q v Smith,1712 S was employed as an after-sorter of debris in a diamond mine. 
He was paid no wages but received a percentage of the value of any diamonds 
that he found. The nature of his work was such that he was able to commence or 
discontinue work at will and was therefore not a servant of the employee in terms 
of section 58 of the repealed Diamond Trade Act 48 of 1882. section was 
charged with the theft of diamonds under section 58 however after presenting 
evidence that he was not a servant in terms of the Act, he was discharged. It was 
found however that section could be charged in terms of section 2 of the Act in 
that he had in his possession rough and uncut diamonds without being able to 
give satisfactory account as to his right to such possession.1713
 
 
S pleaded autrefois acquit on the grounds that he had already in regard to the 
same facts been charge and acquitted of contravening section 58 of the Act. The 
court rejected this plea and found section guilty of diamond theft in terms of 
section 2 of the Act because he was not a servant n terms of section 58 however 
this did not bar the State from bringing a second charge that is distinct from the 
first with other evidence provided. In this case proof of unlawful possession was 
necessary and since it was proved the appeal was dismissed.1714
 
 In this case it 
was quite clear that the court was not prepared to entertain what it termed an 
ingenuous defence to avoid prosecution for diamond theft. 
                                                 
1711 12. 




In the rather racially biased case of Queen v Keast1715 the appellant was charged 
before the Kimberley Magistrate court with the contravention of section 3 of the 
by-laws approved in terms of the Griqualand West Ordinance No. 11 of 1880 and 
adopted by De Beers’ Company. This by-law provided that, it shall be lawful for 
the company to appoint guards for the purpose of preventing any person or 
persons from entering or leaving the mines, mining areas or depositing floors, 




Further, the by-law provided that, any unauthorized person who shall be found 
within the mines, mining areas or any of the depositing floors shall be liable to 
arrest and on conviction be liable to a further fine. A strange and racist provision 
was added to the by-law and it provided that, for the carrying out and 
enforcement of a proper and efficient system of searching the servants employed 
in and about such mines it shall be compulsory ‘for all employers of native labour’ 
in such mines to clothe the ‘natives’ so employed in some suitable uniform or 
dress for preventing as far as possible the secretion of diamonds.1717
 
 
It is understandable that this by-law was framed in a different political 
dispensation when compared to the Constitutional dispensation which South 
Africa has at present. The problem with this by-law is that it labeled only the 
black employees, generically termed as ‘the natives’ as diamond thieves who 
must be clothed in apparel that labels them as such. This was a derogatory 
treatment of employees particularly since the outfits were designed to prevent 
theft by the ‘natives.’1718
 
 
The Supreme Court also confirmed this view but it did not base its reasoning on 
principles of equality and dignity arguments, by stating that although the object 
                                                 
1715 (1889-1890) 7 SC 355. 
1716 358. 
1717 Ibid. 
1718 360.  
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aimed at by the ordinance may have been to assist in preventing diamond 
stealing. This did not authorize the framing of the by-laws for any purpose other 
than the proper and efficient searching and clothing of servants and that to this 
extent it only attempts to prevent the theft and removal of diamonds. It was held 
by the court that anything more than that on the part of the framers of the 




In making this decision, Judge De Villiers CJ actually made a reference to 
another case where an ordinance was promulgated by Town Council to deal with 
the registration of all dogs so as to control a public nuisance by preventing the 
prowling about of dogs with no owners. He said that in that case the regulation 
promulgated by the town council was for general utility and was thus 
acceptable.1720
 
 It is submitted that the reference to this case in this judgment 
creates a stark picture of how the Supreme Court was able to take a decision 
without reference to Constitutional values as they had not been adopted at that 
stage to protect human dignity for the ‘native’ mine employees in this case 
insofar as the ordinance in question was concerned. It is submitted that this was 
stated by the learned Judge so as to illustrate that some regulations are 
justifiable for controlling dogs as a nuisance but not for human beings. 
In R v Khumalo1721
                                                 
1719 Ibid. 
 the accused was charged in the Rustenburg magistrate court 
for theft or attempted theft diamonds from the Mallin Diamond mines. 
Alternatively the accused was also charged with contravening section 103(1)(a) 
of Act 44 of 1927 in that he was engaged in unlawfully digging, prospecting on 
the mine without prescribed authority. The accused was found guilty on the 
alternative charge and this conviction and sentence was being appealed in this 
case. In the appeal it was established that the appellant was employed by the 
Mallin Diamond Mine as a night watchman (‘a police boy’ in true apartheid 
1720 Ibid. 
1721 [1952] 2 All SA 361 (T). 
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language) as a witness testified that he had discovered the appellant sifting 
through diamondiferous gravel which he had scraped from the mine. The 
appellant was searched but there were no diamonds found on him only the mine 
gravel which was still in his pockets. The appellant denied any such sifting.1722
 
  
Court found, it is submitted, correctly by stating that the appeal should fail 
because the facts of the case show that when the appellant was found he was in 
fact ‘prospecting and digging for diamonds’ in an unauthorized manner using an 
iron hoop to scratch among the gravel. Further, there was an established criminal 
intent present in the case because there were sufficient means employed by the 
appellant to attain the objective of committing a crime.1723
 
 This case serves as a 
useful protection of the diamond industry by preventing the illustrated threat in 
casu of uncontrolled diamond mining, a situation which has long been a problem 
in most African diamond rich States. 
The case of Commissioner for SARS and Another v TFN Diamond Cutting Works 
(Pty) Ltd1724 provides some insight on the law pertaining to the liability of the 
State in cases where diamonds have been stolen while in State custody. The law 
of delict played a large role in answering this question in casu as it was essential 
to consider the relationship between State as master of servant employee and 
the potential vicarious liability that may have ensued from such a relationship. 
Further, the court also applied the provisions of the Customs and Excise Act1725 
to spell out State liability and exemptions to such liability, if any under the 
Customs and Excise Act.1726
 
 
The facts of the case show that TFN Diamond Cutting Works (Pty) Ltd (‘TFN,’ the 
Plaintiff in the court a quo) is a purchaser of rough diamonds from a variety of 
sources in South Africa which it then cuts and polishes for resale. In October 
                                                 
1722 363. 
1723 365. 
1724 [2005] 2 All SA 455 (SCA). See Michael O. Dale Mining Law Annual Survey, Juta (2005) 449; 450. 
1725 91 of 1964. 
1726 91 of 1964. 
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2000 a diamond dealer of long standing reputation and the director of TFN 
traveled to New York with a consignment of diamonds. The diamonds had been 
duly inspected and sealed by the South African Diamond Board in accordance 
with the prescribed practice of the South African customs authorities.1727
 
 
The export documentation with due course possible re-importation had been 
lodged with the employees of the Commissioner of the South African Revenue 
Services (‘SARS’ first Defendant in the court a quo). Some of the diamonds were 
sold in New York and some returned with the diamond dealer to South Africa. 
Upon his arrival at the airport, the dealer declared the diamonds to the 
employees of the defendant. As a result of some misunderstanding the original 
invoice for the diamonds could not be produced by the dealer. Since the customs 
officials at the airport were not content with the faxed invoice, the diamonds were 
detained in a plastic pouch supplied by one Sadler. Sadler being a clearing agent 
and employee of Brinks SA (Pty) Ltd. Sadler accompanied by one Daniel and 
Cuthbert both employees of the defendant took the diamonds to a strong room at 
the customs hall where the sealed pouch was placed in a locked safe. Sadler 




Sadler went to the airport with the duly completed documentation to secure the 
release of the diamonds. These documents were presented to an employee of 
the defendant, one Tycoon who was on duty. Having accepted the 
documentation without any query Tycoon went to the safe and returned to inform 
Sadler that the diamonds were missing. This matter was reported to the police. 
The plaintiff believed that the diamonds were stolen by one Joseph and 
continued to sue the defendant for breach of obligations under a contract of 
                                                 
1727 456 par. 2. 
1728 457 par. 3. 
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deposit and alternatively asserted a delictual claim on the basis of the 
defendant’s breach of a duty of care owed to it by the defendant.1729
 
 
The defendant admitted that the package containing diamonds had been 
detained by its employees and it was established at trial that the diamonds had 
been stolen during Joseph Matshiva’s shift as he was in control of the safe and 
the strong room at the time of the disappearance of the diamonds. This 
persuasive inference was not challenged on appeal.1730
 
 
Counsel for the defendant argued that the defendant’s employee was not acting 
within the course and scope of his employment by stealing the diamonds 
therefore the defendant should not be held vicariously liable. Secondly, Counsel 
for the defendant also argued that in terms of section 17(3) of the Customs and 
Excise Act1731 it was exempt from liability to the plaintiff by virtue of this section 
which provides that ‘The State or any officer shall in no case be liable in respect 
of any loss or diminution of or damage to any goods in a State warehouse or in 
respect of any loss or damage sustained by reason of wrong delivery of such 
goods.’ Further, the definition of State warehouse in terms of the Customs and 
Excise Act1732 is defined as ‘any premises provided by the State for the deposit of 
goods for the security thereof and of the duties due thereon or pending 
compliance with the provisions of any law in respect of such goods.’1733
 
 
The court did not entertain the possibility of making a finding that would allow the 
employee of the State to simply steal the plaintiff’s diamonds without due 
consequences. In justifying this conclusion the court established, with Counsel 
for the defendant conceding the point, that Joseph Matshiva had been negligent 
in guarding the contents of the safe. In such cases an employer must be held 
vicariously liable for any loss occasioned in consequence of such negligence 
                                                 
1729 457 par. 5. 
1730 457 par. 5; 6. 
1731 91 of 1964. 
1732 91 of 1964. 
1733 457 par. 7; 458 par. 10. 
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particularly since negligence is a form of fault, so too is intention. The liability in 
this case attached to the defendant because its servant owed the plaintiff a duty 
to keep the diamonds safe but failed to do so.1734
 
 
With regard to the second contention for an exemption of the defendant in terms 
of section 17(3) of the Customs and Excise Act,1735the court found as follows. 
Firstly, the court quickly settled the issue concerning whether or not the customs 
hall at the Johannesburg International Airport was a State warehouse as 
contemplated by the Customs and Excise Act1736by holding that it was in fact a 
State warehouse as contemplated in the Customs and Excise Act.1737  Further, 
the court settled that it would be preposterous for Legislature to have intended to 
include theft in the exemptions covered by the section of the Customs and Excise 
Act1738 as that would mean an employee entrusted with the responsibility of 
safeguarding goods could with impunity steal the goods and thereafter invoke the 
protection afforded by the section.1739
 
 This decision is most cogent and plausible 
as it also encourages the State to monitor its employees so as to not steal 
diamonds that have been entrusted to it. 
With regard to how the courts have dealt with the application of labour laws as a 
means to discipline an employee for allegedly engaging in diamond related 
misconduct that falls short of a crime, the case of De Beers Consolidated Mines 
Ltd v National Union of Mineworkers and Another1740
                                                 
1734 458 par. 9. 
 is important. This case was 
an appeal by the employer against a decision by the court a quo granting the 
second plaintiff, one Mochumi, reinstatement and six months pay back after he 
was dismissed by the appellant employer. Mochumi had been employed as a 
1735 91 of 1964. 
1736 91 of 1964. 
1737 91 of 1964. 
1738 91 of 1964. 
1739 459 par. 12. 
1740 [1998] JOL 3760 (LAC); [1998] 12 BLLR 1201 (LAC). 
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plant or extract operator by the appellant at the Kimberley metallurgical plant and 
had nearly ten years experience.1741
 
 
The plant’s principal functions involved the recovery of diamonds from 
accumulative diamondiferous material derived from underground and dump 
sources throughout Kimberley. It was common cause that the material recovered 
was of great value and many security measures were adopted by the employer 
to prevent the constant threat of diamond theft, as a result a high degree of trust 
was expected of Mochumi in his duties. Further, Mochumi was expected to follow 




During mining operations Mochumi was captured on video in an act that was 
regarded as an illegitimate search for diamonds. The footage showed Mochumi 
shining a torch across the diamondiferous material on the screen, picking up the 
material with his right hand and shining a torch into it, rubbing it with his thumb 
and left hand and returning the material onto the screen. The appeal court had to 
decide whether this evidence showed evidence of an illegitimate search for 




The court found in favour of the employer in this case on the basis that 
Mochumi’s failure to act according to prescribed company policy showed 
evidence of an illegitimate search for diamonds.  Mochumi was not to tamper 
with the diamondiferous material and after many contradictory statements the 
court made a finding that even Mochumi himself could not give a convincing 
explanation for his conduct. It was held by the court that Mochumi had handled 
the material in question with an oblique purpose which would result in a 
dismissal. It was found in conclusion therefore, that the company was correct in 
                                                 
1741 2 par. 2. 
1742 4 par. 11. 
1743 7 par. 23. 
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Clearly this case also sends a message to diamond workers to respect company 
policies and procedures as they are designed to keep diamond theft temptation 
to a bare minimum in a particular workplace. Therefore, to breach such 
procedures is breach of trust. A diamond producer stands to lose out on vast 
revenue if such an employer cannot have employees it can trust to carry out the 
work with required integrity. The unfortunate part of this case is that the 
employee had enough experience to know exactly what was expected of him and 
in spite of this acted contrary to company policy. 
 
The case of National Director of Public Prosecutions v Naidoo and Others1745
 
 is 
important in this chapter to conclude the South African court’s consideration of 
diamond crime. More specifically the facts of this case show that the issue was 
the possession of unwrought precious metal alleged to have been stolen from the 
mines. This case is an important decision as it was dealt with under the 
Prevention of Organized Crime Act 121 of 1998. It is respectfully submitted that 
the principles from this case may be applied to diamond related criminal matters 
which are often plagued by organized crime syndicates. 
10.5.2 Some Foreign Law Perspective 
It is important at this stage to consider cases from other jurisdictions as useful 
comparative guides and persuasive sources of law pertaining to illicit diamond 
dealings. It is obviously impossible to report or study all the possible useful 
diamond crime related cases from all possible jurisdictions, therefore for the 
purposes of this section a few cases from foreign jurisdictions will be studied just 
to gain international or foreign perspective on such issues. As a starting point this 
study will consider the State of Namibia as a diamond producing neighbor to 
                                                 
1744 11 par. 37; par. 41. 
1745 2006 (2) SACR 403 (T). 
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South Africa. The case is reported as S v De Beer1746
 
 and involves an appeal 
against judgment and sentence for a charge of buying illegally or receiving near 
Windhoek rough and uncut diamonds valued at R77 946. 
It was common cause that the accused persons in this case were caught as a 
result of a police trap that had been set. In dismissing the appeal against the 
sentence and conviction, the learned O’Linn J. made the following useful 
comments relating to criminal activity surrounding diamond theft in casu. Firstly, 
O’Linn J. did not accept the plea of innocence on the part of the accused 
because the judge could not accept that two foreigners would simply come to 
Namibia in the hope of securing some future undefined transaction.  
 
O’Linn J. also pointed out that the fact that the appellant had been careful and 
intentional enough to bring all the right equipment along to test the merchandise 
(diamond testing apparatus), left little room for typifying him as a naïve and 
ignorant buyer who trusted strangers so easily. Further, it was obvious that with 
the appellant’s background in diamond evaluation, he had paid for the rough 
diamonds he had seen and was thus guilty of illicit diamond buying in terms of 
the law. Muller AJ in a slightly dissenting statement stated that while consistency 
in diamond theft and like matters is essential, there also needed to be an 
emphasis on making decisions to be determined on a case by case basis with 
each matter being decided on its own merits. 
 
What this limited consideration of foreign diamond crime related cases illustrates, 
is that diamond theft and illicit diamond buying are very serious international 
concerns. These high risk factors of the diamond industry inevitably affect the 
economy from a revenue production perspective as well as having high risk 
insurance implications. However it is clear that these cases are mostly subject to 
the criminal laws of the country involved.   
                                                 




The factors mentioned above were considered in the English case of R v Eshaqh 
Basalian1747 where the appellant had pleaded guilty to five counts of jewellery 
theft. The appellant had been involved in the business of being a diamond dealer 
and had received diamonds for approval from other dealers. The appellant failed 
either to pay for these received diamonds or to return them. The appellant was 
sentenced to five years imprisonment however on appeal it was found that such 
a sentence was excessive particularly upon consideration of the fact that the 
appellant was a man of previous good character, who had also pleaded guilty. 
Interestingly the fate of the diamonds in this case was unknown even to the 
appellant as he himself had stated that he was awaiting payment for them.1748
 
 
This case seems to be a classic case of a diamond thief who was subsequently 
robbed as well. It is submitted that the court was correct in being sympathetic in 
these circumstances. Further, in light of the statement by Muller AJ in S v De 
Beer1749
 
 it seems justified that a case by case basis for dealing with diamond 
thefts should be adopted in such cases as not all cases will justify a rigid 
consistent approach in order to find common ground or similar punishment to fit 
all cases of this nature. This means that an arrogant notorious diamond thief 
cannot be compared with a diamond thief, who has admitted his or her mistake 
when such a crime is brought before a court. 
In the case of Kay v Shauman1750
                                                 
1747 (1989) 11 Cr. App. R. (S.) 42. 
 the English court took the view that is in 
agreement with South African law of delict and the law pertaining to goods 
entrusted for in storage. In this case a plaintiff diamond dealer had supplied 
some diamonds to the defendant who had a small retail jewellery business 
hoping to sell them to a customer. The diamonds were stolen. The plaintiff sued 
the defendant for the loss of the diamonds. An important established custom was 
1748 42 col. 2. 
1749 [1991] 4 All SA 207 (NmH). 
1750 1954 WL 15791. 
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mentioned in this case which provides that it was customary among dealers and 
brokers of the London Diamond Bourse that a person who took goods on 
approval was responsible for them until they were paid for or returned. The 
plaintiff had not established that such a custom existed in this case because the 
defendant was a retailer, however, since there was an express oral contract that 
the defendant would be responsible for the diamonds, the defendant was liable. 
 
In a case reported under the European Union case reports1751the case of 
Kamaran Zabihi v Mahmood Janzemini, Yousef Massodipour, Alounak Kebab 
Limited1752decided by the High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, it emerged 
that in the case of alleged diamond theft in the form of jewellery handed over in 
pursuance of an agreement to sell such jewellery, in such a case, whatever 
damages that arise out of such an agreement will be assessed according to what 
was intended by the parties when entering such a transaction. In this case the 
court dismissed the claims for breach of terms of the agreement on the grounds 
that there was no proof that an agreement was entered into showing that the 
defendant had assumed responsibility for the safe custody of the jewellery in 
question or the sale proceeds.1753
 
 It emerges from this case that a court must 
naturally apply the laws of contract where necessary particularly if there has not 
been proof of the crime of theft of diamonds, no matter how common such thefts 
may be. 
Under the Canadian Statute cited as the Railway Act1754
                                                 
1751 See Westlaw International for educational purposes. 
 liability for diamond loss 
is expressly provided for. It is submitted that because of the common risk of theft 
of commodities such as diamonds, that the Canadian law has to be explicit about 
the liability of the State and other companies with respect to traffic on the railway 
systems used by persons in such circumstances. This provision is of particular 
importance since there risk is often increased when goods of this nature are 
1752 HC06C2426 [2008] EWHC 2910 (Ch). 
1753 Par. 311 of the judgment by Mr. Justice Blackburne 28 November 2008. 
1754 R.S.B.C. 1996, C 935. 
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being carried by State agencies or in the custody of State agencies or other 
companies to which the statute applies.1755 The Canadian statute1756
 
 provides for 
exemption from liability but only where the company protected is aware, through 
its agent or servant of the diamonds to be carried and have taken responsibility 
for their safe keeping: 
‘A company is not liable for any total or partial loss of gold 
or silver, diamonds…or precious stones…including every 
document forming the title or evidence of the title to any 
property of any kind, or articles of great value not being 
ordinary merchandise, by reason of any robbery, theft, 
removal or secreting of them, unless their true nature and 
value has, at the time of delivery for conveyance, been 
declared by the owner or shipper to the company or its 




With regard to law pertaining to the curbing of illicit diamond trading, EU 
legislation is clear on this matter as appears in the ‘Council Common Position of 
29 October 2001 on combating the illicit traffic in conflict diamonds, as a 
contribution to the settlement of conflicts.’1758
                                                 
1755 See Commissioner for SARS and Another v TFN Diamond Cutting Works (Pty) Ltd [2005] 2 All SA 
455 (SCA) 457 par. 5, 6 where it was established that the diamonds in casu were stolen while in State 
custody by an employee of the State.  
The Council Common Position of 29 
October 2001 on combating the illicit traffic in conflict diamonds, as a contribution 
1756 Railway Act, 1996  R.S.B.C. 1996, C 935 section 198(3). 
1757 Ibid. The problem with this declaration is that the servants or agents of the company may very well 
steal the diamonds or other listed precious goods. This was the exact issue in the case of Rex v Fourie and 
Another 1937 AD 31 p 36 where the two accused in this case were charged and convicted of stealing a box 
containing a quantity of gold bullion belonging to the Standard Bank of South Africa. At the time of theft 
the gold bullion was in the lawful custody of the Administration of the South African Railways and 
Harbours. This was also the mischief in Commissioner for SARS and Another v TFN Diamond Cutting 
Works (Pty) Ltd [2005] 2 All SA 455 (SCA) 457 par. 5, 6. 
1758 EU: Common Position 2001/758/CFSP Celex No. 301E0758 Official Journal L 286, 30 October (2001) 
2. 
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to the settlement of conflicts1759 text provides very clearly that having regard to 
the Treaty of the EU1760 the EU is aware that conflict diamonds fuel some of the 
bloodiest conflicts in Africa and therefore measures are adopted and deemed 
necessary to prevent and resolve such conflicts.1761 To make a contribution to 
the end of these conflicts the EU’s common position takes cognizance of the 
KPCS resolutions supported by the UN.1762 Further in light of this the EU makes 
a commitment in law to prevent and resolve African conflict by promoting 
universal respect for embargoes related to the illegal exploitation off and trade in 
high value commodities.1763
 
 It is evident from this EU legislation that persons who 
act contrary to this Common position of the EU community, such persons will be 
subject to the criminal and civil sanction of EU law. 
10.6 Conclusion 
It has been established in this chapter that corruption, crime and other 
misconduct is a major national as well as international problem in diamond trade. 
These have been identified in the form of activities pertaining to illicit diamond 
buying, diamond theft (whether by individuals, State employees or syndicates), 
other diamond related misconduct such as failure to report a discovery of a 
diamond and illegitimate prospecting for diamonds. It is also clear that the police 
and the courts have been active in making sure that such activities are 
addressed with appropriate force.  
 
This is crucial since the diamond industry must be protected in order to continue 
to support the economy of a particular country. It is therefore essential that the 
private citizens of a diamond producing country be made aware of the negative 
effects of diamond related crime on the economy so as to support the work of the 
                                                 
1759 EU: Common Position 2001/758/CFSP Celex No. 301E0758 Official Journal L 286, 30 October (2001) 
2. 
1760 Article 15 thereof which provides that, ‘the Council shall adopt common positions. Common positions 
shall define the approach of the Union to a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature. Member 
States shall ensure that their national policies conform to the common positions.’ 
1761 Preamble section 1. 
1762 Sections 4, 5, 6, 7. 
1763 Section 8. 
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State in the protection of the diamond industry. Further, it is proposed that 
whatever established measures that have been used by the industry to protect 
itself, such as registration of dealers and dealings with reputable diamond 
merchants and the use of advanced security measures to protect the industry. 
Such measures should be upheld by the international community and not overly 
criticized as they have proved to be effective and lawful over time. Ultimately 
diamond trade must be limited to those who will not pervert justice when trading 
in this precious commodity. 
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It is important at this stage to consider the workforce representative bodies in the 
form of mining and diamond Unions as well as other diamond related trade 
structures that contribute significantly to the diamond industry in South Africa.1764 
A study on diamond trade in South Africa is not complete without recognizing the 
voice and force of these bodies, particularly in light of the fact that they are 
Constitutionally protected bodies. As previously discussed in chapter 1 of this 
work, trade unions are bodies or associations that are often active in the diamond 
trading and mining in general, the Constitution provides expressly for the rights of 
forming such bodies.1765
 
 It is therefore a crucial part of the study to acknowledge 
the participation, influence and contribution union structures.  
In the case of DB Investments SA v De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd & De 
Beers Centenary AG1766
                                                 
1764 For greater mineral industry perspectives see Bastida Elizabeth International and Comparative Mineral 
Law and Policy: Trends and Prospects, Kluwer International (2005). 
 which was brought before the Competition Tribunal, 
Unions were invited to participate in merger proceedings. The participation of the 
Union in this merger was a significant step forward in ensuring fair and equitable 
representation by and for workers in the diamond mining industry. This Union 
participation further assisted the court in obtaining a clear understanding of the 
public interest concerns of the mining operations industry in light of the proposed 
merger. The Unions representations in this case are crucial and appear in the 
indented text below. What one sees in these concerns is a strong drive to protect 
employment for workers. The merger was granted by the Tribunal on the basis of 
the certain public interest factors, all of which were fully appreciated and 
communicated to the Unions. The Unions were able to make submissions on the 
issues raised as demonstrated by the quote below taken from the proceedings: 
1765 Chapter 2, Bill of Rights Section 23(2) – (6). 
1766 Case Number: 20/LM/March 2001. 
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‘Public Interest Considerations 
35. Of the 33 trade unions notified of the transaction, only 
four contacted the Commission advising that they wished to 
participate in the merger proceedings. 
NAWUSA,1767 representing employees from the National 
Amalgamated Workers Union of South Africa; NUMSA,1768 
representing employees from the National Union of 
Metalworkers of SA; NUM,1769 or the National Union of 
Mineworkers and FAWU1770
36. NUMSA and NUM expressed the concern that the 
proposed transaction might be part of a broader 
restructuring process, entailing job losses. They sought 
sight of a list of CHL subsidiaries to determine whether any 
fact they were active in any industries affecting the trade 
union members. They further sought undertakings from 
both De Beers and Anglo guaranteeing no future job losses 
in respect of their members. NUM also raised the concern 
that the merger might precipitate an outflow of funds from 
the country in the form of dividends and interest. Further, 
the fact that DBI would be an unlisted foreign company 
would raise transparency and accountability issues, 
affecting their employees in the long-term. 
 or the Food & Allied Workers 
Union. 
37. At the hearing, only FAWU appeared to make oral 
submissions. It represents members employed by Anglo’s 
subsidiaries in the sugar and farming industries. FAWU’s 
concerns were centered around Anglo’s future 
                                                 
1767See www.sabinet.co.za/sabinetlaw/gazindex/20071207.html 19 March 2010. 
1768 www.numsa.org.za/ 19 March 2010. 
1769 www.num.org.za/ 19 March 2010. 
1770 www.fawu.org.za/ 19 March 2010. 
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restructurings, specifically if Anglo opted out of non-mining 
industries as it scaled down in favour of its core operations. 
They were anxious that this would lead to potential job 
losses. They also commented that the transaction would 
result in increased concentration and dominance, raising 
the risk of restrictive business practices arising. 
38. The merging parties were prepared to offer an 
undertaking on behalf of DBI that the instant transaction 
would not result to any change in employment conditions or 
job losses post-merger in relation to De Beers’s employees. 
This undertaking was accepted by the Attorneys for NUM 
and NUMSA. However, DBI contended it could not grant an 
undertaking in perpetuity, DBI would have to in the normal 
course of events, review employment levels from time to 
time. They pointed out that in any event, FAWU had no 
members employed by De Beers. The unions remained 
adamant that Anglo furnish an undertaking confirming that 
there would be no employment implications or changes to 
employment conditions post merger. 
39. With regard to NUM’s concerns, the parties contended 
that the Reserve Bank’s prior approval of the transaction 
signified that the potential migration of funds outside the 
country was not a major concern.’1771
 
 
It is crucial to understand the diamond trade organizational structures as an 
organization is not made only by management but is a co-dependency between 
these structures. In the past the voices of the workforce Unions were not as well 
protected in law as they are in the Constitutional dispensation. Therefore, it is 
important to acknowledge the contributions, the motivations and aspirations of 
                                                 
1771 DB Investments SA v De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd & De Beers Centenary AG Case Number: 
20/LM/March 2001 paragraphs 35 - 39. 
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these bodies as they represent a more organized method of negotiation1772
 
 and 
communication between management and the workforce of the diamond 
industry. 
In the same way it is important for this study to also acknowledge other trade 
related structures and bodies that make the diamond industry function efficiently. 
This is done by increasing friendly trade relations with neighboring States as 
emphasized in the Southern African Customs Union (SACU)1773 agreement;1774 
the guardianship of international trade as provided for by the International Trade 
Administration Commission (ITAC)1775 and the contributions to the diamond 
industry by the DTI.1776
                                                 
1772 See for example, De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v National Union of Mineworkers and Another 
[1998] JOL 3760 (LAC); [1998] 12 BLLR 1201 (LAC); National Union of Mine Workers & Others and 
RSA Geological Services (A Division of De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd) (2004) 25 ILJ 410 (ARB). 
 By studying these bodies in light of diamond trade, this 
chapter aims to complete the puzzle with regard to national structures that are 
significant in diamond trade laws in South Africa. This will be achieved by 
elaborating on the involvement of these relevant organizations and their role in 
aspects of diamond trade. 
1773 This acronym must not be confused with that of the South African Communications Union. 
1774 Which is to be implemented in terms of section 4 of the International Trade Administration Act 71 of 
2002. 
1775 As established in terms of the International Trade Administration Act 71 of 2002 section 1 definition. 
The preamble states as follows: ‘To establish the International Trade Administration Commission; to 
provide for the functions of the Commission and for the regulation of its procedures; to provide for the 
implementation of certain aspects of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) Agreement in the 
Republic; to provide, within the framework of the SACU Agreement, for continued control of import and 
export of goods and amendment of customs duties; and to provide for matters connected therewith.’ See 
section 7 of the Act which provides for the establishment of the ITAC. The section provides that ‘(1) The 
International Trade Administration Commission is hereby established, and  
        (a) has jurisdiction throughout the Republic;  
        (b) is a juristic person; and  
        (c) must exercise its functions in accordance with this Act and any other relevant law.  
(2) The Commission-  
        (a) is independent and subject only to-  
           (i)  the Constitution and the law;  
           (ii) any Trade Policy Statement or Directive issued by the Minister in terms of section 5; and  
           (iii) any notice issued by the Minister in terms of section 6; and  
        (b)  must be impartial and must perform its functions without fear, favour or prejudice.  
(3) Each organ of state must assist the Commission to maintain its independence and impartiality, and to 
exercise its authority and carry out its functions effectively.’ 
1776 www.dti.gov.za/ 19 March 2010. The DTI is involved in development initiatives such as Small 
business development, supplying documentation for BBBEE codes of good practice. 
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Whenever there are significant diamond industry related economic effects, it is 
not unusual to see the Unions raising their voices to represent the views of 
workers’ rights.1777
 
 The views of the Unions are often captured significantly in the 
media especially when strikes are involved with an unfortunate disadvantage of 
negotiations by media and the fortunate advantage of creating some kind of 
transparency in the significant decisions that are taken by mine management in 
consultation with the mining Unions. The role of Unions will be even more 
significant in light of the recession and the vast loss of employment that is taking 




                                                 
1777 See Mail & Guardian, Business & Labour De Beers Optimistic About Talks with Union 24 July 2008 
where it was reported that the world’s top diamond producer De Beers was optimistic about wage 
negotiations with South Africa’s largest mine Workers’ union in a bid to avert a strike at its mines in the 
country. NUM was reported as representing 3 400 workers was negotiating for wage increases in light of 
the rising fuel, food and electricity prices coupled with a string of interest-rate hikes in housing. The effects 
of the recession on Botswana mining were also reported in the Mail & Guardian, Business & Mining De 
Beers Halts Mining in Botswana 24 February 2009. Once again the Botswana Mine Workers Union was 
active in the negotiations surrounding these difficult times for the industry. 
See also, Alex Duval Smith Revealed; Cruel Fate of Miners who Found Perfect Blue Diamond, The 
Observer 10 May 2009. It was reported in this newspaper report that the National Union of Mine Workers 
(NUM) was supporting complaints of racisms and poor working conditions in Petra’s management of the 
Cullinan mine in Pretoria. It is noted that the NUM in this case was also in negotiations with two other 
smaller Unions to address the problems of workers in the mine. It is also noted in the records of NUM that 
because of the recession an estimated 20 000 jobs have been lost to mine workers since October 2008 and 
the Unions are calling for State leadership to develop investor friendly policies to boost mining operations 
in South Africa. After all it is the workers who provide the necessary labour that produces these high 
quality diamonds from the mines. The management of the Cullinan mine were also given an opportunity to 
state their case and they confessed that while the Cullinan mine was a small mine by global standards, they 
were sure that it could stay in operation for at least forty years and  in that time help the village to recover 
and be reborn as a tourist destination (example www.goldreefcity.co.za/ 21 March 2010, a South African 
tourist destination). They also stated that any racial imbalances in the mine were inherited from previous 
management, De Beers however it seems that the workers believe that conditions were far better when De 
Beers was in management. In another newspaper report, The Citizen Union Threatens Diamond Core with 
Labour Court Thursday, 21 May 2009 it was reported that Solidarity was threatening to approach the 
Labour Court if the retrenchments continued at African Diamond explorer, Diamond Core, at this time 
nearly 200 employees were retrenched. The Union’s complaints are that the company was withholding its 
financial statements and this was said to be hampering the facilitation process and therefore it interpreted 
any further retrenchments as unfair dismissals which would be challenged in court if the retrenchments 
continue. It is clear that the Unions’ role in diamond trade is to ensure that Workers’ rights are respected. 
Obviously because of the recession the roles of all diamond stakeholders involved will be challenged. 
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11.2 Unions that are Relevant to the Diamond Industry in South Africa 
The two most notable Unions in the diamond industry are the National Union of 
Mineworkers (NUM)1778 and the South African Diamond Workers Union 
(SADWU).1779 Solidarity (Diamond Export)1780 is also another notable diamond 
industry Union. These Unions are not the only diamond relevant Unions there are 
others, for example, the Jewellers and Goldsmith Union (GU)1781 however for the 
purposes of this study the contributions of these two main diamond industry 
related Unions will be at the forefront (NUM & SADWU).1782 This is due to the 
fact that as diamond industry related Unions these bodies have been most active 




Trade Unions are also often involved in development strategies such as national 
bargaining workshops in an effort to contribute to the development of best trade 
policies relevant to each particular industry. At a national Second Annual 
National Collective Bargaining Workshop held in Johannesburg on 29 to 30 May 
2008 under the sponsorship of the National Labour and Economic Development 
Institute (NALEDI) and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, the National Union of 
Mineworkers (NUM) participated and a report was prepared on the development 
strategies that emerged from that workshop. 
                                                 
1778 www.num.org.za/ 19 March 2010. 
1779 This acronym must not be confused with that of the South African Domestic Workers Union. 
1780 www.solidarity.co.za/ 19 March 2010. 
1781 home.intekom.com/fedusa/affiliates/ 19 March 2010. See also 
www.labourguide.co.za/trade_unions.htm 19 March 2010. 
1782 It is also important to mention at this stage that there is also the Federation of Unions of South Africa 
(FEDUSA) to which SADWU and GU are affiliated. 
1783 See examples of NUM’s activities in the diamond industry.  Mail & Guardian, Business & Labour De 
Beers Optimistic About Talks with Union 24 July 2008 where it was reported that the world’s top diamond 
producer De Beers was optimistic about wage negotiations with South Africa’s largest mine Workers’ 
union in a bid to avert a strike at its mines in the country. NUM was reported as representing 3 400 workers 
was negotiating for wage increases in light of the rising fuel, food and electricity prices coupled with a 
string of interest-rate hikes in housing. The effects of the recession on Botswana mining were also reported 
in the Mail & Guardian, Business & Mining De Beers Halts Mining in Botswana 24 February 2009. Once 
again the Botswana Mine Workers Union was active in the negotiations surrounding these difficult times 
for the industry. National Union of Mineworkers v De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd (1997) 18 ILJ 1442 
(CCMA), National Union Of Mineworkers & Others and RSA Geological Services (A Division of De Beers 
Consolidated Mines Ltd) (2004) 25 ILJ 410 (ARB),National Union of Mineworkers v De Beers 
Consolidated Mines (Pty) Ltd (2006) 27 ILJ 1909 (LC). 
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The report contributed to the development of not only the diamond industry but 
industry generally through an effort initiated by NALEDI to discuss, learn and 
share idea about ways in which Unions can adopt better methods to win 
demands from employers in their negotiations. This workshop was focused on, 
among other things, understanding the Consumer Price Index (CPI)/ Consumer 
Price Index excluding interest rates on mortgage bonds (CPIX) both concepts 
used to measure inflation in economics, reading and understanding the national 
budget information, analyzing company financial statements on the part of private 
sector Unions, skills and equity and particular demands relating to women all 
such factors are important to consider during bargaining grounds.1784 It is 
reassuring to know that the Unions are engaged in development workshops that 
empower them to negotiate employee issues using realistic figures. With this 
knowledge1785
 
 around the efforts of Unions, this study will deliberate on some 
milestone legal contributions of diamond related Unions to the diamond industry. 
11.2.1 National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) 
NUM has been active and prominent in its position of representing mine workers’ 
rights in South Africa. NUM has a track record of CCMA and Labour Court 
cases.1786 For the purposes of this study there will be a brief consideration of 
NUM’s Constitution which is freely made available in the public domain.1787
                                                 
1784 See Simon Kimani Ndungu Collective Bargaining Workshop Report (2008). Also available on 
www.naledi.org.za. 17 July 2009. 
 There 
will also be a consideration of a reported diamond industry related labour court 
judgment in which NUM was specifically influential. The considerations of these 
1785 This is in line with the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000. 
1786 See some of the reported cases, for example, NUM v Freegold Consolidated Gold Mines (Operations) 
Ltd (President Steyn Mine) & another [1998] 11 BLLR 1147 (LC), East Rand Proprietary Mines Ltd v 
UPUSA & others [1997] 1 BLLR 10 (LAC), National Union of Mine Workers v East Rand Gold and 
Uranium Co Ltd [1992] 4 All SA 78 (AD), NUM & others v Alexkor Ltd [2005] 1 BLLR 28 (LC), BHP 
Billiton Energy Coal South Africa Ltd v CCMA & others [2009] 7 BLLR 643 (LC), NUM / St Helena Gold 
Mines [1999] 3 BALR 317 (IMSSA), De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v National Union of Mineworkers 
and Another [1998] JOL 3760 (LAC); [1998] 12 BLLR 1201 (LAC); National Union of Mine Workers & 
Others and RSA Geological Services (A Division of De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd) (2004) 25 ILJ 410 
(ARB). 
1787 www.num.org.za/ 19 March 2010. 
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aspects of NUM in the diamond industry will give sufficient insight with regards to 
the important role of this Union within the diamond industry. It is also submitted 
that the brief consideration of the Union’s Constitution sets the tone for 
understanding exactly what the mandate of the Unions are in industry generally. 
 
In terms of its Constitution NUM by nature is a separate legal persona tasked 
with the mandate of representing workers interests in the mining industry.1788 It 
sustains its financial activities by means of member subscriptions paid to it. The 
structure of the Union consists of Shaft Stewards and Shaft or Workplace, 
Branch, Regional, Regional conference, National Executive (NEC), Central 
committees and National Congress. 1789
 
 The aims and objectives of the Union 
are listed as follows: 
‘to recruit and unite into a single labour organization all 
workers employed in the mining, energy, construction and 
allied industries in order to enhance their economic and 
social welfare, to improve wages, salaries and terms and 
conditions of employment of members through collective 
bargaining and other lawful means, to protect members’ job 
                                                 
1788 This is in line with the purposes of the Labour relations Act 66 of 1995 sections 22, 23, 24, 25 and 26 
and Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996 section 23 which provides as follows: ‘(1) 
everyone has the right to fair labour practices.  
(2) Every worker has the right-  
        (a) to form and join a trade union;  
        (b) to participate in the activities and programmes of a trade union; and  
        (c)  to strike.  
(3) Every employer has the right-  
        (a)  to form and join an employers' organisation; and  
        (b)  to participate in the activities and programmes of an employers' organisation.  
(4) Every trade union and every employers' organisation has the right-  
       (a)  to determine its own administration, programmes and activities;  
        (b)  to organise; and  
        (c)   to form and join a federation.  
(5) Every trade union, employers' organisation and employer has the right to engage in collective 
bargaining. National legislation may be enacted to regulate collective bargaining. To the extent that the 
legislation may limit a right in this Chapter, the limitation must comply with section 36 (1).  
(6) National legislation may recognise union security arrangements contained in collective agreements. To 
the extent that the legislation may limit a right in this Chapter the limitation must comply with section 36 
(1).’  
1789 Constitution of NUM. Part 1, Character of the Union. 
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The aims of NUM also include, the fostering of unity and co-operation among 
workers in mining, construction, energy industries and other industries; the 
establishment of contacts and relationships with other trade Unions, trade 
federations and labour organizations nationally and internationally for the benefit 
of members and to do other lawful things which are in the interest of the Union 
and its members and which are consistent with the Constitution.1791
 
 The 
Constitutional values not only serve as an acid test for lawfulness of Union 
activities but they have also empowered Union structures to act in a manner that 
will enable them to achieve societal goals such as the protection of dignity for 
workers and the achievement of equality before the law for all South Africans. 
This is in line with Constitutionally protected governmental objectives. 
With regards to litigation in a diamond industry related case where NUM was 
involved, one may refer to National Union of Mineworkers & Others v BKH Mining 
Services CC t/a Dancarl Diamond Mine & Others.1792
                                                 
1790 Ibid. 
 This case involved an 
application for committal of the members of Dancarl CC mine into prison for 
contempt of court. The facts of the case show that the applicants were dismissed 
by the respondent close corporation after engaging in an industrial strike action. 
The matter was referred to the CCMA where a subsequent deed of settlement 
was entered into and made an order of the court. The settlement provided that 
the employees would be re-employed through certain labour brokers under 
previous terms and conditions of employment. The employers failed to re-employ 
1791 Ibid. The remained of the NUM Constitution sets out procedures for election of officers, attainment of 
quorums and other incidental Union related business, however it is clear from the Union’s Constitution that 
the aims and objectives of the Union is to protect the employee. This is important particularly in a country 
where the consequential imbalances of past discrimination still continue to exist. 
1792 (1999) 4 LLD 249 (LC). 
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the applicants and they in turn sought an application as aggrieved parties to have 
the employer members committed for contempt of court.1793
 
 
The court held that an aggrieved applicant may apply to court to enforce a penal 
order for contempt of court by way of notice of motion. The success of the 
application will be dependant on whether he or she can satisfy the court beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the respondent is guilty of the offence of being in 
contempt of court. The applicant must prove four things, first that a court order 
was granted, second that the respondent was aware of the order and its terms, 
thirdly that the respondent was in fact in breach of that order and finally that the 
respondent’s failure to comply with the order was willful.1794
 
 
The four elements of contempt above were proved by the employee applicants. 
Therefore the court came to the conclusion that an appropriate penalty must be 
given with an objective of promoting effective resolution of labour disputes. In this 
case effective resolution would be in the form of the re-employment of the 
employees at Dancarl. The court accordingly sentenced the three close 
corporation members to 15 day’s imprisonment without the option of a fine which 
would be suspended on condition that the employees were re-employed within 
14 days at Dancarl.1795
 
 
The judgment above before Grogan AJ was effective in protecting employee 
rights particularly in view of the fact that the Dancarl employers had agreed and 
submitted themselves to court process with regards to the re-employment the 
applicants. Hence it was not in law open to the employers to ignore the court 
process thus making the order of the court arbitrary in the circumstances. It is 
difficult to guarantee that the employees would have had this kind of success 
without the assistance of the Union in this case. 
 





11.2.2 South African Diamond Workers Union (SADWU) 
The consideration of the South African Diamond Workers Union (‘Diamond 
Workers’ Union’) for the purposes of this study will also be limited to the 
contribution it made in the development of a report that was presented to a 
Commission of inquiry into the South African diamond industry by reviewing the 
adequacy of the supply of rough diamonds to the local market. These 
submissions were made together with other industry stakeholders. This report 
allowed for significant amendments1796 to be made to the then existing South 
African diamond laws. The submissions made by the Diamond Workers’ Union, 
which were 34 in total assisted in the shaping the current Diamonds Act.1797
 
 To 
further understand the role of the Diamond Workers’ Union in litigation, a 
milestone labour court judgment involving the Diamond Workers’ Union will also 
be considered. 
In the ‘Report of the Task Team Appointed by the Minister of Minerals & Energy 
to Analyze the Memoranda and Evidence Laid before the Commission of Inquiry 
into the South African Diamond Industry,’ the Diamond Workers’ Union made 
some pertinent submissions when asked to comment on the subject of ‘the 
supply of rough and unpolished diamonds to the local processing industry.’ One 
of the submissions made by the Union was that De Beers had a near monopoly 
of 95 per cent of the total rough diamond production and it believed that that the 
State had partnered with De Beers in ensuring that the status quo remained and 
thus not renewing or benefiting the local diamond any manner. This according to 
the union this was a departure from the principle of free enterprise.1798 This 
submission has been addressed by the Diamond Export Levy (Administration) 
Act1799
 
 and is also regulated by the SADPMR. 
                                                 
1796 See Michael O Dale Mining Law Annual Survey, Juta (2004) 438; 439. 
1797 56 of 1986 www.polity.org.za/polity/govdocs/reports/diamonds/chap5.html 17 October 2009. 
1798 Report of Task Team Appointed by the Minister of Minerals & Energy to Analyze the Memoranda and 
Evidence Laid Before The Commission of Inquiry into the South African Diamond Industry, 20 December 
(1999). Chapter 5. www.polity.org.za/polity/govdocs/reports/diamonds/chap5.html 17 October 2009. 
1799 14 of 2007. 
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With regard to sales or ‘sights’ as commonly referred to in the industry, the 
Diamond Workers’ Union made a submission that it did not approve of allocating 
rough diamonds through Sight holders. The Union preferred the old diamond 
sales system where rough diamonds were allocated directly to cutters or tool 
makers through the Diamond Board. This meant that under the old system every 
cutter had a sight and every cutter had an allocation of rough.1800 The provisions 
of the Diamonds Act1801
 
 as amended have dealt with the issue of enhancing local 
beneficiation. Clearly the Diamond Workers’ Union is an active body which was 
used by the lawmakers in this case to give advice on the appropriate changes in 
law. 
In litigation, the Diamond Workers’ Union was also influential in the landmark 
judgment of South Africa Diamond Workers’ Union v The Master Diamond 
Cutters’ Association of South Africa.1802 In this case the Union had approached 
the industrial court for a decision on whether or not there was an unfair labour 
practice in the diamond cutting industry. The matter was extensively considered 
and deliberated on before President Parsons and Deputy President Ehlers who 
each in turn passed judgment in the matter. Although the judgments were 
approached differently in some respects there was agreement by both judges 
that unfair labour practice was taking place in the diamond cutting industry of 
South Africa, particularly with regards to grade 1 employees.1803
 
 
These incidents complained of in casu were couched in the Government Gazette 
agreements published on 5 August 1977.1804
                                                 
1800  Report of Task Team Appointed by the Minister of Minerals & Energy to Analyze the Memoranda and 
Evidence Laid Before The Commission of Inquiry into the South African Diamond Industry, 20 December 
(1999). Chapter 5. 
 These agreements were made in 
www.polity.org.za/polity/govdocs/reports/diamonds/chap5.html. 5.4.2 of the Report. 17 
October 2009. 
1801 56 of 1986. 
1802 (1982) 3 ILJ 87 (IC). 
1803 113E. 
1804 GG 5701. 
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accordance with the provisions of the Industrial Conciliation Act1805 and were 
entered into by the Diamond Cutters’ Association of South Africa as employers of 
the organization and the South African Diamond Workers’ Union as the trade 
Union or employees. The agreements were recorded as ‘The Main Agreement,’ 
‘Sick Pay Benefit Fund Agreement,’  ‘Demarcation Agreement,’ ‘Termination of 
Employment Agreement,’ and ‘Sick Benefit Agreement.’1806
 
 
The unfair labour practice which the Diamond Workers’ Union complained of in 
the agreements in the form they were in was that the agreements excluded 
compulsory keeping of records. This provided for an unfair labour practice as it 
assisted the employer to escape from the provisions of the agreement. Further, 
grade 1 employees were being progressively undermined out of the industry by 
employers through short-time, dismissal and other subterfuges in that included 
misrepresentation of the short-time provisions in the ‘The Main Agreement’ and 
the ‘Termination of Employment Agreement’ to dismiss employees and of the 
applicability of the ‘Termination of Employment Agreement’ to employees who 
have retired but who continue in employment or who have been re-employed.1807
 
 
There were further complaints of unfair labour practice in that by the employers 
allowing grade 1B employees to perform work in the designation in which grade 1 
employees were qualified either in the same establishment or by employing only 
grade 1B employees in a different company circumvented the spirit of the 
agreement. Further, by presenting one cheque to an employee in respect of 
wages due and a month’s pay in lieu of a notice in an attempt to claim 
acceptance of termination of the contract of employment was also an unfair 
                                                 
1805 28 of 1956 prior to repeal by the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. The Industrial Conciliation Act is 
purposed to ‘consolidate and amend the law relating to the registration and regulation of trade unions and 
employers' organizations, the prevention and settlement of disputes between employers and employees, and 
the regulation of terms and conditions of employment by agreement and arbitration; to provide for the 
establishment of a National Manpower Commission and to define its functions; to provide for the 
establishment of an industrial court and to define its functions; to provide for the establishment of a labour 
appeal court and to define its functions; to provide for the control of labour brokers and the registration of 




labour practice. Further, by giving a misleading notice to grade 1 employees that 
the factory will be closing down for an indefinite period, whereas the notice was 




Further, there was also an unfair labour practice complained of in the exclusion 
of surprise inspections and refusal to cooperate to ensure proper control and 
inspection by the designated agent of the council owing to extensive security 
control procedures. Further, it was also alleged that it constituted an unfair labour 
practice for The Master Diamond Cutter’s Association to continue to support the 




The court dealt extensively with the complaints raised above by the workers and 
came to the conclusion that in the circumstances the dismissals constituted 
unfair labour practice and the affected employees were reinstated with 
retrospective effect. Further, the demarcation agreement had to be altered to 
provide for a more equitable demarcation between skilled and unskilled 
employees. Further, the court also found that failure to agree to the keeping of 
records, notification of the council for short time and provision for the surprise 
inspection by designated agents constituted unfair labour practice.1810 Certain 
areas or the whole diamond industry in South Africa had previously been 
accustomed to abuses of worker’s rights which could not be addressed until the 
Constitutional dispensation. This case illustrates the manner in which the court 




                                                 
1808 Ibid. 
1809 92F. 
1810 87 C – D. 
1811 Unions are active in the diamond industry in an effort to protect worker rights. See Botswana Mining 
Workers Union v Debswana Diamond Company (Pty) Ltd Court of Appeal Civil Appeal No. CACLB-047-
08, Industrial Court Civil Case No. I.C.491-05. 
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11.2.3 Other Structures 
Apart from the Unions, in diamond trade there are other significant structures and 
bodies that relate closely to the diamond industry in South Africa. This list is not 
in any way exhaustive but these additional diamond trade structures also make 
significant contributions to the diamond industry. This includes structures such as 
associations for valuators, the Government Diamond Valuator (GDV),1812 
jewellery associations for example, Jewellery Council of South Africa (JCSA),1813 
the Jewellers Association of South Africa (JASA),1814 Jewellery Council of South 
African Direct Membership,1815 Jewellery Manufacturers Association of South 
Africa (JMASA)1816 the Master Diamond Cutters Association of South Africa,1817 
the Diamond Merchants Association of Southern Africa (DMA),1818 the South 
African Diamond Board,1819 the Diamond Bourse of South Africa,1820
                                                 
1812 www.info.gov.za/speeches/1999/990423224p1003.htm 19 March 2010. See also 
www.sadpmr.co.za/UploadedFiles%5Cabab4237f67241f48c2cf9f768423313.pdf 19 March 2010. 
 the Rough 
1813 http://www.jewellerysa.com/ 19 March 2010. 
1814 JASA is a member organisation of the JCSA. See 
http://www.moneybiz.co.za/my_business/jewellery_industry.asp 19 March 2010. 
1815 Ibid. Jewellery Council of South African Direct Membership is also a member organisation of the 
JCSA. 
1816 Ibid. JMASA is also a member organisation of the JCSA. See 
http://www.goldinsouthafrica.com/pdfs/GLOSSARY.pdf 19 March 2010. 
1817 www.diamond.co.za/ 19 March 2010. 
1818 http://www.mbendi.com/orgs/co58.htm 19 March 2010. 
1819 www.sadb.co.za 15 August 2009. 
1820 See moving parliamentary speech, held 30 May 2007. 
http://beta.parliament.gov.za/live/commonrepository/Processed/20090223/68634_1.doc. 16 October 2009. 
 
‘The department has continued to roll out its support to the development of 
small-scale mining and, for the first time this year, extended this support to 
jewellery fabrication projects as they are easily portable. Both these 
interventions have made an immense contribution to the second economy. 
 Regarding beneficiation, we are developing skills in the jewellery sector 
for our people to be able to take leadership roles and for the provinces to be 
able to play a supporting role when we start implementing the Diamond 
Amendment Act, the Second Diamond Amendment Act and the Precious 
Metals Act. These amendments will usher in a more representative SA 
Diamonds and Precious Metals Regulator to replace the SA Diamond Board. 
The Diamond Exchange and Export Centre that will be introduced will monitor 
the export of diamonds whilst the State Diamond Trader will make diamonds 
available solely to the diamond beneficiators.  
 All these institutions will be in place when the President promulgates these 
pieces of legislation, which promulgation is expected to be not later than 
August this year. Hon members should be aware that the State Diamond Trader 
will initially open in Johannesburg but, with time, it will move permanently to 
Kimberley, making Kimberley the real diamond hub of South Africa. I would 
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Diamond Dealer’s Association,1821 South African Women in Mining Association 
(SAWIMA),1822
 
 industrial diamond associations and other smaller trade Unions 
and chapters, to name a few. 
11.3 International Trade Administration Commission (ITAC) 
It is important at this stage to study the law concerning the creation of the 
International Trade Administration Commission.1823
                                                                                                                                                 
also like to thank De Beers for offering the services of Diamdel to the State 
Diamond Trader and also express appreciation to the Diamond Bourse of SA 
for offering its facilities to be used as the Diamond Exchange and Export 
Centre. This shows the co-operative way in which we work in this country in a 
true public-private partnership.  
 This law is contained in the 
 As we celebrate the 10th anniversary of women in mining, I would like to 
introduce to the House a woman who has taken full advantage of this new 
dispensation: Angelina Nofolovhodwe. I want you to listen carefully as I relate 
her story. Angelina is 50 years old, she only passed Standard 4, she is a rural 
mother of seven, and she is well on her way to becoming South Africa's first 
self-made female mining magnate. Only a few years ago, this Limpopo 
businesswoman was jobless, with grim prospects. Acting on a dream she had 
of holding gold in her hand, she decided to go into mining in 2002. True to her 
dream, she soon won her first licence for a gold mine, but things continued to 
be tough until 2005. Today, she is a happy mother and humble businesswoman 
who has offices in Sandton, and travels the world. She is wanted in Canada and 
in Zimbabwe. Actually, she has licences for mines in Zimbabwe. 
 Our efforts to pursue and consolidate gender empowerment in the mining 
industry have culminated in the revitalisation of the SA Women in Mining 
Association and the official launch of their national offices in Johannesburg. 
Women empowerment is duly assured when women’s organizations are placed 
on a sound administrative and financial footing. We shall continue to do this 
with all women’s organizations.’ 
1821 Contactable on admin@jewellery.org.za 23 March 2010. See www.greendale-diamonds.co.za/trade-
associations.asp 23 March 2010. 
1822 www.sawima.co.za/ 23 March 2010. 
1823 International Trade Administration Act 71 of 2002 section 7 provides for the establishment of the ITAC 
and its general functions are set out in section 15 of the Act as follows: ‘(1) The Commission must carry 
out the functions assigned to it in terms of this Act, any other Act or by the Minister.  
(2) The Commission must carry out any function that arises out of an obligation of the Republic in terms of 
a trade agreement, if the Minister has assigned that function to the Commission.  
(3) The Commission may, to the extent required or permitted by the SACU Agreement, refer matters to any 
institution constituted by or in terms of the SACU Agreement, and may appear before such an institution. 
(Date of commencement of this subsection to be announced) 
(4) The Commission may, subject to section 14 (5), assign any of its functions to:  
        (a)  a member of the Commission;  
        (b)  a committee established in terms of section 14;  
        (c)  a member of the staff of the Commission;  
        (d)  a person referred to in section 23; or  
        (e) any combination of persons referred to in this subsection.’  
 503 
International Trade Administration Act1824 of South Africa, together with 
regulations applicable under it. This law forms an important statutory contribution 
to all areas of international trade industry in South Africa and therefore is it 
directly relevant to the diamond industry in South Africa. The International Trade 
Administration Act1825 practically provides and ensures that local markets are 
protected from potential market disrupting behavior or flooding of local markets 
with foreign goods which have the potential of harming local markets in the 




The purpose of the International Trade Administration Act1828is to establish and 
provide for the ITAC.1829 The International Trade Administration Act1830 was also 
created to enable the implementation of certain aspects of the SACU as per 
SACU Agreement1831 in South Africa for the purpose of controlling the 
importation and exportation of goods, the amendment of customs duties and 
other matters connected to such economic activity.1832In order to understand the 
International Trade Administration Act’s1833 provision for the implementation of 
the SACU agreement,1834 it is important to briefly outline what SACU is as 
described by its own founding documents.1835
 
 
                                                 
1824 71 of 2002. 
1825 71 of 2002. 
1826 71 of 2002. 
1827 For the definition of dumping see section 1 of International Trade Administration Act 71 of 2002. It is 
referred to as ‘the introduction of goods into the commerce of the Republic or Common Customs Area at 
an export price contemplated in section 32(2)(a) that is less than the normal value, as defined in section 
32(2) of those goods.’ Section 32 of the Act deals thoroughly with the provisions that are considered when 
an alleged dumping is taking place. 
1828 71 of 2002. 
1829 Preamble. 
1830 71 of 2002. 
1831 http://www.sacu.int/main.php?include=about/what_is.html&menu=menus/leftmenu.html 30 October 
2010. 
1832 See introductory paragraph of the International Trade Administration Act 71 of 2002. 
1833 71 of 2002. 
1834 International Trade Administration Act 71 of 2002 section 4. 
1835 http://www.sacu.int/ 23 March 2010. See ‘What is SACU?’ 
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‘The SACU consists of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South 
Africa, and Swaziland. The SACU Secretariat is located in 
Windhoek, Namibia. SACU was established in 1910, 
making it the world’s oldest Customs Union. Historically 
SACU was administered by South Africa, through the 1910 
and 1969 Agreements. The customs union collected duties 
on local production and customs duties on members’ 
imports from outside SACU, and the resulting revenue was 
allocated to member countries in quarterly installments 
utilizing a revenue-sharing formula. Negotiations to reform 
the 1969 Agreement started in 1994, and a new agreement 
was signed in 2002. The new arrangement was ratified by 
SACU Heads of State. The Economic structure of the Union 
links the Member states by a single tariff and no customs 
duties between them. The Member States form a single 
customs territory in which tariffs and other barriers are 
eliminated on substantially all the trade between the 
Member States for products originating in these countries; 




The structure of the International Trade Administration Act1837 shows that it is a 
clearly drafted technical piece of legislation that sets about to record South 
Africa’s trade policy in the most express manner. The technicalities of the terms 
of the Act are explained in the definition section in a satisfactory manner with the 
Minister of Trade and Industry and the Minister of Finance being called to task by 
the provisions of this International Trade Administration Act.1838 What emerges 
from the International Trade Administration Act1839
                                                 
1836 Ibid. 
 immediately is that it captures 
1837 71 of 2002. 
1838 71 of 2002. 
1839 71 of 2002. 
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into South African law the inter-governmental cooperation with neighboring 
States who form the Common Customs Area1840
 
 and these States are member 
States of SACU. This illustrates an African based unity that allows SACU States 
to be able to support one another in trade first and foremost before seeking to 
look to the developed worlds. 
The SACU Agreement to which the SACU member States have adopted is 
captured in the schedule 1 of the International Trade Administration Act1841 and is 
made easily accessible to all areas of trade and industry in the Republic to 
ensure that the provisions of the agreement are not contravened.1842 The SACU 
Agreement is contained in a relatively concise document.1843
 
  
The International Trade Administration Act1844 sets out the South African Trade 
policy in chapter 2 of the Act. This chapter provides with reference to the 
implementation of the SACU agreement as the basis of the national trade policy. 
The policy also prescribes that the Minister is the head representative of the 
Republic to the SACU council.1845 Further, in terms of the trade policy, the 




                                                 
1840 Section 1(2). 
1841 71 of 2002. 
1842 In terns of the Chapter 5 of International Trade Administration Act 71 of 2002 there is a provision for a 
strong set of legal sanctions for the contravention of the trade principles of this Act. See for example 
section 55 of the Act which prescribes the amount of fines or terms of imprisonment for certain offences. 
Further, there is an intelligence force that can be used to quash the criminal efforts of this law with 
informants being given statutory protection to keep confidentiality when engaging in an act of blowing the 
whistle on offences taking place, section 33. 
1843 2002 SACU Agreement. It must be well understood that SACU was established in terms of the SACU 
Agreement 1910, which has been superseded by the SACU Agreement 1969 and then the SACU 
Agreement of 2002 (current) which was ratified by South Africa in 2004. The International Trade 
administration Act 71 of 2002 provides in schedule 1 of the Act as follows: ‘the SACU Agreement is to be 
inserted pursuant to its final conclusion and to the relevant constitutional requirements pertaining to 
international agreements having been met.’ This means that the SACU Agreement is essentially a work in 
progress. See http://www.sacu.int/main.php?include=docs/legislation/2002-agreement/part8.html 24 March 
2010. 
1844 71 of 2002. 
1845 Section 4(1). 
1846 Section 4(4). This right may be exercised in terms of Article 20(3) of SACU Agreement. 
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The International Trade Administration Act1847 also clearly provides in chapter 3 
for the structure of the International Trade Administration Commission. This 
chapter sets out the law on the Constitution of the Commission, the appointment 
of officers serving on the Commission, the conduct of such officers and the 
meetings to take decisions by this body. The International Trade Administration 
Act1848provides for the general functions of the Commission and this includes 
inter alia functions set out by the Act1849 or other functions section assigned by 
the Minister. These functions must be at all times carried out with the intention of 
achieving the goals and objectives of the SACU Agreement. Further and most 
importantly to enhance trade, the Promotion of Access to Information Act1850 is 
given importance under the International Trade Administration Act1851 to 




The Promotion of Access to Information Act1853
 
 mentioned above illustrates the 
practical aspects of this welcomed intergovernmental cooperation. Such 
cooperation cannot be achieved without necessary information sharing. It is 
commendable to acknowledge the Constitutional dimension of interaction of 
States in such trade matters in the form of accessing State held information. 
11.4 Southern African Customs Union (SACU) 
It has been submitted that SACU is a body that has allowed for a deeper 
integration of member States by abolishing tariffs and most quantitative trade 
restrictions pertaining to its member States. This SACU goal is accompanied by 
                                                 
1847 71 of 2002. 
1848 71 of 2002 section 15. 
1849 Section 26, for example, the receipt of applications for permits and adjudicating on matters in terms of 
the Act. 
1850 2 of 2000. 
1851 71 of 2002. 
1852 Section 19.  
1853 2 of 2000. 
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The SACU Secretariat has vivid goals and strategic intents it has listed in its 
mandate to achieve with reference to the SACU Agreement. These include 
economic policy co-ordination and harmonization, trade negotiation, trade 
facilitation, revenue sharing, strategic positioning of SACU, efficient and effective 
SACU Institutions and Secretariat Operational Excellence.1855
 
 Many of these 
goals have been realized to some extent. Further, there is ongoing input from 
member States and the international community to ensure that these goals are 
made a reality. Ultimately if SACU implements trade friendly policies, this will 
attract forms of revenue which are necessary for the development of Southern 
Africa as a whole. 
It is evident that the work of SACU is not in vain as it has as recently as April 
2009 achieved a milestone achievement in international trade policy 
development recognition. This took place when the 2002 SACU Agreement was 
recognized and formally considered by the WTO following its notification in 2007. 
The official notification of the 2002 SACU Agreement was followed by a factual 
review by the WTO and this was used as an opportunity to publicize SACU to the 
                                                 
1854 For the common policies it is important to refer to Articles 38, 39, 40 and 41 of the SACU Agreement 
2002 which provide for ‘the industrial development policy (Article 38), i.e., ‘1. Member States recognise 
the importance of balanced industrial development of the Common Customs Area as an important objective 
for economic development.  2. Pursuant to paragraph 1, Member States agree to develop common policies 
and strategies with respect to industrial development.’ Article 89 provides for the agricultural policy which 
provides that ‘1. Member States recognize the importance of the agricultural sector to their economics.  
2. Member States agree to co-operate on agricultural policies in order to ensure the co-coordinated 
development of the agricultural sector within the Common Customs Area.’ Article 40 provides for the 
competition policy which states that ‘1. Member States agree that there shall be competition policies in 
each Member State. 2. Member States shall co-operate with each other with respect to the enforcement of 
competition laws and regulations.’ Article 41 provides for unfair trade practices policy and provides that 
‘the Council shall, on the advice of the Commission, develop policies and instruments to address unfair 
trade practices between Member States. These policies and measures shall be annexed to this Agreement.’ 
Tsidiso Disenyana SACU and Deeper Integration Development through Trade Opinion (2008). See 
www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/africa/sacu.htm. 
1855 www.sacu.int 20 October 2009. 
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rest of the international community.1856
 
 This is essential milestone development 
for African trade. This mention of SACU efforts to uplift Southern African trade 
contributes to the understanding of the contribution made by cogent economic 
and trade policies to the diamond industry, which continues to be important to 
Southern African States. 
The challenge to the full implementation of the SACU Agreement is that to date 
several of the bodies under the SACU Agreement have not yet been established, 
this includes, for example the Tariff Board1857and the Tribunal.1858 It is evident 
that without the establishment of these bodies, it means that ITAC is mainly 
responsible for all trade related investigations.1859 The independence of ITAC is 
established in the International Trade Administration Act1860 it is submitted that 
ITAC is dealing with all trade related matters without input from SACU as 
required in the International Trade Administration Act.1861
                                                 
1856 See Tswelopele Moremi SACU Factual Review by the World Trade Organization (WTO), Committee 
on Regional Trade Arrangements (CRTA) 20 – 21 April 2009 Geneva Switzerland. 
 This means that South 
1857 The Tariff Board is to be established in terms of Article 8. See 
http://www.sacu.int/main.php?include=about/tariff_board.html 23 March 2010 where it is explained that 
‘the Tariff Board is an independent institution consisting of experts drawn from the Member States.  
The Tariff Board is responsible for making recommendations to the Council on the level and changes of 
customs, anti-dumping, countervailing and safeguard duties on goods imported from outside the Common 
Customs Area, and rebates, refunds, or duty drawbacks based on the directives given to it by the Council as 
provided for in Article 8 of the SACU Agreement. The terms of reference, policy mandates, procedures and 
regulations of the Tariff Board is determined by the Council in accordance with Article 8 of the SACU 
Agreement.  The Tariff Board is yet to be established. It is anticipated that it will be operational by March 
2009.’ To date such a body is still not established. 
1858 To date this ad hoc dispute resolution body is not established as required in terms of the SACU 
Agreement. http://www.sacu.int/main.php?include=about/tribunal.html 23 March 2010. 
1859 International Trade Administration Act 71 of 2002  section 7 which provides for ‘(1) The International 
Trade Administration Commission is hereby established, and-  
        (a) has jurisdiction throughout the Republic;  
        (b) is a juristic person; and  
        (c)  must exercise its functions in accordance with this Act and any other relevant law.  
(2) The Commission-  
        (a)  is independent and subject only to-  
           (i)   the Constitution and the law;  
           (ii)  any Trade Policy Statement or Directive issued by the Minister in terms of section 5; and  
           (iii)  any notice issued by the Minister in terms of section 6; and  
        (b)   must be impartial and must perform its functions without fear, favour or prejudice.  
    (3) Each organ of state must assist the Commission to maintain its independence and impartiality, and to 
exercise its authority and carry out its functions effectively.’ 
1860 71 of 2002 section 7. 
1861 71 of 2002 section 4 and schedule 1. 
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Africa is acting ultra vires in its international obligations in continuing to 
unilaterally decide of the customs duty and rebate structure as contained in the 
SACU Agreement. On the other hand it is submitted that South Africa is showing 
initiative in leadership while SACU bodies are being established. 
 
11.5. The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
For the purposes of this study it is important to highlight that the DTI1862 in South 
Africa upholds Constitutionally protected principles of clean and humane 
diamond trade. As one of the key structures that influences economic growth and 
trade development in South Africa, the DTI forms an important diamond industry. 
The DTI upholds and supports the practical aspects of economic empowerment 
of all South Africans, by supporting skills development, providing for BBBEE 
codes of good practice,1863
 
 application of trade friendly international treaties and 
agreements such as the respect for the KPCS in diamond trade. 
                                                 
1862 www.thedti.gov.za 27 January 2007. See http://www.dfa.gov.za/department/report_2003-
2004/part3.pdf 23 March 2010.  The discussion of the document focuses on the partnership of the DTI, 
SACU and other relevant bodies and their contribution to clean diamond trade through the implementation 
of the KPCS. The document provides that ‘the SACU-US Free Trade negotiations are important both in the 
context of encouraging US support for economic development and co-operation and supporting the 
implementation of NEPAD. The talks have the potential to improve trade flows between the SACU region 
and the US significantly 
and to contribute to regional economic integration and growth. During the period under review, a number 
of rounds of negotiations, preceded by internal SACU co-coordinating meetings, took place 
both in SACU and the US. Progress was on schedule, although certain problematical 
areas with the potential to delay the talks beyond the envisaged deadline of December 
2004 were identify ed. The SACU-US FTA negotiations are led by the DTI and include the DFA. They are 
central to the SA-US bilateral economic relationship, as well as the regional customs union.’ 
1863 http://www.dti.gov.za/bee/Inside.pdf 23 March 2010. The introduction to the summary of the DTI’s 
BBBEE provides in line with the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996 section 9(2) as 
follows: ‘this guide has been developed as an interpretation aide for individuals and entities seeking to 
gain further clarity and understanding of the Codes of Good Practice (‘the Codes’). Before the release of 
the Strategy on Broad-Based BEE1, there was no framework in existence for the measurement of broad-
based BEE. The Strategy provided the outline of a broad-based scorecard, together with weightings, but did 
not contain detail on measurement principles and the application of the scorecard. By the beginning of 2004 
when the BEE Act was promulgated, numerous sectors of the economy had drafted industry charters on 
BEE and transformation. Whilst some contained scorecards loosely based on the broad-based scorecard 
contained in the Strategy, others were merely written undertakings of commitment to transformation. In 
addition, several of these charters were drafted prior to the release of the Strategy and stakeholders 
therefore had little point of reference in terms of broad-based elements and weightings. Furthermore, it 
became evident that other pertinent issues surrounding the measurement of BEE needed to be 
addressed to further accelerate the transformation process.’ 
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11.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided insight on the importance of stakeholder cooperation 
in the diamond industry by looking at the contributions of other diamond related 
structures that make the industry work efficiently in South Africa. Further, this 
chapter has also considered the importance of encouraging trade friendly policies 
among States starting in Africa and then the international community. It is 
submitted that at a time when diamond trade is challenged there should be an 
even greater need for the stakeholders highlighted above to work together. 
 
The role of Unions within the context of South African diamond trade has been 
captured and deliberated on to show that it is of core relevance to the diamond 
industry as they represent the mine workers who have built the economy in the 
tough conditions of mining. Therefore, it is essential that their rights are protected 




Chapter 12: Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
12.1 Identifying a More Humane Diamond Trade 
This study has been motivated by a need to make a unique contribution to the 
study of law and to add to the extension of the knowledge of the law pertaining to 
international trade focusing particularly on international diamond trade and 
diamond regulations in South African law. What has emerged in this study is that 
diamond trade in South Africa and in the international community has been 
influenced by recognition that trading in diamonds must be based on fair trading 
principles. 
 
The principles of fair trade are motivated by the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa Act 108 of 1996 and are acceptable in so far as they enhance 
diamond trade that protects human dignity, equality and fairness. This movement 
is what this study would like to term ‘the identification of a more humane diamond 
trade.’ Part of having a more humane diamond trade means that conflict 
diamonds are never again going to be legitimately bought and sold with clean 
diamonds in the international community. Further, in South Africa transformation 
in the diamond industry will make sure that there will no longer be an unfair 
exclusion of certain persons from participating in South Africa’s diamond 
resources because of unfair discrimination. 
 
It is recommended that the principles of humane diamond trade as contained in 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act1864
                                                 
1864 108 of 1996. 
 the United Nations 
international trade treaties, the Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 and the MPRDA 28 of 
2002, among other equally relevant law, should be upheld by all diamond 
industry stakeholders in South Africa in order to ensure a sustainable and 
equitable diamond industry. Where existing challenges exist because of the 
criminal elements, these should be eradicated and dealt with in law for the 
benefit of all citizens of South Africa. 
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12.2 Diamond Trade as an Important Economic Tool  
It has been practically illustrated in this study that through legal participation of 
leading diamond producers such as De Beers South African diamond trade in the 
Constitutional dispensation has been ameliorated to enhance the South African 
beneficiation industry. This has been partly achieved through the South African 
State and the private sector participation. It is important to note that the State has 
made sure that ‘charity does indeed begin at home’ when dealing with a 
country’s resources and raw materials. On the other hand it is also noted and 
appropriately so in this study that the De Beers Group not only has made a rich 
historical contribution to South African diamond trade and law (this is not to say 
they have been perfect as they too have in the past contributed to the economic 
imbalances fostered by the apartheid regime). De Beers still dynamically adds to 
the desirable upliftment of the socio-economic status of the South African 
diamond industry. 
 
However having said that it is recommended that because of their commendable 
handling of the diamond resources in South Africa and their exemplary methods 
to achieve Constitutional goals in present day South Africa, they must be 
acknowledged for their valuable efforts. It is recommended that the future of the 
diamond industry will survive as long as there is cooperation among diamond 
stakeholders together with other important South African diamond industry 
players such as diamond producers include Trans Hex, Alexkor Ltd, Rex 
Diamond Mining, Messina Diamonds and Benguela Concessions and alluvial 
diamond diggers, to name a few, for their part in contributing to the development 
of the economy of South Africa through its mineral resources. 
The diamond industry is also an important economic tool for South Africa in that it 
allows South Africa to participate and compete in a competent manner in 
international diamond markets. This means that notwithstanding the current 
global economic challenges that are impacting negatively on international trade 
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and commerce, trade and business in diamonds makes South Africa a 
competent trading partner.  
 
Evident in the diamonds laws and other international trade law which South 
Africa subscribes to, the country is showing that it is a State that is able to act 
with the legal integrity and uniformity with other civilized States through the 
application of various treaties and rules pertaining to private international law. It 
is recommended that where treaties or other international instruments of 
international trade such as model laws are being considered for adoption into 
South African international trade laws, such reforms must be adopted without 
delay into South Africa so as to continue to make South Africa a desirable 
destination for potential trading partners and other diamond merchants 
particularly in times of the recession.  
 
12.3 Having Due Regard to all Diamond Trade Stakeholders 
It has emerged from this study that diamond trade in South Africa is not an 
independent or sole responsibility of a few managing directors of certain diamond 
producers. What has been unequivocally established is that diamond trade is an 
industry that can only be sustained by various stakeholders including Police 
agencies, Unions and supportive trade bodies of South Africa’s neighboring 
States.  
 
It is these stakeholders together with the State and producers who are the parties 
that contribute to a development of a diamond market that fosters friendly 
relations with neighboring States and the global community. In order to keep the 
various stakeholders motivated to perform well in their duties, it is recommended 
that they should be given due regard through certain appropriate incentives 
where possible including acknowledgment for a job well done. This international 
co-operation is in line with the UN efforts to bring international upliftment to all the 
citizens of the world through initiatives and international human development 
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It is proposed in light of the findings of this study that a contribution which 
necessarily fills the knowledge gap on the latest developments in diamond trade 
law has been created. It is submitted that through the many lessons highlighted 
in this study, the South African diamond industry will continue to thrive. Further, 
with guidance and participation with the global community in trade, it is intended 
and proposed through this study to showcase South African diamond laws as 
exemplary and cogent for the rest of the diamond producing African States and 
other foreign countries even in developed worlds. South Africa’s Constitutionally 
based diamond law provides a well of knowledge for nationalities, particularly in 
Africa to draw wisdom both in the practice and law pertaining to diamond 
production and trade. 
 
12.4 Some Conclusions and Recommendations 
It has emerged during the course of this study that as correctly identified in the 
hypothesis, that South African diamond laws have been significantly altered in 
their spirit and purport as a result of the emergence of the Constitutional 
dispensation. The provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
Act1865
 
 relate closely to the diamond industry as has been identified in this study 
as being motivated by the Bill of Rights. Therefore in the conclusions and 
recommendations of this study below, a succinct discussion of the impact of the 
analysis contained in this study will be discussed and linked to some 
recommendations to be made for further development of South African diamond 
regulations. 
The impact of the analysis of this study has shown that South African diamond 
regulations from 1994 to 2009 there have been positively impacted to take into 
                                                 
1865 108 of 1996. 
 515 
account the socio-economic concerns of the Republic of South Africa insofar as 
the diamond industry as a whole is concerned. The positive themes involve the 
protection of economic freedom and equal participation in the nation’s mineral 
resources. The reasons for the success of the more positive laws is due to the 
partnerships between the South African State and private business in the 
achievement of broad based socio-economic empowerment goals.  
 
In terms of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act1866
 
 affirmative 
action measures, in terms of section 9(2) are part of the positive laws intended to 
address the systematic inequality that has long stained the fabric of South 
Africa’s diverse society. It has been shown during the course of the study that all 
sectors of the South African State and private diamond producers as designated 
employers, all have participated in efforts to transform and become part of the 
development of laws that is taking place in South Africa. De Beers, as a case 
study example, has engaged in BBBEE through various projects and internal 
training and development projects while applying Employment Equity 
programmes in their policies. It is recommended that more training on diversity 
and empowerment be invested in by companies in order to have the best social 
cohesion in workplaces where transformation has taken place. 
The positive socio-economic impact of the developed diamond laws of the last 
fifteen years also shows success that has also impacted on the international 
community through international efforts that also uphold human dignity in 
international diamond trade. The implementation of the Kimberley Process 
Certification Scheme, for example, is a tool that serves to uplift South African 
minerals policy a policy that advocates the protection of human rights in diamond 
trade. It is recommended that South Africa continues to uphold the values 
against illicit trading in conflict diamonds and any other corrupt activity that has 
the potential of creating a form of resource curse by fuelling inhumanely gained 
revenues in diamond trade. The police intelligence should be appropriately 
                                                 
1866 108 of 1996. 
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funded to ensure that illicit diamonds are eradicated together with the existence 
of black markets. 
 
The positive influence of more developed diamond regulations in South Africa is 
also in line with the UN 2015 Millennium Development Goals (MDG) which has 
identified diamond trade to be a positive vehicle for achieving those goals. This is 
done by developing international initiatives to support artisanal diamond diggers 
to be able to obtain fair returns for their minerals trade. The UN 2015 Millenniums 
Development Goals are listed and discussed in the study and illustrate the 
support for Constitutional objectives that seek to support the upliftment of the 
quality of life for all the people of South Africa. 
 
The structures such as the UN that enforce the international efforts for fair 
diamond trade in South Africa contribute positively to the impact of these laws. 
This allows South African diamond trade to be attractive for investors from 
civilized nations that respect equitable trade. In South Africa one of the positive 
aspects of positive diamond regulations is that it addresses in a fair manner the 
legal relationships between investing companies’ interests, such as De Beers 
and the State Organs that seek to execute national diamond laws.  
 
The crucial relationships in diamond trade as stated above are dealt with through 
principles of transparency and government accountability. This is clearly evident 
in the open manner in which certain questionable company activities in diamond 
trade are dealt with by the South African government. For example, in the matter 
involving the exportation of De Beers stockpile in 1992 without payment of tax, 
that matter is dealt with in the public domain and all parties are given a fair 
opportunity to establish their arguments in law. It is recommended that in matters 
of this nature, such public accountability concerning South African interests be 
addressed in a similar manner without fear or favoritism.  
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With regard to the tax regime as established in the recent Diamond Export Levy 
(Administration) 14 of 2007, it is submitted that though the regime is seen as 
harsh by some, it has had the desired effect of benefiting the local beneficiation 
market and also provided stable mining revenues for South Africa. The tax 
regime as provided for in the diamond regulations in the form of Diamond Export 
Levy (Administration) 14 of 2007 and the Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 in South 
Africa still poses significant hurdle to more external investment, however this is 
also an important disincentive to corporations that may seek to invest in the 
country without expecting to plough back tax revenues into South Africa. 
 
With regard to the development of diamond industry activities as a tool for broad 
based socio-economic investment, it is recommended that in view of the socio-
economic impact of this study that more emphasis needs to be placed on 
supporting sustainable, small scale mining such as established by the Diamond 
Development International Initiative whose activities have been summarized in 
chapter 1 of this study as follows:  
 
The initiative taken on by the Diamond Development 
Initiative International (DDII) in partnership with 
ONESKY.1867 Report 2007 it was reported that over a 
million African and South American artisanal diamond 
diggers live in absolute poverty. This is because most of 
their countries are recovering from the ravages of war and 
are also disadvantaged by working outside of the formal 
economy. One of the projects engaged in by the DDII 
among many other projects is to ensure that fair returns are 
promoted for artisanal diamond diggers in order to 
eradicate extreme poverty and hunger in those nations.1868
 
 
                                                 
1867 www.ddiglobal.org/pages/projects-tclp.php 17 February 2010. 
1868 Ibid. 
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The DDII is concerned with projects around the 
development of diamond standards that are in line with the 
UN Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. It is 
concerned with investigation the fair pay for diamond trade 
from those areas of the informal diamond sector. It is 
concerned with using the use of artisanal diamond digging 
to empower women and to encourage environmental 
conservation and other initiatives that will support 
sustainable life after diamond mining. It is concerned with 
displaced children in areas of Sierra Leon and the DRC. 
Above all the DDII initiative is said to be aiming to achieve 
the global success of the KPCS when fully implemented.1869
 
 
Many of South Africans live in abject poverty with limited prospects for employment 
opportunities and skills development. Through the support of small scale mining 
initiatives accompanied by State or private business skills development, poor 
communities can be given tools to help themselves in artisanal diamond mining. 
This will be done with all the principles of the Millennium Goals in mind. South 
Africa can only be benefited by these types of mining initiatives as it would 
contribute to social investment, environmental conservation, the improvement of 
health and achievement of education.  
 
Even though there is an attempt to deal with small scale mining in South African 
law, as briefly mentioned in National Environmental Management Act.1870 The 
regulations1871
 
 under this Act provide that  
                                                 
1869 Ibid. For example, the DDII initiative is running a project known as the ‘DDII’s Tukudimuna Project’. 
This project ‘seeks to prevent and remove children from working in the diamond mines in the Mbuji-Mayi 
region of DRC; to understand the dynamics and the political economy of child labour in artisanal diamond 
mining; and to find sustainable and replicable methodologies to end this practice.’ 
1870 107 of 1998. 
1871 GN 435 of 23 February 2001. 
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‘Government encourages and facilitates the sustainable 
development of small-scale mining in order to ensure the 
optimal exploitation of small mineral deposits and to enable 
this sector to make positive contributions to the national, 
provincial and local economy. In this regard, a National 
Small-Scale Mining Development Framework has been 
developed to assist first-time small-scale mining 
entrepreneurs to overcome constraints facing initial 
development.’1872
 
   
It is submitted that at present the laws are much more concerned with readily 
established diamond entities and the plight of small scale miners is not sufficiently 
supported in legislation. It is only addressed as a wide objective or ideal with no 
other statutory structural implementation of this ideal. More research support and 
study into the development of small-scale mining in South African law needs to be 
addressed. 
 
It is recommended that a South African State appointed task team should identify 
ways in which small scale alluvial diamond diggers can be assisted to make their 
contributions count within the formal economy. This survey must engage in taking 
into account the need to develop national diamond industry skills. This task team 
should identify potential artisanal talent and train such talent to be on par with 
international benchmarks in diamond beneficiation. This task team must also look 
into equitable ways of allowing access to mineral rich areas. This will allow 
previously dependant or disadvantaged people from stressing South African State 
welfare and cause such capable persons to be able to work for themselves. The 
most important theme in developing national diamond laws in this manner must be 
sustainability.  
 
                                                 
1872 2.1 Minerals and Mining. 
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Sustainability of mining activities must also be balanced with sufficient research 
into efforts about what ought to happen once the lifespan of a mineral deposit is 
exhausted. Initiatives to educate communities about life after diamonds must be in-
built with every project of developing minerals utilization at all levels from the 
biggest mining giant to a small scale miner. Regular workshops and information 
sharing activities must be held to support and create awareness concerning the 
need for sustainability in mining practices. This will allow the country to be able to 
move away fro seeing diamond trade as a scheme to get rich quick without any 
concern for future sustainability and conservation. 
 
With regard to the granting of mineral rights and licenses in terms of the Diamonds 
Act1873
 
 it has been identified that while licensing is easier to obtain for new 
entrants, there are insufficient tools to effectively conduct successful mining 
operations. It is recommended that a survey of these technical limitations be 
investigated so that transformation and empowerment in the diamond industry can 
be ameliorated through certain potential investments. Failure to do this will result in 
many shelf diamond entities that look as if they are active on paper and showing 
more transformation yet are unable to participate meaningfully in the formal 
national diamond industry not to mention being able to participate in international 
markets.  
It is also recommended that the South African State organs that are responsible for 
implementing diamond regulation should follow a decentralized structure of 
administration rather than a deconcentrated scheme of administration. This will 
serve to allow State organs to be very clear as to the administrative powers they 
possess and the different organs will serve as internal checks and balances by 
acting in a manner that is more independent. This will be useful since the laws are 
very clear on the issues of application. Further the regulations themselves together 
with the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act1874
                                                 
1873 56 of 1986. 
 provide sufficient 
1874 108 of 1996. 
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provisions that will prevent unfair administrative action. Failure to adopt a 
decentralized model of administration will allow for a type of subtle unchecked 
dictatorship in the regulation of diamond laws. It is with this submission in mind that 
a recommendation is made to amend the deconcentrated model of public 
administration as illustrated in section 103 of the MPRDA. 
 
With regard to the international law that has been considered in this study, 
particularly with special reference to the UN CISG, 1980 and other developmental 
Conventions, it is recommended that such instruments if not already part of South 
African law, should be ratified into South Africa. This must be done in order to 
create a trade friendly diamond merchant market that will increase demand for the 
nations output of diamonds which will serve to bring more revenue into South 
Africa. International law as it stands is concerned with the plight of developing 
nations, under the NIEO regime which calls for increasing of global interaction by 
upholding principles of comity and harmonization of international law and the 
protection of human rights. These ideals are at the core of the developed diamond 
regulations and therefore are essential for South Africa to participate more 
meaningfully in the implementation of these identified international laws. 
 
It is submitted that this study not seek to recommend an arbitrary greater output 
of diamonds and an over saturation of the local beneficiation industry with 
diamonds it cannot handle. What the study does seek is to ensure that the 
Constitutional objectives of freely participating in the economy of the country is 
extended in pursuance to the empowerment objectives that will lead to 
sustainable mining in South Africa and create a cogently regulated diamond 
industry that truly benefits the nation in accordance with State policy. There must 
be an encouragement of fair capitalism and an investment into human capital. It 
is submitted that all these benefits applied together will cause South Africa to be 
a strong economy with all is people engaging in industries with short term visions 
that are equally balanced with long term objectives of sustainable participation in 
diamond markets. 
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FORM KPC(i)  
KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATE  
[Form KPC(i) inserted by GN R1361 of 1 November 2002]  
   
Minimum requirements of the Kimberley Process Certificate in terms of subregulation 1(1) (f) :  
  




KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATE  
  
Issued in terms of Regulation 1(1) (f) of the Diamonds Act, 1986 (Act 56 of 1986).  
  




SOUTH AFRICAN DIAMOND BOARD  
  
It is hereby certified that the unpolished diamonds in this consignment have been handled in accordance 
with the provisions of the Kimberley Process International Certification Scheme for unpolished diamonds.  
  
  Country of Origin: .......................................... Number of Packets: ....................................  
  
  Name of Exporter: ..................................................................................................................  
  
  Address of Exporter: ..............................................................................................................  
  
  Fax no. and e-mail: ................................................................................................................  
  
  Name of Importer: ..................................................................................................................  
  
  Address of Importer: ..............................................................................................................  
  
  Fax no. and e-mail: .................................................................................................................  
  





Value (US$)  
  
    
    7102.21  
  
        
    7102.31  
  
        
  Issued on: .............../.............../............... Expires on .............../.............../...............  
  
  ________________________  
Signature of registering officer  
  
__________________________  
Stamp of Diamond Board  
  
    
  It is hereby verified that the content of the container accompanying this Kimberley Process 




....... ! ........................................................................... (Perforation) 
..........................................................  
  
    Importing authority: ..................... Date: ........./ ........../ .......  
  
      
    IMPORT CONFIRMATION  
  
    This is to certify that the unpolished diamonds accompanied by Republic of South African 
Kimberley Process Certificate No ................... were imported into ...................... and verified in 
compliance with the KPCS for Unpolished Diamonds. Copy of certificate to accompany confirmation.  
  
    Date of receipt by importing authority: ........./ ........./ ..........  
  
    Importing authority:  
  
              
    Date ..................................................  
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    Signature .........................................  
  





FORM KPC(ii)  
EXPORT DECLARATION FOR UNPOLISHED DIAMONDS  
[Form KPC (ii) inserted by GN R1361 of 1 November 2002]  
   
DIAMONDS ACT, 1986 (ACT 56 OF 1986)  
  
EXPORT DECLARATION FOR UNPOLISHED DIAMONDS  




PARTICULARS OF EXPORTER  
  
  Name / Company Name: ...............................................................................................  
  
  Identity Number/ Company Registration No...............................................................  
  






CHARACTERISTICS OF DIAMONDS  
  
  GEM  
  
Carat Mass / Weight  
  
Value US$  
  
  
  INDUSTRIAL  
  
      
  TOTAL  
  
      
C  
  







       I ................................................. hereby declare that the unpolished diamonds mentioned above 
have been acquired in a lawful manner and will be exported within 10 working days from the date of 
release; and  
  
       the prescribed register in terms of section 57 of the Diamonds Act, 1986, confirming substantiation 
of such acquisition has been submitted to the South African Diamond Board / is attached hereto.  
  
Signature: ----------------------------------------------------  
  





United Nations A/RES/55/56 
General Assembly Distr.: General 
29 January 2001 
Fifty-fifth session 
Agenda item 175 
00 56275 
Resolution adopted by the General Assembly 
[without reference to a Main Committee (A/55/L.52 and Add.1)] 
55/56. The role of diamonds in fuelling conflict: breaking the 
link between the illicit transaction of rough diamonds and 
armed conflict as a contribution to prevention and 
settlement of conflicts 
The General Assembly, 
Expressing its concern over the problem of conflict diamonds fuelling conflicts 
in a number of countries and the devastating impact of these conflicts on peace, 
safety and security for people in affected countries, 
Understanding conflict diamonds to be rough diamonds which are used by 
rebel movements to finance their military activities, including attempts to undermine 
or overthrow legitimate Governments, 
Recognizing that the vast majority of rough diamonds produced in the world 
are from legitimate sources, 
Recognizing also that the legitimate trade in diamonds makes a critical 
contribution to economic development in many countries worldwide, 
Acknowledging that the problem of conflict diamonds is of serious 
international concern, and that measures to address the problem should involve all 
concerned parties, including producing, processing, exporting and importing 
countries, as well as the diamond industry, 
Recognizing the need to address the problem of rough diamonds originating 
from territories of diamond-producing countries under military occupation by 
another country, 
Emphasizing that these measures should be effective and pragmatic, consistent 
with international law, including relevant trade provisions and commitments, and 
should not impede the current legitimate trade in diamonds or impose an undue 
burden on Governments or industry, particularly smaller producers, and not hinder 
the development of the diamond industry, 
Recalling all the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, including its 
resolutions 1173 (1998) of 12 June 1998, 1295 (2000) of 18 April 2000 and 1306 
(2000) of 5 July 2000, as well as resolution 1304 (2000) of 16 June 2000, 
A/RES/55/56 
2 
Highlighting the additional important initiatives already taken to address this 
problem, in particular by the Governments of Angola and Sierra Leone and by other 
key producing, processing, exporting and importing countries, as well as by the 
diamond industry and civil society, including the creation by the industry of the 
World Diamond Council, 
Welcoming with appreciation the initiative by the African diamond-producing 
countries to launch an inclusive consultation process of Governments, industry and 
civil society, referred to as the Kimberley Process, to deal with the issue, 
Taking note of the ministerial statement issued at the conclusion of the meeting 
on diamonds held in Pretoria on 21 September 2000,1 
Also taking note of the communiqué issued by the London Intergovernmental 
Meeting on Conflict Diamonds, held on 25 and 26 October 2000,2 
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1. Calls upon all States to implement fully Security Council measures 
targeting the link between the trade in conflict diamonds and the supply to rebel 
movements of weapons, fuel or other prohibited materiel; 
2. Urges all States to support efforts of the diamond producing, processing, 
exporting and importing countries and the diamond industry to find ways to break 
the link between conflict diamonds and armed conflict, and encourages other 
appropriate initiatives to this end, including improved international cooperation on 
law enforcement; 
3. Expresses the need to give urgent and careful consideration to devising 
effective and pragmatic measures to address the problem of conflict diamonds, the 
elements of which would include: 
(a) The creation and implementation of a simple and workable international 
certification scheme for rough diamonds; 
(b) Basing the scheme primarily on national certification schemes; 
(c) The need for national practices to meet internationally agreed minimum 
standards; 
(d) The aim of securing the widest possible participation; 
(e) The need for diamond processing, exporting and importing States to act 
in concert; 
(f) The need for appropriate arrangements to help to ensure compliance, 
acting with respect for the sovereignty of States; 
(g) The need for transparency; 
4. Welcomes the offer by the Government of Namibia to convene a 
workshop of the world’s leading diamond processing, exporting and importing 
countries, continuing the momentum of the Kimberley Process to consider technical 
aspects pertaining to the envisaged international certification scheme for rough 
diamonds; 
5. Encourages the countries participating in the Kimberley Process to 
consider expanding the membership of the Process in order to allow all key States 
1 A/55/638, annex. 
2 A/55/628, annex. 
A/RES/55/56 
3 
with a significant interest in the world diamond industry to participate in further 
meetings, and to move ahead with the intergovernmental negotiating process to 
develop detailed proposals for the envisaged international certification scheme for 
rough diamonds, in close collaboration with the diamond industry and taking into 
account the views of relevant elements of civil society; 
6. Requests the countries participating in the Kimberley Process to submit 
to the General Assembly, no later than at its fifty-sixth session, a report on progress 
made; 
7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-sixth session the 
item entitled “The role of diamonds in fuelling conflict”. 
79th plenary meeting 




UNGA Resolution 56/263  





RESOLUTION ON THE ROLE OF DIAMONDS IN FUELLING CONFLICT 
Breaking the link between the illicit transaction of rough diamonds and armed conflict as 
a contribution to prevention and settlement of conflicts  
Recognizing that the trade in conflict diamonds is a matter of serious international 
concern, which can be directly linked to the fuelling of armed conflict, the activities of 
rebel movements aimed at undermining or overthrowing legitimate governments, and the 
illicit traffic in, and proliferation of armaments, especially small arms and light weapons;  
Further recognizing the devastating impact of conflicts fuelled by the trade in conflict 
diamonds on the peace, safety and security of people in affected countries and the 
systematic and gross human rights violations that have been perpetrated in such conflicts;  
Noting the negative impact of such conflicts on regional stability and the obligations 
placed upon states by the United Nations Charter regarding the maintenance of 
international peace and security;  
Recognizing therefore that urgent action to curb the trade in conflict diamonds is 
imperative;  
Recognizing the positive benefits of the legitimate diamond trade to producing countries, 
and that provision of assistance to the developing producing countries should be 
encouraged to further develop their production capacity and markets for their diamonds 
and to encourage competitive, diversified and open markets for trade in rough diamonds;  
Underlining the need for urgent international action to prevent the problem of conflict 
diamonds from negatively affecting the trade in legitimate diamonds, which makes a 
critical contribution to the economies of many of the producing, exporting, and importing 
states, especially developing states;  
Recalling all the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council under 
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and determined to contribute to and support 
the implementation of the measures provided for in these resolutions;  
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Recalling United Nations General Assembly Resolution 55/56 (2000) calling on the 
international community to develop detailed proposals for a simple and workable 
international certification scheme for rough diamonds based primarily on national 
certification schemes and on internationally agreed minimum standards;  
Believing that the opportunity for conflict diamonds to play a role in fuelling armed 
conflict can be seriously reduced by introducing a certification scheme for rough 
diamonds and that such a scheme would help protect the legitimate trade and ensure the 
effective implementation of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security 
Council containing sanctions on the trade in conflict diamonds;  
Emphazing that the envisaged certification scheme for rough diamonds should be 
effective and pragmatic, should not impede the present legitimate trade in diamonds or 
impose an undue burden on Governments or industry, particularly smaller producers, and 
not hinder the development of the diamond industry;  
Acknowledging the important initiatives already taken to address the problem of conflict 
diamonds, in particular by the governments of Angola, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Guinea and Sierra Leone and by other key producing exporting and importing 
countries and encourage those governments to continue these initiatives;  
Welcoming the important contribution made by the Kimberley Process, an inclusive 
consultation process of Governments, industry and civil society initiated by the African 
producing countries, towards developing proposals for such an international certification 
scheme for rough diamonds;  
Welcoming the important contribution made by the diamond industry, in particular the 
World Diamond Council, as well as civil society, to assist international efforts to stop the 
trade in conflict diamonds;  
Welcoming voluntary self-regulation initiatives for the diamond industry announced by 
the World Diamond Council and recognising that a system of such voluntary self-
regulation will contribute to ensuring the effectiveness of national systems of internal 
controls for rough diamonds;  
Recognizing that an international certification scheme for rough diamonds will only be 
credible if all participants have established internal systems of control designed to 
eliminate the presence of conflict diamonds in the chain of producing, exporting and 
importing rough diamonds within their own territories, while taking into account that 
differences in production methods and trading practices as well as differences in 
institutional controls thereof may require different approaches to meet minimum 
standards;  
Emphazing the importance of ensuring that the measures taken to implement the 
international certification scheme for rough diamonds are consistent with international 
law governing international trade;  
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Noting with approval that the Kimberley Process has pursued its deliberations on an 
inclusive basis, involving concerned stake-holders including producing, exporting and 
importing states, the diamond industry and civil society;  
Recognizing that state sovereignty should be fully respected and the principles of 
equality, mutual benefits and consensus should be adhered to;  
Welcoming important progress by the Kimberley Process to date, in particular the 
development of a Working Document containing the Essential Elements of an 
International Scheme of Certification for Rough Diamonds, with a view to breaking the 
link between armed conflict and the trade in conflict diamonds.  
1. Notes with appreciation the report by the Chair of the Kimberley Process submitted 
further to Resolution 55/56 and congratulates the Kimberley Process participants on their 
achievements thus far;  
2. Calls for the full implementation of existing Security Council measures targeting the 
role played by the illicit trade in rough diamonds in fuelling conflict;  
3. Welcomes the detailed proposals agreed at the Ministerial meeting in Gaborone, 
Botswana on 29 November 2001, towards an international certification scheme for rough 
diamonds developed by the participants in the Kimberley Process and presented in the 
form of Kimberley Process Working Document 9/2001 (as amended) “Essential Elements 
of an International Scheme of Certification for Rough Diamonds, with a view to breaking 
the link between armed conflict and the trade in rough diamonds”, dated 29 November 
2001, notes that the measures proposed are reasonable and proportionate and that they 
include regular review of the certification scheme;  
4. Urges the implementation of the certification scheme as soon as possible, recognising 
the urgency of the situation from a humanitarian and security standpoint;  
5. Welcomes the extension of the mandate of the Kimberley Process until such time as an 
international certification scheme is adopted and its simultaneous implementation by 
participants begins;  
6. Encourages the Kimberley Process to resolve outstanding issues including verification 
measures, administrative considerations and the nature of a possible international 
instrument covering the certification scheme;  
7. Underlines the need, as an essential tool for the successful implementation of the 
international certification scheme, for the collation and dissemination of statistical data 
on the production of, and international trade in, rough diamonds;  
8. Stresses that the widest possible participation in the proposed certification scheme is 
essential and should be encouraged and facilitated;  
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9. Welcomes the offer by the Government of Canada to host the next meeting of the 
Kimberley Process in Ottawa, in order to achieve further progress in addressing 
outstanding issues, and towards implementation of the envisaged certification scheme at 
the earliest possibility;  
10. Requests the countries participating in the Kimberley Process to present to the 
General Assembly, no later than its 57th session, a report on progress made;  
11. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its 57th session the item entitled "The 
role of diamonds in fuelling conflict. 
 533 
APPENDIX E 
 
 
 
